extraordinary event, which surprises us by its novelty. In a more
accurate and philosophic sense, a miracle is an effect which does not
follow from any of the regular laws of nature, or which is inconsistent
with some known law of it, or contrary to the settled constitution and
course of things. Accordingly, all miracles presuppose an established
system of nature, within the limits of which they operate, and with the
order of which they disagree. Of a miracle in the theological sense many
definitions have been given. That of Dr. Samuel Clarke is: A miracle is
a work effected in a manner unusual, or different from the common and
regular method of providence, by the interposition of God himself, or of
some intelligent agent superior to man, for the proof or evidence of
some particular doctrine, or in attestation of the authority of some
particular person.” Mr. Hume has insidiously or erroneously maintained
that a miracle is contrary to experience; but in reality it is only
different from experience. Experience informs us that one event has
happened often; testimony informs us that another event has happened
once or more. That diseases should be generally cured by the application
of external causes, and sometimes at the mere word of a prophet, and
without the visible application of causes, are facts not inconsistent
with each other in the nature of things themselves, nor irreconcilable
according to our ideas. Each fact may arise from its own proper cause;
each may exist independently of the other; and each is known by its own
proper proof, whether of sense or testimony. As secret causes often
produce events contrary to those we do expect from experience, it is
equally conceivable that events should sometimes be produced which we do
not expect. To pronounce, therefore, a miracle to be false, because it
is different from experience is only to conclude against its general
existence from the very circumstance which constitutes its particular
nature; for if it were not different from experience, where would be its
singularity? or what particular proof could be drawn from it, if it
happened according to the ordinary train of human events, or was
included in the operation of the general laws of nature? We grant that
it does differ from experience; but we do not presume to make our
experience the standard of the divine conduct. He that acknowledges a
God must, at least, admit the possibility of a miracle. The atheist,
that makes him inseparable from what is called nature, and binds him to
its laws by an insurmountable necessity; that deprives him of will, and
wisdom, and power, as a distinct and independent Being; may deny even
the very possibility of a miraculous interposition, which can in any
instance suspend or counteract those general laws by which the world is
governed. But he who allows of a First Cause in itself perfect and
intelligent, abstractedly from those effects which his wisdom and power
have produced, must at the same time allow that this cause can be under
no such restraints as to be debarred the liberty of controlling its laws
as often as it sees fit. Surely, the Being that made the world can
govern it, or any part of it, in such a manner as he pleases; and he
that constituted the very laws by which it is in general conducted, may
suspend the operation of those laws in any given instance, or impress
new powers on matter, in order to produce new and extraordinary effects.
In judging of miracles there are certain criteria, peculiar to the
subject, sufficient to conduct our inquiries, and warrant our
determination. Assuredly they do not appeal to our ignorance, for they
presuppose not only the existence of a general order of things, but our
actual knowledge of the appearance which that order exhibits, and of the
secondary material causes from which it, in most cases, proceeds. If a
miraculous event were effected by the immediate hand of God, and yet
bore no mark of distinction from the ordinary effects of his agency, it
would impress no conviction, and probably awaken no attention. Our
knowledge of the ordinary course of things, though limited, is real; and
therefore it is essential to a miracle, both that it differ from that
course, and be accompanied with peculiar and unequivocal signs of such
difference. We have been told that the course of nature is fixed and
unalterable, and therefore it is not consistent with the immutability of
God to perform miracles. But, surely, they who reason in this manner beg
the point in question. We have no right to assume that the Deity has
ordained such general laws as will exclude his interposition; and we
cannot suppose that he would forbear to interfere where any important
end could be answered. This interposition, though it controls, in
particular cases, the energy, does not diminish the utility, of those
laws. It leaves them to fulfil their own proper purposes, and effects
only a distinct purpose, for which they were not calculated. If the
course of nature implies the general laws of matter and motion, into
which the most opposite phenomena may be resolved, it is certain that we
do not yet know them in their full extent; and, therefore, that events,
which are related by judicious and disinterested persons, and at the
same time imply no gross contradiction, are possible in themselves, and
capable of a certain degree of proof. If the course of nature implies
the whole order of events which God has ordained for the government of
the world, it includes both his ordinary and extraordinary
dispensations, and among them miracles may have their place, as a part
of the universal plan. It is, indeed, consistent with sound philosophy,
and not inconsistent with pure religion, to acknowledge that they might
be disposed by the supreme Being at the same time with the more ordinary
effects of his power; that their causes and occasions might be arranged
with the same regularity; and that, in reference chiefly to their
concomitant circumstances of persons and times, to the specific ends for
which they were employed, and to our idea of the immediate necessity
there is for a divine agent, miracles would differ from common events,
in which the hand of God acts as efficaciously, though less visibly. On
this consideration of the subject, miracles, instead of contradicting
nature, might form a part of it. But what our limited reason and scanty
experience may comprehend should never be represented as a full and
exact view of the possible or actual varieties which exist in the works
of God.
