It was there that Napoleon arrived on the 11th; Masséna was in advance,

and a battle took place on the banks of the Taya, and after a sharp combat

the bridge was forced. But already Prince John of Lichtenstein had come to

ask a suspension of hostilities, announcing openly the intention of the

Austrian government to begin negotiations for peace. The deliberations

were carried on at the head-quarters, while the army ranged itself in the

plain of Znaïm. The emperor recapitulated rapidly in his mind the dangers

and chances of a prolonged war. The opinion of several of his generals was

to follow up Austria, and crush the coalition finally. Napoleon felt the

enormous burden weighing on his shoulders: he saw a difficult and

lingering war in Spain, Prussia agitated, Russia cold and secretly ill-

disposed, the difficulties of Rome, England for the future taking her part

in the continental struggle: he cried, "Enough blood has been shed; let us

make peace!" It was necessary to repeat his words several times to the

hostile parties at Znaïm, to induce them to cease fighting. The officers

whose duty it was to carry the intelligence to the field of battle were

wounded before they were able to stop the combat.

The armistice was signed in the night of the 11th July, and Napoleon

immediately returned to Schoenbrunn. Negotiations had commenced, but their

success was by no means sure. The Austrian armies had been brilliantly

vanquished, but they were neither dispersed nor destroyed, and the efforts

their resistance had cost sufficiently proved the military qualities of

the chief and his soldiers. The Emperor Napoleon, encamped in the centre

of the Austrian monarchy--of which he occupied the capital; he could not,

and durst not in any way, relax his warlike watchfulness. New bodies of

men were summoned from France. The Tyrol not being comprised in the

armistice, the Bavarians and Prince Eugène were ordered to reduce its two

portions, German and Italian. The posts were everywhere fortified, and

works of defence pursued with vigor. The greater part of the army occupied

vast barracks in the suburbs of Vienna. Napoleon distributed rewards to

the officers and soldiers; he even showed his displeasure to Marshal

Bernadotte, who had presumed to address a personal order of the day to the

corps of the army under his direction at Wagram.

"His Majesty commands his army in person," he sent word to the Prince of

Pontecorvo by Major-General Berthier; "it belongs to him alone to

distribute the degree of glory with each merits." Napoleon added, in a

letter to the minister of war, "I am glad also that you are aware that the

Prince of Pontecorvo has not always conducted himself well in this

campaign. The truth is, that this column of bronze has been constantly in

disorder." By thus wounding his vanity, unexpected political difficulties

afterwards arose, by leaving in the heart of Bernadotte implacable

resentment against the emperor.

I wished to pursue without interruption the history of the campaign of

Germany during these three months, so fertile in obstinate combats, in

works as vast as they were novel, in pitched battles, more sanguinary and

important from the number of troops engaged than any which had preceded

them. Germany was not, however, the only theatre of the struggle; and the

attention of Europe, always attracted to the places where Napoleon

commanded in person and carried out his own plans, was occasionally

diverted towards the Spanish and Portuguese peninsula. There several of

the most skilful generals of the emperor fought against populations

eagerly struggling for their independence; there gradually rose to

greatness the name of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and that reputation for

stability and heroic perseverance which at a later date constituted his

power and splendor.

Fighting was carried on in Spain, not without glory or success; the

insurgents having more than once had the honor of annoying the all-

powerful conqueror in the midst of his triumphs. There was no fighting at

Rome, and oppression reigned there without material resistance; yet for

more than a year a struggle continued between the Emperor Napoleon and the

Pope, Pius VII., without all the advantages remaining on the side of

force, or the conqueror feeling certain that he held the prey he had

confided to the care of General Miollis. On the 6th July, 1809, the same

day as the battle of Wagram, the Pope was suddenly taken away from Rome,

and conducted as a prisoner out of that palace and that town which he had

never previously quitted, except to visit Paris for the purpose of

consecrating the very man who was to-day stripping him of his throne.

Since the month of February, 1808, the thoughts and hearts of many had

still found time to seek the aged pontiff at the Quirinal, and they now

followed him with sympathy into exile and captivity.

After the occupation of Rome by General Miollis, when the foreign

cardinals had received orders to return to their respective countries, and

the Pope had recalled his legate from Paris, the Emperor Napoleon, on

stepping into his carriage to visit Bayonne, had ordered Champagny to

transmit to Cardinal Caprara the following note:---

"The _sine quâ non_ of the emperor is, that all Italy, Rome, Naples, and

Milan make a league offensive and defensive, so as to remove disorder and

war from the peninsula. If the holy father consents to this proposition,

all is terminated; if he refuses, by that he declares war against the

emperor. The first result of war is conquest, and the first result of

conquest is change of government. This will not occasion any loss to the

spiritual rights of the Pope; he will be Bishop of Rome, as have been all

his predecessors in the eight first centuries, and under Charlemagne. It

will, however, be a subject of regret, which the emperor will be the first

to feel, to see foolish vanity, obstinacy and ignorance destroy the work

of genius, policy and enlightenment.

"The recall of your Eminence is notified contrary to custom, against the

formalities in usage, and on the eve of the Passion week--three

circumstances which sufficiently explain the charitable and entirely

evangelical spirit of the holy father. No matter, his Majesty recognizes

your Eminence no more as legate. From this moment the Gallican Church

resumes all the integrity of its doctrine. More learned, more truly

religious, than the Church of Rome, she has no want of the latter. I send

to your eminence the passports you have demanded. We are thus at war, and

his Majesty has given orders in consequence. His Holiness will be

satisfied--he will have the happiness of declaring war in the holy week.

The thunders of the Vatican will be all the more formidable. His Majesty

fears them less than those of the castle of St. Angelo. He who curses

kings, is cursed by God."

At the same time, and by order of Napoleon, a decree was prepared

enumerating all the grievances of which he accused the court of Rome, and

enacting that "the provinces of Urbino, Ancona, Macerata, and Camerino,

should be irrevocably and forever united to the kingdom of Italy, to form

three new departments." The Code Napoleon was to be proclaimed there.

The violent and arbitrary measures employed by the emperor towards the

Pope naturally bore their fruits. In removing from Pius VII. the cardinals

who were not natives of the Roman states, he had deprived the pontiff of

the most enlightened and moderate counsels which could reach his ears, and

had delivered him, in his weakness and just indignation, to all the

influences against which Cardinal Consalvi had constantly struggled. From

this time every despotic act of Napoleon, every rude word of the soldiers

charged to execute his orders, increased the irritation of the Pope, and

urged him to advance on a course of blind resistance. A prohibition to

swear allegiance to the new government was addressed to the bishops and

all the priests of the territories taken away from the pontifical states;

this prohibition was founded upon principles of dogma and religion.

Henceforth the personal will of the Pope, his dignity as a sovereign, and

his conscience as a priest, were all engaged in the struggle against the

Emperor Napoleon. "Those who have succeeded in alarming the conscience of

the holy father are still the strongest," Lefebvre, the chargé-d'affaires

of France, who had not yet quitted Rome, wrote to Champagny. "The tenor of

the reply to the ultimatum that I have been instructed to remit to him has

been changed twice this morning--so much did they still hesitate upon the

decision to take. The theologians themselves were divided even in the

Sacred College, and I doubt not that the refusal of his Holiness to agree

with the emperor will throw into consternation a number of his warmest

partisans."

The rupture was from this time official, and the relations of the Pope

with the French authorities who occupied the pontifical city became every

day more bitter. Pius VII. had chosen for his secretary of state, Cardinal

Pacca, witty, amiable, devoted to the holy father, but strongly attached

to the most narrow ideas as to the government of the Roman Church in the

world; in other respects, prudent in his conduct towards General Miollis,

and often excited to action by the Pope, who complained of his timidity.

"They pretend in Rome that we are asleep," said Pius VII. to his minister;

"we must prove that we are awake, and address a vigorous note to the

French general." The protest was posted everywhere in Rome, on the morning

of the 24th August, 1808; eight days later, and under the pretext that the

secretary of state interfered with the recruiting for the civic guard,

Cardinal Pacca received the order to quit Rome in twenty-four hours. "Your

Eminence will find at the gate of St. John an escort of dragoons, whose

duty is to accompany you to Benevento, your native town." In the meantime

a French officer was appointed to watch over the cardinal. The latter was

still talking with his jailer, when Pius VII. suddenly entered the cabinet

of his minister.

