The Direct Primary Bill.
Parallel Between It and the Walker-Otis Bill - Attempt to Placate the
Machine Weakened Position of Its Supporters - Most Serious Criticism
Came from Advocates of the Direct Primary Idea - What the Original
Measure Provided - Machine's Plan of Campaign.
The parallel between the Walker-Otis Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill and
the Wright-Stanton Direct Primary bill furnishes the most suggestive
feature of the Legislative session. Each was based on a demand of a
large majority of the people of the State for the correction of an
abuse; the one to prevent the prostitution of the race-course in the
interest of the gambling element; the second to prevent the domination
in public affairs of the corrupt, corporation-backed political boss.
Each had been discussed in the public prints for months previous to the
convening of the Legislature, and each had been made in the popular view
of affairs a sort of test by which the Legislature was to be judged.
Each had the support of not only the better element of electors, but the
better element of each House of the Legislature. Each had the determined
secret opposition, and so far as it dared, the open opposition of the
machine.
The campaign which the machine planned against the bills was practically
the same in each instance - to amend the measures into a condition of
ineffectiveness, and then pass them as sop to The People. This would
have given The People a Direct Primary law without a direct primary; an
Anti-Gambling law that would neither close poolrooms nor interfere with
bookmaking.
And here the parallel ends.
The proponents of the Anti-Gambling bill introduced an Anti-Gambling
measure, showed that it was the best that could be drawn, and let it be
known that they (the supporters of the measure) would, if it were
amended by the machine, vote against it.
The proponents of the Direct Primary bill, on the other hand, seemed
possessed of the notion that they must placate the machine if any Direct
Primary bill were to be passed.
The backers of the Anti-Gambling bill treated the machine leaders as
recognized enemies of the measure, with whom there could be no
compromise. The backers of the Direct Primary bill treated the machine
leaders as friends and allies, inviting them to offer suggestion and
advice.
The results of the two campaigns speak for the effectiveness of the two
methods. The Anti-Gambling element put through an effective
Anti-Gambling bill, refusing to compromise on so much as the change of a
comma. But in the case of the Direct Primary bill, the machine not only
had the last word, but in the feature of the nomination of United States
Senators, the real bone of contention, amended the measure very much to
its liking.
Long before the Legislature convened it was common talk at San Francisco
that the backers of the Direct Primary bill were willing to accept any
sort of a bill, so long as a direct primary measure be passed. Inasmuch
as it is quite possible that a legislative enactment called Direct
Primary law may be a trifle worse than no Direct Primary law at all, the
jelly-fish attitude of the leaders in the movement caused no little
unfavorable comment.
It did not seem to occur to the self-constituted leaders that their
proper course was to draw up the most effective measure possible, let
its effectiveness be known to the people - as was done in the case of
the Anti-Gambling bill - and insist that the Legislature go on record
for or against it.
Instead, they endeavored to satisfy everybody, apparently attempted to
come to a compromise understanding with the machine, or at least to
please machine leaders. Their theory seemed to be that if the measure
were not made too effective, the machine would not seriously oppose its
passage, thus insuring a glorious and at the same time, easy victory.
However unwarranted this assumption from appearances may be, such
hidebound machine men as Wolfe and Leavitt were consulted and flattered,
apparently with the idea that although they had been abused like
pickpockets on previous occasions, they could be won over to the Direct
Primary cause.
The stupidity of this policy was shown at the end of the session, when
Wolfe and Leavitt dictated the terms under which the Direct Primary bill
should pass. Had the supporters of the Anti-Gambling bill pursued the
same policy, and treated the machine leaders as possible friends instead
of recognized enemies, Wolfe, Leavitt and the other machine leaders
would unquestionably have dictated the provisions of the Anti-Gambling
bill, and have forced that compromise which Wolfe in his speech on the
Walker-Otis bill regretted so bitterly had not been made.
The purpose of the Direct Primary is primarily to take away from the
political bosses the monopoly which the convention system gives them in
naming candidates for office, and to place such nomination in the hands
of The People. To this end, under the Direct Primary laws that have of
recent years been adopted, the boss-controlled convention is done away
with, and the candidate for office nominated by the direct vote of The
People.
The play of the machine was to make the direct nomination difficult and
impracticable and, if possible, entirely ineffective. The real
supporters of the Direct Primary idea aimed to make the nomination as
simple as possible, and easily attained, that genuine expression of the
choice of the electors could be secured.
But instead of aiming at simplicity and direct methods, the Direct
Primary bill, introduced in the Senate by Wright and in the Assembly by
Stanton[35], threw a confusing mass of partisan detail about the
selection of the primary candidate. It was made practically impossible
for an independent citizen believing in the principles of a given party,
but withholding his right to exercise the citizen's judgment at the
polls, to become a primary candidate. Throughout, the measure made it
smooth sailing for the mere partisan and extremely hard for independent
Republican or independent Democrat to secure party nomination[35a].
