The lobbying problem, like Jere Burke, continues with us.

Chapter XXIII.

Influence of the San Francisco Delegation.

Casts Nearly Twenty-five Per Cent of the Vote in Each House - Majority

Invariably Found on the Side of the Machine - Opposed Passage of the

Walker-Otis Bill - Instrumental in Amending the Direct Primary Law -

Defeated Local Option Bill.

The popular idea that the State outside San Francisco is not concerned

about political conditions at the metropolis is not borne out by the

record of the legislative session of 1909. The San Francisco delegations

in Senate and Assembly had, as they always have had and will have for

many a year to come, the deciding voice in practically all important

issues.

San Francisco elects within one of 25 per cent of the members of the

State Senate, and within two of 25 per cent of the Assembly. In other

words, nine of the forty Senators come from San Francisco, and eighteen

of the eighty Assemblymen. The nine San Francisco Senators and the

eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen join with the outside members in

making laws not for San Francisco alone, but for the entire State. Their

numbers give them decided advantage. The character of the laws passed at

a legislative session almost invariably bears the stamp of the character

of the San Francisco delegation. The character of the delegation depends

upon political conditions at San Francisco. The whole State, then, is

concerned in the efforts of the best citizenship of the metropolis to

oust from power the corrupt element that has so long dominated San

Francisco politics.

The record of the San Francisco delegation at the session of 1909, while

better in the Assembly than in the Senate, is not one for San Francisco

- or the State for that matter - to enthuse over. The votes on test

questions of the eighteen members of the Assembly and of the nine

members of the Senate, will be found set forth in tables in the

appendix.

The table showing the votes of the nine San Francisco Senators covers

sixteen roll calls, on which the San Francisco Senators cast 128 votes,

ninety-nine of which were in support of machine policies and only

twenty-nine against. Thus the nine Senators averaged on sixteen roll

calls, eleven votes for the machine and three votes against. Had the San

Francisco Senators broken even on the issues involved; that is to say,

had sixty-four of the 128 votes been cast for the machine, and

sixty-four against the machine, and the sixty-four anti-machine votes

been evenly distributed among the several issues, the machine would have

been defeated on every issue coming before the Senate.

The Assembly showing is not quite so overwhelmingly machine as that of

the Senate, but it is bad enough. Eleven roll calls are considered. On

these the eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen cast a total of 165 votes,

of which 108 were for machine policies and fifty-seven against. Thus,

even in the Assembly, the vote was approximately 2 to 1 in favor of the

machine. Of the fifty-seven anti-machine votes, eleven were cast by

Callan, who made an absolutely clean record, nine by Gerdes and seven by

Lightner, a total of twenty-seven for the three. Deducted from the total

of anti-machine votes, this leaves only thirty anti-machine votes for

the remaining fifteen members of the delegation. Or to put it the other

way, Callan, Gerdes and Lightner cast among them only four machine

votes, which leaves 104 machine votes cast by the other fifteen San

Francisco members.

On the individual issues the San Francisco Senators and Assemblymen made

as bad a showing as does their vote in the aggregate. The passage of the

Walker-Otis Racetrack Gambling bill for example demonstrates that the

poolsellers had little hold upon the legislators of any community of the

State outside of San Francisco. In the Senate but seven votes were cast

against the bill. Five of the seven came from the San Francisco

delegation - Finn, Hare, Hartman, Reily and Wolfe. The two remaining

came from Alameda and Shasta-Siskiyou Counties. Leavitt, representing

Alameda, and Weed, representing Shasta and Siskiyou, voted with the five

San Francisco Senators against suppressing bookmaking and pool-selling.

The record of the San Francisco Assembly delegation on the anti-gambling

measure is scarcely less suggestive. Before the Walker-Otis bill could

pass the Assembly the proponents of the measure had to win six fights,

as is shown by the table giving the several votes taken in the Assembly

on the Walker-Otis bill. The three most important of the six were:

1. To prevent the bill being referred back to the Committee on Public

Morals.

2. To pass the measure on third reading without amendment.

3. To prevent reconsideration of the vote by which the bill had been

passed.

In the first fight twenty-three Assemblymen voted to refer the bill back

to the Committee. Of these twelve - more than one-half - were from San

Francisco.

The day of the second fight, only ten Assemblymen voted on the side of

the gamblers. Every one of the ten was from San Francisco.

In the third fight, on the motion to reconsider, nineteen Assemblymen

voted for reconsideration. Of these, ten, more than fifty per cent, were

from San Francisco.

Or, to put it in a lump, in the three most important fights over the

Walker-Otis bill in the Assembly, in the aggregate fifty-two votes were

cast against the measure. Of these, thirty-two were from San Francisco

Assemblymen. Only twenty were from outside San Francisco.

The universal demand throughout the State for the passage of an

anti-pool selling measure offset the influence and the vote of the San

Francisco delegation in both Senate and Assembly. But in the issues more

involved, where the lines were more closely drawn, San Francisco

practically made the laws for the whole State. This could be

demonstrated by many instances. The most striking perhaps are shown by

the histories of the Direct Primary measure and the Railroad Regulation

bills.

When the first fight over the Direct Primary bill came up in the Senate,

it will be remembered, the anti-machine forces defeated the machine by a

vote of twenty-seven to thirteen. Of the thirteen Senators who voted to

amend the bill to the liking of Wolfe and Leavitt, six - almost fifty

per cent - were from San Francisco. They were Finn, Hare, Hartman,

Kennedy, Reily, Wolfe.

When the machine element had succeeded in amending the Direct Primary

measure to its liking in the Assembly and there came a new alignment on

the bill in the Senate, eight of the nine San Francisco Senators voted

with Wolfe and Leavitt for the amendments, which denied the people of

California State-wide vote on candidates for the United States Senate.

One San Francisco Senator only, Anthony, voted with the better element

in the Senate, against the amendments.

Had only two of the nine Senators from San Francisco voted for the bill

in its original form, the measure would have been passed by a vote of

twenty-one to nineteen without the machine amendments.

The influence of the San Francisco members in shaping the Direct Primary

law was even more forcibly illustrated in the Assembly. Of the eighteen

San Francisco Assemblymen, fifteen voted for the Assembly amendments,

two, Callan and Gerdes, voted against them, and Hopkins is not recorded

as voting.

It will be remembered that the amendments were read into the bill by a

vote of thirty-six to thirty-eight. Had the San Francisco delegation

divided even on this vote, had nine voted for the amendments and nine

against, the vote would have been forty-three against putting them in

the bill, and thirty-two for, the bill would not have been amended in

the Assembly; it would have become a law in the same shape that it had

originally passed the Senate. It is noticeable that in an Assembly of

eighty members, only twenty-three of the Assemblymen who voted for the

Assembly amendments to the Direct Primary bill were from outside San

Francisco. In the Senate eight of the twenty Senators who voted for the

amendments were from San Francisco, only twelve were from outside that

city. Thus, out of 120 members in the Legislature, ninety-three of whom

were from outside San Francisco, only thirty-five from districts outside

the metropolis voted for the Assembly, or machine amendments to the

Direct Primary bill. But twenty-three of the twenty-seven San Francisco

Senators and Assemblymen did vote for them, and only three of the San

Francisco members voted against them.

It will be seen that the people of California who live outside San

Francisco are decidedly interested in the character of Senators and

Assemblymen whom that city sends to the Legislature.

The people of San Francisco are, of course, as much concerned over

reasonable regulation of the transportation companies as Californians

living outside that city. But the San Francisco Senators were a unit in

their opposition to the passage of an effective railroad regulation

measure.

The fight over the railroad regulation came in the Senate. The final

line-up showed eighteen Senators for the effective Stetson bill and

against the ineffective Wright bill; while twenty-two Senators were

against the Stetson bill and for the Wright bill. The Wright bill was

accordingly passed. Every one of the nine San Francisco Senators voted

for the Wright bill. Only thirteen Senators who voted for the Wright

bill were from outside San Francisco.

In a word, the proponents of the Stetson bill were from the start

handicapped by a solid delegation of nine from San Francisco which they

could not overcome. Had three of the nine San Francisco Senators been

for the Stetson bill, that measure would now be the law of California.

The transportation issue was fought out in the Assembly over the Sanford

Senate resolution endorsing Bristow's plan to establish a line of

Government steamers between San Francisco and Panama. The fruit growers

of Southern California are particularly interested in this project. The

Assembly, however, amended all reference to the Bristow report and all

criticism of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company and the railroads out of

the resolution.

Of the eighteen San Francisco Assemblymen only one, Callan, voted

against the amendments; fourteen - Beatty, Beban, Coghlan, Collum,

Cullen, Hopkins, Lightner, Macauley, McManus, Nelson, O'Neil, Pugh,

Perine and Wheelan - voted for the amendments, while three - Black,

Gerdes and Schmitt - did not vote at all.

The Local Option bill was also killed by San Francisco votes. This

measure was strongly backed by the rural districts. The various

counties, particularly those engaged in farming, dairying and fruit

growing, sent representatives to the Legislature instructed to vote for

Local Option. The issue in all ways concerned the country districts

rather than the large cities. But the votes of the San Francisco

Senators defeated the Local Option bill.

The first fight over the Local Option bill came when in the ordinary

course of events it reached third reading. Instead of letting a vote be

taken on the measure, Wolfe moved that it be referred to the Judiciary

Committee. This was clearly a move against the passage of the bill, for

it meant delay which might prove fatal. But Wolfe's motion prevailed by

a vote of twenty to fifteen. The nine San Francisco Senators voted to

refer the bill to the committee, only eleven Senators from outside San

Francisco voted with them.

The nine members from San Francisco continued consistent in their

opposition to the measure. When the Local Option bill did come to a vote

their nine votes were cast against it.

The people of Del Norte county and the people of San Diego county are

denied the privilege of voting "Wet or dry" because of the opposition to

the Local Option bill of the solid San Francisco delegation in the

Senate. It will be seen that the people of these distant counties are

decidedly interested in political conditions in San Francisco, for in a

large way the character of the San Francisco delegation in the

Legislature is unmistakably reflected in the laws which are passed for

the government of the entire State.