2. If we be asked whether miracles are credible, we reply, that,
abstractedly considered, they are not incredible; that they are capable
of indirect proof from analogy, and of direct, from testimony; that in
the common and daily course of worldly affairs, events, the
improbability of which, antecedently to all testimony, was very great,
are proved to have happened, by the authority of competent and honest
witnesses; that the Christian miracles were objects of real and proper
experience to those who saw them; and that whatsoever the senses of
mankind can perceive, their report may substantiate. Should it be asked
whether miracles were necessary, and whether the end proposed to be
effected by them could warrant so immediate and extraordinary an
interference of the Almighty, as such extraordinary operations suppose;
to this we might answer, that, if the fact be established, all
reasonings _à priori_ concerning their necessity must be frivolous, and
may be false. We are not capable of deciding on a question which,
however simple in appearance, is yet too complex in its parts, and too
extensive in its object, to be fully comprehended by the human
understanding. Whether God could or could not have effected all the ends
designed to be promoted by the Gospel, without deviating from the common
course of his providence, and interfering with its general laws, is a
speculation that a modest inquirer would carefully avoid; for it carries
on the very face of it a degree of presumption totally unbecoming the
state of a mortal being. Infinitely safer is it for us to acquiesce in
what the Almighty has done, than to embarrass our minds with
speculations about what he might have done. Inquiries of this kind are
generally inconclusive, and always useless. They rest on no solid
principles, are conducted by no fixed rules, and lead to no clear
conviction. They begin from curiosity or vanity, they are prosecuted
amidst ignorance and error, and they frequently terminate in impious
presumption or universal skepticism. God is the best and indeed the only
judge how far miracles are proper to promote any particular design of
his providence, and how far that design would have been left
unaccomplished, if common and ordinary methods only had been pursued.
So, from the absence of miracles, we may conclude, in any supposed case,
that they were not necessary; from their existence, supported by fair
testimony, in any given case, we may infer with confidence that they are
proper. A view of the state of the world in general, and of the Jewish
nation in particular, and an examination of the nature and tendency of
the Christian religion, will point out very clearly the great expediency
of a miraculous interposition; and when we reflect on the gracious and
important ends that were to be effected by it, we shall be convinced
that it was not an idle and useless display of divine power; but that
while the means effected and confirmed the end, the end fully justified
and illustrated the means. If we reflect on the almost irresistible
force of prejudice, and the strong opposition it universally made to the
establishment of a new religion on the demolition of rites and
ceremonies, which authority had made sacred, and custom had
familiarized; if we reflect on the extent and importance, as well as the
singularity, of the Christian plan; what was its avowed purpose to
effect, and what difficulties it was necessarily called to struggle with
before that purpose could be effected; how much it was opposed by the
opinions and the practice of the generality of mankind, by philosophy,
by superstition, by corrupt passions and inveterate habits, by pride and
sensuality, in short, by every engine of human influence, whether formed
by craft, or aided by power;--if we seriously reflect on these things,
and give them their due force, (and experience shows us that we can
scarcely give them too much,) we shall be induced to admit even the
necessity of a miraculous interposition, at a time when common means
must inevitably, in our apprehensions, have failed of success.
