established by Christ and his Apostles, superior to that of presbyters;
that all ministers, being ambassadors, are equal by their commission;
and that elder, or presbyter, and bishop, are the same in name and
office, and the terms synonymous. Their arguments against the
Episcopalians are as follows:--With respect to the successors of the
Apostles, they seem to have been placed on a footing of perfect
equality, the διάκονοι, or deacons, not being included among the
teachers. They were inferior officers, whose province it originally was
to care for the poor, and to discharge those secular duties arising out
of the formation of Christian communities, which could not be discharged
by the ministers without interfering with the much higher duties which
they had to perform. These ministers are sometimes in the New Testament
styled ϖρεσϐύτεροι, or presbyters, at other times ἐπίσκοποι, or bishops;
but the two appellations were indiscriminately applied to all the
pastors who were the instructers of the different churches. Of this
various examples may be given from the sacred writings. The Apostle
Paul, upon a very affecting occasion, when he was convinced that he
could never again have an opportunity of addressing them, sent for the
elders or presbyters of Ephesus, the persons to whom the ministry in
that church had been committed; and after mentioning all that he had
done, and intimating to them the sufferings which awaited him, he
addressed to them what may be considered as his dying advice, and as
comprehending in it all that he judged it most essential for them to do.
Take heed, therefore, unto yourselves, and to all the flock over which
the Holy Ghost hath made you bishops or overseers, to feed the church of
God,” Acts xx, 17, 28. Here they whose duty it was to feed the church of
God, as having been set apart through the Holy Spirit for that
interesting work, are termed by the Apostle presbyters and bishops, and
there is not the slightest allusion to the existence of any other
ἐπίσκοπος, or bishop, superior to those ἐπίσκοποι, or bishops, to whom
he gives the moving charge now recorded. In his epistle to Titus, St.
Paul thus writes: For this purpose I left thee in Crete,” where, as yet,
it is probable that no teachers had been appointed, that thou shouldest
ordain elders, or presbyters, in every city.” He then points out the
class of men from which the presbyters were to be selected, adding, as
the reason of this, for a bishop must be blameless as the steward of
God,” Titus i, 5, 7. It is quite plain that the epithet bishop is here
applicable to the same persons who were a little before styled elders,
and both are declared to be the stewards of God, the guardians and
instructers of his church. The Apostle Peter, in his first epistle
addressed to the Jewish converts, has these words: “The elders which are
among you I exhort, who am also an elder, ὁ συμπρεσϐύτερος, and a
witness of the sufferings of Christ, feed the flock of God which is
among you, taking the oversight of it, ἐπισκοποῦντες, being bishops of
it, not by constraint but willingly,” 1 Peter v, 1, 2. This passage is a
very strong one. The Apostle speaks of himself in his extraordinary
capacity, a witness of the sufferings of Christ, and in his ordinary
capacity as a teacher; showing, by the use of a very significant term,
that as to it he was on a footing of equality with the other pastors or
presbyters. He gives it in charge to them to feed the flock of God; the
charge which, under most particular and affecting circumstances, he had
received from the Lord after the resurrection, and which includes in it
the performance of every thing requisite for the comfort and the
edification of Christians; and he accordingly expresses this by the word
ἐπισκοποῦντες, being bishops over them. It cannot, with any shadow of
reason, be supposed that the Apostle would exhort the elders or
presbyters to take to themselves the office, and to perform the duties,
of a bishop, if that term really marked out a distinct and higher order;
or that he would have considered the presbyters as fitted for the
discharge of the whole ministerial office, if there were parts of that
office which he knew that it was not lawful for them to exercise.