"I was then witness of a phenomenon which I had often heard spoken of,"

relates Cardinal Pacca in his memoirs. "In an access of violent anger, the

hair of the holy father bristled up, and his sight was confused. Although

I was dressed as a cardinal, he did not know me. 'Who is there?' he

demanded, in a loud voice. 'I am the cardinal,' I replied, kissing his

hand. 'Where is the officer?' demanded the holy father; and I pointed him

out near me, in a respectful attitude. Then the Pope, turning towards him,

'Go and tell your general that I am weary of suffering so many insults and

outrages from a man who dares still to call himself a Catholic. I command

my minister not to obey the injunctions of an illegitimate authority. Let

your general know, that if force is employed to tear him from me it shall

only be after having broken all the doors; and I declare him beforehand

responsible for the consequences of such an enormous crime.' And making a

sign to the cardinal to follow him, 'Let us go,' said the Pope. The

officer had gone out to carry to the general the message of the holy

father. The secretary of state was installed in an apartment which opened

into the Pope's bedroom. The gates of the Quirinal remained closed to all

the French officers, and General Miollis did not claim his prisoner."

Months had meanwhile passed away. The emperor had quitted Spain to make

preparations for the campaign of Germany. Without ever ceasing to load the

Pope with unfriendly words and treatment, Napoleon had been engaged in

affairs more important than his troubles with the pontifical court. Public

order was maintained in Rome, thanks to the Italian prudence of the

secretary of state, and the strict discipline which General Miollis knew

how to maintain among his troops, and even among the auxiliaries he had

recruited from the revolutionary middle-class. The time arrived, however,

when this situation, more violent in fact than in form, was suddenly to

assume its real character. Napoleon was at Schoenbrunn, already victor in

the five days' battle which had rendered him master of Vienna, and more

certain than he was immediately after Essling of the promptitude and

extent of his success. It was then that he drew up, and sent by Champagny,

two decrees relating to the taking possession, pure and simple, of the

States of the Pope. He explained the reasons of this to his minister in a

long letter, which was to serve as a basis for Champagny's report, and

which, by its singular mixture of thoughts and principles, showed the

historical heredity connecting the power of Napoleon with that of

Charlemagne, united to the sovereign power which disposed in the name of

conquest of territories and states, were confused in the imagination of

the emperor, and made him look upon the independent attitude of the Pope

as an act of criminal opposition.

"When Charlemagne made the popes temporal sovereigns, he wished them to

remain vassals of the empire; now, far from thinking themselves vassals of

the empire, they are not even willing to form a part of it. The aim of

Charlemagne in his generosity towards the popes was the welfare of

Christianity; and now they claim to ally themselves with Protestants and

the enemies of Christianity. The least impropriety that results from these

arrangements is to see the head of the Catholic religion negotiating with

Protestants; whilst according to the laws of the Church he ought to shun

them, and excommunicate them. (There is a prayer to this effect recited at

Rome.)

"The interest of religion, and the interest of the peoples of France,

Germany and Italy, require that an end should be made of this ridiculous

temporal power--the feeble remnant of the exaggerated pretensions of the

Gregories, who claimed to reign over kings, to give away crowns, and to

have the direction of the affairs of earth as well as of heaven. In the

absence of councils, let the popes have the direction of the affairs of

the Church so far as they do not infringe on the liberties of the Gallican

Church--that is all right; but they ought not to mix themselves up with

armies or state policy. If they are the successors of Jesus Christ, they

ought not to exercise any other dominion than that which He Himself

exercised, and His 'kingdom is not of this world.'

"If your Majesty does not do that which you alone can do, you will leave

in Europe the seeds of dissension and discord. Posterity, whilst praising

you for having re-established religion and re-erected her altars, will

blame you for having left the empire (which is in fact the major portion

of Christendom) exposed to the influence of this fantastic medley,

inimical to religion and the tranquillity of the empire. This obstacle can

only be surmounted by separating the temporal from the spiritual

authority, and by declaring that the states of the Pope form a portion of

the French Empire."

It is too often an error of men, even of the first rank, to believe in the

universal power and duration of their wishes and decisions. The Emperor

Napoleon though he had solved forever this question of the temporal power

of the popes-a question which we have so many times heard discussed by the

most eloquent voices; we have seen armies upholding on fields of battle

contradictory principles on this subject, and diplomacy painfully

accomplishing imperfect settlements.

He displayed towards Pope Pius VII. the most arrogant contempt of the

rights and independence of others, and a passionate self-will as regards

all resistance. Under shelter of ancient authority, of which he

retrospectively took possession, he boldly invoked the highest reasons and

the most venerated names, in order to justify an arbitrary resolution, and

the grasping selfishness which swayed his mind. It was the practice of the

French Revolution to prop up its violent and despotic proceedings by the

loftiest principles; the Emperor Napoleon had not forgotten this

tradition.

In all the manifestly criminal acts of his powerful career--in the fatal

resolves of his mistaken and culpable caprices, whether it was a question

of the assassination of the Due d'Enghien or the brutal removal of the

Pope from Rome--Napoleon always chose his part in the complete isolation

of his soul, and by the spontaneous act of a personal decision; he made

sure of the execution of his will with minute precautions: he did not the

less subsequently seek to throw back the responsibility of the acts

themselves upon the instruments too ready to obey him. When Europe

suddenly learnt that the Pope had been removed from the states henceforth

united to the French Empire, Napoleon wrote to Fouché, "I am vexed that

the Pope has been arrested; it is a great folly. It was necessary to

arrest Cardinal Pacca, and leave the Pope in tranquillity at Rome;" and to

Cambacérès, the 28th July: "It is without my orders, and against my will,

that the Pope has been made to leave Rome."

Measures had, however, been taken with that provident exactitude which

characterized the personal orders of the Emperor Napoleon. Immediately he

had resolved upon the confiscation of the Roman States he had divined the

consequence and importance of this act; the new government was organized,

Murat had been charged with the command of the troops, and to hold himself

ready for any event. "Since your Majesty has made me aware of your

intentions as to Rome, I shall not withdraw from Naples," wrote Murat to

the emperor. "Word has been sent me that the Pope wished to send forth an

excommunication, but that the majority of the Consistory were opposed to

it. All your orders will be fulfilled, and I hope without trouble."

This was hoping for much from the patience of the holy father, and

maintaining great illusions as to the decision long since taken by the

Court of Rome. The project of the spoliation of the pontifical states had

not been kept so secret that the Pope and his minister had not been

apprised of it; and several times Pius VII. had let it be understood that

he was prepared for resistance. "We see plainly that the French wish to

force us to speak Latin," he had said quite recently; "ah, well! we will

do it."

General Miollis, supported and directed by the King of Naples, did not

take much account of the Latin of the court of Rome when it was a question

of obeying the orders of the Emperor Napoleon. The military preparations

completed (the 10th June, 1809), the tricolor flag was mounted upon the

castle of St. Angelo in place of the pontifical arms, and the imperial

decrees were everywhere read before the population of Rome and the

assembled troops. The report of these things soon reached the Quirinal. "I

rushed suddenly into the apartment of the holy father," writes Cardinal

Pacca, "and on meeting we both pronounced the words of the Redeemer,

_Consummatum est!_ I was in a condition difficult to describe, but the

sight of the holy father, who maintained an unalterable tranquillity, much

edified me, and reanimated my courage. A few minutes afterwards my nephew

brought me a copy of the imperial decree. Observing the Pope attentively

at the first words, I saw emotion on his countenance, and the signs of

indignation only too natural. Little by little he recovered himself, and

he heard the reading with much tranquillity and resignation." Cardinal

Pacca was even obliged to urge the pope to promulgate the bull of

excommunication, which had been prepared already since 1806. Pius VII.

still hesitated. "Raise your eyes towards heaven, Thrice Holy Father,"

said the secretary of state, "and then give me your order, and be sure

that that which proceeds from your mouth will be the will of God." "Ah,

well! let the bull go forth," cried the Pope; "but let those who shall

execute your orders take great care, for if they are discovered they will

be shot, and for that I should be inconsolable."

The bull of excommunication against the Emperor Napoleon was everywhere

placarded in Rome, without the agents of Cardinal Pacca undergoing the

vengeance dreaded by the Pope. Anger and fear were wrestling in a higher

sphere. The instructions of the emperor had been precise: "I have confided

to you the care of maintaining tranquillity in my Roman states," he wrote

to General Miollis. "You are to have arrested, even in the house of the

Pope himself, those who plot against public tranquillity, and against the

safety of my soldiers. A priest abuses his character, and merits less

indulgence than another man, when he preaches war and disobedience to

temporal power, and when he sacrifices spiritual things for the interest

of this world, which the Scripture declares not to be his." And to the

King of Naples, in two different letters, of the 17th and 19th of June:

"If the Pope wishes to form a reunion of caballers like Cardinal Pacca, it

will be necessary to permit nothing of the kind, and to act at Rome as I

should act towards the cardinal archbishop of Paris.... I have given you

to understand that my intention was that the affairs of Rome should be

quickly settled, and that no species of opposition should take place. No

asylum ought to be respected, if my decrees are not submitted to; and

under no pretext whatever ought any resistance to be allowed. If the Pope,

in opposition to the spirit of his office and of the Gospel, preaches

revolt, and wishes to make use of the immunity of his house for the

printing of circulars, he ought to be arrested. The time for this sort of

thing is past. Philippe le Bel caused Boniface to be arrested; and Charles

V. kept Clement VII. in prison for a long time, for far less cause. The

priest who to the temporal powers preaches discord and war, instead of

peace, abuses his character."

