was not considered to be the creator of the world. Neither was he the
God of the Old Testament, and the giver of the Mosaic law. This notion
was supported by the same argument which infidels have often urged, that
the God of the Jews is represented as a God of vengeance and of cruelty;
but it was also a natural consequence of their fundamental principle,
that the author of good cannot in any manner be the author of evil. In
accordance with this notion, we find all the Gnostics agreed in
rejecting the Jewish Scriptures, or, at least, in treating them with
contempt. Since they held that the supreme God was revealed for the
first time to mankind by Christ, he could not have been the God who
inspired the prophets; and yet, with that strange inconsistency which we
have already observed in them, they appealed to these very Scriptures in
support of their own doctrines. They believed the prophets to have been
inspired by the same creative _æon_, or the same principle of evil,
which acted originally upon matter; and if their writings had come down
to us, we should perhaps find them arguing, that, though the prophets
were not inspired by the supreme God, they still could not help giving
utterance to truth.
4. Their same abhorrence of matter, and their same notion concerning
that purity of knowledge which Christ came upon earth to impart, led
them to reject the Christian doctrines of a future resurrection and a
general judgment. They seem to have understood the Apostles as preaching
literally a resurrection of the body; and it is certain that the fathers
insisted upon this very strongly as an article of belief. But to imagine
that the body, a mass of created and corruptible matter, could ever
enter into heaven, into that _pleroma_ which was the dwelling of the
supreme God, was a notion which violated the fundamental principle of
the Gnostics. According to their scheme, no resurrection was necessary,
much less a final judgment. The Gnostic, the man who had attained to
perfect knowledge, was gradually emancipated from the grossness of
matter; and, by an imperceptible transition, which none but a Gnostic
could comprehend, he was raised to be an inhabitant of the divine
_pleroma_. If we would know the effect which the doctrines of the
Gnostics had upon their moral conduct, we shall find that the same
principle led to two very opposite results. Though the fathers may have
exaggerated the errors of their opponents, it seems undeniable, that
many Gnostics led profligate lives, and maintained upon principle that
such conduct was not unlawful. Others, again, are represented as
practising great austerities, and endeavouring, by every means, to
mortify the body and its sensual appetites. Both parties were actuated
by the same common notion, that matter is inherently evil. The one
thought that the body, which is compounded of matter, ought to be kept
in subjection; and hence they inculcated self-denial, and the practice
of moral virtue: while others, who had persuaded themselves that
knowledge was every thing, despised the distinctions of the moral law,
which was given, as they said, not by the supreme God, but by an
inferior _æon_, or a principle of evil, who had allied himself with
matter.
5. With respect to the origin of this system the same author observes:
There is no system of philosophy which has been traced to a greater
number of sources than that which we are now discussing; and the variety
of opinions seems to have arisen from persons either not observing the
very different aspects which Gnosticism assumed, or from wishing to
derive it from one exclusive quarter. Thus, some have deduced it from
the eastern notion of a good and evil principle, some from the Jewish
Cabbala, and others from the doctrines of the later Platonists. Each of
these systems is able to support itself by alleging very strong
resemblances; and those persons have taken the most natural and probably
the truest course, who have concluded that all these opinions
contributed to build up the monstrous system, which was known by the
name of Gnosticism.
