Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the

strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties

of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature

of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true

philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of

hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the

worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they

prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be

determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this

experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and,

accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case,

and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self

control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to

this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those

abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for

capricious or unprincipled conduct,--an excuse which is never admitted

by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The

latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they

achieve to the coöperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they

will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done

amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have

willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question,

the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only

competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those

who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and

pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness,

under whatever dispensation, Acts x, 35; Romans ii, 7, 10. And surely

the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices, of the

humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they

were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they

might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to

make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid

beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement

inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere

speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me

it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural

religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The

inquiry is not how the mind _may be_, but how it _is actually_,

constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and

must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience,

not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for

the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their

interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act

as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves

capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their

talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise

a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the

assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular,

to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the

nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of

preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to

be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme

be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive

induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every

civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have

been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And

the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case,

because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All

human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are

grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self

control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and

in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in

the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be

easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to

deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal

necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore

excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and

essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be

avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they

were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy.

Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not

presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of

such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to

frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and

solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the

existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their

conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and

their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the

practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so

conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally

deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to

metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth,

not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is,

but what they imagine he _must be_. In their reasonings they differ, as

might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth

and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will

always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his

crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did.

The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged

leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in

the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these

faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the

power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can

indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be

so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct

inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these

faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his

special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or

merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue

whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of

the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we

no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have

no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil.

Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and

therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of

his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his

foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason

concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity,

must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture.

And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight

into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of

irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would

but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe

adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were

wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the

Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the

certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative

source of all that is great, glorious, and good in heaven or in earth;

while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on

the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is

excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy,

goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the

present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our

affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that

as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the

nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a

system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other,

can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it

would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all

moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred

the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or

evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many

rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our

nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so

clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the

happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and

invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies

politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching

conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence;

and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence,

whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human

race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with

national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once

corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign

domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it:

consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the

maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident

consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of

its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of

a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition

to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in

another point of view,--as a most important class of moral phenomena;

inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations

of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common

consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure,

independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of

private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or

passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment

and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the

freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human

actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards

and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these

notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the

moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these

principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to

regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral

government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we

cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced

from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that

similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as

man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more

developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent

imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such

general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence

as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon

which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously

conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected

therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little

more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God

in Christ to bring “life and immortality to light through the Gospel,”

it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the

wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.

WIND. The Hebrews, like us, acknowledge four principal winds, Ezek.

xiii, 16–18: the east wind, the north wind, the south wind, and the west

wind, or that from the Mediterranean sea. See WHIRLWIND.

WINDOWS. The method of building both in Barbary and the Levant seems to

have continued the same from the earliest ages. All the windows open

into private courts, if we except sometimes a latticed window or balcony

toward the street. It is only during the celebration of some _zeenah_,

or public festival, that these houses and their latticed windows are

left open; for this being a time of great liberty, revelling, and

extravagance, each family is ambitious of adorning both the inside and

outside of their houses with the richest part of their furniture; while

crowds of both sexes, dressed out in their best apparel, and laying

aside all ceremony and restraint, go in and out where they please. The

account we have, 2 Kings ix, 30, of Jezebel’s painting her face, tiring

her head, and looking out at a window upon Jehu’s public entry into

Jezreel, gives us a lively idea of an eastern lady at one of those

solemnities.

WINE, יין, Gen. xix, 32, οινος, Matt. ix, 17, a liquor expressed from

grapes. The art of refining wine upon the lees was known to the Jews.

The particular process, as it is now practised in the island of Cyprus,

is described in Mariti’s Travels. The wine is put immediately from the

vat into large vases of potters’ ware, pointed at the bottom, till they

are nearly full, when they are covered tight and buried. At the end of a

year what is designed for sale is drawn into wooden casks. The dregs in

the vases are put into wooden casks destined to receive wine, with as

much of the liquor as is necessary to prevent them from becoming dry

before use. Casks thus prepared are very valuable. When the wine a year

old is put in, the dregs rise, and make it appear muddy, but afterward

they subside and carry down all the other feculences. The dregs are so

much valued that they are not sold with the wine in the vase, unless

particularly mentioned.