Taken as a whole, the San Francisco delegation in Senate and Assembly

were nothing for that city to be proud of, and at a critical moment San

Francisco came near paying dearly for her Hartmans, Hares, Macauleys and

McManuses. But for the intervention of the country members the Islais

Creek bond project would have been defeated.

The improvement calls for the purchase of sixty-three water blocks at

Islais Creek to be converted into an inland harbor. The future

development of San Francisco depends largely upon this improvement. But

private interests demanded that nineteen of the sixty-three blocks be

excluded from the plan, which would have rendered the whole project

impracticable. When the fight came on, San Francisco Senators and

Assemblymen opposed the purchase of the sixty-three blocks.

To begin with, Senator Wolfe, as member of the State Harbors Committee,

had signed a report which recommended that forty-four blocks only be

purchased. But Wolfe afterwards insisted that he had signed the report

not knowing what he was doing.

When the fight for the improvement came up in the Senate, only two

Senators, Hartman and Reily, both of San Francisco, opposed the project.

They were in the end ignominiously defeated, every Senator present

voting against them. But both Hartman and Reily did the best they knew

how to defeat the purchase of the area necessary for the improvement.

The San Francisco delegation in its opposition to the Islais Creek

project had better success in the Assembly. Nine San Francisco

Assemblymen, Beban, Black, Cullen, Lightner, Macauley, McManus, O'Neil,

Perine and Wheelan, united against the measure as it had passed the

Senate. They succeeded in throwing doubt upon the necessity of the

purchase of sixty-three blocks, and finally won twenty-two outside

members over to their way of thinking. Had it not been for the efforts

of Assemblymen Callan, Beatty and Nelson of San Francisco, backed by the

Los Angeles delegation, the Islais Creek Harbor project would

unquestionably have been defeated in the Assembly, solely because of the

opposition of nine San Francisco Assemblymen.

But there is plenty of evidence of improved political conditions at San

Francisco. An anti-machine Board of Supervisors is standing out manfully

against the demands of machine-protected interests. The District

Attorney's office is, indeed, pressing representatives of those

interests pretty close to the doors of the penitentiary, although the

District Attorney is handicapped by laws for which San Francisco is

largely responsible, because of the character of the men whom session

after session she has sent to the Legislature.

There is, however, enough to warrant the belief that San Francisco will

improve the character of the Assembly and Senate delegation. Upon such

improvement, the well-being of the whole State largely depends.

Chapter XXIV.

Attacks On And Defense of the Fish Commission

Fast Becoming a Powerful Political Factor - Enormous Fund Which It

Expends Practically Without Check. - Legislative Investigation Blocked -

Scheme to Give Commissioners Salary Fails.

Without the general public realizing just what is going on, the machine

is, in the State Fish and Game Commission, building up an adjunct which

seems destined to play an important part in any fight that may be

carried on by the independent electors to break the machine's

strangle-hold upon the State. Naturally the machine element in the

Legislature was prepared always to rally to the defense of the

Commission, and the defense was necessary, for the Commission is

vulnerable, and was attacked at many points.

The Commission is perhaps the most extraordinary institution in the

State. At its head is General George Stone, one-time chairman of the

Republican State Central Committee. At its tail is Jake Steppacher,

another one-time potent politician who has passed the days of his

usefulness. Between Stone at the lead and Steppacher at the tail, is an

astonishing array of formerly prominent politicians, as well as

politicians who are decidedly in the present. In fact, the Fish and Game

Commission is fast becoming one of the most potent adjuncts to the State

political machine, that strictly non-partisan organization which guards

the interests of the tenderloin, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company,

the racetrack gamblers, their associates and allies, and which rather

presumptuously assumes to be the Republican Party of California.

One of the features of the session of 1909 was the keen little fight of

the anti-machine members of the Legislature to restore the Fish and Game

Commission to its one-time simplicity, legitimacy and usefulness, and

the efforts of the machine members to prevent this.

Up to two years ago, under the name of Fish Commission, the now Fish and

Game Commission did most admirable work on an allowance of about

$50,000. So far as the writer can ascertain, the Commission's income up

to 1907 never exceeded $54,000 in any one year; usually it was a trifle

under $50,000.

But in 1907 a tax of $1 a year was imposed upon all citizens of

California who wished to go hunting. Citizens of other States, wishing

to hunt in California, are under the same law taxed $10 a year, while

foreigners are taxed $25. The law provides that the income thus raised

be turned over to the Fish Commission.

The first year that the law was in force, the Commission received

$116,579 on account of it. This, with moneys received from State

appropriations, fines collected and the like, swelled the Commission's

income for that year, the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, to

$184,467.70, an increase of more that $130,000 from the previous fiscal

year.

For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, the cost of conducting the

Governor's office, including the Governor's salary, the salaries of his

secretaries and clerks, stationery, postage stamps, secret service,

everything in a word in connection with the office, was $32,377.

In the same way the expense of conducting the State Controller's office

was $23,417; of the State Treasurer's office, $16,751 ; of the Attorney

General's office, $33,082; of the Surveyor General's office, $20,679; of

the State Superintendent of Schools' office, $22,380.

But the General Stone captained - or perhaps generaled - Fish Commission

had for that year a modest bit of $184,467. The Fish Commission then,

for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908, cost California almost six

times as much as did the Governor's office, eight times as much as did

the Controller's office, eleven times as much as did the State

Treasurer's office, almost six times as much as did the Attorney

General's office, more than nine times as much as the Surveyor General's

office, and eight times as much as did the State Department of Public

Instruction. And let it be borne in mind that this does not include the

sums which the various counties paid for game wardens and for local

protection of game, the best protection, by the way, and the most

practical.

The $184,467, did not go to the counties. It went exclusively to General

Stone's Commission. It will be seen that General Stone's Commission has

a very good thing of it.

Another surprising feature of the Stone-Generaled Commission is that

there is little check upon its expenditures. If the Governor wishes to

raise the salary of his secretary or one of his stenographers he must

appeal to the Legislature for permission. The State Controller, the

State Treasurer, the Secretary of State, the State superintendent of

Schools, and so on down the list Of State officials, are powerless to

increase the salary of an assistant or of a clerk, or of an office boy,

without legislative sanction.

But not so General Stone's Commission. The Commission is left to do

pretty much as it pleases with its income. So, recently, without saying

a word to anybody, it increased the salary of one of its deputies

(Vogelsang) from $200 to $300 a month. Three hundred dollars a month is

$3600 a year. Up to this year the salary of the State Controller, of the

Secretary of State, of the State Treasurer, of the Surveyor General, of

the Superintendent of Public Instruction, etc., was only $3,000 a year.

So it will be seen that one of General Stone's Deputies was drawing $600

a year more salary from the State than the elected State officials.

Jake Steppacher and other politicians, finding easy berths in the

Commission, were also granted generous salary increases.

But in ways other than generous increase in the salaries of its deputies

has the Fish Commission shown its kingly independence. The law provides

that each State official and Commission shall, biennially, in the

September before the Legislature convenes, file with the Governor a

report of its activities and expenditures. This enables the Governor to

make such recommendations as he may deem necessary in his message to the

Legislature. The Controller, Attorney General, in fact all the State

officials and departments, observed the law last September with but one

exception. The Fish Commission, costing the State from six to eleven

times more money that the State departments, did not file a report with

the Governor.

The fact that the Commission had filed no report in September, the

generous increase in salaries of its deputies, alleged instances of

arbitrary conduct of its representatives, resulted in a resolution being

introduced by Assemblyman Harry Polsley, demanding that the Commission

be made the subject of legislative inquiry.

The resolution was referred to the Assembly Committee on Fish and Game,

a committee notoriously in sympathy with the Commission. The Committee

held a sort of preliminary hearing which resulted in a general

whitewashing[100]. Polsley made out what was generally regarded as a

prima facie case against the Commission, but the Committee did not

choose to consider it such, and so the investigation got no

further[100a].

But it was noticeable after the "preliminary hearing" that the advocates

of the Fish Commission measures did not show up so sprightly confident

of their passage as before. Polsley's efforts were by no means lost.

Many measures intended to strengthen the already gigantically strong

Commission failed of passage, or had their viciousness amended out of

them, which, had it not been for Polsley's efforts, might have become

laws.

The most important of these was Senate Bill 741. The measure as

originally introduced by Senator Willis provided that "every person in

the State of California, who hunts, pursues or kills any of the wild

birds or animals, excepting predatory birds or animals, or fishes for

or catches with hook and line any of the protected fish of this State,

without first procuring a license therefor, as provided in this Act,

is guilty of a misdemeanor."

Had the act become a law as introduced, not only those who hunt, but

those who fish, would have been obliged to pay one dollar for a license.

Thus, if a family of father, mother and three children wanted to go

fishing, they would first have had to pay five dollars for the

privilege.

The writer has it from a gentleman who has made careful study of the

Fish Commission and its ways that the licensing of amateur fishers would

have increased the income of the Fish and Game Commission $150,000 a

year. This, with the income already enjoyed by the Commission of

$184,000 a year, would have swelled its annual income to more than

$330,000. This sum is $90,000 more than it cost to maintain the Stockton

Hospital for the Insane for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908;

$125,000 more than the maintenance of the Agnews Asylum for that year;

$122,000 more than the cost of the maintenance of the Folsom State

Prison. The Fish and Game Commission was scarcely modest in its

demands[101].

Naturally, the backers of the Fish and Game Commission made a hard fight

for the measure's passage. But in spite of their efforts they could not

edge it through the Senate until March 3d. In the Assembly, the measure

met genuine opposition.

The Assembly Committee on Fish and Game of course recommended it for

passage, and on March 15th, after a hot fight, it actually passed the

Assembly. But Cattell gave notice of reconsideration. Incidentally,

Governor Gillett let it be known that he would veto any measure that

required amateur fishermen to pay license. This was a damper upon the

Fish Commission crowd. When Cattell called the bill up for

reconsideration it was reconsidered and defeated. However, Leeds

accepted an amendment which struck out the clause which provided that

amateur fishermen must pay a license tax. On Leeds' motion the next day,

the amended bill was reconsidered and passed.