GOAT, עו. There are other names or appellations given to the goat, as,
1. השופ, 1 Kings xx, 27, which means the _ram-goat_, or leader of the
flock. 2. עתודים, a word which never occurs but in the plural, and
means, _the best prepared_, or choicest of the flock; and metaphorically
_princes_, as, Zech. x, 3, “I will visit the goats, saith the Lord,”
that is, I will begin my vengeance with the princes of the people. “Hell
from beneath is moved for thee, to meet thee at thy coming; it stirreth
up the dead for thee, even all the great goats of the earth,” Isaiah
xiv, 9; all the kings, all the great men. And Jeremiah, speaking of the
princes of the Jews, says, “Remove out of the midst of Babylon, and be
as the he-goats before the flocks,” Jer. 1, 8. 3. צפיר, a name for the
goat, of Chaldee origin, and found only in Ezra vi, 17; viii, 35; Daniel
viii, 5, 21. 4. עואול, from עו, _a goat_, and אול, _to wander about_,
Leviticus xvi, 8, “the scape-goat.” 5. שער, _hairy_, or _shaggy_, whence
שעירים, “_the shaggy ones_.” In Lev. xvii, 7, it is said, “And they
shall no more offer their sacrifices unto devils,” (_seirim_, “hairy
ones,”) “after whom they have gone a whoring.” The word here means
idolatrous images of goats, worshipped by the Egyptians. It is the same
word that is translated _satyrs_, in Isaiah xiii, 21; where the LXX
render it δαιμόνια, _demons_. But here they have ματαιοίς, _to vain
things_ or _idols_, which comes to the same sense. What gives light to
so obscure a passage is what we read in Maimonides, that the Zabian
idolaters worshipped demons under the figure of goats, imagining them to
appear in that form, whence they called them by the names of _seirim_;
and that this custom, being spread among other nations, gave occasion to
this precept. In like manner we learn from Herodotus, that the Egyptians
of Mendes held goats to be sacred animals, and represented the god Pan
with the legs and head of that animal. From those ancient idolaters the
same notion seems to have been derived by the Greeks and Romans, who
represented their Pan, their fauns, satyrs, and other idols, in the form
of goats: from all which it is highly probable, that the Israelites had
learned in Egypt to worship certain demons, or sylvan deities, under the
symbolical figure of goats. Though the phrase, “after whom they have
gone a whoring,” is equivalent in Scripture to that of committing
idolatry, yet we are not to suppose that it is not to be taken in a
literal sense in many places, even where it is used in connection with
idolatrous acts of worship. It is well known that Baal-peor and
Ashtaroth were worshipped with unclean rites, and that public
prostitution formed a grand part of the worship of many deities among
the Egyptians, Moabites, Canaanites, &c.
The goat was one of the clean beasts which the Israelites might both eat
and offer in sacrifice. The kid, גרי is often mentioned as a food, in a
way that implies that it was considered as a delicacy. The אקו, or _wild
goat_, mentioned Deut. xiv, 5, and no where else in the Hebrew Bible, is
supposed to be the _tragelaphus_, or “goat-deer.” Schultens conjectures
that this animal might have its name, _ob fugacitatem_, from its
shyness, or running away. The word יעל, occurs 1 Sam. xxiv, 3; Job
xxxix, 1; Psalm civ, 18; Prov. v, 19: and various have been the
sentiments of interpreters on the animal intended by it. Bochart insists
that it is the _ibex_, or “rock-goat.” The root whence the name is
derived, signifies _to ascend_, _to mount_; and the ibex is famous for
clambering, climbing, and leaping, on the most craggy precipices. The
Arab writers attribute to the _jaal_ very long horns, bending backward;
consequently it cannot be the chamois. The horns of the _jaal_ are
reckoned among the valuable articles of traffic, Ezek. xxvii, 15. The
ibex is finely shaped, graceful in its motions, and gentle in its
manners. The female is particularly celebrated by natural historians for
tender affection to her young, and the incessant vigilance with which
she watches over their safety; and also for ardent attachment and
fidelity to her mate.
GOD, an immaterial, intelligent, and free Being; of perfect goodness,
wisdom, and power; who made the universe, and continues to support it,
as well as to govern and direct it, by his providence. Philologists have
hitherto considered the word God as being of the same signification with
good; and this is not denied by M. Hallenberg. But he thinks that both
words originally denoted _unity_; and that the root is אתד, _unus_;
whence the Syriac _Chad_ and _Gada_; the Arabic _Ahd_ and _Gahd_; the
Persic _Choda_ and _Chuda_; the Greek ἀγαθὸς and γάθος; the Teutonic
_Gud_; the German _Gott_; and our Saxon _God_. The other names of God,
this author thinks, are referable to a similar origin.
2. By his immateriality, intelligence, and freedom, God is distinguished
from Fate, Nature, Destiny, Necessity, Chance, _Anima Mundi_, and from
all the other fictitious beings acknowledged by the Stoics, Pantheists,
Spinosists, and other sorts of Atheists. The knowledge of God, his
nature, attributes, word, and works, with the relations between him and
his creatures, makes the subject of the extensive science called
theology. In Scripture God is defined by, “I am that I am; Alpha and
Omega; the Beginning and End of all things.” Among philosophers, he is
defined a Being of infinite perfection; or in whom there is no defect of
any thing which we conceive may raise, improve, or exalt his nature. He
is the First Cause, the First Being, who has existed from the beginning,
has created the world, or who subsists necessarily, or of himself.