The orders were precise, and admitted of no hesitation. The confiscation

of the papal states had been responded to by the papal bull; open war had

broken out between Pius VII., and the Emperor Napoleon. The latter was

desirous of insuring the execution of his will by sending to Rome General

Radet, less honorably scrupulous than General Miollis; an instrument

docile and daring, as regards the details of the general scheme. Radet has

himself given an account of the removal of the Pope in a report to the

minister of war, dated July 13th, 1809. In 1814, he had forgotten the

existence of this letter, and vainly sought to minimize the importance of

the part which he played on the 6th of July. History must preserve for

General Radet his place in her annals. The man to carry out the projects

of Napoleon had been well chosen.

Already for several months the Pope had been carefully guarding himself in

the Quirinal; the precautions had been redoubled since the decrees, and

the publication of the bull. Pius VII. and his counsellors foresaw the

removal. General Radet took all possible measures to turn aside suspicion.

"On the 5th, at the break of day," he himself wrote, "I made the necessary

arrangements, which I succeeded in screening from the eyes of the Romans

by double patrols and measures of police. I kept the troops in the

barracks all day, in order to lull the public and the inhabitants of the

Quirinal into a feeling of security. From that spot the Pope governed with

his finger more than we did with our bayonets. At nine o'clock, I caused

the military chiefs to come to me, one after another, and gave them my

orders. At ten o'clock, we were collected in the place of the Holy

Apostles, and at the barracks of La Pilota, which was the centre of my

operations. At eleven o'clock I myself placed my patrols, my guards, my

posts, and my detachments for carrying out the operations, whilst the

governor-general caused the bridges of the Tiber and the castle of St.

Angelo to be occupied by a Neapolitan battalion."

General Radet had received a written order from General Miollis, for the

arrest of Cardinal Pacca. The order to arrest the Pope was not written

down. Nobody had dared to put his signature to it; verbal instructions

only were given.

Three detachments of soldiers, furnished with scaling-ladders, ropes and

grappling-irons, surrounded the Quirinal. At half-past ten, the sentinel

who kept guard on the tower of the Quirinal disappeared. The signal was

immediately given. With varying success the small battalions introduced

themselves into the palace. The Swiss guard was disarmed; it had for a

long time previously received orders to make no resistance. The chief

anxiety of the Pope had always been that he might be up and about when

they should come to arrest him. He had gone to bed late, and was roused up

by the noise in the middle of his first sleep. Cardinal Pacca, however,

found him completely dressed, when the former rushed precipitately into

his chamber. The gate was already yielding to the efforts of the

assailants. Pius VII. seated himself under a canopy; making a sign to the

secretary of state, and to Cardinal Desping, to place themselves near him.

"Open the gate," said he.

General Radet had never seen the Pope; he recognized him by the attitude

of his guides; and immediately sending back the soldiers, he caused the

officers to enter with drawn swords; a few gendarmes, with muskets in

their hands, also glided into the chamber. The priest was waiting in

silence; the soldier was hesitating. At length the latter, hat in hand,

spoke: "I have a sorrowful mission to accomplish," said General Radet; "I

am compelled by my oaths to fulfil it." Pius VII. stood up. "Who are you,"

said he, "and what is it you require of me, that you come at such an hour

to trouble my repose and invade my dwelling-place?" "Most Holy Father,"

replied the General, "I come in the name of my government to reiterate to

your Holiness the proposal to officially renounce your temporal power. If

your holiness consents to it, I do not doubt but that affairs may be

arranged, and that the emperor will treat your holiness with the greatest

respect." The Pope was resting one hand upon the table placed before him.

"If you have believed yourself bound to execute such orders of the emperor

by reason of your oath of fidelity and obedience, think to what an extent

we feel compelled to sustain the rights of the holy see, to which we are

bound by so many oaths? We can neither yield nor abandon that which

belongs to it. The temporal power belongs to the Church, and we are only

the administrator. The emperor may tear us in pieces, but he will not

obtain from us what he demands. After all that we have done for him, ought

we to expect such treatment?"

"I know that the emperor is under many obligations to your holiness!"

replied Radet, more and more troubled. "Yes, more than you are aware of;

but, finally, what are your orders?"--"Most Holy Father, I regret the

commission with which I am charged, but I must inform you that I am

ordered to take you away with me." The pontiff bent slightly towards the

speaker, and said in tones of sweet compassion, "Ah! my son, your mission

is one that will not draw down upon you the divine blessing." Then,

turning again towards the cardinals, and appearing to speak to himself,

"This, then, is the recognition which is accorded to me of all that which

I have done for the emperor! This, then, is the reward for my great

condescension towards him and towards the Church of France! But perhaps in

this respect I have been culpable towards God. He wishes to punish me; I

submit with humility."

General Radet had sent for the final orders of General Miollis. The

brigadier of gendarmerie charged with this commission re-entered the

chamber of the Pope. "The order of his excellency," said he, "is, that it

is necessary for the holy father and Cardinal Pacca to set out at once

with General Radet: the other persons in his suite will follow after." The

Pope rose up; he walked with difficulty. Moved in spite of himself, Radet

offered his arm to support him, proposing to retire, in order to leave the

holy father free to give his orders and dispose of any valuable objects

that he might have a fancy for. "When one has no hold upon life, one has

no hold upon the things of this world," replied Pius VII., taking from a

table at the side of his bed his breviary and his crucifix. "I am ready,"

said he.

The carriage was already at the palace gate, the postillions ready to

start. The Pope stood still, giving his benediction to the city of Rome,

and to the French troops ranged in order of battle on the place. It was

four o'clock in the morning; the streets were deserted. The Pope got into

the carriage beside Cardinal Pacca; the doors were locked by a gendarme.

General Radet and a marshal of the household got on to the box-seat; the

horses set off at a quick trot along the road to Florence.

General Radet offered a purse of Gold to the Pope, which the latter

refused. "Have you any money?" asked the holy father of his companion. "I

have not been permitted to enter my apartment," said the cardinal; "and I

did not think of bringing my purse." The Pope had a papetto, value twenty

sous. "This is all that remains tome of my principality," said he,

smiling. "We are travelling in apostolic fashion," responded Pacca. "We

have done well in publishing the bull of the 10th of June," replied Pius

VII.; "now it would be too late."

For nineteen hours the coach rattled along; the stores were getting low.

Everywhere, and in spite of a few accidents, the passage of the Pope

forestalled the news of his capture. The suite of the holy father joined

him on the morrow; the Pope was suffering, he was in a fever. The populace

began to be stirred up with the rumors which were circulating: they

crowded round the carriages. "I disembarrassed myself of them," writes

Radet, "by calling out to them to place themselves on their knees on the

right and left of the road, in order that the holy father might give him

his benediction; then all of a sudden I ordered the postillions to dash

forward. By this means the people were still on their kness whilst we were

already far away, at a gallop. This plan succeeded everywhere."

Arrived on the 8th of July at the chartreuse of Florence, Pius VII.

expected to rest there a few days: but the Princess Baciocchi had not

received instructions from the emperor: she hurried the departure. "I see

well that they want to cause my death by their bad treatment," said the

exhausted old man; "and if there is but a little more of it I feel that

the end will not be far off." Cardinal Pacca was no longer with him. At

Genoa the Prince Borghese, who was commanding there, was seized with the

same panic as the Princess Baciocchi. After a few moments of repose at

Alexandria, Pius VII. was carried, by way of Mondovi and Rivoli, towards

Grenoble. In the last stages, in the little Italian villages, the bells

pealed forth, and the crowd who besought the benediction of the prisoner

everywhere retarded the advance. It was the same in all the districts of

Savoy and Dauphiny. When the Pope made his entry into Grenoble, on the

21st of July, the ardor of the population had not diminished, but the

bells rang no longer; the clergy had been forbidden to present themselves

before the pontiff. The prefect was absent, Fouché having been designedly

detained at Paris. The orders of the emperor had at length arrived from

Schoenbrunn. "I received at the same time the two letters of General

Miollis and that of the Grand Duchess," he wrote, on the 18th of July, to

Fouché. "I am vexed that the Pope has been arrested; it is a great folly.