The three Fish and Game Commissioners serve without salary. Their

compensation comes from the pleasure of disbursing upwards of $200,000 a

year, what political prestige there may be in it, and rather generous

expense money[102]. But a bill was introduced to give each Commissioner

a salary of $3,000 a year. The measure did not become law, for which the

writer believes much credit is due Assemblymen Polsley of Red Bluff. The

State was thus saved $9,000 a year. General Stone and his associates are

just that amount out of pocket. They have, however, given no indication

of resigning their offices because the salary has been denied them.

But if the Fish and Game Commission was unsuccessful in increasing its

revenue and putting through other measures from the standpoint of its

members advantageous, its opponents were quite as unsuccessful in their

attacks upon the Commission. Like the panther cat that guards her young,

the agents of the Commission fought to retain the advantages which they

had secured in 1907, and were generally successful.

The chief of the attacks was that of Assemblyman Polsley, author of

Assembly Bill 433. This bill wasn't very long, contained less than five

lines, in fact, and just forty-three words, but its passage would have

saved the people of California more than $100,000 a year, or almost as

much as it costs the State to run the Governor's office, the

Controller's office, the State Treasurer's office and the office of

State Superintendent of Schools combined. Assembly Bill 433 repealed the

law of 1907, under which hunters are required to pay the Fish and Game

Commission for the privilege of going hunting. The bill was introduced

January 15th. It was referred to the notorious Assembly Committee on

Fish and Game. There it was held until March 10th. It was then referred

back to the Assembly with the recommendation that it "do not pass." That

settled Assembly Bill 433.

Another measure which caused the agents of the Fish Commission much

worry was introduced in the Assembly by Preston and in the Senate by

Sanford. This bill provided that $50,000 should be paid out of the Fish

and Game Commission fund each year to be used in paying bounties for

exterminating coyotes. This would have left the Commission only about

$130,000 a year. Naturally, the agents of the Commission resented the

raid on their funds. The measure was referred to the Assembly Committee

on Fish and Game. This was on January 18th. And it never was heard of

after.

The companion Senate measure, introduced by Sanford, got further, but

not much. The Senate Committee reported it "without recommendation." But

even so, it passed second reading and went to engrossment and third

reading. There it languished. On March 18th it was withdrawn by its

author.

Another measure which gave the Commissioners a deal of worry was one

introduced by Johnson of Placer, which provided that to each hunter who

took fifty blue jay heads to the County's Clerk's office should be

issued a hunter's license free. It was thought that this would encourage

boys to kill blue jays for the hunter's license prize, value one dollar.

But General Stone could not see it that way.

"If this bill becomes a law," said General Stone, "we shall have to

retrench somewhere."

The bill didn't become a law, and the Fish and Game Commission was

saved.

But the most "unkindest cut of all" came when the Assembly attempted to

break into that sacred Fish and Game Commission fund by way of

resolution. The Assembly actually adopted a resolution calling for a

Commission to be appointed by the Governor for the purpose of

ascertaining the feasibility of dividing the State into game districts,

and generously providing $5,000 out of the Fish Commission fund for that

purpose. Naturally the agents of the Fish Commission were scandalized at

this proposed reckless expenditure of moneys from their fund by somebody

else. But they were powerless. The resolution went through.

Rather late in the session the Assembly discovered that under the law it

cannot "resolute" money out of any fund other than the Assembly

contingent fund. The resolution was not, therefore, worth the paper it

was printed on. Once again the sacred Fish Commission fund was saved.

But the Assembly could switch money out of the fund by legislative

enactment, and a bill covering the same ground as the resolution was

introduced without delay.

The measure passed the Assembly but did not reach the Senate until March

22d, two days before adjournment. That was very late for such a measure,

but a heroic effort was made to secure its passage.

On Estudillo's motion, an attempt was made to suspend the State

Constitution, declare the bill a matter of special urgency, and pass it

forthwith. But the motion failed. Again did the Fish Commission escape a

raid on its fund.

Senator Walker and Assemblyman Rutherford introduced measures providing

for a distribution of the fund with counties, which at any rate looked

pretty good to the counties, although the agents of the Fish Commission

were not pleased at all.

The bills provided that one-half of the moneys collected from the sale

of hunters' licenses, and on account of fines for infringement of the

State game laws, should be paid to the counties in which collected, and

the balance go to the Fish Commission fund.

Walker's bill was introduced on January 8th. It went to the Senate

Committee on Fish and Game and was never heard of after.

Rutherford's bill was introduced on January 15th. It went to the

Assembly Committee on Fish and Game. Like the Walker bill, the

Rutherford bill was lost in committee oblivion.

Such, from the standpoint of the more important bills to increase and to

decrease the Fish Commission fund, was the record of fish and game

legislation. The Fish and Game Commission - and its overgrown fund - is

still with us. But it might have been infinitely worse. Bad little boys

who play hookey from Sunday-school to go fishing, for example, might

have - in addition to the other frightful penalties imposed on them -

been compelled to pay a license tax of $1 for the privilege.

[100] That the Fish and Game Committee would whitewash the Commission

was recognized from the first. Even members of the machine who stand for

genuine game protection objected to this committee making the

investigation. When the motion was made to refer the resolution to this

committee, Assemblyman Greer of Sacramento, took the floor to protest:

"It is useless to refer the matter to the Committee on Fish and Game,"

said Greer, "for we all know what that committee will do. We'll get no

action there. Let it go to some committee that will give it

consideration."

[100a] The Fish and Game Commission was very bitter against Polsley and

all who approved his course. Because of the incident, Game Warden Welch

of Santa Cruz County lost his position. Welch was a county official,

paid by the county. The Commission complained that he had written a

letter to Polsley commending the Assemblyman for his effort to secure a

report 'from the Commission. Santa Cruz County receives a monthly

stipend from the Commission toward the support of the Brookdale

hatchery. The writer is reliably informed that one of the Commissioners

stated that the Commission would do nothing for Santa Cruz County so

long as "that man Welch" remained in office. Welch was removed by the

Supervisors. Welch has a national-wide reputation as a game warden, and

such papers as the "Forest and Stream," New York, and "Sports Afield,"

Chicago, have joined the California press in denunciation of his

dismissal.

As these pages are going through the press, word comes from Santa Cruz

that Welch has been reinstated by Judge Lucas F. Smith of the Superior

Court of Santa Cruz County.

In summarizing his findings, Judge Smith holds that the local Board of

Supervisors exceeded its legal power in declaring vacant the office of

voluntary warden, which Welch held; exceeded its legal authority in

removing Welch without specific charges being prepared, notice served on

him and an opportunity given for a hearing.

[101] All sorts of estimates have been made of the income that would

have been enjoyed by the Fish and Game Commission, had this bill become

a law. The lowest that the writer knows of, made by a disinterested

person, places the increase at $50,000 a year.

[102] Some of the commission's expense accounts on file with the State

Controller are curiosities. For example, General Stone when he is on

commission business taxes the fund $1 for breakfast, $1 for lunch, $1

for dinner. It thus costs the Commission three annual hunter's licenses

to feed General Stone for a day.

Chapter XXV.

The Rewarding of the Faithful.

Senators and Assemblymen Whose Votes Were Cast Against Reform Measures

Given State and Federal Positions in Some Instances, in Others Appointed

to Holdover Committees or Sent on Trips at the Expense of the State.

The machine has many ways of rewarding the faithful who persist until

the end. The faithful member of Senate or Assembly may be rewarded by a

Federal appointment (Senator Bates has just been graciously recognized

in this way[102a]) or he may be given a State job (witness Senator Price

or Assemblyman Beardslee) ; or he may be put on a legislative hold-over

committee to investigate something, or to represent the State at

something, or to prepare some kind of a bill to be introduced at the

next session of the Legislature.

This last is perhaps the most genteel method of reward. It entails

little work, gives the beneficiary a certain distinction and pays very

well.

Nine Senators were rewarded in this way in the closing hours of the

session of 1909. There might have been ten, but that prince of

"bandwagon" Senators, Welch, had to be rewarded twice, so but nine got

holdover committeeships. They are Wolfe, Welch, Wright, Willis, Leavitt,

Bills (labeled Republicans), Kennedy, Hare and Curtin (labeled

Democrats). The names of the nine are not unfamiliar. With the exception

of that of Curtin, their votes during the session were consistently cast

on the side of the machine. For them to be rewarded came as a matter of

course.

The machine will continue to reward such men until the people take the

Legislature out of machine hands. But that is another story.

The Legislative Holdover Committee is about as useless a thing as can be

imagined. This is very well illustrated by the State's experience with

the so-called Harbors Committee, appointed by the Legislature of 1907 to

inquire into harbor conditions throughout the State.

The committee consisted of three Senators and three Assemblymen. The

Senators managed to incur expenses of $2,524.20. Assemblymen were more

modest. Their expenses were only $1,851.80, making a total expense

charge for the committee of $4,376.

But the $4,376 covers the committee's expenses only, does not provide

compensation for the committeemen. A bill appropriating $6,000 for that

purpose was introduced at the session of 1909. This gave the

committeemen $1,000 each for their services. It made the investigation

cost the State $10,376[102b].

The Harbors Committee - or somebody or something else, the writer is not

sure which - prepared an elaborate report of the committee's findings.

But owing to a surprising blunder that involved Senator Wolfe most

curiously, the report was not filed until March 23, the day before the

Legislature adjourned. The report was ordered printed in the journal,

but it did not appear in the journal of the 23rd, which was circulated

on the morning of the 24th. Instead, was a note to the effect that it

would appear in the corrected journal. So, few knew that it had been

filed at all, and it went unnoticed by the daily press.

But the details of the report[102c] were known to the general public

long before it was filed with the Senate, and its provisions made

Senator Wolfe appear to exceptional disadvantage. Wolfe was a member of

the Harbors Committee, as was Senator Wright. Among the recommendations

set forth in the report as originally prepared, was one that forty-four

blocks only of land be purchased by the State for the improvement of the

San Francisco Harbor at Islais Creek, instead of the sixty-three blocks

necessary for practical harbor development.