3. The plain argument, says Maclaurin, in his “Account of Sir I.
Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries,” for the existence of the Deity,
obvious to all, and carrying irresistible conviction with it, is from
the evident contrivance and fitness of things for one another, which we
meet with throughout all parts of the universe. There is no need of nice
or subtle reasonings in this matter; a manifest contrivance immediately
suggests a contriver. It strikes us like a sensation; and artful
reasonings against it may puzzle us, but it is without shaking our
belief. No person, for example, that knows the principles of optics, and
the structure of the eye, can believe that it was formed without skill
in that science; or that the ear was formed without the knowledge of
sounds; or that the male and female in animals were not formed for each
other, and for continuing the species. All our accounts of nature are
full of instances of this kind. The admirable and beautiful structure of
things for final causes, exalts our idea of the Contriver; the unity of
design shows him to be one. The great motions in the system performed
with the same facility as the least, suggest his almighty power, which
gave motion to the earth and the celestial bodies with equal ease as to
the minutest particles. The subtilty of the motions and actions in the
internal parts of bodies, shows that his influence penetrates the inmost
recesses of things, and that he is equally active and present every
where. The simplicity of the laws that prevail in the world, the
excellent disposition of things, in order to obtain the best ends, and
the beauty which adorns the works of nature, far superior to any thing
in art, suggest his consummate wisdom. The usefulness of the whole
scheme, so well contrived for the intelligent beings that enjoy it, with
the internal disposition and moral structure of these beings themselves,
shows his unbounded goodness. These are arguments which are sufficiently
open to the views and capacities of the unlearned, while at the same
time they acquire new strength and lustre from the discoveries of the
learned. The Deity’s acting and interposing in the universe, show that
he governs as well as formed it; and the depth of his counsels, even in
conducting the material universe, of which a great part surpasses our
knowledge, keeps up an inward veneration and awe of this great Being,
and disposes us to receive what may be otherwise revealed to us
concerning him. It has been justly observed, that some of the laws of
nature now known to us must have escaped us if we had wanted the sense
of seeing. It may be in his power to bestow upon us other senses, of
which we have at present no idea; without which it may be impossible for
us to know all his works, or to have more adequate ideas of himself. In
our present state, we know enough to be satisfied of our dependency upon
him, and of the duty we owe to him, the Lord and Disposer of all things.
He is not the object of sense; his essence, and, indeed, that of all
other substances, are beyond the reach of all our discoveries; but his
attributes clearly appear in his admirable works. We know that the
highest conceptions we are able to form of them, are still beneath his
real perfections; but his power and dominion over us, and our duty
toward him, are manifest.
4. Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, says Mr. Locke,
yet, having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed
with, he hath not left himself without a witness; since we have sense,
perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him as long as
we carry ourselves about us. To show, therefore, that we are capable of
knowing, that is, of being certain that there is a God, and how we may
come by this certainty, I think we need go no farther than ourselves,
and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence. I think it is
beyond question, that man has a clear perception of his own being; he
knows certainly that he exists, and that he is something. In the next
place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no
more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles.
If, therefore, we know there is some real Being, it is an evident
demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what
was not from eternity had a beginning; and what had a beginning must be
produced by something else. Next it is evident, that what has its being
from another must also have all that which is in, and belongs to, its
being from another too; all the powers it has must be owing to, and
derived from, the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being
must be also the source and original of all power; and so this eternal
Being must be also the most powerful. Again: man finds in himself
perception and knowledge: we are certain, then, that there is not only
some Being, but some knowing, intelligent Being, in the world. There was
a time, then, when there was no knowing Being, or else there has been a
knowing Being from eternity. If it be said there was a time when that
eternal Being had no knowledge, I reply, that then it is impossible
there should have ever been any knowledge; it being as impossible that
things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any
perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossible that a
triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones.
Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in
our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this
certain and evident truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and
knowing Being, which, whether any one will call God, it matters not. The
thing is evident; and from this idea, duly considered, will easily be
deduced all those other attributes we ought to ascribe to this eternal
Being. From what has been said, it is plain to me, that we have a more
certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our
senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say
that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any
thing else without us. When I say we _know_, I mean, there is such a
knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply
our minds to that as we do to several other inquiries. It being then
unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude that something has
existed from eternity, let us next see what kind of thing that must be.