It was needful to arrest Cardinal Pacca, and to leave the Pope quietly at

Rome. But there is no remedy for it now; what is done is done. I know not

what the Prince Borghese will have done, but my intention is that the Pope

should not enter France. If he is still in the Rivière of Genoa, the best

place at which he could be placed would be Savona. There is a house there

large enough, where he would be suitably lodged until we know what course

he decides upon. If his madness terminates, I have no objection to his

being taken back to Rome. If he has entered France, have him taken back

towards Savona and San Remo. Cause his correspondence to be examined. As

to Cardinal Pacca, have him shut up at Fenestrella; and let him understand

that if a single Frenchman is assassinated through his instigation, he

will be the first to pay for it with his head."

Fifteen days later (August 6th, 1809), in the midst of his prudent and

foreseeing preparations for the possible resumption of hostilities,

enlightened by reflection, or by the report of the popular emotion in the

provinces traversed by Pius VII., Napoleon modified his orders as to the

residence of the Pope. "Monsieur Fouché, I should have preferred that only

Cardinal Pacca had been arrested at Rome, and that the Pope had been left

there. I should have preferred, since the Pope has not been left at Genoa,

that he had been taken to Savona; but since he is at Grenoble, I should be

vexed that you should make him set out to be re-conducted to Savona; it

would be better to guard him at Grenoble, since he is there; the former

course would have the appearance of making sport of the old man. I have

not authorized Cardinal Fesch to send any one to his holiness; I have only

had the minister of religion informed that I should desire Cardinal Maury

and the other prelates to write to the Pope, to know what he wishes, and

to make him understand that if he renounces the Concordat I shall regard

it on my side as null and void. As to Cardinal Pacca, I suppose that you

have sent him to Fenestrella, and that you have forbidden his

communication with any one. I make a great difference between the Pope and

him, principally on account of his rank and his moral virtues. The Pope is

a good man, but ignorant and fanatical. Cardinal Pacca is a man of

education and a scoundrel, an enemy of France, and deserving of no regard.

Immediately I know where the Pope is located I shall see about taking

definitive measures; of course if you have already caused him to set out

for Savona, it is not necessary to bring him back."

The Pope was at Savona, where he was long to remain. Already the

difficulties of religious administration were commencing, and the

emperor's mind was engrossed with the institution of bishops to the vacant

sees. He had ordered all the prelates to chant a public _Te Deum_ with

reference to the victory of Wagram. The bishops of Dalmatia alone had

frankly and spiritedly replied to the statement of reasons which preceded

the circular. In France the silence was still profound. The emperor had

beforehand forbidden the journals to give any news from Rome. "It is a bad

plan to let articles be written," he wrote to Fouché; "there is to be no

speaking, either for or against, and it is not to be a matter for

discussion in the journals. Well-informed men know perfectly that I have

not attacked Rome. The mistaken bigots you cannot alter. Act on this

principle." The _Moniteur_ held its tongue. All the journals followed its

example. No one talked of the bull of excommunication. The circuits of the

missionary priests were forbidden, as well as the ecclesiastical

conferences of St. Sulpice. "The missionaries are for whoever pays them,"

declared the emperor, "for the English, if they are willing to employ

them. I do not wish to have any missions whatever; get me ready a draft of

a decree on that subject; I wish to complete it. I only know bishops,

priests, and curates. I am satisfied with keeping up religion in my own

country; I do not care about propagating it abroad." All the cardinals

still remaining at Rome were expelled. In the depths of his soul, and in

spite of the chimerical impulses of his irritated thoughts, Napoleon was

already feeling the embarrassments which he had himself sown along his

path. The Pope a prisoner at Savona, indomitable in his conscientious

resistance, might become more dangerous than the Pope at Rome, powerless

and unarmed. The struggle was not terminated; a breath of revolt had

passed over Europe. Henceforth Napoleon was at war with that Catholic

religion, the splendor of whose altars he had deemed it a point of honor

to restore; he struggled at the same time violently against that national

independence of the peoples which he had everywhere in his words invoked

in opposition to the arbitrary jealousy of the monarchs. The Spanish

sovereigns had succumbed to his yoke; the Spanish people, henceforth

sustained by the might of England, courageously defended its liberties. At

the moment when the supreme effort of the victory of Wagram was about to

snatch humiliating concessions from the Emperor Francis, the captive Pope

and the Spanish insurgents were presenting to Europe a salutary and

striking contrast, the teachings of which she was beginning to comprehend.

Not the least significant of the lessons on the frailty of the human

colossi raised by conquerors is the impossibility of tracing their history

on the same canvas. For a long time Napoleon alone had filled the scene,

and his brilliant track was easily kept in view. In proportion as he

accumulated on his shoulders a burden too heavy, and as he extended his

empire without consolidating it, the insufficiency of human will and human

power made itself more painfully felt. Napoleon was no longer everywhere

present, acting and controlling, in order to repair the faults he had

committed, or to dazzle the spectators with new successes. In vain the

prodigious activity of his spirit sought to make up for the radical defect

of his universal dominion. The Emperor Napoleon was conquered by the very

nature of things, before the fruits of his unmeasured ambition had had

time to ripen, and before all Europe, indignant and wearied out, was at

length roused up against him.

There was already, in 1809, a confused but profound instinctive feeling

throughout the world that the moment for resistance and for supreme

efforts had arrived. The Archduke Charles had proved it in Austria by the

fury of his courage; the English cabinet were bearing witness to it by the

great preparations they were displaying on their coast and in their

arsenals, as well as by the ready aid lent by them to the insurgents of

the Peninsula. The Emperor Napoleon on quitting Spain, in the month of

January, had left behind him the certain germs of growing disorder.

Obliged of necessity to commit the chief command to King Joseph, he had

been desirous of remedying the weakness and military incapacity of the

monarch whom he had himself put on the throne by conferring upon the

marshals charged with continuing the war an almost absolute authority over

their _corps d'armée_. Each of them was to correspond directly with the

minister of war, supremely directed by Napoleon himself. Deprived thus of

all serious control over the direction of the war, King Joseph saw himself

equally thwarted in civil and financial affairs. Spanish interests were

naturally found to conflict with French interests. King Joseph defended

the former; an army of imperial functionaries were charged with the

protection of the second. In this mission they proceeded at times even to

insult. King Joseph threatened to place in a carriage M. de Fréville,

administrator for the treasury of confiscated goods, and to send him

directly to France. The complaints of the unfortunate monarch to his

brother were frequent and well founded. "Your Majesty has not entire

confidence in me," he wrote on the 17th of February to Napoleon, "and

meanwhile, without that, the position is not tenable. I shall not again

repeat what I have already written ten times as to the situation of the

finances; I give all my faculties to business from eight o'clock in the

morning to eleven o'clock in the evening; I go out once a week; I have not

a sou to give to any one; I am in the fourth year of my reign, and I still

see my guard with the first frock-coat which I gave it, three years ago; I

am the goal of all complaints; I have all pretensions to overcome; my

power does not extend beyond Madrid, and at Madrid itself I am daily

thwarted. Your Majesty has ordered the sequestration of the goods of ten

families, it has been extended to more than double. All the habitable

houses are sealed up; 6000 domestics of the sequestrated families are in

the streets. All demand charity; the boldest of them take to robbery and

assassination. My officers--all those who sacrificed with me the kingdom

of Naples--are still lodged by billets. Without capital, without income,

without money, what can I do? All this picture, bad as it is, is not

exaggerated, and, bad as it is, it will not exhaust my courage; I shall

arrive at the end of all that. Heaven has given me everything needful to

overcome the hindrances from circumstances or from my enemies; but that

which Heaven has denied me is an organization capable of supporting the

insults and contradictions of those who ought to serve me, and, above all,

of contending with the dissatisfaction of a man whom I have loved too well

to be ever willing to dislike him. Thus, sire, if my whole life has not

given you the fullest confidence in me; if you judge it necessary to

surround me with petty souls, who cause me myself to redden with shame; if

I am to be insulted even in my capital; if I have not the right to appoint

the governors and commandants who are always under my eyes,--I have not

two choices to make. I am only King of Spain by the force of your arms. I

might become so by the love of the Spaniards; but for that it would be

necessary to govern in my own manner. I have often heard you say, 'Every

animal has its instinct, and each one ought to follow it.' I will be such

a king as the brother and friend of your Majesty ought to be, or I will

return to Mortefontaine, where I shall ask for nothing but the happiness

of living without humiliation, and of dying with a tranquil conscience."

Joseph Bonaparte had presumed too much on his forces and the remains of

his independence. Constantly hard and severe with regard to his brothers,

the emperor replied with scorn to King Joseph: "It is not ill-temper and

small passions that you need, but views cool and conformable to your

position. You talk to me of the constitution. Let me know if the

constitution forbids the King of Spain to be at the head of 300,000

Frenchmen? if the constitution prohibits the garrison from being French,

and the governor of Madrid a Frenchman? if the constitution says that in

Saragossa the houses are to be blown up one after another? You will not

succeed in Spain, except by vigor and energy. This parade of goodness and

clemency ends in nothing. You will be applauded so long as my armies are

victorious; you will be abandoned if they are vanquished. You ought to

have become acquainted with the Spanish nation in the time you have been

in Spain, and after the events that you have seen. Accustom yourself to

think your royal authority as a very small matter."