Senator Wolfe was a warm advocate of the sixty-three block plan which is

the only practical plan, by the way, and shows that Senator Wolfe can

land on the right side of things occasionally. But it was very

discouraging for Senator Wolfe to be confronted with the unfiled report

of his own Harbors Committee, endorsed by his own signature as

committeeman, in which the purchase of only forty-four blocks was urged.

Senator Wolfe's defense was ingenious. He stated that he had signed the

report as a matter of courtesy, not really knowing what it contained.

The incident illustrates the value to the State of such legislative

investigations.

But in spite of the curious history of Wolfe's Harbors Committee, he was

given another holdover committee in 1909. The Senate - on Wolfe's motion

- adopted a resolution setting aside $5,000 to meet the expenses of a

holdover committee to consist of three members to investigate the cause

of recent advances in the cost of foodstuffs. Senators Wolfe, Welch and

Hare are honored with the appointments. Lieutenant-Governor Porter

appointed.

Senator Wolfe, from the machine standpoint, certainly earned the

distinction thus thrust upon him, and his share of the money. Senator

Wolfe was not in good health during the session, but in spite of his

indisposition he managed to be present in the Senate Chamber, where

often, pale, haggard and plainly on the verge of breakdown, he fought

valiantly against the reform measures which were aimed at the prestige

of the State machine, and the domination of the tenderloin, the Southern

Pacific Railroad, the racetrack gamblers and allied interests in State

politics.

Wolfe led the fight against the Walker-Otis Anti-Gambling bill, against

the Local Option bill, against the effective Stetson Railroad Regulation

bill, against the Direct Primary bill, against admitting Senator Bell of

Pasadena to the Republican caucus, against the bill to prohibit the sale

of intoxicants within a mile and a half of Stanford University, against

the initiative amendment to the Constitution, against the amendment to

the Constitution to correct ambiguities as to the powers and duties of

the State Railroad Commission, and against Burnett's resolution for the

investigation of the cause of the increase in freight rates and express

charges. Senator Wolfe also led the fight for the passage of the Change

of Venue bill.

Curiously enough, Senator Wolfe's stock argument, used in most of the

opposition to reform measures, was to the effect that if such measures

became laws, the Republican party in California would be undermined.

Senator Wolfe's argument had great weight with Republicans like Leavitt

and Weed and Democrats like Hare and Kennedy. For the "good of the

Republican party," these gentlemen generally voted as Senator Wolfe

dictated.

Senator Welch, the second member of the Pure Food Committee, is at least

entitled to gracious consideration at the hands of the Wolfe-Leavitt

element. Senator Welch was one of the twenty-seven Call-heralded heroes

who defeated the Wolfe-Leavitt element in the first fight on the Direct

Primary bill in the Senate. And Senator Welch was one of the seven

heroes who "flopped" to the Wolfe-Leavitt side when the psychological

moment came. Welch's one vote in the final struggle would have decided

the Direct Primary fight for the side of the reform element. But when

the reform element needed Welch he was found snugly quartered with Wolfe

and Leavitt.

Welch voted for the Walker-Otis bill, but he was one of the last members

of the Senate to be counted for that measure. Indeed, Welch caught the

rear of the bandwagon on that issue just in time.

On railroad issues Welch's record is as good as the Southern Pacific

Railroad could wish. He voted against the adoption of the practical

absolute rate, and for the impracticable maximum rate; he voted for the

ineffective Wright bill and against the effective Stetson bill. He voted

against the Constitutional Amendment simplyfying the wording of the

Constitution in those sections which prescribe the powers and duties of

the Railroad Commissioners.

So Senator Welch had his appointment to the Food Investigation Committee

due him. He was also made member of the Legislative Committee to

represent the State at the Alaska-Yukon Exposition, of which more later.

Thus Senator Welch rounded out the session very satisfactorily to

Senator Welch and to the machine, if not to the State of California.

Senator Hare is down in the legislative records as a Democrat. He voted

on most measures consistently under the lead of Wolfe and Leavitt. His

appointment need not, therefore, cause surprise.

When the Direct Primary bill was before the Senate Committee on Election

Laws, Hare's vote was with those of Wolfe and Leavitt to make the

measure as ineffective as possible. Hare was among the thirteen

unworthies who voted against the measure when the first fight was made

for it on the floor of the Senate; he was among the twenty who finally,

under Wolfe's leadership, held the measure up in the Senate until by

trick it could be amended to the machine's liking. Hare was one of the

seven Senators who voted against the Walker-Otis Anti-Gambling bill. He

was one of those who voted for the passage of the Change of Venue bill.

On railroad measures Hare voted against the Stetson bill and for the

Wright bill, against the absolute rate and for the maximum rate. He

voted against the amendment to the Constitution to clear up the alleged

ambiguity regarding the powers and duties of the Railroad Commissioners.

Lack of space prevents continuance of the review of Hare's votes. But

enough has been said to show that this "Democrat" was entitled to the

honor at the hands of the Performer, Republican Lieutenant Governor

Warren Porter, of appointment to the Holdover Committee which, under the

leadership of Senator Eddie Wolfe, will investigate the cause of the

increase in the price of foodstuffs.

But a far more desirable appointment was to the committee which is to

represent the State at the Alaska-Yukon Pacific Exposition. By

concurrent resolution the Senate and Assembly decided that seven

Senators, seven Assemblymen, one Lieutenant Governor (Warren Porter) and

one Governor (Gillett) should attend the exposition at the State's

expense. For this purpose $7,000 of the State's money has been provided.

The seven Senators appointed by Performer Porter are Wright, Willis,

Welch, Leavitt, Bills, Kennedy, Curtin.

The seven Assemblymen appointed by Speaker Stanton are Transue,

Beardslee, Leeds, Hewitt, McManus, McClellan and Schimtt.

The records of the Senators thus honored show them worthy the machine's

consideration. Their votes on the banner measures before the Legislature

last winter were as follows:

Against the Walker-Otis bill, to prohibit poolselling and bookmaking

(Anti-Gambling bill) - Leavitt - 1.

For the Walker-Otis bill-Bills, Curtin, Kennedy, Willis, Welch, Wright -

6.

Only seven Senators voted against the Walker-Otis bill. Of the seven

Leavitt is given the Alaska trip; Wolfe and Hare are put on the Food

Investigation Committee. Thus of nine Senators who got on holdover

committees three were among the seven who voted in the interest of the

gambling element.

The records made by the State Senators who will attend the exposition at

the State's expense in the Direct Primary fight are quite as suggestive.

When the first attempt was made in the Senate to force the machine

amendments into the bill, February 18, the seven Senators voted as

follows:

For the machine's amendments - Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt, Willis.

Against the machine's amendments - Curtin, Welch, Wright.

Thirteen Senators on February 18 voted for the machine's amendments. Of

their number Hare and Wolfe are on the Food Investigation Committee;

Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt and Willis are to attend the exposition at the

State's expense. Thus six of the thirteen have been rewarded.

The machine, having failed to amend the Direct Primary bill in the

Senate, amended it in the Assembly. When the measure was returned to the

Senate, six of the seven Senators who will attend the exposition voted

to concur in the Assembly amendments. They were, Bills, Kennedy,

Leavitt, Welch, Willis and Wright. Only one of the seven voted against

the machine amendments, Curtin.

The records of the seven favored, trip-taking Senators on railroad

regulation measures are as follows:

For the Wright bill, against the Stetson bill; for the maximum rate,

against the absolute rate - Leavitt, Welch, Willis, Wright, Bills,

Kennedy - 6.

Against the Wright bill, for the Stetson bill, against the maximum rate,

for the absolute rate - Curtin - 1.

Against the constitutional amendment to make clear the powers and duties

of Railroad Commissioners - Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt, Welch, Willis - 5.

For the amendment - Curtin, Wright - 2.

Against the Burnett resolution calling for an investigation of the cause

for an increase in freight rates - Bills, Kennedy, Leavitt, Willis,

Wright - 5.

For the resolution - 0.

Absent or not voting - Curtin, Welch - 2.

The records of the seven on the Local Option bill and the Change of

Venue bill are:

Against Local Option - Leavitt, Welch, Willis, Bills, Curtin, Kennedy -

6.

For Local Option - Wright - 1.

For the Change of Venue bill - Bills, Leavitt, Welch, Willis, Wright -

5.

Against the Change of Venue bill - Curtin, Kennedy - 2.

Kennedy, to be sure, voted against the Change of Venue bill when that

measure passed the Senate. But Senator Kennedy was unaccountably absent

the next morning when the Change of Venue bill was taken up on a motion

for reconsideration. Because of Kennedy's absence, the motion to

reconsider the measure was lost, and its defeat prevented. Senator

Kennedy is scarcely entitled to credit for being recorded on the right

side of this measure.

Nine Senators are included in the two hold-over committees which are

under consideration. As Wolfe and Hare invariably voted with Leavitt, it

will be seen that eight of the nine voted against the Stetson bill and

for the Wright bill; seven of the nine voted against the Constitutional

amendment to make plain the constitutional powers and duties of the

Railroad Commissioners; seven of the nine voted against investigating

the cause of increase in freight and express rates to the Pacific Coast;

eight of the nine voted against local option; seven voted for the Change

of Venue bill, and one of the two others as good as voted for it,

although on record against the measure.

As Republican Senators Bell, Birdsall, Black, Boynton, Cutten,

Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge and Thompson, who were invariably

on the right side of things, look upon the records of the "Democrats"

and "Republicans" included among the nine favored receivers of plums,

they can scarcely be blamed for demanding with the discouraged little

boy - What's the use of being good, anyhow?

And as the Democratic Senators, Caminetti, Campbell, Cartwright,

Holohan, Miller and Sanford, who worked with the anti-machine

Republicans for the passage of good laws and the defeat of bad ones look

upon the favored Hare and Kennedy they cannot be blamed if the same

question occurs to them also.

The indications are that the Senators who were thus overlooked will have

"to wait for theirs," until The People of California, and not the

machine, award the prizes for faithful public service.

Of the seven Assemblymen who will attend the Alaska-Yukon Exposition,

one, Hewitt, voted against the machine on every important issue that

came up. The other six are a spotted lot.