The “new wine,” or “must,” is mentioned, Isa. xlix, 26; Joel i, 5; iii,

18; and Amos ix, 13, under the name עסים. The “mixed wine,” ממסד, Prov.

xxiii, 30, and in Isaiah lxv, 11 rendered “drink-offering,” may mean

wine made stronger and more inebriating by the addition of higher and

more powerful ingredients, such as honey, spices, _defrutum_, or wine

inspissated by boiling it down, myrrh, mandragora, and other strong

drugs. Thus the drunkard is properly described as one that seeketh

“mixed wine,” Prov. xxiii, 30, and is mighty to “mingle strong drink,”

Isa. v, 22; and hence the psalmist took that highly poetical and sublime

image of the cup of God’s wrath, called by Isaiah, li, 17, “the cup of

trembling,” containing, as St. John expresses it, Rev. xiv, 10, pure

wine made yet stronger by a mixture of powerful ingredients: “In the

hand of Jehovah is a cup, and the wine is turbid; it is full of a mixed

liquor, and he poureth out of it,” or rather, “he poureth it out of one

vessel into another,” to mix it perfectly; “verily the dregs thereof,”

the thickest sediment of the strong ingredients mingled with it, “all

the ungodly of the earth shall wring them out, and drink them.” “Spiced

wine,” Cant. viii, 2, was wine rendered more palatable and fragrant with

aromatics. This was considered as a great delicacy. Spiced wines were

not peculiar to the Jews; Hafiz speaks of wines “richly bitter, richly

sweet.” The Romans lined their vessels, _amphoræ_, with odorous gums, to

give the wine a warm bitter flavour: and the orientals now use the

admixture of spices to give their wines a favourite relish. The “wine of

Helbon,” Ezek. xxvii, 18, was an excellent kind of wine, known to the

ancients by the name of _chalibonium vinum_. It was made at Damascus;

the Persians had planted vineyards there on purpose, says Posidosius,

quoted by Athenæus. This author says that the kings of Persia used no

other wine. Hosea, xiv, 7, mentions the wine of Lebanon. The wines from

the vineyards on that mount are even to this day in repute; but some

think that this may mean a sweet-scented wine, or wine flavoured with

fragrant gums.

WINE PRESS. The vintage in Syria commences about the middle of

September, and continues till the middle of November. But grapes in

Palestine, we are informed, were ripe sometimes even in June or July,

which arose perhaps from a triple pruning, in which case there was also

a third vintage. The first vintage was in August, the second in

September, and the third in October. The grapes when not gathered were

sometimes found on the vines until November and December. The Hebrews

were required to leave gleanings for the poor, Lev. xix, 10. The season

of vintage was a most joyful one, Judges ix, 27; Isaiah xvi, 10; Jer.

xxv, 30; xlviii, 33. With shoutings on all sides, the grapes were

plucked off and carried to the wine press, פורה, פארה, ληνὸς, which was

in the vineyard, Isa. liii, 3; Zech. xiv, 10; Haggai ii, 16; Matt. xxi,

33; Rev. xiv, 19, 20. The presses consisted of two receptacles, which

were either built of stones and covered with plaster, or hewn out of a

large rock. The upper receptacle, called נת, as it is constructed at the

present time in Persia, is nearly eight feet square and four feet high.

Into this the grapes are thrown and trodden out by five men. The juice

flows out into the lower receptacle, through a grated aperture, which is

made in the side near the bottom of the upper one. The treading of the

wine press was laborious, and not very favourable to cleanliness; the

garments of the persons thus employed were stained with the red juice,

and yet the employment was a joyful one. It was performed with singing,

accompanied with musical instruments; and the treaders, as they jumped,

exclaimed, הידד, Isa. xvi, 9, 10; Jer. xxv, 30; xlviii, 32, 33.

Figuratively, vintage, gleaning, and treading the wine press, signified

battles and great slaughters, Isa. xvii, 6; lxiii, 1–3; Jer. xlix, 9;

Lam. i, 15. The must, as is customary in the east at the present day,

was preserved in large firkins, which were buried in the earth. The wine

cellars were not subterranean, but built upon the earth. When deposited

in these, the firkins, as is done at the present time in Persia, were

sometimes buried in the ground, and sometimes left standing upon it.