For example, the candidate for party nomination, was, according to the
terms of the bill, required not only to set forth the name of the party
under which he might seek nomination, but to make affidavit "that he
affiliated with said party at the last preceding general election, and
either that he did not vote thereat, or voted for a majority of the
candidates of said party at said next preceding general election, and
intends to so vote at the ensuing election."
Thus, no citizen who had not supported the majority of his party
candidates at the previous election, and who was unwilling to take an
oath before their nomination, to support a majority of the candidates at
the next ensuing election, was to be eligible for primary nomination to
office.
But this, and similar unfortunate provisions were practically lost sight
of in the fight made over the provisions for the nomination of United
States Senators, and remained in the measure as it was finally enacted
into law.
It may be, as the machine element contends, that provision for the
nomination of United States Senators has no place in a Direct Primary
law, but the fact remains that The People have inseparably linked with
the direct primary idea the selection of United States Senators by
direct vote.
The Federal laws provide that United States Senators shall be elected by
the Legislature. But in States where Direct Primary laws have been
adopted, provisions have been made by which the names of candidates for
the United States Senate are placed on the primary ballot the same as
the name of any other candidate for a State office. The same Direct
Primary laws give candidates for the Legislature opportunity to pledge
themselves to accept The People's decision, and as members of the
Legislature to cast their votes for such candidate for the United States
Senate as The People may have named.
The Legislature is thus made to abide by The People's will in electing
United States Senators, precisely as the Electoral College is made to
abide by The People's will in the election of the President.
To be sure, no candidate for the Legislature need take the pledge if he
does not care to do so, but it is recognized that where it is possible
for the voter to express a choice for United States Senator, the
legislative candidate who fails to pledge himself to respect The
People's choice would stand slim chances of election.
The Direct Primary law adopted by Oregon[35b] represents the highest
development of the plan for popular selection of United States Senators.
In that State the candidate for the United States Senate is nominated
the same as any other candidate, the names of each successful primary
nominee going on the regular ballot the same as that of any candidate
for State office.
The Senatorial candidate who receives the highest number of votes is
not, of course, elected to the United States Senate, but candidates to
the Legislature are given opportunity to pledge themselves to respect
the wishes of the voters and elect to the Senate the candidate who is
thus endorsed. The Legislative candidate may sign such a pledge, or he
may sign a statement that he will regard the popular vote for United
States Senator as merely advisory and not binding.
But it is noticeable that in Oregon and other States where such
wholesome direct primary measures have become laws the legislative
candidate signs the pledge to abide by the mandate of the electors.
Unquestionably The People of California expected some such provision in
the California Direct Primary law. Unfortunately, however, Senator
Wright, who had charge of the bill, is not at all in sympathy with the
Oregon plan. It is claimed that the framers of the bill were as little
in sympathy with the Oregon plan as Senator Wright himself. At any rate,
the bill, as a sort of compromise, gave the electors opportunity to
express their choice for United States Senator within party lines. The
candidate for the Legislature was to be given opportunity to pledge
himself to abide, not by the selection of the electors of the State, but
by the selection of the electors of his party[36].
The name of a candidate for the United States Senate did not, under the
original Wright-Stanton bill, go on the final ticket. His choice was
confined to the primaries and was at best to be regarded only by the
legislators of his own political faith. The People of California were
not to be given a direct vote in the selection of United States
Senators, as are The People of Oregon.
If the framers of the Wright-Stanton Primary bill thought that their
compromise on the United States Senator feature of the measure would
placate the machine, they were much disappointed. The machine fought the
arrangement for popular selection of United States Senators within party
lines as positively as it would have combated the Oregon plan itself.
Under either plan, the machine recognized there was always danger that
the selection of a United States Senator would actually be made by The
People. This would mean loss to the machine of Federal patronage, and
Federal patronage is the sure rock upon which the machine in California
is founded. Indeed, had either plan been incorporated into law, the
re-election of Senator Frank Flint would have been made practically
impossible. So the machine fought the Wright-Stanton plan as stubbornly
as it would have opposed the Oregon plan.
On the other hand, the best supporters of the Direct Primary idea were
much disappointed that the Oregon plan had not been incorporated into
the bill. Not a few of them grew lukewarm in their support of the
measure. The extreme partisanship of its provisions and the failure to
provide for popular selection of United States Senators hurt the measure
with its friends, and failed to placate its enemies. From the beginning
the most effective arguments against the bill were found in the bill
itself.
This was demonstrated at the public hearing, held January 26th, to
consider the various provisions of the measure. The principal speakers
were Hiram Johnson and Judge John F. Davis.
Mr. Johnson dealt with the Direct Primary in a general way. He spoke of
it in its relation to practical politics, showing that an effective
Direct Primary would place this Government of ours back into the hands
of The People. That is what was wanted. Every point Johnson made was
received with applause from the crowd that packed the Senate Chamber.
And when Johnson concluded with an appeal for "a Direct Primary law that
shall be a Direct Primary law in substance and not in form alone," he
was cheered to the echo.