The six - Beardslee, Leeds, McManus, McClellan, Schmitt and Transue -

voted for the famous "gag rules" which the Assembly rejected by a vote

of 41 to 32. Indeed, Beardslee and Transue were on the Committee on

Rules which the Assembly, when it rejected the Committee's rules,

repudiated.

In the fight for the passage of the Walker-Otis Anti-Gambling bill, two

of the six, Leeds and Transue, managed to keep their records straight.

On the six roll-calls taken on the measure before it passed the

Assembly, Beardslee voted five times against the bill and once for it;

McManus voted six times against it; Schmitt voted five times against it,

on one roll-call he did not vote; while McClellan voted four times for

it and twice against.

Five of the six, Beardslee, Leeds, McManus, McClellan and Schmitt voted

against forcing out of the Committee on Federal Relations the Sanford

resolution, which called for a government line of steamers from Panama

to San Francisco. The five voted for the Johnson amendments to the

resolutions, which cut out all criticizing reference to the

rate-boosting combinations between the great transportation companies.

Transue was absent when the vote to force the resolution out of

committee was taken. But he was present to vote for the Johnson

amendments.

Five of the six, Leeds, McManus, McClellan, Schmitt and Transue, voted

for the machine amendments to the Direct Primary bill, which were read

into that measure in the Assembly, and which resulted in the Senate

deadlock over the measure. Beardslee voted against the amendments.

Five of the six - Beardslee, Leeds, McManus, McClellan and Transue -

voted against the Holohan bill to remove the party circle from the

election ballot. Schmitt did not vote on this measure.

Assemblyman Hewitt will, at the Alaska-Yukon, find himself in

distinguished company. From the Wolfe-Leavitt-Johnson standpoint, he is

the only one of his associates who cannot be said to have earned the

preferment thrust upon him.

[102a] As these forms are going through the press, word comes that

Senator Willis has been made Assistant United States District Attorney

at Los Angeles. See Willis' record, Table "A" of the appendix.

[102b] The State Constitution provides no method of compensation for

such services. The providing of this compensation, therefore, becomes a

matter of great delicacy. It is done, under a decision of the Supreme

Court that that tribunal cannot go back of a legislative Act, but must

abide by the wording of the Act. The appropriation bills to compensate

the members for their services on hold-over Committees are worded to

meet the opinion of the courts. The money is invariably appropriated "to

pay the claim of," etc. The Legislature is, according to the courts, the

sole Judge of whether the alleged claim is a claim and not a petition

for a gift. The "to -pay- the-claim-of" bills never fail to pull down

the money.

[102c] The report as originally drawn, and as it was signed by Senator

Wolfe and his associates.

Chapter XXVI.

The Holdover Senators.

Eleven of Them May Be Counted Upon to Vote Against the Machine at the

Session of 1911, Two Are Doubtful, One Will Probably Vote with the

Majority, While Six May Be Counted Upon to Support Machine Policies.

Twenty of the 120 members who sat in the Legislature of 1909 - half of

the forty Senators - hold over and will serve in the Legislature of

1911. The twenty constitute the strength with which the machine and the

anti-machine forces will enter the field in the struggle for control of

the Legislature two years hence.

The machine has, long before this, taken stock of those twenty holdover

Senators. Machine agents unquestionably know what the holdover members

owe and to whom indebted; know their family history; know the church to

which they belong, their lodges, their likes, their dislikes and their

prejudices; know how they can be "reached" if vulnerable; know how they

can be "kept in line" if already tarred with the machine brush.

But the plain citizen, not within the charmed circle of machine

protection, is not concerning himself much about these holdovers. He

scarcely knows their names. It is safe to say that not 2 per cent of the

voters of California could off-hand name the twenty holdover members of

the Upper House of the Legislature.

In other words, the machine is posted, and the citizen is not. And here

is the secret of much of the machine's success. In its campaign for

control of affairs, the machine knows to a nicety just what to expect

from men in public life; the plain citizen is without such information.

In the Appendix will be found a table, "Table H," showing the votes of

the twenty holdover Senators on sixteen roll calls. Representative

citizens, all standing for good government, may differ as to the

desirability or undesirability of several of the measures included in

the list. But by and large the average normal citizen will hold that

certain of the sixteen measures are desirable and others undesirable.

Thus all would probably agree that the Change of Venue bill is

undesirable legislation, and declare the Walker-Otis Anti-Racetrack

Gambling measure to be desirable, although they might honestly differ on

the Local Option bill.

On the sixteen roll calls the twenty holdover Senators cast 283 votes.

Of the 283, 164 are recorded against what the normal citizen would

regard as bad measures, or for what the normal citizen would regard as

good measures. In other words, speaking broadly, 164 of the 283 votes

were cast against machine policies. Only 119 were cast with the machine.

In other words, over the whole session, on what may be fairly considered

the most important roll calls taken in the Senate, the holdover Senators

cast 164 votes against the machine and only 119 votes for the machine.

This isn't a bad showing to start with.

The showing is strengthened by the fact that ninety-two of the 119

machine votes were cast by eight Senators, Finn, Wolfe, Bills,

Martinelli, Hurd, Hare, Lewis and Welch. Senator Finn of San Francisco

heads the list with fifteen of these negative votes. On one occasion

Senator Finn didn't vote. After Finn comes Wolfe, also from San

Francisco, with thirteen of the ninety-two negative or machine votes to

his credit or his discredit; Bills of Sacramento and Martinelli of Marin

follow with twelve each; Hurd of Los Angeles with eleven; Hare of San

Francisco and Lewis of San Joaquin with ten each, and Welch of San

Francisco with nine.

This leaves twenty-seven machine votes to be divided among twelve of the

holdover Senators, about two votes on an average each.

Burnett is credited with seven of the twenty-seven, which reduces the

number to twenty for eleven Senators. Of the twenty votes, seven were

cast in the two ballots taken on the Local Option issue, again the bill;

and eight were cast in two ballots against the Holohan bill to remove

the party circle from the election ballot.

Thus, excluding the votes on local option, and on the Party Circle bill,

on twelve important ballots, eleven of the holdover Senators cast only

five votes for machine policies.

The eleven are Birdsall, Campbell, Cutten, Estudillo, Holohan,

Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson and Walker.

These eleven Senators, as judged by their performances at the session

just closed, may be depended upon to vote for good bills and against bad

ones at the session of 1911.

To this list should be added the name of Burnett. Burnett got off wrong

on the Stetson Railroad Regulation bill, and managed to land with the

Wolfe element in the direct primary fight. But there is good reason to

believe that Burnett was very sick of his company before the session

closed. The probabilities are that Senator Burnett feels more at home

with Senators Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson and Cutten than with Hare,

Finn and Wolfe.

Senator Hurd is another holdover who started out very well, but went

badly astray after the vote on the Railroad Regulation bills. Like

Burnett, Hurd showed signs toward the end of the session of feeling

himself in uncongenial company. There is reason to believe that Hurd at

the next session will be found voting with the

Thompson-Stetson-Strobridge element.

Senator Welch will be found voting with the majority. This reduces the

number of holdover Senators who can be counted upon to accept Wolfe's

leadership, machine Senators, if you like, to six. The line-up of the

twenty holdovers, then, would on this basis be as follows:

Anti-machine - Birdsall, Cutten, Estudillo, Roseberry, Rush, Stetson,

Strobridge, Thompson, Walker (Republicans), Campbell, Holohan

(Democrats) - 11.

Doubtful - Burnett, Hurd (Republicans) - 2.

With the majority - Welch (Republican) - 1.

Machine - Bills, Finn, Lewis[103], Martinelli, Wolfe (Republicans), Hare

(Democrat) - 6.

On this basis the anti-machine element will start with all the advantage

in the struggle for control of the Senate in 1911. If Burnett and Hurd

vote with the eleven anti-machine Senators, it will be necessary to

elect only eight anti-machine Senators that the reform element may

control the Senate. This will mean twenty-two votes for the reform

element, for Welch, if he is to be judged by past performances, will be

found with the majority.

From present indications, four important fights will be made at the

Legislative session of 1911.

(1) To pass an effective railroad regulation measure and to amend those

sections of the State Constitution which prescribe the duties and powers

of the Railroad Commissioners.

(2) To amend the Direct Primary law passed at the session just closed to

meet with the popular demand for an effective measure.

(3) To grant local option to the counties.

(4) To adopt an amendment to the State Constitution granting the

initiative to the electors of the State.

Significantly enough, the line-up of the holdover Senators in the Direct

Primary deadlock of the last session was nine to eleven, the eleven

Senators who divide but five machine votes between them standing out

against Wolfe and Leavitt for an effective provision for the selection

of United States Senators by State-wide vote, while the six machine

Senators, the "bandwagon" Senator and the two doubtfuls, voted with

Wolfe and Leavitt.

But the probabilities are that in the event of the anti-machine element

controlling the Senate of 1911, Burnett, Hurd, Lewis, Martinelli and

Welch would join with the reform forces to make necessary amendments to

the measure. When the Direct Primary bill was first before the Senate,

these five Senators united with the Good Government forces and assisted

in defeating the machine's amendment. When the bill was amended in the

Assembly, however, the five flopped to the machine side. Indeed, only

four of the twenty holdover Senators voted for the machine's amendments

to the Direct Primary bill when the measure was first passed upon by the

Senate. They were Bills, Finn, Hare and Wolfe.

The holdover Senators made their poorest showing on the railroad

measures. When the test came on the Stetson bill the twenty holdovers

split even, ten being for the effective Stetson bill, ten for the

ineffective Wright bill. The line-up was as follows:

For the Stetson bill - Birdsall, Campbell, Cutten, Holohan, Lewis,

Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Strobridge, Thompson - 10.

For the Wright bill - Bills, Burnett, Estudillo, Finn, Hare, Hurd,

Martinelli, Walker, Welch, Wolfe - 10.

Lewis, who usually voted with the performers, voted for the Stetson

bill. But the reform forces lost two votes, those of Walker and

Estudillo. On another vote on the same issue, however, Burnett,

Estudillo and Walker would probably be found with the anti-machine

forces supporting an effective measure. This would make the vote of the

holdover Senators, thirteen for effective railroad regulation, and seven

for a measure of the Wright law variety.