It seems, by the passages that have been quoted, to be placed beyond a
doubt, that, in what the Apostles said respecting the ministers of
Christ’s religion, they taught that the ἐπίσκοποι and the ϖρεσβύτεροι
were the same class of instructers; and that there were, in fact, only
two orders pointed out by them, bishops or presbyters, and deacons. This
being the case, even although it should appear that there were bishops,
in the common sense of that term, recognized in the apostolic age, all
that could be deduced from the fact would be, that the equality at first
instituted among the teachers, had, for prudential reasons, or under
peculiar circumstances, been interrupted; but it would not follow either
that the positive and general declarations on the subject by the
inspired writers were not true, or that it was incumbent at all times,
and upon all Christians, to disregard them. It has been strenuously
contended that there were such bishops in the infancy of the church, and
that allusion is made to them in Scripture; but without directly
opposing the assertion, this much must be admitted, that the proof of it
is less clear than that bishops and presbyters were represented as the
same in rank and in authority. Indeed, there does not appear to have
been any occasion for this higher order. To presbyters was actually
committed the most important charge of feeding the church of God, that
is, of promoting the spiritual improvement of mankind; and it is
remarkable that their privilege of separating from the people by
ordination the ministers of religion, is explicitly acknowledged in the
case of Timothy, whom the Apostle admonishes not to neglect the gift
that was in him, and which had been given by prophecy, and by the laying
on of the hands of the presbytery; by which can be meant only the laying
on of the hands of those who were denominated presbyters or bishops. But
although all the parts of the ministerial duty had been intrusted to
presbyters, it is still contended that the New Testament indicates the
existence of bishops as a higher order. There has, however, been much
diversity of opinion in relation to this point by those who contend for
the divine institution of episcopacy. Some of them maintain that the
Apostles, while they lived, were the bishops of the Christian church;
but this, and upon irrefragable grounds, is denied by others. Some urge
that Timothy and Titus were, in what they call the true sense of the
term, bishops; but many deny that, founding their denial upon these
evangelists not having resided within the bounds, or been limited to the
administration of any one church, being sent wherever it was resolved to
bring men to the knowledge of divine truth. Many conceive that the
question is settled by the epistles in the book of Revelation being
addressed to the angels of the respective churches named by the Apostle.
But it is far from being obvious what is implied under the appellation
angel; there has been much dispute about this point, and it is certainly
a deviation from all the usual rules by which we are guided in
interpreting Scripture, to bring an obscure and doubtful passage in
illustration of one, about the import of which, if we attend to the
language used, there can be no doubt. It may, therefore, be safely
affirmed that there is nothing clear and specific in the writings of the
New Testament which qualifies the positive declarations that bishops and
presbyters were the same officers; that the ground upon which the
distinction between them is placed, is, at least, far from obviously
supporting it; and that there is not the slightest intimation that the
observance of such a distinction is at all important, much less
absolutely essential to a true Christian church, insomuch that, where it
is disregarded, the ordinances of divine appointment cannot be properly
dispensed. If therefore it be established,--and some of the most learned
and zealous advocates for the hierarchy which afterward arose have been
compelled to admit it,--that Scripture has not recognized any difference
of rank or order between the ordinary teachers of the Gospel, all other
means of maintaining this difference should be with Protestants of no
force. It may be shown that the admission of the distinction is not
incompatible with the great ends for which a ministry was appointed, and
even in particular cases may tend to promote them; but still it is
merely a matter of human regulation, not binding upon Christians, and
not in any way connected with the vital influence of the Gospel
dispensation. The whole of the writers of antiquity may be urged in
support of it, if that could be done; and, after all, every private
Christian would be entitled to judge for himself, and to be directed by
his own judgment, unless it be maintained that where Scripture has
affirmed the existence of equality, this is to be counteracted and set
at nought by the testimonies and assertions of a set of writers, who,
although honoured with the name of fathers, are very far, indeed, from
being infallible, and who have, in fact, often delivered sentiments
which even they who, upon a particular emergency, cling to them, must
confess to be directly at variance with all that is sound in reason, or
venerable and sublime in religion. It also follows, from the Scriptural
identity of bishops and presbyters, that no church in which this
identity is preserved, can on that account be considered as having
departed from the apostolic model, or its ministers be viewed, at least
with any good reason, as having less ground to hope for the blessing of
God upon their spiritual labours; because if we admit the contrary, we
must also admit that the inspired writers, instead of properly
regulating the church, betrayed it into error, by omitting to make a
distinction closely allied with the essence of religion. What is this
but to say that it is safer to follow the erring direction of frail
mortals, than to follow the admonitions of those who, it is universally
allowed, were inspired by the Holy Spirit, or commissioned by him to be
the instructers of the world?