Judge Davis was not so fortunate in his text as was Mr. Johnson. Davis
was there to discuss the details of the bill. He had scarcely begun
before he found himself between a cross fire of questions from those on
the one side who wanted an effective measure passed and on the other
from those who wanted no Direct Primary at all. The opponents of the
Direct Primary scored few points; the believers in the measure did.
To save himself from a ridiculous position, Davis had to evade the
question whether he would rather see an able and effective Democrat
elected to the United States Senate than a vicious and corrupt
Republican. He failed as miserably in attempting to justify the extreme
partisan features of the bill. And the questions which Judge Davis could
not answer came from men who wanted to see an effective Direct Primary
measure enacted, not from the opponents of the Direct Primary theory.
Of course this dissatisfaction of the advocates of an effective law
encouraged the machine to action. The measure was deliberately left with
the Committee on Election Laws. The Anti-Gambling bill had passed both
Houses by February 4th, one month after the session had opened. But on
that date, the Committee had just begun consideration of the measure. To
be sure, the Election Laws Committee had been stacked against the Direct
Primary bill, but the Public Morals Committee had been stacked against
the Anti-Gambling bill as well. But the opponents of racetrack gambling
were satisfied with the Walker-Otis bill, while the proponents of the
Direct Primary for California were by no means satisfied with the
Wright-Stanton bill.
So the machine dared do with the Direct Primary bill what it did not
dare do with the Anti-Gambling bill. The Walker-Otis bill had a standing
which the Wright-Stanton bill did not have.
That the Committee on Election Laws did not act early in the session on
the Direct Primary bill was not because of the purpose of Senator
Estudillo, Chairman of the Committee. Time after time did Estudillo call
meetings for consideration of the bill, and repeatedly, he found only
himself, and Senators Stetson and Wright in attendance. Finally, in
February, Senator Estudillo succeeded in getting his committee together
for consideration of the all-important measure.
That the machine proposed to make the bill inoperative was recognized
from the moment the committee was called to order. The manner in which
this was to be done developed as rapidly. The machine's plan was as
follows:
(1) As to candidates:
The machine proposed to amend the bill so that either a majority or a
high plurality vote should be required to nominate candidates at the
primary election. In the event of no candidate for a given office
receiving a majority or the required plurality, the nomination was to be
made by a nominating convention as under the old convention system. With
such a provision it would have been easy for the machine to introduce a
large number of candidates at the primaries, thus making it
impracticable for any one of them to receive a majority or even a high
plurality vote. This would have thrown nominations into a convention.
Thus, while the State would have had a Direct Primary law, it would have
been practically impossible to nominate a candidate under its
provisions.
(2) As to United States Senators:
To deny The People a voice in the election of United States Senators,
the machine had two plans:
(A) To cut all provisions for the election of United States Senators out
of the bill.
(B) Failing in this, to amend the bill so that candidates for the
Legislature would be required to regard the choice of the electors of
their several districts as advisory. The vote was in no way to be held
binding, nor was a legislative candidate to be required to sign a pledge
to regard in any way the wishes of the electors. Under this arrangement
there could be as high as 100 candidates for the United States Senate
endorsed at a single election - eighty from Assembly, twenty from
Senatorial districts. The effect would be, of course, the endorsement of
at least several candidates, with the result that the Legislature would
in the end be left to choose as under the present system. Thus, while
the State would have a law which apparently gave The People a voice in
the naming of Federal Senators, there would be no change whatever in the
manner in which the Federal Senators were nominated and elected.
[35] In addition to the Wright-Stanton bill, Senator Roseberry
introduced a measure providing for a postal primary. In the appendix
will be found Senator Roseberry's views on the postal primary plan.
[35a] The writer has been reliably informed that this concession was made
to the machine before a member of the Legislature reached Sacramento.
[35b] Senator Caminetti introduced a separate bill providing the Oregon
plan for the popular choice of United States Senators. He was requested
not to press its passage BECAUSE IT MIGHT INJURE THE CHANCES OF PASSAGE
OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY BILL. The machine claquers is never at a loss for
an excuse for the defeat of a meritorious measure.
[36] The original Wright-Stanton bill provided two pledges, which the
candidate for the Legislature was given opportunity to sign. The first
pledge bound him to abide by the choice of the electors of his party for
United States Senator. It read as follows:
"I further declare to The People of California and to The People of the
.......... (Senatorial or Assembly) District that during my term of
office, without regard to my individual preference, I will always vote
for that candidate for United States Senator in Congress who shall have
received for that office the highest number of votes cast by my party at
the September primary election next preceding the election of a Senator
in Congress."
If the legislative candidate did not care to sign this pledge, he was
given the alternative of signing the following:
"I further declare to The People of California and to The People of the
... (Senatorial or Assembly) District that during my term of office I shall
consider the vote of The People at any primary election for United
States Senator as nothing more than a recommendation, which I shall be
at liberty wholly to disregard, if I see fit."