ruined tower or the deserted habitation. In Isaiah, xxxiv, 11, it is
accordingly foretold that the raven, with other birds of similar
dispositions, should fix his abode in the desolate houses of Edom. In
the Septuagint and other versions the Hebrew word for _desolation_ is
rendered _raven_. The meaning is, that in those splendid palaces, where
the voice of joy and gladness was heard, and every sound which could
ravish the ear and subdue the heart, silence was, for the wickedness of
their inhabitants, to hold her reign for ever, interrupted only by the
scream of the cormorant and the croaking of the raven.
READING. In the countries of the Levant the people never read silently,
but go on in a kind of singing voice, aloud. The eunuch was probably
thus reading when Philip overheard him, and finding that he was reading
the Scriptures, said, “Understandest thou what thou readest?”
REASON, USE OF, IN RELIGION. The sublime, incomprehensible nature of
some of the Christian doctrines has so completely subdued the
understanding of many pious men, as to make them think it presumptuous
to apply reason in any way to the revelations of God; and the many
instances in which the simplicity of truth has been corrupted by an
alliance with philosophy confirm them in the belief that it is safer, as
well as more respectable, to resign their minds to devout impressions,
than to exercise their understandings in any speculations upon sacred
subjects. Enthusiasts and fanatics of all different names and sects
agree in decrying the use of reason, because it is the very essence of
fanaticism to substitute, in place of the sober deductions of reason,
the extravagant fancies of a disordered imagination, and to consider
these fancies as the immediate illumination of the Spirit of God.
Insidious writers in the deistical controversy have pretended to adopt
those sentiments of humility and reverence, which are inseparable from
true Christians, and even that total subjection of reason to faith which
characterizes enthusiasts. A pamphlet was published about the middle of
the last century that made a noise in its day, although it is now
forgotten, entitled, “Christianity not founded on Argument,” which,
while to a careless reader it may seem to magnify the Gospel, does in
reality tend to undermine our faith, by separating it from a rational
assent; and Mr. Hume, in the spirit of this pamphlet, concludes his
Essay on Miracles with calling those dangerous friends or disguised
enemies to the Christian religion who have undertaken to defend it by
the principles of human reason: “Our most holy religion,” he says, with
a disingenuity very unbecoming his respectable talents, “is founded on
faith, not on reason;” and, “mere reason is insufficient to convince us
of its veracity.” The church of Rome, in order to subject the minds of
her votaries to her authority, has reprobated the use of reason in
matters of religion. She has revived an ancient position, that things
may be true in theology which are false in philosophy; and she has, in
some instances, made the merit of faith to consist in the absurdity of
that which was believed.
The extravagance of these positions has produced, since the Reformation,
an opposite extreme. While those who deny the truth of revelation
consider reason as in all respects a sufficient guide, the Socinians,
who admit that a revelation has been made, employ reason as the supreme
judge of its doctrines, and boldly strike out of their creed every
article that is not altogether conformable to those notions which may be
derived from the exercise of reason. These controversies concerning the
use of reason in matters of religion are disputes, not about words, but
about the essence of Christianity. But a few plain observations are
sufficient to ascertain where the truth lies in this subject.
The first use of reason in matters of religion is to examine the
evidences of revelation. For, the more entire the submission which we
consider as due to every thing that is revealed, we have the more need
to be satisfied that any system which professes to be a divine
revelation does really come from God.
After the exercise of reason has established in our minds a firm belief
that Christianity is of divine original, the second use of reason is to
learn what are the truths revealed. As these truths are not in our days
communicated to any by immediate inspiration, the knowledge of them is
to be acquired only from books transmitted to us with satisfying
evidence that they were written above seventeen hundred years ago, in a
remote country and foreign language, under the direction of the Spirit
of God. In order to attain the meaning of these books we must study the
language in which they were written; and we must study also the manners
of the times, and the state of the countries, in which the writers
lived; because these are circumstances to which an original author is
often alluding, and by which his phraseology is generally affected; we
must lay together different passages in which the same word or phrase
occurs, because without this labour we cannot ascertain its precise
signification; and we must mark the difference of style and manner which
characterizes different writers, because a right apprehension of their
meaning often depends upon attention to this difference. All this
supposes the application of grammar, history, geography, chronology, and
criticism in matters of religion; that is, it supposes that the reason
of man had been previously exercised in pursuing these different
branches of knowledge, and that our success in attaining the true sense
of Scripture depends upon the diligence with which we avail ourselves of
the progress that has been made in them. It is obvious that every
Christian is not capable of making this application. But this is no
argument against the use of reason, of which we are now speaking. For
they who use translations and commentaries rely only upon the reason of
others, instead of exercising their own. The several branches of
knowledge have been applied in every age by some persons for the benefit
of others; and the progress in sacred criticism, which distinguishes the
present times, is nothing else but the continued application, in
elucidating the Scripture, of reason enlightened by every kind of
subsidiary knowledge, and very much improved in this kind of exercise by
the employment which the ancient classics have given it since the
revival of letters.