It is to be observed, however, that although bishops and presbyters were
the same when the epistles of the New Testament were written, it would
be going too far to contend that no departure from this should ever take
place; because, to justify such a position, it would be requisite that a
positive injunction should have been given that equality must at all
times be carefully preserved. There is, however, no such injunction.
Unlike the Old Testament, which specified every thing, even the most
minute, in relation to the priesthood, the New only alludes in general
terms, and very seldom, to the ministry; and the reason probably is,
that, being intended for all nations, it left Christians at liberty to
make such modifications in the ecclesiastical constitution as in their
peculiar situation appeared best adapted for religious edification. The
simple test to be applied to the varying or varied forms of church
government is that indicated by our Lord himself: By their fruits ye
shall know them.” Wherever the regulations respecting the ministry are
such as to divert it from the purposes for which it was destined, to
separate those who form it from the flock of Christ, to relax their
diligence in teaching, and to destroy the connection between them and
their people, so as to render their exertions of little or of no use,
there we find a church not apostolical. But wherever the blessed fruits
of Gospel teaching are in abundance produced, where the people and the
ministers are cordially united, and where every regulation is calculated
to give efficacy to the labours of those who have entered into the
vineyard, we have an apostolical church, or, to speak more properly, a
church of Christ, built upon a rock, because devoted to the beneficent
objects for which our Saviour came into the world.
The form of church government among the Scotch Presbyterians is as
follows:--The kirk session, consisting of the minister and lay elders of
the congregation, is the lowest ecclesiastical judicature. The next is
the presbytery, which consists of all the pastors within a certain
district, and one ruling elder from each parish. The provincial synods,
of which there are fifteen, meet twice in the year, and are composed of
the members of the several presbyteries within the respective provinces.
From the kirk sessions appeal lies to the presbyteries, from these to
the synods, and from them to the general assembly, which meets annually,
and is the highest ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom. This is
composed of delegates from each presbytery, from every royal borough,
and from each of the Scotch universities; and the king presides by a
commission of his own appointment. The Scotch ordain by the laying on of
the hands of the presbytery,” before which persons may be licensed to
preach as probationers, but cannot administer the sacraments. The clergy
are maintained by the state, and nominated to livings by patrons, as in
other establishments. Those properly called the English Presbyterians,
have no connection with the Scotch kirk. They are now indeed broken into
separate churches, and follow the same form of church government as the
Congregationalists or Independents. The name Presbyterian, therefore, is
now inapplicable to them although retained. So Dr. Doddridge: Those who
hold every pastor to be so a bishop or overseer of his own congregation,
as that no other person or body of men have, by divine institution, a
power to exercise any superior or pastoral office in it, may, properly
speaking, be called, so far at least, congregational; and it is by a
vulgar mistake that any such are called Presbyterians.” See
EPISCOPALIANS.
PRESCIENCE, or foreknowledge, an attribute of God. (See _Omniscience_.)