The revelation of the divine will by inspired persons is, as such,
miraculous; and therefore, before the adversaries of the Gospel can
employ with propriety their objections to the particular miracles on
which its credibility is based, they should show the impossibility of
any revelation. In whatever age the revelation is given, succeeding ages
can know it only from testimony; and, if they admit, on the report of
their fellow creatures, that God had inspired any being with the
preternatural knowledge of his will, why should they deny that he had
enabled the same being to heal the sick, or to cleanse the leprous? How,
may it be asked, should the divine Teacher give a more direct and
consistent proof of his preternatural commission, than by displaying
those signs and wonders which mark the finger of God? That the Apostles
could not be deceived, and that they had no temptation to deceive, has
been repeatedly demonstrated. So powerful, indeed, is the proof adduced
in support of their testimony, that the infidels of these later days
have been obliged to abandon the ground on which their predecessors
stood; to disclaim all moral evidences arising from the character and
relation of eye-witnesses; and to maintain, upon metaphysical, rather
than historical, principles, that miracles are utterly incapable, in
their own nature, of existing in any circumstances, or of being
supported by any evidence.
Miracles may be classed under two heads: those which consist in a train
or combination of events, which distinguish themselves from the ordinary
arrangements of Providence; and those particular operations which are
performed by instruments and agents incompetent to effect them without a
preternatural power. In the conduct of Providence respecting the Jewish
people, from the earliest periods of their existence, as a distinct
class of society, to the present time, we behold a singularity of
circumstance and procedure which we cannot account for on common
principles. Comparing their condition and situation with that of other
nations, we can meet with nothing similar to it in the history of
mankind. So remarkable a difference, conspicuous in every revolution of
their history, could not have subsisted through mere accident. There
must have been a cause adequate to so extraordinary an effect. Now, what
should this cause be, but an interposition of Providence in a manner
different from the course of its general government? For the phenomenon
cannot be explained by an application of those general causes and
effects that operate in other cases. The original propagation of
Christianity was likewise an event which clearly discovered a miraculous
interposition. The circumstances which attended it were such as cannot
rationally be accounted for on any other postulatum. (See the article
_Christianity_.) It may now be observed, that the institutions of the
law and the Gospel may not only appeal for their confirmation to a train
of events which, taken in a general and combined view, point out an
extraordinary designation, and vindicate their claim to a divine
authority; but also to a number of particular operations which,
considered distinctly, or in a separate and detached light, evidently
display a supernatural power, immediately exerted on the occasion.
Since Christ himself constantly appealed to these works as the evidences
of his divine mission and character, we may briefly examine how far they
justified and confirmed his pretensions. That our Lord laid the greatest
stress on the evidence they afforded; nay, that he considered that
evidence as sufficient to authenticate his claims to the office of the
Messiah with all reasonable and well disposed inquirers, is manifest not
only from his own words, John x, 25, but also from a great variety of
other passages in the evangelists. Thus, when the disciples of John were
sent to Christ, to receive from his own lips the most satisfactory
proofs of his divine mission, he referred them to his miracles. Go,”
said he, and show to John again those things which ye hear and see: the
blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the
deaf hear, and the dead are raised up,” Matt. xi, 4, 5. Again: If I do
not the works of my Father, believe me not: but if I do, though ye
believe not me, believe the works,” John x, 37. This appeal to miracles
was founded on the following just and obvious grounds:--
First: That they are visible proofs of divine approbation, as well as of
divine power: for it would have been quite inconclusive to rest an
appeal on the testimony of the latter, if it had not at the same time
included an evidence of the former; and it was, indeed a natural
inference, that working of miracles, in defence of a particular cause,
was the seal of Heaven to the truth of that cause. To suppose the
contrary, would be to suppose that God not only permitted his creatures
to be deceived, but that he deviated from the ordinary course of his
providence, purposely with a view to deceive them. The conclusion which
the man whom our Saviour restored to sight drew from this miracle was
exceedingly just, and founded on the common sentiments and impressions
of the human heart. We know,” says he, that God heareth not sinners: but
if any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth his will, him he heareth.
Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of
one that was born blind. If this man were not of God, he could do
nothing,” John ix, 31–33. If the cause which our Saviour was engaged in
had not been approved of by God, it would not have been honoured with
the seal of miracles: for the divine power can never be supposed to
counteract the divine will. This would be to set his nature at variance
with itself; and, by destroying his simplicity, would destroy his
happiness, and terminate in confusion and misery. Hence we may justly
reject, as incredible, those miracles which have been ascribed to the
interposition of wicked spirits. The possibility of their interference
is a mere hypothesis, depending upon gratuitous assumption, and leading
to very dangerous consequences; and the particular instances in which
credulous superstition, or perverted philosophy, has supposed them to
interfere, are, as facts, destitute of any clear and solid evidence; or,
as effects, often resolvable into natural causes.
Secondly: When our Lord appealed to his miracles, as proofs of his
divine mission, it presupposed that those miracles were of such a nature
as would bear the strictest examination; that they had all those
criteria which could possibly distinguish them from the delusions of
enthusiasm, and the artifices of imposture; else the appeal would have
been fallacious and equivocal. He appealed to them with all the
confidence of an upright mind, totally possessed with a consciousness of
their truth and reality. This appeal was not drawn out into any laboured
argument, nor adorned by any of the embellishments of language. It was
short, simple, and decisive. He neither reasoned nor declaimed on their
nature or their design: he barely pointed to them as plain and
indubitable facts, such as spoke their own meaning, and carried with
them their own authority. The miracles which our Lord performed were too
public to be suspected of imposture; and, being objects of sense, they
were secured against the charge of enthusiasm. An impostor would not
have acted so absurdly as to have risked his credit on the performance
of what, he must have known, it was not in his power to effect; and
though an enthusiast, from the warmth of imagination, might have
flattered himself with a full persuasion of his being able to perform
some miraculous work; yet, when the trial was referred to an object of
sense, the event must soon have exposed the delusion. The impostor would
not have dared to say to the blind, Receive thy sight; to the deaf,
Hear; to the dumb, Speak; to the dead, Arise; to the raging of the sea,
Be still; lest he should injure the credit of his cause, by undertaking
more than he could perform; and though the enthusiast, under the
delusion of his passions, might have confidently commanded disease to
fly, and the powers of nature to be subject to his control; yet their
obedience would not have followed his command.
The miracles of Christ then were such as an impostor would not have
attempted, and such as an enthusiast could not have effected. They had
no disguise; and were in a variety of instances of such a nature as to
preclude the very possibility of collusion. They were performed in the
midst of his bitterest enemies; and were so palpable and certain, as to
extort the following acknowledgment even from persons who were most
eager to oppose his doctrines, and to discredit his pretensions: This
man doeth many miracles. If we let him thus alone, all men will believe
on him,” John xi, 47, 48. The miracles Christ performed were indeed
sufficient to alarm the fears of those whose downfall was involved in
his success. And it was impossible for them to deny the facts, which so
many thousands were ready to attest on evidence too certain to admit
even the possibility of mistake, delusion, or imposture. But his
enemies, who admitted their reality and yet resisted their design, by
not acknowledging the person who wrought them to be the Messiah, had
recourse to the most impious and most absurd suppositions, in order to
evade their evidence. The Heathen imputed them to some occult power of
magic: and thus applied what has no existence in nature, in order to
account for a phenomenon that existed out of its common course. The
stories of the Jews, who confessed the miracles, but denied what they
were intended to establish, are too ridiculous to be mentioned. We must
not, however, omit to take notice of the wicked and blasphemous cavil of
the Pharisees, and the noble reply which our Lord made to it. They could
not deny the fact, but they imputed it to the agency of an infernal
spirit: This fellow,” said they, doth not cast out devils, but by
Beelzebub, the prince of the devils. And Jesus knew their thoughts, and
said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to
desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not
stand: and if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself; how
shall then his kingdom stand?” Matt. xii, 24–26. The purity of the
doctrine which was taught by our blessed Lord was totally adverse to the
kingdom of darkness. It tended to overthrow it, by the introduction of
principles far different from those which Satan would inspire, and by
prosecuting objects totally opposite to those which that wicked and
malignant spirit would tempt us to pursue: so that in proportion to the
prevalence of the kingdom of Christ, the kingdom of Satan would of
course be diminished. Now, supposing miracles to be in the power of an
infernal spirit, can it be imagined that he would communicate an ability
of performing them to persons who were counteracting his designs? Would
he by them give credit to a cause that tended to bring his own into
disgrace? Thus, as our Saviour appealed to miracles as proofs of his
power; so he appealed to the inherent worth and purity of the doctrines
they were intended to bear witness to, as a proof that the power was of
God. In this manner do the external and internal evidences give and
receive mutual confirmation and mutual lustre.