After the two uses of reason that have been illustrated, a third comes
to be mentioned, which may be considered as compounded of both. Reason
is of eminent use in repelling the attacks of the adversaries of
Christianity. When men of erudition, of philosophical acuteness, and of
accomplished taste, direct their talents against our religion, the cause
is very much hurt by an unskilful defender. He cannot unravel their
sophistry; he does not see the amount and the effect of the concessions
which he makes to them; he is bewildered by their quotations, and he is
often led by their artifice upon dangerous ground. In all ages of the
church there have been weak defenders of Christianity; and the only
triumphs of the enemies of our religion have arisen from their being
able to expose the defects of those methods of defending the truth which
some of its advocates had unwarily chosen. A mind trained to accurate
and philosophical views of the nature and the amount of evidence,
enriched with historical knowledge, accustomed to throw out of a subject
all that is minute and irrelative, to collect what is of importance
within a short compass, and to form the comprehension of a whole, is the
mind qualified to contend with the learning, the wit, and the sophistry
of infidelity. Many such minds have appeared in this honourable
controversy during the course of this and the last century; and the
success has corresponded to the completeness of the furniture with which
they engaged in the combat. The Christian doctrine has been vindicated
by their masterly exposition from various misrepresentations; the
arguments for its divine original have been placed in their true light;
and the attempts to confound the miracles and prophecies upon which
Christianity rests its claim, with the delusions of imposture, have been
effectually repelled. Christianity has, in this way, received the most
important advantages from the attacks of its enemies; and it is not
improbable that its doctrines would never have been so thoroughly
cleared from all the corruptions and subtleties which had attached to
them in the progress of ages, nor the evidences of its truths have been
so accurately understood, nor its peculiar character been so perfectly
discriminated, had not the zeal and abilities which have been employed
against it called forth in its defence some of the most distinguished
masters of reason. They brought into the service of Christianity the
same weapons which had been drawn for her destruction, and, wielding
them with confidence and skill in a good cause, became the successful
champions of the truth.
The fourth use of reason consists in judging of the truths of religion.
Every thing which is revealed by God comes to his creatures from so high
an authority, that it may be rested in with perfect assurance as true.
Nothing can be received by us as true which is contrary to the dictates
of reason, because it is impossible for us to receive at the same time
the truth and the falsehood of a proposition. But many things are true
which we do not fully comprehend; and many propositions, which appear
incredible when they are first enunciated, are found, upon examination,
such as our understandings can readily admit. These principles embrace
the whole of the subject, and they mark out the steps by which reason is
to proceed in judging of the truths of religion. We first examine the
evidences of revelation. If these satisfy our understandings, we are
certain that there can be no contradiction between the doctrines of this
true religion, and the dictates of right reason. If any such
contradiction appear, there must be some mistake; by not making a proper
use of our reason in the interpretation of the Gospel, we suppose that
it contains doctrines which it does not teach; or we give the name of
right reason to some narrow prejudices which deeper reflection, and more
enlarged knowledge, will dissipate; or we consider a proposition as
implying a contradiction, when, in truth, it is only imperfectly
understood. Here, as in every other case, mistakes are to be corrected
by measuring back our steps. We must examine closely and impartially the
meaning of those passages which appear to contain the doctrine; we must
compare them with one another; we must endeavour to derive light from
the general phraseology of Scripture and the analogy of faith; and we
shall generally be able, in this way, to separate the doctrine from all
those adventitious circumstances which give it the appearance of
absurdity. If a doctrine which, upon the closest examination, appears
unquestionably to be taught in Scripture, still does not approve itself
to our understanding, we must consider carefully what it is that
prevents us from receiving it. There may be preconceived notions hastily
taken up which that doctrine opposes; there may be pride of
understanding that does not readily submit to the views which it
communicates; or reason may need to be reminded, that we must expect to
find in religion many things which we are not able to comprehend. One of
the most important offices of reason is to recognize her own limits. She
never can be moved, by any authority, to receive as true what she
perceives to be absurd. But, if she has formed a just estimate of human
knowledge, she will not shelter her presumption in rejecting the truths
of revelation under the pretence of contradictions that do not really
exist; she will readily admit that there may be in a subject some points
which she knows, and others of which she is ignorant; she will not allow
her ignorance of the latter to shake the evidence of the former, but
will yield a firm assent to that which she does understand, without
presuming to deny what is beyond her comprehension. And thus, availing
herself of all the light which she now has, she will wait in humble hope
for the time when a larger measure shall be imparted.
REBEKAH, the wife of Isaac. See ISAAC.