There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or
conceives; such as are purely material without sense or perception, and
sensible, perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be. These two
sorts we shall call cogitative and incogitative beings; which to our
present purpose are better than material and immaterial. If, then, there
must be something eternal, it is very obvious to reason that it must be
a cogitative being; because it is as impossible to conceive that bare
incogitative matter should ever produce a thinking, intelligent being,
as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any
parcel of matter eternal, we shall find it in itself unable to produce
any thing. Let us suppose its parts firmly at rest together, if there
were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a
dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive that it can add motion to
itself, or produce any thing? Matter, then, by its own strength cannot
produce in itself so much as motion. The motion it has must also be from
eternity, or else added to matter by some other being, more powerful
than matter. But let us suppose motion eternal too, yet matter,
incogitative matter, and motion could never produce thought: knowledge
will still be as far beyond the power of nothing to produce. Divide
matter into as minute parts as you will, vary its figure and motion as
much as you please, it will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of
proportionable bulk, than it did before this division. The minutest
particles of matter knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the
greater do; so that if we suppose nothing eternal, matter can never
begin to be; if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal, motion
can never begin to be; if we suppose only matter and motion to be
eternal, thought can never begin to be; for it is impossible to conceive
that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and
from itself, sense, perception, and knowledge, as is evident from hence,
that then sense, perception, and knowledge must be a property eternally
inseparable from matter, and every particle of it. Since, therefore,
whatsoever is the first eternal Being must necessarily be cogitative;
and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it,
and actually have, at least all the perfections that can ever after
exist, it necessarily follows, that the first eternal Being cannot be
matter. If, therefore, it be evident that something must necessarily
exist from eternity, it is also evident that that something must
necessarily be a cogitative Being. For it is as impossible that
incogitative matter should produce a cogitative Being, as that nothing,
or the negation of all being, should produce a positive Being or matter.
This discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind
sufficiently leads us to the knowledge of God. For it will hence follow,
that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend upon
him, and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he
gives them; and therefore if he made those, he made also the less
excellent pieces of this universe, all inanimate bodies, whereby his
omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and from thence
all his other attributes necessarily follow.
5. In the Scriptures no attempt is made to prove the existence of a God;
such an attempt would have been entirely useless, because the fact was
universally admitted. The error of men consisted, not in denying a God,
but in admitting too many; and one great object of the Bible is to
demonstrate that there is but one. No metaphysical arguments, however,
are employed in it for this purpose. The proof rests on facts recorded
in the history of the Jews, from which it appears that they were always
victorious and prosperous so long as they served the only living and
true God, Jehovah, the name by which the Almighty made himself known to
them, and uniformly unsuccessful when they revolted from him to serve
other gods. What argument could be so effectual to convince them that
there was no god in all the earth but the God of Israel? The sovereignty
and universal providence of the Lord Jehovah are proved by predictions
delivered by the Jewish prophets, pointing out the fate of nations and
of empires, specifying distinctly their rise, the duration of their
power, and the causes of their decline; thus demonstrating that one God
ruled among the nations, and made them the unconscious instruments of
promoting the purposes of his will. In the same manner, none of the
attributes of God are demonstrated in Scripture by reasoning; they are
simply affirmed and illustrated by facts; and instead of a regular
deduction of doctrines and conclusions from a few admitted principles,
we are left to gather them from the recorded feelings and devotional
expressions of persons whose hearts were influenced by the fear of God.
These circumstances point out a marked singularity in the Scriptures,
considered as a repository of religious doctrines. The writers,
generally speaking, do not reason, but exhort and remonstrate; they do
not attempt to fetter the judgment by the subtleties of argument, but to
rouse the feelings by an appeal to palpable facts. This is exactly what
might have been expected from teachers acting under a divine commission,
and armed with undeniable facts to enforce their admonitions.
6. In three distinct ways do the sacred writers furnish us with
information on this great and essential subject, the existence and the
character of God; from the _names_ by which he is designated; from the
_actions_ ascribed to him; and from the _attributes_ with which he is
invested in their invocations and praises; and in those lofty
descriptions of his nature which, under the inspiration of the Holy
Spirit, they have recorded for the instruction of the world. These
attributes will be considered under their respective heads; but the
impression of the general view of the divine character, as thus
revealed, is too important to be omitted.