The emperor had correctly judged the precarious condition of the French

power in Spain; he had reckoned, and he still reckoned, on the success of

his arms. The military counsellor whom he had left near his brother

possessed neither his esteem nor his confidence. Marshal Jourdan was a

cold and prudent spirit, always imbued with the military habits of the

French Revolution, and had never courted the favor of Napoleon; King

Joseph was attached to him, and had brought him with him to Naples. The

lieutenants of the emperor showed him no deference; it was, however, by

his agency that the orders of the minister of war passed to the staff-

officers at Madrid. Already, and by the express instructions of the

emperor, Marshal Soult was on march for Portugal. His rapid triumphs did

not appear doubtful; and the operations of Marshal Victor in the south of

Spain were to be dependent on the succors that were to reach him when

Lisbon was conquered. The difficulties everywhere opposed to Marshal Soult

by the passionate insurrection of the Portuguese population, however,

retarded his march. He only arrived on the banks of the Minho on the 15th

of February; the peasants had taken away the boats. An attempted passage

near the mouth of the river having failed, the _corps d'armée_ was

compelled to reascend its course, after a series of partial combats

against the forces of the Marquis of Romana, who had given his support to

the Portuguese insurrection. When he had at length succeeded in crossing

the Minho at Orense, Soult seized successively the towns of Chaves and

Braga, which were scarcely defended. The chiefs of the insurgents had been

constrained by their soldiers to this useless show of resistance, General

Frère having been massacred by the militia whom he ordered to evacuate

Braga. At Oporto the disorder was extreme; the population fought under the

orders of the bishop. The attack had been cleverly arranged. At the moment

when the bewildered crowd was pressing tumultuously over the bridge of

boats across the Douro, the cables broke; men, women, and children were

engulfed in the waves. In spite of the efforts of the general, the city

was sacked. The long wars, the rude life of the camps, the daily habit of

subsisting by pillage, had little by little relaxed the bonds of

discipline. Marshal Soult established himself at Oporto, incapable of

advancing even to Lisbon with his forces reduced by garrisoning towns, in

presence of the English troops, who had not ceased to occupy the capital.

He could not, or he would not make known at Madrid the position in which

he found himself. Behind him the insurrection had closed every passage. He

found himself isolated in Portugal, and conceived the thought of

submitting the environs of Oporto to a regular and pacific government, re-

establishing order all round, and constantly attentive to gain the favor

of important persons. Perhaps the marshal raised his hopes even to the

foundation of an independent and personal power, more durable than

imperial conquests. It was with his consent that the draft of a popular

pronunciamento was circulated in the provinces of Minho and Oporto,

praying "his Excellency the Duke of Dalmatia to take the reins of

government, to represent the sovereign, and to invest himself with all the

attributes of supreme authority, until the emperor might designate a

prince of his house or of his choice to reign over Portugal."

The sentiments of the army were divided, and an opposition was preparing

to the schemes of the marshal, when the latter learned that an enemy more

redoubtable than the Portuguese insurrection was threatening him in this

province, where he had dreamed of founding a kingdom. Sir Arthur Wellesley

had arrived at Lisbon on the 22nd of April, with reinforcements which

swelled the English _corps d'armée_ to 25,000 men; fifteen or twenty

thousand Portuguese soldiers marched under his orders; a crowd of

insurgents impeded rather than aided his operations. He advanced

immediately against Marshal Soult, now for five weeks immovable at Oporto.

On the 2nd of May he was at Coimbra. Well informed of the plots which were

preparing at Oporto, to which a French officer named Argentan had been

engaged to lend a hand, he resolved upon attacking as speedily as possible

the positions of the marshal. When the latter was informed of the projects

of the English general, retreat was already cut off in the valley of the

Tamega by a strong assemblage of the insurgents, and in the valley of the

Douro by the English general Beresford. Only one route remained still open

to Marshal Soult--by Braga and the provinces of the north. Retreat was

resolved upon, the powder saturated, the field artillery horsed; the

departure was ordered for twelve at noon, and a part of the army was

already defiling on the road to Amarante.

In the night between the 11th and 12th two English battalions had crossed

the Douro at Avinto, three leagues above Oporto, collecting all the

vessels which were to be found on the river, and descending the course of

the stream under cover of the darkness. The army of Sir Arthur Wellesley

had meanwhile occupied the suburbs of the left bank, concealing his

movements behind the heights of La Sarca. Marshal Soult was ignorant of

that operation. At daybreak a small body of picked men, boldly crossing

the river within sight of our soldiers, took possession of an enclosure

called the Seminary. Entrenching themselves there, and constantly

receiving new reinforcements, the English made a desperate defence against

the attempts of General Delaborde. The main body of the enemy's army

beginning to fill all the streets of Oporto, the marshal at once sounded

retreat, and the wounded and sick were left to the care of the English.

When, on the evening of the 12th, the army reached the town of Baltar,

Soult learned that the roads by Braga had been intercepted, as well as by

the valley of the Douro. General Loison, unable to force the passage of

the Tamega, had evacuated Amarante. The roads from the north would bring

the army back to the suburbs of Oporto. The marshal, not wishing to risk a

fresh encounter with the enemy, at once made up his mind to sacrifice

without hesitation his baggage, ammunition, artillery, and even the

greater part of the treasure of the army, to enter the mountain passes,

and join at Guimaraens the divisions which had preceded him. When at last

the army reached Orense, after seven days' marching, varied by small

skirmishes, the soldiers were exhausted and depressed. Portugal was for

the second time lost to us. Marshal Soult immediately marched towards

Galicia, which had for two months been the theatre of Ney's operations,

and freed Lugo, while that marshal was making a brilliant expedition in

the Asturias along with General Kellermann. The two chiefs made an

arrangement as to the measures to be taken against the insurgents who had

assembled at St. Jago under the orders of the Marquis Romana; after which

Soult was to march upon Old Castile as far as Zamora, to be near the

English, who were said to be threatening the south of Portugal. Ney

proposed to attack Vigo, where General Noriena had fortified himself,

supported by the crews of several English vessels. From the very first,

since the junction of the two armies, both officers and soldiers had

exchanged keen and bitter recrimination. A better feeling, however, had

reappeared, and the mutual good-will of the chiefs for each other silenced

the ill-disposed. After their separation, Ney freed St. Jago; but after

advancing to the suburbs of Vigo, and seeing its strong position, he

waited for the result of Soult's movement against Romana.

Several days having elapsed, he learned that, after driving Romana back to

Orense without fighting, and staying several days at Montforte, the

marshal had taken the road to Zamora, without replying to the letters of

his companion-in-arms. From information received from Lugo, Ney was

persuaded that Soult's project had long been premeditated, and that he had

of deliberate purpose broken the bargain stipulated between them. His

anger burst forth with a violence proportioned to the frankness he had

shown when treating with Soult, and this anger was shared by the officers

and soldiers of his army. He at once determined to evacuate Galicia, which

was threatened both by the English and the Spanish insurgents. Leaving a

strong garrison at Ferrol, Ney slowly advanced towards Lugo, where he

collected the sick and wounded left by Soult, and then returned to

Astorga, in the beginning of July. He wrote to King Joseph: "If I had

wished to resolve to leave Galicia without artillery, I could have

remained there longer, at the risk of being hemmed in; but, avoiding such

a mode of departure, I have retreated, bringing with me my sick and

wounded, as well as those of Marshal Soult, left in my charge. I inform

your Majesty that I have decided not to serve again in company with

Marshal Soult."