The truth of the Christian religion does not, however, wholly depend on
the miracles wrought by its divine Founder, though sufficient in
themselves to establish his claims: but, in order to give the evidence
of miracles the strongest force they could possibly acquire, that
evidence was extended still farther; and the same power that our Lord
possessed was communicated to his disciples, and their more immediate
successors. While yet on earth he imparted to them this extraordinary
gift, as the seal of their commission, when he sent them to preach the
Gospel: and after his glorious resurrection and ascension into heaven,
they were endowed with powers yet more stupendous. Sensible of the
validity of this kind of evidence, the Apostles of our Lord, with the
same artless simplicity, and the same boldness of conscious integrity,
which distinguished their great Master, constantly insisted upon the
miracles they wrought, as strong and undeniable proofs of the truth of
their doctrines. Thus the miracles of our blessed Lord may be justly
considered as the evidence of his divine mission and character. If we
consider their nature, their greatness, and their number; and if to this
consideration we add that which respects their end and design, we must
acknowledge that no one could have performed them, unless God was with
him. They were too public to be the artifices of imposture; too
substantial and too numerous to afford the slightest suspicion of
undesigned and fortuitous coincidence. In a word, supposing that the
Most High should in any instance so far counteract the common laws of
nature, as to produce a miracle; and should design that miracle as a
monument to future times of the truth of any peculiar doctrine, we
cannot conceive any mode of communicating it more effectual than that
which he has chosen. Stronger proofs could not be afforded, consistently
with the design of the Gospel, which is not to overpower our
understandings by an irresistible and compulsory light, but to afford us
such rational evidence as is sufficient to satisfy moral inquirers, who
are endowed with faculties to perceive the truth; but at the same time
who also have power totally to resist it, and finally to forfeit all its
blessings. These miracles were of a nature too palpable to be mistaken.
They were the objects of sense, and not the precarious speculations of
reason concerning what God might do; or the chimerical suggestions of
fancy concerning what he did. The facts were recorded by those who must
have known whether they were true or false. The persons who recorded
them were under no possible temptations to deceive the world. We can
only account for their conduct on the supposition of their most perfect
conviction and disinterested zeal. That they should assert what they
knew to be false; that they should publish it with so much ardour; that
they should risk every thing dear to humanity, in order to maintain it;
and at last submit to death, in order to attest their persuasion of its
truth in those moments when imposture usually drops its mask, and
enthusiasm loses its confidence; that they should act thus in opposition
to every dictate of common sense, and every principle of common honesty,
every restraint of shame, and every impulse of selfishness, is a
phenomenon not less irreconcilable to the moral state of things than
miracles are to the natural constitution of the world. Falsehood
naturally entangles men in contradiction, and confounds them with
dismay: but the love of truth invigorates the mind; the consciousness of
integrity anticipates the approbation of God; and conscience creates a
fortitude, to which mere unsupported nature is often a stranger.