Formerly, also, new wine or must was preserved in leathern bottles; and,

lest they should be broken by fermentation, the people were very careful

that the bottles should be new, Job xxxii, 19; Matt. ix, 17; Mark ii,

22. Sometimes the must was boiled and made into syrup, which is

comprehended under the term דבש, although it is commonly rendered

“honey,” Gen. xliii, 11; 2 Chron. xxxi, 5. Sometimes the grapes were

dried in the sun and preserved in masses, which were called “bunches or

clusters of raisins,” 1 Sam. xxv, 18; 2 Sam. xvi, 1; 1 Chron. xii, 40;

Hosea iii, 1. From these dried grapes, when soaked in wine and pressed a

second time, was manufactured sweet wine, which is also called new wine,

γλεῦκος, Acts ii, 13.

WISDOM is put for that prudence and discretion which enables a man to

perceive that which is fit to be done, according to the circumstances of

time, place, persons, manners, and end of doing, Eccles. ii, 13, 14. It

was this sort of wisdom that Solomon intreated of God with so much

earnestness, and which God granted him with such divine liberality, 1

Kings iii, 9, 12, 28. It also signifies quickness of invention, and

dexterity in the execution of several works, which require not so much

strength of body, as industry, and labour of the mind. For example, God

told Moses, Exod. xxxi, 3, that he had filled Bezaleel and Aholiab with

wisdom, and understanding, and knowledge, to invent and perform several

sorts of work for completing the tabernacle. It is used for craft,

cunning, and stratagem, and that whether good or evil. Thus it is said

by Moses, that Pharaoh dealt wisely with the Israelites, when he opposed

them in Egypt, Exodus i, 10: it is observed of Jonadab, the friend of

Ammon, and nephew of David, that he was very wise, that is, very subtle

and crafty, 2 Sam. xiii, 3; and Job, v, 13, says, that God “taketh the

wise in their own craftiness.” Wisdom means also doctrine, learning, and

experience: “With the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days

understanding,” Job xii, 12. It is put for true piety, or the fear of

God, which is spiritual wisdom: “So teach us to number our days, that we

may apply our hearts unto wisdom,” Psalm xc, 12; “The fear of the Lord

that is wisdom,” Job xxvii, 28. Wisdom is put for the eternal Wisdom,

the Word of God. It was by wisdom that God established the heavens, and

founded the earth, Prov. iii, 19. How magnificently does Solomon

describe the primeval birth of the eternal Son of God, under the

character of Wisdom personified; to which so many references and

allusions are to be found in the Old and New Testament! “The Lord

possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was

set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When

there were no depths, I was brought forth; when there were no fountains

abounding with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the

hills was I brought forth,” Prov. viii, 22–25. The apocryphal book of

Wisdom introduces, by a reference to this passage, the following

admirable invocation, Wisdom ix, 9, 10:--

“O send forth wisdom, out of thy holy heavens,

Even from the throne of thy glory;

That being present she may labour with me,

That I may know what is pleasing in thy sight!”

And our Lord assumes the title of Wisdom, Luke xi, 49; Matt. xxiii, 34;

and declares that “wisdom shall be justified of all her children,” Matt.

xi, 19; Luke vii, 35.

WISDOM, BOOK OF, an apocryphal book of Scripture, so called on account

of the wise maxims contained in it. This book has been commonly ascribed

to Solomon, either because the author imitated that king’s manner of

writing, or because he sometimes speaks in his name. But it is certain

Solomon was not the author of it; for it was not written in Hebrew, nor

was it inserted in the Jewish canon, nor is the style like that of

Solomon; and therefore St. Jerom observes justly that it smells strong

of the Grecian eloquence; that it is composed with art and method, after

the manner of the Greek philosophers, very different from that noble

simplicity so full of life and energy to be found in the Hebrew books.

It has been ascribed by many of the ancients to Philo.