RECEIPT OF CUSTOM. Matthew, when called, was sitting at the receipt of
custom, or dues on merchandise. He was a publican or tax-gatherer, or,
as we should say, a custom house officer. The publicans had houses or
booths built for them at the foot of bridges, at the mouth of rivers, by
the sea shore, and the parts of the lake of Gennesareth, or sea of
Tiberias, to collect the taxes on passengers and merchandise. See
PUBLICAN.
RECHABITES. The Rechabites, though they dwelt among the Israelites, did
not belong to any of their tribes; for they were Kenites, as appears
from 1 Chron. ii, 55, where the Kenites are said to have come of
“Hemath, the father of the house of Rechab.” These Kenites, afterward
styled Rechabites, were of the family of Jethro, otherwise called Hobab,
whose daughter Moses married; for “the children of the Kenite, Moses’s
father-in-law,” it is said, “went up out of the city of palm trees with
the children of Judah, and dwelt among the people,” Judges i, 16; and we
read of “Heber the Kenite, who was of the children of Hobab, the
father-in-law of Moses, who had severed himself from the Kenites,” or
from the bulk of them who settled in the tribe of Judah, “and pitched
his tent in the plain of Zaanaim,” Judges iv, 11. They appear to have
sprung from Midian, the son of Abraham by Keturah, Gen. xxv, 2; for
Jethro, from whom they are descended, is called a Midianite, Num. x, 23.
Of this family was Jehonadab, the son of Rechab, a man of eminent zeal
for the pure worship of God against idolatry, who assisted King Jehu in
destroying the house of Ahab, and the worshippers of Baal, 2 Kings x,
15, 16, 23, &c. It was he who gave that rule of life to his children and
posterity which we read of in Jer. xxxv, 6, 7. It consisted of these
three articles: that they should drink no wine; that they should neither
possess nor occupy any houses, fields, or vineyards; that they should
dwell in tents. This was the institution of the children of Rechab; and
this they continued to observe for upward of three hundred years, from
the time of Jehu to that of Jehoiakim, king of Judah, when
Nebuchadnezzar coming to besiege Jerusalem, the Rechabites were obliged
to leave the country and take refuge in the city. In Jer. xxxv, there is
a promise made to this people, that Jonadab, the son of Rechab, should
not want a man to stand before the Lord; that is, that his posterity
should not fail: and to this day this tribe is found among the Arabians
of the desert, distinct, free, and practising exactly the institutions
of Jonadab, whose name they bear, and of whose institutions they boast.
This is a remarkable instance of the exact fulfilment of a minute and
isolated prophecy. See BENI KHAIBIR.
RECONCILIATION. The expressions “reconciliation” and “making peace”
necessarily suppose a previous state of hostility between God and man,
which is reciprocal. This is sometimes called enmity, a term, as it
respects God, rather unfortunate, since enmity is almost fixed in our
language to signify a malignant and revengeful feeling. Of this, the
oppugners of the doctrine of the atonement have availed themselves to
argue, that as there can be no such affection in the divine nature,
therefore, reconciliation in Scripture does not mean the reconciliation
of God to man, but of man to God, whose enmity the example and teaching
of Christ, they tell us, is very effectual to subdue. It is, indeed, a
sad and humbling truth, and one which the Socinians in their discussions
on the natural innocence of man are not willing to admit, that by the
infection of sin “the carnal mind is enmity to God,” that human nature
is malignantly hostile to God and to the control of his law; but this is
far from expressing the whole of that relation of man in which, in
Scripture, he is said to be at enmity with God, and so to need a
reconciliation, the making of peace between God and him. That relation
is a legal one, as that of a sovereign in his judicial capacity, and a
criminal who has violated his laws and risen up against his authority,
and who is, therefore, treated as an enemy. The word ἐχθρὸς is used in
this passive sense, both in the Greek writers and in the New Testament.
So, in Romans xi, 28, the Jews, rejected and punished for refusing the
Gospel, are said by the Apostle, “as concerning the Gospel,” to be
“enemies for your sakes;” treated and accounted such; “but, as touching
the election, they are beloved for the fathers’ sakes.” In the same
epistle, v, 10, the term is used precisely in the same sense, and that
with reference to the reconciliation by Christ: “For if when we were
enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son;” that is,
when we were objects of the divine judicial displeasure, accounted as
enemies, and liable to be capitally treated as such. Enmity, in the
sense of malignity and the sentiment of hatred, is added to this
relation in the case of man; but it is no part of the relation itself;
it is rather a cause of it, as it is one of the actings of a corrupt
nature which render man obnoxious to the displeasure of God, and the
penalty of his law, and place him in the condition of an enemy. It is
this judicial variance and opposition between God and man which is
referred to in the term reconciliation, and in the phrase “making
peace,” in the New Testament; and the hostility is, therefore, in its
own nature, mutual.