King Joseph now had a most troublesome complication, and a position that

daily became more serious. At one time, in April, he was in hopes of

seeing his affairs right themselves again, in spite of the absence of all

news of Soult's operations in Portugal. Marshal Victor, urged by the King

of Spain and by his staff to obey the emperor's instructions and invade

Andalusia, had crossed the Tagus in three columns, and, reforming again on

the Guadiana, had, after passing that river, joined near Medellin Don

Gregorio de la Cuesta, who retreated for several days before him. A severe

battle having dispersed those large forces of the Spanish insurgents, on

the 28th March, the marshal took up his position on the banks of the

Guadiana, at the very time when General Sebastiani, at the head of two

divisions, was defeating the army of Estremadura at Ciudad Real, and

driving it back to the entrance of the Sierra Morena. There they awaited

the movement ordered in the instructions given to Soult, the pivot of the

whole campaign, projected by Napoleon before his departure for Paris. It

was in Germany, just after the battle of Essling, that the emperor learned

of the check caused to all his combinations by Soult's immobility at

Oporto. Obstinate in directing himself the operations of armies at a

distance, without the power of taking into account the state of public

opinion, and without any knowledge of all that had occurred between the

departure of the couriers and the arrival of peremptory orders no longer

suitable to the situation, the emperor conceived the idea of concentrating

three armies under one man. Making all personal considerations bend to the

order of seniority, he entrusted the command to Marshal Soult, thus

investing him with supreme authority over Marshals Mortier and Ney. The

order reached Madrid at the moment when the leaders of the armies were

most keenly antagonistic. "You will send a staff-officer to Spain,"

Napoleon had written to the minister of war, "with the orders that the

forces of the Duke of Elchingen, the Duke of Trevisa, and the Duke of

Dalmatia will form only one army, under the command of the Duke of

Dalmatia. These forces must only move together, to march against the

English, pursue them incessantly, defeat them, and throw them into the

sea. Putting all considerations aside, I give the command to the Duke of

Dalmatia, as being senior in rank. These forces ought to form from 50,000

to 60,000 men, and if the junction is promptly effected, the English will

be destroyed, and the affairs of Spain arranged finally. But they must

keep together, and not march in small parties. That principle applies to

every country, but especially to a country where there can be no

communication. I cannot appoint a place for the armies to meet, because I

do not know what events have taken place. Forward this order to the king,

to the Duke of Dalmatia, and to the two other marshals, by four different

roads."

Whilst thus writing, constantly and justly apprehensive of the danger

caused by the English army, Napoleon was still ignorant of the evacuation

of Portugal. "Let your instructions to them be, to attack the enemy

wherever they meet him," he said three days previously to General Clarke,

"to renew their communications with the Duke of Dalmatia, and support him

on the Minho. The English alone are to be feared; alone, if the army is

not directed differently, they will in a few months lead it to a

catastrophe."

The order sent by the emperor necessarily assisted in bringing about the

catastrophe of which he was afraid. Marshal Soult, being deceived as to

the plan of the English, and meditating an attack upon Portugal by Ciudad

Rodrigo, wished to concentrate large forces for this purpose. He sent for

Marshal Mortier, who was posted at Villacastín, where he covered Madrid,

and demanded reinforcements from Aragon and Catalonia. The latter troops

were refused him, and Generals Suchet and St. Cyr had great difficulty in

keeping those two provinces in respect. Marshal Jourdan had foreseen the

attack of the English on the Tagus, and was anxious about the position of

Marshal Victor, isolated in Andalusia. Like the other leaders, the marshal

acted independently, without attending to the orders from Madrid: he found

himself compelled to fall back upon Talavera.

He was not to hold that post long. In spite of the extreme difficulty

experienced by Sir Arthur Wellesley in maintaining a good understanding

with his Spanish allies, he had marched to attack Marshal Victor, to whom

King Joseph was sending reinforcements as quickly as he could. About

22,000 English soldiers were now on the field, reduced to such scarcity of

provisions and money as to cause pillage and disorder, in spite of their

commander's anger. Don Cuesta, with about 40,000 men under his orders, had

been appointed, much against his will, to occupy the mountain passes. A

Spanish army of 30,000 men, collected by General Venegas, was expected to

join the two principal armies. On leaving Madrid, with the forces at his

disposal, King Joseph had impressed upon Soult the necessity of attacking

the enemy's rear, so that the Anglo-Spanish army might be crushed between

superior forces. The marshal announced his departure.

Victor had had time to fall back upon Vargas, behind the Guadarama. Sir

Arthur Wellesley crossed the Alberche, a tributary of the Tagus, and as

soon as he found himself in presence of the enemy, wished to offer battle,

urging Cuesta to join him in attacking Victor before the arrival of the

enemy's reinforcements. The Spanish general declared that his honor was at

stake in holding his positions, and absolutely refused to fight. The

English alone, had not men enough at their disposal to contend with the

French troops. Scarcely had the latter commenced their retreat when the

Spanish, suddenly seized with the ardor of battle, rushed in pursuit,

complaining that the "rascals withdrew so fast," wrote Cuesta to

Wellesley, "that one cannot follow them in their flight." "If you run like

that, you will get beaten," replied the English general, scornfully,

annoyed at seeing himself perpetually thwarted in his able plans.

In fact when the Spaniards, a few days afterwards, at last engaged with

the French, Marshal Victor's advance-guard were sufficient to drive Cuesta

back as far as the English battalions, which had been prudently told off

to support him. The fighting was gallant on the part of our troops, and

helped to excite their ardor. King Joseph was urged to join battle: he

feared an attack on Madrid, which he had been compelled to leave

undefended, and reckoned upon the rapid movements of Soult, who had

received orders to advance with all haste from Salamanca to Placentia. He

had no experience of war, and neglected to take into account the chances

of delay and the loss of troops during the march. Marshal Victor was

daring, full of contempt for the Spanish troops, and ignorant of the

qualities of the English army, which had not for a long time been seen on

the continent. The French army advanced upon Talavera, which was strongly

held by Sir Arthur. Hampered by the obstinacy and want of discipline of

his Spanish allies, the English general had relinquished all attempts at

daring, entrenching himself on the defensive. Marshal Soult had not

arrived, being unable, he wrote, to effect his operation on the enemy's

rear before the beginning of August. On the 27th of July, however, on

occupying the ground before the English positions at Talavera, Victor gave

orders to attack a height which was badly defended, and was driven back

with heavy loss. Marshal Jourdan insisted on a delay of a few days, to

allow Soult time to arrive; but the anxiety of King Joseph, and Victor's

impatience, gained the day, and on the 28th, at daybreak, they attacked

the mamelon, already threatened on the 27th.

Our troops gained the top under the English fire, but Sir Arthur had

doubled the ranks of those in defence, and a terrible charge under General

Hill compelled the French again to abandon the position.

The check was serious, and the soldiers began to be discouraged. By common

consent, and without orders given by the leaders, the fight ceased. The

English and French crowded on the two banks of a small brook which

separated the two armies, and all quenched their thirst, without suspicion

of treason or perfidy, and without a single shot being fired on either

side. The French generals again discussed the question of resuming

hostilities. "If this mamelon is not taken," exclaimed Victor,

impetuously, "we should not take any part in a campaign." King Joseph,

deficient in authority both of position and character, gave way. Sir

Arthur Wellesley, seated on the grass at the top of a hill, surveyed the

enemy's lines, and the defences, which he had just strengthened by a

division, and a battery of artillery obtained with great difficulty from

Cuesta. Till then the English had borne the brunt of the fighting; on

General Donkin coming to tell Sir Arthur that the Spanish were betraying

him, the general-in-chief quietly said, "Go back to your division." The

attack was again begun, and this time directed against the whole line of

the English positions, while Village's brigade turned the mamelon to

assail them in flank.

At this moment a charge of the enemy's cavalry poured upon our columns. A

German regiment followed Seymour's dragoons, but were stopped by a

watercourse, and pulled up: the English horsemen alone, boldly crossing

the obstacle, made a furious attack on the French ranks, which opened to

let them pass. In their daring impetuosity the dragoons went as far as our

rear-guard, where they were stopped by new forces, and finally brought

back with great loss to the foot of the mamelon. They stopped the flank

movement however; and the centre of the English army, shaken for a moment,

formed again round Colonel Donellan after a brilliant charge, and our

soldiers were again driven back towards their position. The losses were

great on both sides. The English did not attempt to pursue their

advantages, and when the fight had ceased were satisfied with encamping on

the heights of Talavera. Next day the French army withdrew beyond the

Alberche without being disturbed by the enemy, and waited finally for

Marshal Soult's arrival.

He appeared on the 2nd of August at Placentia, too late for his glory as

well as for the success of the French arms, though in time to modify

Wellesley's plans. The latter had commenced to advance towards him,

thinking he should meet forces inferior to his own; but Mortier had

already followed Soult, Ney's troops were advancing by Salamanca, and King

Joseph was preparing to put under him all his regiments, except those

accompanying General Sebastiani in his march towards Madrid. Sir Arthur

Wellesley understood the dangers of his position: his troops were tired,

and badly fed; and not wishing to risk again the lot of arms, he hurriedly

re-crossed the Tagus, taking care to blow the bridges up, and fell back

upon Truxillo, by the rugged mountain passes. The want of a proper

understanding, and the mutual distrust which during the whole campaign had

reigned between the English and Spanish, had borne their fruits.