WOLF, זאב, in Arabic, _zeeb_, Gen. xlix, 27; Isa. xi, 6; lxv, 25; Jer.

v, 6; Ezek. xxii, 27; Zeph. iii, 3; Hab. i, 8; λύκος, Matt. vii, 15; x,

16; Luke x, 3; John x, 12; Acts xx, 29; Eccles. xiii, 17. M. Majus

derives it from the Arabic word _zaab_ or _daaba_, “to frighten;” and

hence, perhaps, the German word _dieb_, “a thief.” The wolf is a fierce,

strong, cunning, mischievous, and carnivorous quadruped; externally and

internally so nearly resembling the dog, that they seem modelled alike,

yet have a perfect antipathy to each other. The Scripture observes of

the wolf, that it lives upon rapine; is violent, bloody, cruel,

voracious, and greedy; goes abroad by night to seek its prey, and is a

great enemy to flocks of sheep. Indeed, this animal is fierce without

cause, kills without remorse, and by its indiscriminate slaughter seems

to satisfy its malignity rather than its hunger. The wolf is weaker than

the lion or the bear, and less courageous than the leopard; but he

scarcely yields to them in cruelty and rapaciousness. His ravenous

temper prompts him to destructive and sanguinary depredations; and these

are perpetrated principally in the night. This circumstance is expressly

mentioned in several passages of Scripture. “The great men have

altogether broken the yoke and burst the bonds; wherefore, a lion out of

the forest shall slay them, and a wolf of the evenings shall spoil

them,” Jer. v, 6. The rapacious and cruel conduct of the princes of

Israel is compared by Ezekiel, xxii, 27, to the mischievous inroads of

the same animal: “Her princes in the midst thereof are like wolves

ravening the prey, to shed blood, to destroy lives, to get dishonest

gain;” and Zephaniah, iii, 3, says, “Her princes within her are roaring

lions, her judges are evening wolves: they gnaw not the bones till the

morrow.” Instead of protecting the innocent and restraining the evil

doer, or punishing him according to the demerit of his crimes, they

delight in violence and oppression, in blood and rapine; and so

insatiable is their cupidity, that, like the evening wolf, they destroy

more than they are able to possess. The dispositions of the wolf to

attack the weaker animals, especially those which are under the

protection of man, is alluded to by our Saviour in the parable of the

hireling shepherd: “The wolf catcheth them, and scattereth the flock,”

Matt. vii, 15. And the Apostle Paul, in his address to the elders of

Ephesus, gives the name of this insidious and cruel animal to the false

teachers who disturbed the peace and perverted the faith of their

people: “I know this, that after my departing shall grievous wolves

enter in among you, not sparing the flock,” Acts xx, 29.

WORD. Sometimes the Scripture ascribes to the word of God certain

supernatural effects, and often represents it as animated and active:

“He sent his word and healed them,” Psalm cvii, 20. It also signifies

what is written in the sacred books of the Old and New Testament, Luke

xi, 28; James i, 22; the divine law which teaches and commands good

things, and forbids evil, Psalm cxix, 101; and is used to express every

promise of God, Psalm cxix, 25, &c, and prophecy or vision, Isaiah, ii,

1. This term is likewise consecrated and appropriated to signify the

only Son of the Father, the uncreated Wisdom, the second Person of the

most holy Trinity, equal to and consubstantial with the Father. St. John

the evangelist, more expressly than any other, has opened to us the

mystery of the Word of God, when he tells us, “In the beginning was the

Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in

the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him was

not any thing made that was made,” John i, 1–3. The Chaldee paraphrasts,

the most ancient Jewish writers extant, generally make use of the word

_memra_, which signifies “the Word,” in those places where Moses puts

the name Jehovah. They say, for example, that it was the _Memra_, or the

Word, which created the world, which appeared to Moses on Mount Sinai,

which gave him the law, which spoke to him face to face, which brought

Israel out of Egypt, which marched before the people, and which wrought

all those miracles that are recorded in Exodus. It was the same Word

that appeared to Abraham in the plain of Mamre, that was seen of Jacob

at Bethel, to whom Jacob made his vow, and acknowledged as God, saying,

“If God will be with me, and will keep me in this way that I go, then

shall the Lord be my God,” Gen. xxviii, 20, 21. The manner in which St.