On this subject three leading theories have been resorted to, in order
to evade the difficulties which are supposed to be involved in the
opinion commonly received. The Chevalier Ramsay, among his other
speculations, holds it a matter of choice in God, to think of finite
ideas; and similar opinions, though variously worded, have been
occasionally adopted. In substance these opinions are, that though the
knowledge of God be infinite as his power is infinite, there is no more
reason to conclude, that his knowledge should be always exerted to the
full extent of its capacity, than that his power should be employed to
the extent of his omnipotence; and that if we suppose him to _choose_
not to know some contingencies, the infiniteness of his knowledge is not
thereby impugned. To this it may be answered, that the infinite power of
God is in Scripture represented, as in the nature of things it must be,
as an infinite capacity, and not as infinite in act; but that the
knowledge of God is on the contrary never represented there to us as a
capacity to acquire knowledge, but as actually comprehending all things
that are, and all things that can be. 2. That the notion of God’s
choosing to know some things, and not to know others, supposes a reason
why he refuses to know any class of things or events; which reason, it
would seem, can only arise out of their nature and circumstances, and
therefore supposes at least a partial knowledge of them, from which the
reason for his not choosing to know them arises. The doctrine is
therefore somewhat contradictory. But, 3. It is fatal to this opinion
that it does not at all meet the difficulty arising out of the question
of the consistency of divine prescience, and the free actions of men;
since some contingent actions, for which men have been made accountable,
we are sure, have been foreknown by God, because by his Spirit in the
prophets they were foretold; and if the freedom of man can in these
cases be reconciled to the prescience of God, there is no greater
difficulty in any other case which can possibly occur.
A second theory is, that the foreknowledge of contingent events, being
in its own nature impossible, because it implies a contradiction, it
does no dishonour to the divine Being to affirm, that of such events he
has, and can have, no prescience whatever; and thus the prescience of
God, as to moral actions, being wholly denied, the difficulty in
question is got rid of. To this the same answer must be given as to the
former. It does not meet the case, so long as the Scriptures are allowed
to contain prophecies of rewardable and punishable actions. The great
fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action
destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and
certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate,
that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can
only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into
common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that
account, to present itself to different minds under different shades of
meaning. If, however, the term _contingent_ in this controversy has any
definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must
mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to
necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results
from the choice of the agent, is distinguished from a necessary one in
this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to
the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this
specific quality of a free action, that the term contingency is used; it
might have been otherwise, in other words, it was not necessitated.
Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is
opposed, not to certainty, but to constraint. The very nature of this
controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question
is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is,
whether they _will_ happen or not; but about the nature of them, whether
free or constrained, whether they _must_ happen or not. Those who
advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply
considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why
they object to a certain prescience of moral actions, is this,--they
conclude, that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the
quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen
or not. If contingency meant _uncertainty_, the sense in which such
theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an
uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated
action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the
least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause
of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with
exerted power: for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or
necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a
voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a
necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be
contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on
the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not
result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the
necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action
does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but
from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It
alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might
have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would
have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action, is
not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of
the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will
nor the act is controlled by the knowledge; and the action, though
foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then
no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for
this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions
may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by
that foreknowledge. But here it is said, If the result of an absolute
contingency be certainly foreknown, it _can_ have no other result, it
_cannot_ happen otherwise.” This is not the true inference. It _will_
not happen otherwise; but it may be asked, Why _can_ it not happen
otherwise? _Can_ is an expression of potentiality, it denotes power or
possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action
should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If
a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than
as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from
the necessitating cause solely, and not from the prescience of the
action which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into
the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might
have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the
foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the
other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of
foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise,
nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in
that case, must be uncertain.” Not unless any person can prove, that the
divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the
human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the
influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitances and haltings
of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for
us,” but it is the knowledge of Him who understandeth the thoughts of
man afar off.” “But if a contingency _will_ have a given result, to that
result it _must_ be determined.” Not in the least. We have seen that it
cannot be determined to a given result by mere precognition; for we have
evidence in our own minds that mere knowledge is not causal to the
actions of another. It is determined to its result by the will of the
agent; but even in that case, it cannot be said, that it _must_ be
determined to that result, because it is of the nature of freedom to be
unconstrained: so that here we have an instance in the case of a free
agent that he _will_ act in some particular manner; but it by no means
follows from what _will_ be, whether foreseen or not, that it _must_ be.