But that there is no truth in the notion, that reconciliation means no
more than our laying aside our enmity to God, may also be shown from
several express passages. The first is the passage we have above cited:
“For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God,” Rom. v, 10.
Here the act of reconciling is ascribed to God, and not to us; but if
this reconciliation consisted in the laying aside of our own enmity, the
act would be ours alone: and, farther, that it could not be the laying
aside of our enmity, is clear from the text, which speaks of
reconciliation while we were yet enemies. The reconciliation spoken of
here is not, as Socinus and his followers have said, our conversion. For
that the Apostle is speaking of a benefit obtained for us previous to
our conversion, appears evident from the opposite members of the two
sentences, “much more, being justified, we shall be saved from wrath
through him,” “much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his
life.” The Apostle argues from the greater to the less. If God were so
benign to us before our conversion, what may we not expect from him now
we are converted? To reconcile here cannot mean to convert; for the
Apostle evidently speaks of something greatly remarkable in the act of
Christ; but to convert sinners is nothing remarkable, since none but
sinners can be ever converted; whereas it was a rare and singular thing
for Christ to die for sinners, and to reconcile sinners to God by his
death, when there have been but very few good men who have died for
their friends. In the next place, conversion is referred more properly
to his glorious life, than to his shameful death; but this
reconciliation is attributed to his death, as contradistinguished from
his glorious life, as is evident from the antithesis contained in the
two verses. Beside, it is from the latter benefit that we learn the
nature of the former. The latter, which belongs only to the converted,
consists of the peace of God, and salvation from wrath, Rom. v, 9, 10.
This the Apostle afterward calls receiving the reconciliation. And what
is it to receive the reconciliation, but to receive the remission of
sins? Acts x, 43. To receive conversion is a mode of speaking entirely
unknown. If, then, to receive the reconciliation is to receive the
remission of sins, and in effect to be delivered from wrath or
punishment, to be reconciled must have a corresponding signification.
“God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, not imputing their
trespasses unto them,” 2 Cor. v, 19. Here the manner of this
reconciliation is expressly said to be, not our laying aside our enmity,
but the non-imputation of our trespasses to us by God; in other words,
the pardoning of our offences and restoring us to favour. The promise,
on God’s part, to do this, is expressive of his previous reconciliation
to the world by the death of Christ; for our actual reconciliation is
distinguished from this by what follows, “and hath committed to us the
ministry of reconciliation,” by virtue of which all men were, by the
Apostles, entreated and besought to be reconciled to God. The reason,
too, of this reconciliation of God to the world, by virtue of which he
promises not to impute sin, is grounded by the Apostle, in the last
verse of the chapter, not upon the laying aside of enmity by men, but
upon the sacrifice of Christ: “For he hath made him to be sin,” a
sin-offering, “for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the
righteousness of God in him.” “And that he might reconcile both unto God
in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby,” Eph. ii, 16.
Here the act of reconciling is attributed to Christ. Man is not spoken
of as reconciling himself to God; but Christ is said to reconcile Jews
and Gentiles together, and both to God, “by his cross.” Thus, says the
Apostle, “he is our peace;” but in what manner is the peace effected?
Not, in the first instance, by subduing the enmity of man’s heart, but
by removing the enmity of “the law.” “Having abolished in” or by “his
flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments.” The ceremonial law only
is here, probably meant; for by its abolition, through its fulfilment in
Christ, the enmity between Jews and Gentiles was taken away; but still
it was not only necessary to reconcile Jew and Gentile together, but to
“reconcile both unto God.” This he did by the same act; abolishing the
ceremonial law by becoming the antitype of all its sacrifices, and thus,
by the sacrifice of himself, effecting the reconciliation of all to God,
“slaying the enmity by his cross,” taking away whatever hindered the
reconciliation of the guilty to God, which, as we have seen, was not
enmity and hatred to God in the human mind only, but that judicial
hostility and variance which separated God and man as Judge and
criminal. The feeble criticism of Socinus, on this passage, in which he
has been followed by his adherents to this day, is thus answered by
Grotius: “In this passage the dative Θεῷ, _to God_, can only be governed
by the verb ἀποκατάλλαξῃ, _that he might reconcile_; for the
interpretation of Socinus, which makes _to God_ stand by itself, or that
to reconcile to God is to reconcile them among themselves, that they
might serve God, is distorted and without example. Nor is the argument
valid which is drawn from thence, that in this place St. Paul properly
treats of the peace made between Jews and Gentiles; for neither does it
follow from this argument, that it was beside his purpose to mention the
peace made for each with God. For the two opposites which are joined,
are so joined among themselves, that they should be primarily and
chiefly joined by that bond; for they are not united among themselves,
except by and for that bond. Gentiles and Jews, therefore, are made
friends among themselves by friendship with God.”