The holdovers made a good showing on the Initiative amendment, eleven

voting for it and five against it, four not voting at all. The vote was

as follows:

For the Initiative - Birdsall, Campbell, Cutten, Estudillo, Hare,

Roseberry, Rush, Stetson, Thompson, Walker, Welch - 11.

Against the Initiative - Bills, Hurd, Lewis, Martinelli, Wolfe - 5.

Not voting - Burnett, Finn, Holohan, Strobridge - 4.

Of the four who did not vote, three, Burnett, Holohan and Strobridge,

would have voted for the amendment. Finn would probably have voted

against it. This would have made the vote fourteen to six in the

amendment's favor. It will be seen that those who would have the

initiative granted the people, have a good start for the next session.

The outlook for local option is not so reassuring. Of the holdover

Senators who ordinarily were for measures which give the people a voice

in the management of public affairs, Birdsall, Holohan, Rush and

Strobridge were unalterably opposed to the local option idea. The six

machine Senators, of course, opposed it, which with the votes of

Burnett, Welch and Hurd placed thirteen of the twenty holdover Senators

against the measure.

Six of the holdovers voted for the Local Option bill - Campbell, Cutten,

Estudillo, Roseberry, Thompson and Walker.

Stetson was absent and did not vote. He, however, favored the bill. His

vote would have made it 13 to 7. Thus on the vote on their bill at the

last session, the local option forces have seven of the holdover

Senators with them, and thirteen against.

On the other hand, seventeen of the holdover Senators voted for the

Walker-Otis Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill, while only three, Finn, Hare

and Wolfe, voted against it. Thus on the moral issue, as well as the

political and the industrial, the anti-machine element is stronger in

the holdover delegation in the Senate than is the machine. It rests with

the good citizenship of California to maintain its advantage by electing

to the Senate in 1910, men who will stand with the majority of the

holdover members for the passage of good and the defeat of vicious

measures.

[103] Lewis voted with the anti-machine element in the Railroad

Regulation fight, one of the most severe tests of the session. Persons

who know Lewis well stated that he will, if the anti-machine forces be

effectively organized at the session of 1911, be found against the

machine. It is "up to Senator Lewis."

Chapter XXVII.

The Retiring Senators.

Of the Twenty Whose Terms of Office Will Have Expired, the Machine Loses

Eleven, the Anti-Machine Element Seven - Two Who Voted With the Machine

on Occasion Were Usually on the Side of Good Government.

Twenty of the forty Senators who sat in the Legislature of 1909, must,

if they sit in the Legislature of 1911, be re-elected at the general

elections in November 1910. They are: Senators Anthony of San Francisco,

Bates of Alameda, Bell of Pasadena, Black of Santa Clara, Boynton of

Yuba, Caminetti of Amador, Cartwright of Fresno, Curtin of Tuolumne,

Hartman of San Francisco, Kennedy of San Francisco, Leavitt of Alameda,

McCartney of Los Angeles, Miller of Kern, Price of Sonoma, Reily of San

Francisco, Sanford of Mendocino, Savage of Los Angeles, Weed of

Siskiyou, Willis of San Bernardino and Wright of San Diego.

By consulting Table A of the Appendix, it will be seen that on sixteen

roll calls the forty members of the Senate of 1909 voted 570 times. Of

the 570 votes 311 were cast against what are regarded as machine

policies; 259 for such policies. Of the 311 anti-machine votes, 164 were

cast by holdover Senators, and were considered in the last chapter,

while 147 were cast by Senators whose successors will be elected in

1910. Thus it will be seen, that on this basis, more desirable Senators

will hold over than those whose terms of office will have expired before

the next Legislature convenes.

On the basis of the machine votes the result is as satisfactory. On the

sixteen roll calls, 259 machine votes were cast. Of these 140 were cast

by the retiring Senators, and only 119 by those who will hold over, and

who will sit in the Legislature of 1911. So, on the whole, the machine

loses and the people gain in the retirement of the twenty Senators.

In point of numbers the result is as satisfactory. The machine will lose

eleven Senators: Bates, Hartman, Kennedy, Leavitt, McCartney, Price,

Reily, Savage, Weed, Willis and Wright; while the anti-machine forces

will lose only seven who can be counted constantly for reform policies:

Bell, Black, Boynton, Caminetti, Cartwright, Miller and Sanford.

This leaves only Anthony and Curtin to be accounted for. Both these men

stood out against the machine's amendments to the Direct Primary bill,

Anthony in particular standing against the severest pressure that could

be brought to compel him to vote against the interests of his

constituents and of the State. But Anthony could not be moved. On the

railroad measures, however, Anthony voted with the machine. But he voted

for the Walker-Otis bill, and, generally speaking, for all measures

which made for political reforms. With any sort of organization of the

reform forces, Anthony could be counted upon as safe for reform. His

record on the Direct Primary bill certainly entitles him to the highest

consideration.

Curtin also was as a general thing with the reform element. He voted,

however, against the bill to do away with the party circle and he voted

against the Local Option bill, but in so doing he merely followed the

lead of such men as Birdsall, who, while out and out against the

machine, were at the same time against local option and lukewarm on

ballot reform. Birdsall, however, finally voted for the bill to remove

the party circle from the election ballot, although he had on the first

ballot voted against the bill. Curtin did not, however, change his vote.

But Curtin did vote against the Initiative Amendment. On the other hand,

Curtin's record on the Direct Primary bill, on the Railroad Regulation

bills, and on the Anti-Gambling bill is all that could be desired.

While the retirement of all the Senators who do not hold over would

strengthen the reform element in the Senate, nevertheless the State can

ill afford to lose the services of the seven who stood out so valiantly

against machine policies. Senator Bell heads the list, with Caminetti,

Black, Boynton and Sanford close seconds.

Senator Bell not only made the best record made in the Senate of 1909,

but he made the best record of the Senate of 1907. Conscientious, fully

awake to the responsibilities of his position, alive to the tricks of

the machine leaders, in constant attendance, Senator Bell proved himself

during the two sessions that he has served in the Senate, a power for

good government. His absence from the session of 1911 would be a loss to

the State.

Senators Black and Boynton at the session of 1909 made records quite as

good as that made by Senator Bell. On the sixteen roll calls taken as

tests of the standing of the several Senators, Black voted but once

against reform policies. On the first ballot on the Party Circle bill he

voted against the measure, but the day following, corrected his mistake

by voting for the measure. Boynton voted to return the Local Option bill

to the Judiciary Committee, but at the final test his vote was recorded

for the bill[103a]. Thus neither of the two Senators can be said to have

voted with the machine even on comparatively unimportant issues.

Senator Caminetti probably gave the machine more worry during the

session than any other one Senator. Caminetti has, a way of saying out

loud what his anti-machine associates are thinking, which is not at all

popular with the machine. True to principle, he, a Democrat, voted for

United States Senator Perkins because, from Caminetti's view-point, no

other candidate came so near to being the popular choice of the people

as Perkins, and Caminetti holds that the people and not the Legislature

should select the United States Senator. The machine was glad of

Caminetti's vote for Perkins, but was not at all pleased with the

departure of a Democrat voting for a Republican. Caminetti's course

continued in by all the members of the Legislature, and the machine

would lose its monopoly of Federal Senator-making.

Caminetti's record is admirable. To be sure, he opposed Local Option,

but he fought as few others fought for an effective Direct Primary law,

for effective railroad regulation, in fact for practically all the

reform policies which the anti-machine forces advocated and the machine

opposed. Senator Sanford also voted for and worked for reform policies.

Like Caminetti, however, he opposed the Local Option bill and voted

against it. Senator Miller, on the other hand, supported the Local

Option bill, but slipped more seriously than did either Caminetti or

Sanford, by voting with the machine Senators against the Initiative

amendment. Miller's work for effective railroad regulation and for an

effective Direct Primary law, won him the deserved admiration and

confidence of the better element of the Legislature. Senator Cartwright

voted but twelve times on the sixteen roll calls, but the twelve

included the votes on the Direct Primary issues, on railroad regulation,

and on all the moral issues considered. And each time, Senator

Cartwright's vote was cast on the side of good government.

On the other side, the machine side, Senator Bates distinguished himself

but once during the session. It was Senator Bates who, to oblige a

friend, had the notorious Change of Venue bill placed on the Special

Urgency File, thus making the passage of the bill possible. Senator

Bates' vote and influence - such as it was - were thrown in the balance

against giving the people of California a State-wide vote - the only

practical vote - for United States Senators. He voted against the

effective Stetson bill; he voted for the ineffective Railroad Regulation

bill. In fact, aside from the Walker-Otis bill, Bates was on the machine

side of practically every issue[104].

Senator Hartman was during the session a mere machine vote. He was

always on hand, always voted, and voted with the machine. It was Senator

Hartman who named an employee of the notorious Sausalito gambling rooms

for an important committee clerkship. So far as the writer can recall,

Hartman made but two speeches during the session; one against the

Walker-Otis Anti-Gambling bill, one against the Islais Creek Harbor

bill, the passage of which meant so much for San Francisco, the city, by

the way, responsible for Hartman's presence at Sacramento.

On the sixteen roll calls under consideration, Hartman voted sixteen

times for machine policies. As a vote, Hartman is a valuable machine

asset; otherwise a nonentity.

Those who have read the previous chapters have already formed their

opinion of the advisability of returning to the Senate, Kennedy, the

hero of the passage of the Change of Venue bill; McCartney, the author

of the famous amendment to the Direct Primary bill; Weed, who introduced

the resolution to drag Senator Black from his sick bed at Palo Alto;

Reily, who with Senator Hartman, alone of all the Senate stood out

against the passage of the Islais Creek Harbor bills; Willis, who as

Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, backed such measures as the Change

of Venue bill, and opposed such measures as the Commonwealth Club bills;

Savage, who in committee and out of it, opposed the State-wide vote plan

for nominating United States Senators, and Senator Price.