Wellesley's soldiers, deprived of the resources to which they had been

accustomed, and which they had a right to expect from their allies, died

in great numbers in their encampments on the bank of the Guadiana: their

wounded had been abandoned at Talavera, when Cuesta evacuated that

position. Sir Arthur gave vent to his bitter complaints in writing to

Frère, the English _chargé d'affaires_ at the insurgents' head-quarters:

"I wish the members of the Junta, before blaming me for not doing more,

and charging me beforehand with the probable results of the faults and

imprudence of others, would be good enough to come here, or send somebody

to supply the wants of our army dying of hunger, and actually after

fighting two days, and defeating in the service of Spain an enemy of twice

their number, without bread to eat. It is a positive fact that for the

last seven days the English army has not received a third of its

provisions, that at this moment there are 4000 wounded soldiers dying for

want of the care and necessaries which any other country in the world

would have supplied, even to its enemies, and that I can derive assistance

of no kind from the country. I cannot even get leave to bury the dead

bodies in the neighborhood. We are told that the Spanish troops sometimes

behave well: I confess that I have never seen them behave otherwise than

badly."

The emperor's anger was extreme on learning the check our troops had

received at Talavera. He wrote to Marshal Jourdan, indignantly

recapitulating all the blunders made during the campaign, without at all

considering the difficulties everywhere caused by orders sent from a

distance, in ignorance of the actual facts of the situation. "When at last

they decided to give battle," Napoleon summed up, "it was done without

energy, since my arms were disgraced. Battle should not be given, unless

seventy chances in one's favor can be counted upon beforehand: even then,

one should not offer battle unless there are no more chances to be hoped

for, since the lot of battle is from its nature always doubtful: but once

the resolution is taken, one must conquer or perish, and the French eagles

must not withdraw till all have equally put forth every effort. There must

have been a combination of all these faults before an army like my army of

Spain could have been beaten by 30,000 English: but so long as they will

attack good troops, like the English ones, in good positions, without

reconnoitring these positions, without being certain of carrying them,

they will lead my men to death, and for nothing at all."

The Spanish armies were, after the battle scattered everywhere, according

to their custom, to appear again in a short time like swarms of wasps to

harass our soldiers. Sir Arthur Wellesley entrenched himself at Badajoz,

ready to fall back upon Portugal. No definitive result had crowned the

bloody campaign just completed, but it had an influence upon the

negotiations then being carried on in Spain. An attempt, long prepared by

the English, and to which they attached a great importance, now occupied

the Emperor Napoleon's mind still more than the affairs of Spain.

For several weeks it was believed that the great maritime expedition

organized on the coasts of England was for the purpose of carrying

overwhelming reinforcements to Spain. A first attempt, of less importance,

was directed against our fleets collected at the island of Aix, near

Rochefort. Admiral Willaumez, in charge of an expedition to the Antilles,

had to rally the squadrons of Lorient and Rochefort, and being unavoidably

delayed at the latter place, it was there that Admiral Gambier came to

attack our vessels. Vice-Admiral Allemand carefully fortified the isle of

Aix against an attack, the nature of which he had foreseen, though not the

extent. During the night of the 11th and 12th April, conducted by several

divisions, composed of frigates and brigs, thirty large fire-ships were

suddenly launched against our vessels, exploding in all directions,

breaking the wooden bars by the weight of their burning masses, adhering

to the sides of the ships and compelling even those which they did not set

on fire to go aside to avoid dangers which were more to be dreaded. Thanks

to the skill and bravery of our sailors, none of the vessels perished by

fire; but four of them ran aground at the mouth of the Charente, and were

attacked by the English. The _Calcutta_ surrendered after several hours'

fighting--her commander, Captain Lafon, having to pay with his life for

the weak resistance he is said to have made. The English blew up the

_Aquilon_ and _Varsovie_, and Captain Roncière himself set fire to the

_Tonnerre_, after landing all his crew. Napoleon's continued efforts to

form a rival navy in France constituted a standing menace to England.

After the cruel expedition of the isle of Aix, the principal effort was to

be directed against Antwerp, always an object of English jealousy and

dissatisfaction, as a commercial port, or as a place of war. The works

which the emperor had been carrying on there increased their anxiety, and

on the 29th July forty vessels of the line and thirty frigates appeared in

sight of the island of Walcheren. From 700 to 800 transport-ships brought

an army to be landed, under the orders of Lord Chatham, Pitt's elder

brother, and containing about 40,000 men, with much artillery. The emperor

was at once informed, and M. Decrès, minister of the marine, proposed to

station at Flushing the fleet of Admiral Missiessy. The latter refused,

saying that he would not let himself be taken, and did not wish to see his

crews decimated by the Walcheren fever. That was the auxiliary upon which

Napoleon reckoned against the English expedition; and rightly, too.

Walcheren was slightly and badly fortified; the emperor considering

Flushing to be quite impregnable. "You say that the bombardment of

Flushing makes you apprehensive of its surrender," he wrote on the 22nd

August. "You are wrong to have any such fear. Flushing is impregnable so

long as there is bread in it, and they have enough for six months.

Flushing is impregnable, because there is a moat full of water, which must

be crossed; and finally, because by cutting the dykes they can inundate

the whole island. Write and tell everywhere that Flushing cannot be taken,

unless by the cowardice of the commandants; and also that I am certain of

it, and that the English will go off without having it. The bombs are

nothing--absolutely nothing; they will destroy a few houses, but that has

no effect upon the surrender of a place."

General Monnet, who commanded at Flushing, was an old officer of the

revolution wars, brave and daring and he did his best in opposing the

landing of the English, with a part of his forces, and in gallantly

defending the place; but the inundation did not succeed, on account of the

elevation of the ground and the wind being contrary. Therefore when

Napoleon wrote to Fouché, Flushing had already capitulated, under the

efforts of the most formidable siege artillery. The Dutch commandant

surrendered the forts Denhaak and Terwecre at the same time as Middelburg.

The feeling of the Dutch nation, formerly favorable to republican France,

had been modified since the imperial decrees ruined all the transit trade,

the source of Holland's wealth. King Louis alone hastened to the

assistance of the French army, advancing with his little army between

Santvliet and Antwerp. Four Dutch regiments were fighting in Germany, and

a small corps had been sent into Spain. Thus, while extending his

enterprises in remote parts, the unbounded ambition of Napoleon left

unprotected the very centre of his empire.

General Rousseau, however, succeeded in protecting the island of Cadsand,

and Admiral Strachan and Lord Chatham recalled to the eastern Scheldt the

forces which had been intended for the attack on that island. The English

forces began to land upon the islands of North and South Beveland, in

order to attack Fort Batz at the junction of the two Scheldts, and thus

outflank the French fleet lying in the western Scheldt. Fortunately,

Admiral Missiessy had the advantage over the English commanders in speed,

and sailing up into the higher Scheldt, formed by the two branches of the

river, he arranged his vessels under forts Lillo and Liefkenshoek which by

their cross-fires protected the river from bank to bank. Antwerp was thus

safe from attack by sea; at Paris there was great anxiety as to attacks by

land.

A few provisional demi-brigades, the gendarmes, and picked national

guards, about 30,000 men altogether--such were the forces at the disposal

of the war minister. He durst not--nobody durst, change the destination of

the troops already marching to Germany. The minister of marine and Fouché

at once proposed a general levy of the national guard, under the orders of

Bernadotte--one being daring and dissatisfied, the other fostering

discontent of every kind openly or secretly, and still remembering the

revolutionary procedure. The Council, presided over by the Arch-chancellor

Cambacérès, refused to authorize the calling out of the national guards

without the emperor's express order; but Fouché, without waiting for

orders, wrote on his own authority to all the prefects, and stirred up

everywhere a patriotic zeal. At first Napoleon approved of the ardor of

his minister of police, and severely rated the arch-chancellor and

minister of war for their prudence. "I cannot conceive what you are about

in Paris," he wrote to General Clarke on the 10th August; "you must be

waiting for the English to come and take you in your beds. When 25,000

English are attacking our dockyards and threatening our provinces, is the

ministry doing nothing? What trouble is there in raising 60,000 of the

national guard? What trouble is there in sending the Prince of Pontecorvo

to take the command there, where there is nobody? What trouble is there in

putting my strongholds, Antwerp, Ostend, and Lille, in a state of siege?

It is inconceivable. There is none but Fouché who appears to me to have

done what he could, and to have felt the inconvenience of remaining in a

dangerous and dishonorable position:--dangerous, because the English,

seeing that France is not in movement, and that no impulse is given to

public opinion, will have nothing to fear, and will not hurry to leave our

territory; dishonorable, because it shows fear of opinion, and allows

25,000 English to burn our dockyards without defending them. The slur thus

cast upon France is a perpetual disgrace. Circumstances vary from moment

to moment. It is impossible for me to give orders to arrive within a

fortnight. The ministers have the same power as I, since they can hold a

council and pass decisions. Make use of the Prince of Pontecorvo--make use

of General Moncey. I send you besides Marshal Bessières, to remain in

Paris in reserve. I have ordered a levy of 30,000 men of the national

guard. If the English make progress, make a second levy of 30,000 in the

same or other departments. It is evident that the enemy, feeling the

difficulty of taking Flushing, intend marching straight to Antwerp, to

make a sudden attempt upon the squadron."