John commences his Gospel is strikingly different from the introductions

to the histories of Christ by the other evangelists; and no less

striking and peculiar is the title under which he announces him--“the

Word.” It has therefore been a subject of much inquiry and discussion,

from whence this evangelist drew the use of this appellation, and what

reasons led him, as though intending to solicit particular attention, to

place it at the very head of his Gospel. That it was for the purpose of

establishing an express opinion, as to the personal character of him it

is used to designate, is made more than probable from the predominant

character of the whole Gospel, which is more copiously doctrinal, and

contains a record more full of what Jesus “_said_” than the others. As

to the source from which the term Logos was drawn by the Apostle, some

have held it to be taken from the Jewish Scriptures; others, from the

Chaldee paraphrases; others, from Philo and the Hellenizing Jews. The

most natural conclusion certainly appears to be, that, as St. John was a

plain, “unlearned” man, chiefly conversant in the Holy Scriptures, he

derived this term from the sacred books of his own nation, in which the

Hebrew phrase, _Dabar Jehovah_, “the Word of Jehovah,” frequently occurs

in passages which must be understood to speak of a personal Word, and

which phrase is rendered Λόγος Κυρίου [the word of the Lord] by the

Septuagint interpreters. Certainly, there is not the least evidence in

his writings, or in his traditional history, that he ever acquainted

himself with Philo or with Plato; and none, therefore, that he borrowed

the term from them, or used it in any sense approaching to or suggested

by these refinements:--in the writings of St. Paul there are allusions

to poets and philosophers; in those of St. John, none, except to the

rising sects afterward known under the appellation of Gnostics. The

Hebrew Scriptures contain frequent intimations of a distinction of

Persons in the Godhead; one of these Divine Persons is called Jehovah;

and, though manifestly represented as existing distinct from the Father,

is yet arrayed with attributes of divinity, and was acknowledged by the

ancient Jews to be, in the highest sense, “their God,” the God with

whom, through all their history, they chiefly “had to do.” This Divine

Person is proved to have been spoken of by the prophets as the future

Christ; the evangelists and Apostles represent Jesus as that Divine

Person of the prophets; and if, in the writings of the Old Testament, he

is also called the Word, the application of this term to our Lord is

naturally accounted for. It will then appear to be a theological, not a

philosophic appellation, and one which, previously even to the time of

the Apostle, had been stamped with the authority of inspiration.

Celebrated as this title of the Logos was in the Jewish theology, it is

not, however, the appellation by which the Spirit of inspiration has

chosen that our Saviour should be principally designated. It occurs but

a very few times, and principally and emphatically in the introduction

to St. John’s Gospel. A cogent reason can be given why this Apostle

adopts it; and we are not without a probable reason why, in the New

Testament, the title “Son of God” should have been preferred, which is a

frequent title of the Logos in the writings also of Philo. Originating

from the spiritual principle of connection, between the first and the

second Being in the Godhead; marking this, by a spiritual idea of

connection; and considering it to be as close and as necessary as the

Word is to the energetic mind of God, which cannot bury its intellectual

energies in silence, but must put them forth in speech; it is too

spiritual in itself, to be addressed to the faith of the multitude. If

with so full a reference to our bodily ideas, and so positive a

filiation of the second Being to the first, we have seen the attempts of

Arian criticism endeavouring to resolve the doctrine into the mere dust

of a figure; how much more ready would it have been to do so, if we had

only such a spiritual denomination as this for the second! This would

certainly have been considered by it as too unsubstantial for distinct

personality, and therefore too evanescent for equal divinity. One of the

first teachers of this system was Cerinthus. We have not any particular

account of all the branches of his system; and it is possible that we

may ascribe to him some of those tenets by which later sects of Gnostics

were discriminated. But we have authority for saying, that the general

principle of the Gnostic scheme was openly taught by Cerinthus before

the publication of the Gospel of St. John. The authority is that of

Irenæus, a bishop who lived in the second century, who in his youth had

heard Polycarp, the disciple of the Apostle John, and who retained the

discourses of Polycarp in his memory till his death. There are yet

extant of the works of Irenæus, five books which he wrote against

heresies, one of the most authentic and valuable monuments of

theological erudition. In one place of that work he says, that Cerinthus

taught in Asia that the world was not made by the Supreme God, but by a

certain power very separate and far removed from the Sovereign of the

universe, and ignorant of his nature. In another place, he says that

John the Apostle wished, by his Gospel, to extirpate the error which had

been spread among men by Cerinthus; and Jerom, who lived in the fourth

century, says that St. John wrote his Gospel, at the desire of the

bishops of Asia, against Cerinthus and other heretics, and chiefly

against the doctrines of the Ebionites, then springing up, who said that

Christ did not exist before he was born of Mary.

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