Price did not distinguish himself particularly. On the sixteen roll

calls included in Table A, his vote was recorded against the machine as

many as four times. But there were ten Senators who did even worse.

However, a story of the closing days of the session is quite

characteristic of Senator Price.

An important roll call was on - if the writer remembers correctly, it

was on Burnett's motion to continue the investigation into the causes of

the increase of freight and express rates. Price was present, but did

not answer to the call of his name. The advocates of the resolution

insisted that all vote, and demanded a call of the Senate. The doors

were ordered closed, at which order Price made a run for the door.

Caminetti saw the move, understood it and started to intercept the

fleeing Senator. But if Caminetti were quick, Price was quicker.

Caminetti missed his grab at Price, and so chased that gentleman to the

door of the Senate chamber. The assistant Sergeant-at-Arms at the door

was just swinging it closed as Price shot through. The determined

Caminetti made a last grab at Price's coattails, but too late. The

massive doors banged closed, with Price, coattails and all, on the

outside, and the balked Caminetti on the inside. Price didn't vote on

that roll call.

The failure to return Leavitt to the Senate will be a decided loss for

the machine, one hard to offset. Next to Wolfe, Leavitt was by far the

ablest floor leader in the Senate. The brute force of the man, his

grossness, his indifference to public opinion, made him an ideal

machine leader. Leavitt's return from Alameda seems extremely doubtful.

His district takes in the notorious gambling community, Emeryville,

which will be purged of the thug element that has dominated it, by the

enforcement of the Walker-Otis law. With the loss of this portion of

his constituency, Senator Leavitt's chance of re-election from

Emeryville appears slim indeed.

But, according to rather persistent rumor, Senator Leavitt may be

returned to the Senate, not from Alameda, but from the Siskiyou-Shasta

District, the district represented by Weed. Leavitt has property up

there, and the story runs that he will be a candidate from that part of

the State. The voters of Shasta and Siskiyou, however, may conclude that

they have something to say about it.

Senator Wright, the last of the Senators whose terms will have expired

before the next session of the Legislature convenes, is being mentioned

as a "reform candidate" for Governor. The idea seems to be that he will

run on his record made at the session of 1909. If this be true, he may

not be a candidate for re-election to the Senate. Senator Wright's

record as a State Senator has already been treated at length.

[103a] Senator Boynton was a consistent supporter of the Local Option

bill from the beginning to the end of the session. He held, however,

that the bill as originally drawn was not in proper form, and explained

that he voted to have the bill returned to the committee that

amendments, which he deemed necessary, could be made.

[104] Since the Legislature adjourned Senator Bates has been given a

lucrative position in the United States Mint.

Chapter XXVIII.

Conclusion.

Events of the Session of 1909 Show That Before Any Effective Reform Can

Be Brought About in California, Good Government Republicans and

Democrats Must Unite to Organize Senate and Assembly - Appointment of

Senate Committees May Be Taken Out of the Hands of the

Lieutenant-Governor.

In the opening chapter it was stated that the machine element in the

Legislature of 1909, although in the minority, defeated the purposes of

the reform majority, because of three principal reasons:

(1) The reform element was without organization.

(2) The reform members had, except in the anti-racetrack gambling fight,

no definite plan of action.

(3) The reform members of both Houses permitted the machine to name

presiding officers and appoint committees.

This third reason must appeal to those who have read the foregoing pages

as the most important of all. The story of every machine success, in

face of opposition, is that of advantage gained through the moral

support given by the presiding officers[105], or of co-operation of

committees, or of both. But, unfortunately, a stupid partisanship - a

partisanship which the machine finds far more potent than bribe money -

makes this cause of machine success more difficult to overcome than

either of the others. Already a movement is on foot, the details of

which the writer is not at liberty to make public, that will unite the

reform element of the next Legislature into a working body, from the day

nominations are made. Steps to this end were taken before the last

Legislature adjourned. In the same way, the work of bringing reform

issues before the public - reform of the ballot laws, amendment of the

Direct Primary law, the simplification of the mode of criminal procedure

- is being taken up in the same effective, commonsense way as was the

Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill. But here the progress of the commonsense

element of machine opposition seems to halt. In spite of their

experience of the last session, Democrats and Republicans who stand for

good government hesitate at the suggestion of non-partisan organization

of Senate and Assembly. The writer has shown in the foregoing chapters

that the machine Republicans and the machine Democrats were for

practical purposes a unit in the organization of the Legislature of

1909. Why, then, should not the anti-machine Republicans and the

anti-machine Democrats unite for purposes of organization, just as they

united, at the session of 1909, to oppose vicious measures and to work

for the passage of good bills? That is a question which has never been

satisfactorily answered. It leads us, however, to the question of the

real line of division in Senate and Assembly, and, for that matter, in

State politics[106].

That the real division is no longer between political parties, or even

between party factions, is apparent to the observer who has given the

question any attention at all.

Not once, for example, did the California Legislature of 1909 divide on

a party question; nor did it have to deal with any problem that had not

at one time or another been endorsed by both parties. Both Democrats and

Republicans in either State or county platforms had declared for the

passage of an Anti-Racetrack Gambling law, for an effective Direct

Primary law, for an effective Railroad Regulation law, for the

submission to the people of a Constitutional Amendment granting the

people the privilege of initiating laws. In the same way, county

conventions of both parties - and county conventions are the closest to

the people and most representative of them - had declared for local

option, for the election of United States Senators by direct vote of the

people, for amendments to the codes that should simplify proceedings in

criminal cases, for effective railroad regulation. Estimating the

purposes of the two parties by their county and State platforms, none of

these reforms can be regarded as any more Democratic than Republican,

and these were the issues with which the Legislature of 1909 was called

upon to deal.

A glance at the tables of votes in the appendix will show that the

Assemblymen and the Senators who voted against the Anti-Racetrack

Gambling bill, generally speaking, voted against the effective Stetson

Railroad Regulation bill and for the ineffective Wright bill, opposed

the provision in the Direct Primary bill giving the people an effective

part in the selection of United States Senators, supported the passage

of the Change of Venue bill, opposed the passage of the Local Option

bill, opposed the submission of the Initiative amendment to the electors

of the State. This negative element, opposed to policies which the

normal citizen regards as making for the State's best interests, has in

these pages been called the machine[107].

As has been shown in these pages, the interests of the several

beneficiaries of the system are in effect pooled; one element helps the

other. The managers of the several elements, the political agents, if

you like, of the tenderloin, Southern Pacific, racetrack, and

public-service monopolies generally; in a word, all who seek to evade

the law or to secure undue special privileges or to continue secure in

the possession of such privileges already secured, recognize that they

must hang together or submit to a reckoning with the public, which must

necessarily result in the breaking of the particular monopoly which each

enjoys, be it in transportation, nickel-in-the-slot graft, or traffic in

the bodies of young women. Should the political bureau of the Southern

Pacific Railroad Company, for example, lose the support of the

tenderloin, or of the racetrack gamblers, or of any other powerful group

of its political associates, the corporation could no longer continue

its strangle-hold upon the State. But none of its associates would dare

thus offend. Such is the machine, which, in the name of a protective

tariff, "sound money," Abraham Lincoln, or Theodore Roosevelt, has

organized the Legislature of California for sixteen years. Previous to

1895, there were California Legislatures organized in the name of Thomas

Jefferson. But the machine has not taken the name of Thomas Jefferson in

vain in California for many years[108].

Nevertheless, although acting under the name Republican, the machine is

quite as dependent upon "Democrats" as upon "Republicans," and as

dependent upon either as upon the tenderloin, the brewery trust or the

racetrack gambling element. It monopolizes neither party, but it divides

both parties. Or it may be described as a canker that has eaten into

both, diseased both, rendered both unwholesome, until a condition exists

in the dominating parties that requires that the uncorrupted element of

both unite to cut the diseased portion away[109].

As the machine divides the parties, so did it divide the Republican and

Democratic delegations in the Senate and the Assembly of the California

Legislature of 1909. Hare and Kennedy, for example, Democratic Senators,

voted constantly with Wolfe and Leavitt, Republican Senators, for

machine policies. Nor was the opposition restricted to party lines.

Black and Boynton and Cutten, Republican Senators, were found voting

constantly with Campbell and Holohan, Democratic Senators, against the

machine. Between Black and Wolfe, Republicans, there was nothing in

common during the entire session; nor was there anything in common

between Campbell and Kennedy, Democrats. On practically every important

issue, however, Kennedy, Democrat, and Wolfe, Republican, made common

cause, while Black, Republican, and Campbell, Democrat, opposed them.

The same comparisons could be made in the Assembly, where such Democrats

as Wheelan and Baxter were found with Mott and Coghlan, Republicans,

supporting machine policies, while opposed to them were anti-machine

Republicans of the character of Bohnett and Callan, and anti-machine

Democrats like Polsley and Mendenhall.

Thus, for practical purposes, the Legislature can not be divided on

party lines. The only practical line of division is between the machine

element, and the anti-machine element. Such, at the session of 1909, was

the division on every important issue; such will it be at the

legislative session of 1911. Why should not the same division govern the

organization of Senate and Assembly?

As a matter of fact, the machine disregards party lines even in

organizing. In making up its committees it considers fealty to machine

interests above party name. For example, Hare and Kennedy were the

Democratic Senators who this year affiliated with the machine. Kennedy

was appointed to practically every important committee, at least to

those before which important fights were to be made. Thus we find him on

the Committee on Commerce and Navigation, Contingent Expenses, Elections

and Election Laws, Prisons and Reformatories, and Public Morals, Hare

was appointed to the Committee on Commerce and Navigation, Elections and

Election Laws, Labor, Capital and Immigration, Municipal Corporations,

Printing, and Public Buildings and Grounds. In committees, as well as on

the floor of the Senate, Hare and Kennedy were found as a general thing

casting their influence and their votes on the side of machine policies.

Had the anti-machine Democrats and the anti-machine Republicans in

Senate and Assembly, who worked together for the same ends and voted

together on practically every important issue, taken the same course,

and united for the organization of the two Houses, reform measures which

were defeated by narrow margins would have been made laws, and machine

measures which became laws defeated.