Flushing had succumbed, but the operations of the English were delayed by

their indecisive generalship. Hope's division easily took possession of

Fort Batz, but the main body of the army remained behind. The

fortifications of Antwerp were daily increased and strengthened. The

engineers, under Decaux, who checked the warlike ardor of King Louis,

rendered the forts impregnable to sudden assault, inundated the country

all round, and erected the old dams on the Scheldt; and troops also began

to arrive, rapidly concentrating upon the threatened spot. According to

the emperor's order the Prince of Pontecorvo had set out for Antwerp, and

took the command there. While the army was being formed round the town,

the English with great difficulty got their fleet into the Scheldt as far

as Fort Batz. Their forces being already considerably reduced by the

fever, and the preparations made at Antwerp to receive them causing Lord

Chatham some uneasiness, he held a council of war on the 26th, and sent

their decision to London, where it was approved by the ministry. It was

too late now to attack Antwerp, the opportunity having been lost; and the

huge army, collected with so much display, fell back upon the island of

Walcheren, and a large number of the vessels sailed for the Downs. Every

day 800 casks of fresh water were brought from the Downs to the garrison

still occupying Flushing, Middelburg, and the forts. The English were

completely checked; and there were already signs that they might evacuate

the island of Walcheren altogether.

The emperor triumphed at Schönbrunn. Advising his generals not to attack

the English, but to leave them to be killed by ague, he congratulated

himself on the unexpected reinforcement thus gained by his army. "It is a

continuation of the good fortune attending our present circumstances," he

wrote, "that this expedition, which has reduced to nothing England's

greatest effort, gives us an army of 24,000 men, which otherwise we should

have been unable to get." He at once made use of it to organize the new

army of the north, suddenly called out by the country's danger. At the

same time, by a strong instinct of government, he severely blamed the

revolutionary movement which Fouché had excited in the departments. On the

26th September he wrote to him: "I have your letter informing me that the

'cadres' of the regiment for the national guard are formed everywhere. I

know it, but am not pleased at it. Such a measure cannot be taken without

my order. There has been too great haste; all that has been done will not

hasten by a single hour the arming of the national guard, if they are

needed. That causes fermentation, whereas it would have been sufficient to

put in movement the national guards of the military divisions which I have

indicated. Then you call out the national guards of Flanders to assist on

the frontiers by which the enemy intend invading Flanders; the reason is

obvious. But when there is a levy in Languedoc, Piedmont, Burgundy, people

think there is an agitation, though there is none. My intentions are not

fulfilled, and I am put to unnecessary expense."

The command, accordingly, was withdrawing from the Prince of Pontecorvo,

who, though always called to serve at the moment of danger, was considered

fickle and suspicious by the emperor. "You will let him know," wrote

Napoleon to his minister of war, "that I am displeased with his 'order of

the day;' that it is not true that he had only 15,000 men, when, with the

soldiers of the Duke of Conegliano and Istria, I have on the Scheldt more

than 60,000 men; but that even if he only had 15,000, his duty was to give

the enemy no hint of it. It is the first time that a general, from excess

of vanity, has been seen to betray the secret of his position. He at the

same time eulogized the national guards, who know very well themselves

that they have had no opportunity of doing anything. You will also express

to him my dissatisfaction with his Paris correspondence, and insist upon

his ceasing to receive mischievous letters from the wretches whom he

encourages by such conduct. The third point as to which you will indicate

to him my intentions is, that he should go to the army or to the waters."

The useless attempt of the English at Walcheren, and their prudent retreat

from Antwerp, was made use of by the French diplomatists who were still

discussing the terms of peace at Altenburg. The Emperor Napoleon, however,

was tired of the delays of their negotiations. Being now certain that

Austria could have no more support, he received Bubna and Prince John of

Lichtenstein, who had been sent to him directly by the Emperor Francis.

Napoleon haughtily dwelt upon the value of the concessions which he had

already granted. "What!" said he to the envoys, "I had not yet

relinquished the principle of the _uti possidetis_, and now I relinquish

it at your emperor's request! I claimed 400,000 souls of the population of

Bohemia, now I cease to demand them! I wished 800,000 souls in Upper

Austria, and I am satisfied with 400,000! I asked for 1,400,000 souls in

Carinthia and Carniola, and I give up Klagenfurth, which is a further

sacrifice of 200,000 souls. I therefore restore to your master a

population of a million of subjects, and he says I have made no

concession! I have only kept what is necessary to keep the enemy away from

Passau and the Inn--what is necessary to connect the territories of Italy

and Dalmatia; yet they persuade him that I have not modified any of my

demands! It is thus that they have led on the Emperor Francis to war; it

is thus that they will finally bring him to ruin!" He refrained, however,

from replying to the Emperor Francis's letter. "It were undignified for me

to say to a prince, 'You don't know what you say;' but that is what I find

myself compelled to say, since his letter is founded upon an error."

"Leave vain repetitions and silliness to the Austrians," he wrote to

Champagny. At the same time he reviewed his troops, and hurried the

movements of the reinforcements which were arriving. The Emperor Alexander

had received Austria's promise to make a speedy settlement, refusing to

take part in the negotiations, and trusting that Napoleon would look after

his interests. The only point which he reserved was the Polish question:

he was afraid of the increase of the grand duchy of Warsaw. "Your Majesty

can give me a certain pledge of your friendship towards me," he wrote to

Napoleon on the 31st August, "by recalling what I frequently said at

Tilsit and Erfurt, as to the interests of Russia with reference to the

affairs of Poland (lately so-called), and what I have since instructed

your ambassador to repeat to you."

It was precisely upon Galicia that the ambitious views of Napoleon were at

that moment directed. Being repeatedly pressed by the Austrian envoys to

explain his definitive intentions, he at last declared that he wished

Carniola, the circle of Wilbach, and the right bank of the Save as far as

Bosnia; ceding Linz, and keeping Salzburg. He thus became master of

1,500,000 souls in Austria. In Galicia he claimed all the territory which

Austria had obtained at the second partition of Poland, as well as the

circles of Solkiew and Zeloczow, which he intended to cede to Russia, in

order to restrain her displeasure. The population of these territories

amounted to 2,000,000 souls. To these conditions Napoleon added a war

contribution of 100,000,000, and the obligation of Austria reducing her

army to 150,000 men. The Austrian diplomatists succeeded in getting off

15,000,000 from the military contribution. That was the only favor

granted. "I have given Austria the most advantageous peace she could

expect," wrote Napoleon to the Emperor Alexander, on the 10th October,

1809. "She only cedes Salzburg and a small district on the Inn; she cedes

nothing in Bohemia; and on the Italian side she only cedes what is

indispensable to me for communication with Dalmatia. The monarchy

therefore remains entire. It is a second experiment which I wished to

make, and I have shown towards her a moderation which she had no right to

expect. In doing so I trust to have pleased your Majesty. You will see

that, in accordance with your desires, the greater part of Galicia does

not change masters, and that I have been as careful of your interests as

you could have been yourself, by reconciling everything with what honor

demands from me. For the prosperity and well-being of the duchy of Warsaw,

it is necessary that it should be in your Majesty's good graces; and the

subjects of your Majesty may be assured that in no case, on no

contingency, ought they to expect any protection from me."

So many protestations and flattering assurances could not destroy the

effect of the development of the grand duchy of Warsaw, and the constant

menace created for Russia by that partial resuscitation of a Poland

submitted to French influence. The Emperor Alexander made Caulaincourt

sensible of this by a few sharp words. The secret discord was now

increasing between the two allies, in proportion as the divergence of

their interests made itself felt. The unreasonable passions of Napoleon

were soon to open between them the gulf into which he was to drag France.

The Tyrol was not included in the negotiations of peace, any more than in

the armistice. When at last the treaty was signed at Vienna, on the 20th

October, a few days after the discovery of a plot to assassinate Napoleon,

the fighting was still continued in the mountains with the keen

determination of despair. In vain did Prince Eugène offer the insurgents a

general pardon, confirming the subservience of their country; the peasants

proudly rejected the conditions offered them. Crushed by the combined

French and Bavarian forces, the Tyrolese succumbed with glory: their

popular leader, Andrew Hofer, was taken in a remote mountain retreat where

he had taken refuge, brought to Mantua on the 19th January, 1810, and

there shot on the 25th February, by Napoleon's express order. "I gave you

instructions to have Hofer brought to Paris," wrote Napoleon to the

Viceroy of Italy; "but since he is at Mantua, send an order to have him

tried at once by court-martial, and shot on the spot. Let it be an affair

of twenty-four hours." Hofer underwent his fate with an heroic and pious

simplicity. It was only in 1824 that Austria paid to this humble patriot

the honors due to his memory, his body being then transported to

Innsbruck, and buried there with pomp in the cathedral. A statue was

placed on his tomb.