Such being the case, is it not the duty of the anti-machine Republicans

and the anti-machine Democrats who may sit in the Legislature of 1911,

to organize both Senate and Assembly to resist machine purposes and

policies?

This can be done comparatively easily in the Assembly, where a movement

to elect the Speaker such as was started by Drew of Fresno this year, if

carried out, would take the Assembly out of machine hands. Although the

organization of the Senate looks more difficult, because the Senate has

no voice in the selection of its presiding officer, nevertheless, even

though a Warren Porter occupy the post of Lieutenant-Governor, at the

session of 1911 the reform element can elect its President pro tem., and

appoint the Senate committees. In other words, a majority of the Senate,

may if it see fit, take the appointing of the committees out of the

hands of the Lieutenant-Governor.

There are two important precedents for this course, one established by a

Democratic Senate; the other by a Republican Senate.

The Democratic precedent was established in 1887. In that year Robert W.

Waterman, a Republican, was Lieutenant-Governor and presiding officer of

the Senate. The Senate was made up of twenty-six Democrats and fourteen

Republicans. The Democratic majority organized the Senate under the

following rule, which will be found in the Senate journal of that

session:

"All Committees of the Senate, special and standing, and all joint

Committees on the part thereof, shall be elected by the Senate unless

otherwise ordered."

The Republican precedent was made in 1897. In that year, William T.

Jeter, a Democrat, was Lieutenant-Governor, while a majority of the

Senators were Republicans. Instead of leaving the appointing of the

committees to the Democratic Lieutenant-Governor, the Republican

Senators adopted a rule that "all standing committees of the Senate

shall be named by the Senate, unless otherwise ordered, and the first

named shall be chairman thereof. All other committees shall be appointed

in such manner as the Senate shall determine."

In other words, the Republican majority of the Senate named the Senate

committees of the session of 1897, taking their appointment out of the

hands of the Lieutenant-Governor as the Democrats had done ten years

before. There is no good reason why the members of the anti-machine

majority in the Senate should not have taken the same course in 1909,

and named the committees. Had they done so, and named the President pro

tem., they would have organized the Senate in the interest of those

policies in advancing which they were soon in open revolt against

Lieutenant-Governor Porter, the machine Senators and the machine lobby.

Failing to do so, they placed themselves under a handicap which they

were unable to overcome.

The reform element of the Legislature of 1911 will have in the

experience of the reform element of the session of 1909, an important

lesson. And The People of California, who will elect that Legislature,

have a lesson as important. The successes of the machine at the session

of 1909, where a clear majority of both Houses opposed machine policies,

demonstrated that the well-being of the State requires that the

opponents of the machine in Senate and Assembly, regardless of party

label, organize the Legislature. But back of this is the even more

important requirement that there be elected to the Legislature American

citizens, with the responsibility of their citizenship upon them, rather

than partisans, burdened until their good purposes are made negative, by

the responsibility of their partisanship.

[105] See, for example, Speaker Stanton's ruling on the Direct Primary

bill when the Assembly was considering the question of receding from its

amendments.

[106] The machine recognizes the real division, if the reform element

does not. The machine, for example, calls itself Republican, and as such

controls the patronage of the San Francisco water front. The

appointments to water front jobs are, of course, partisan, but the

writer is reliably informed that as many "Democrats" as "Republicans"

are employed there. Senators Hare and Kennedy, we have seen, although

Democrats, got appointments to holdover committees. The machine

recognizes but one line in politics, that which divides those who

support machine policies from those who stand for good government and

the square deal. When those who stand for good government and the square

deal become as clear sighted, the fight against the machine will not be

quite so unequal.

[107] The term "machine" is, as a general thing, rather lightly used. It

is made to stand for everything, from what might be and should be

perfectly legitimate party organization, to the Southern Pacific

political bureau. The Southern Pacific political bureau is, as a matter

of fact, the dominating factor in machine affairs, which gives some

reason for dubbing the machine Southern Pacific. But it is nor more the

Southern Pacific machine than it is the Tenderloin machine or the

Racetrack gamblers' machine, or the United Railroads machine, or the

Electric Power Trust machine.

[108] Bryce in his American Commonwealth, more than a quarter of a

century ago, showed the hollowness of the contention of the machine

element for arty consideration. "The interest of a Boss in political

questions," said Bryce in one of his admirable chapters on this subject,

"is usually quite secondary. Here and there one may be found and who is

a politician in the European sense, who, whether sincerely or not,

purports and professes to be interested in some principle or measure

affecting the welfare of the country. But the attachment of the ringster

is usually given wholly to the concrete party, that is, to the men who

compose it, regarded as office-holders or office-seekers; and there is

often not even a profession of zeal for any party doctrine. As a noted

politician happily observed to a friend of mine: 'You know, Mr. R.,

there are no politics in politics.' "

[109] One has a wider view of this condition if he look out beyond the

Sacramento Capitol, into the Senate Hall at Washington. The following is

from an editorial article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post,

of June 12 last:

"The Iron trade is still in a depressed state. Output is much below the

capacity of the mills, and prices have not recovered from the

demoralization of early spring. Yet the other day the common stock of

the Steel Trust sold higher than ever before. When issued, this common

stock was rather thinner than water, and it represented mostly a

capitalization of the Trust's tariff graft. At the new high price the

market valuation of the graft, therefore, is some three hundred million

dollars. A few days before this new high price was made, eighteen

Democratic Senators voted with the Aldrich Republicans to take iron ore

from the free list - where the House bill had put it - and protect it by

a substantial duty. This action was generally regarded as insuring a

continuation of the Trust's tariff graft. Hence a record price for the

common stock was logical enough, although the iron trade was not exactly

flourishing at the moment.

"Similar acts by Democratic Senators were denounced by President

Cleveland as party perfidy and dishonor; but the regrettable fact is

there is only one party in the United States Senate - just one party,

with some scattering Republicans and Democratic Insurgents. For the

purpose of getting elected and making stump speeches, different labels

and catchwords are employed; but when it comes down to real business in

the matter of taxing eighty-odd million users of iron and steel products

for the benefit of an opulent trust, we find forty-three Republican

Senators and eighteen Democratic Senators staunchly voting aye, against

fourteen Republicans and ten Democrats who vote nay.

"With over half of the Democratic members of the Upper House fondly

recording themselves as Little Brothers to Protection, there is slight

danger that the tariff will be revised otherwise than by its friends."

Appendix

Tables of Votes.

The test votes given in the several tables record in every instance the

result of a contest between the machine and the anti-machine forces in

Senate or Assembly. It is quite evident that a unanimous vote cannot be

counted a test vote. Thus the unanimous vote by which the Reciprocal

Demurrage bill passed the Senate cannot be regarded as a test, although

the machine fought the demurrage principle viciously in 1907.

Nor can a vote on a measure be taken as a test vote, where the vote was

taken without the members fully realizing what was before them. Thus the

votes on the Wheelan bills do not appear in either Senate or Assembly

tables. These measures were slipped through Senate and Assembly without

the members of either House fully realizing what the bills were, their

purpose, or far-reaching effects. To be sure, a member of the

Legislature should know what he is voting on, but when one considers the

incidents of the whirl-wind close of the session of 1909, the injustice

of holding a member accountable for inadvertently voting for a measure

which he had intended to oppose, becomes apparent.

Following this rule, a vote on a given measure may be a test vote in one

House and not in the other. The Change of Venue bill is an example in

point. The Change of Venue bill was slipped through the Assembly,

without the members fully realizing its import, and hence without

opposition. But in the Senate the issue was fought out. The Senate vote

on the Change of Venue bill, then, is taken as a test vote, while the

Assembly vote on the same measure is not so regarded. In the same way,

the vote on the substitution of the Wright bill for the Stetson Railroad

Regulation bill was a test vote in the Senate. But in the Assembly there

was no test vote taken on the railroad regulation measures, for the

Wright bill was put through practically without opposition. The test

railroad vote in the Assembly came on the Sanford resolution providing

for government steamships on the Pacific. There was no test vote on this

in the Senate, for in the Senate it was adopted practically without

opposition.

Table A - Records of Senators.

The records of the members of the Senate on sixteen test votes are shown

in Table A. The names of the Senators are arranged in the order of the

number of times their votes were recorded on the side of progress and

reform, the name of the Senator with the most positive votes to his

credit appearing at the top of the list, and the Senator with the least

number at the bottom.

While few will quarrel with the fact that Senator Bell's name leads the

list, while Senators Finn and Hartman divide negative honors at the

bottom, nevertheless the arrangement is not, strictly speaking, fair,

although it is probably as fair as it could be made.

Senator Walker, for example, has only one anti-reform vote registered

against him, but it was, perhaps, the most important test vote of the

session, that on the Railroad Regulation measures. Senator Cutten, on

the other hand, voted on the reform side of every question with the

exception of the measure intended to work political reform by removing

the party circle from the election ballot. Senator Cutten is recorded

twice against this bill, it being necessary, in justice to all the

Senators, to give both the votes taken on this measure. But considering

the relative importance of the Railroad Regulation bills and the Party

Circle bill, all must admit that Senator Cutten made a better record

than Senator Walker, although Cutten's name appears below that of

Walker.

Unavoidable absence from the Senate Chamber cut down the records of

several of the Senators. Black and Stetson, whose severe illness kept

them from Sacramento toward the end of the session, furnish examples of

this.

Then again, the Party Circle bill and the Local Option bill were

measures on which several of the strongest of the opponents of the

machine differed with the majority of their anti-machine associates.

With the four votes taken on these two issues out of the reckoning,

Bell, Thompson, Roseberry, Cutten, Campbell, Boynton, Sanford,

Cartwright, Black, Holohan, Birdsall, Stetson, Rush and Strobridge, have

not one vote for a machine-backed policy against them. Caminetti's vote

to amend the Stanford bill excludes him from the list, but as this

measure was of the same character and policy as the Local Option bill,

Caminetti's name should in justice be included among those of the

Senators who made practically clear records. Looking at the table in a

broad way, the first nineteen Senators of the list made anti-machine

records. Of the eleven caucus Republicans among them, only one voted

against admitting Bell to the Republican caucus.