Chapter V.

Election of United States Senator.

Opposition to Perkins Overcome by the Dead Weight of the Machine

- Movement Against His Re-election Failed for Want of Leadership

- Proceedings Without Warmth or Enthusiasm.

No funeral was ever attended by greater somberness than was the

re-election of George C. Perkins to the United States Senate, January

12-13, 1909. The nominating speeches were made without enthusiasm; not a

cheer greeted Senator or Assemblyman charged with the task of putting

the aged Senator in nomination. Pulcifer of Alameda, who made the

nominating speech in the Assembly, was received with icy calmness. Even

when the Alamedan referred to the veteran Senator as "one whose hair has

grown white and whose eyes have grown dim in the service of his

country," not so much as a ripple of applause stirred the chamber. When

the speaker concluded his review of the Senator's life and political

career, the incipient murmur of approval which somebody started died

away for want of vitality.

In the Senate, the task of nominating Perkins fell to Stetson of

Alameda. But Stetson's nominating speech was received with no more

enthusiasm than was that of the shifty Pulcifer. The "system," the

"organization," the "machine," have it as you will, returned George C.

Perkins to the United States Senate. The people of California had no

voice in it, nor, for that matter, the Legislature, although the

majority of the Legislature was opposed to the machine. In carrying out

the ignoble part prepared for them - prepared for them by the "machine"

which a majority of them opposed - the members of Senate and Assembly

went through the forms prescribed without a hand clap and without a

cheer.

But it must not be thought that the re-election of Senator Perkins was

without opposition. Indeed, it met with the same sort of honest but

ineffective resistance that attended the election of Stanton to the

Speakership of the Lower House. And like the campaign against Stanton

the opposition to Perkins got nowhere because of the lack of leadership,

organization and plan of action on the part of the resisting

legislators.

The machine had been preparing for Perkins' re-election for months; but

the opposition to Perkins made no move until after the November

elections.

The first outward sign of opposition came from Assemblyman E. J. Callan

of the Thirty-ninth District, the fighting reform district of San

Francisco. Callan, three or four weeks before the Legislature convened,

fell into a trap which the wily Alameda County politician had set some

time previous. Perkins had long before invited criticism of his

"record," which meant his votes on issues that had been passed upon by

the United States Senate. As a matter of fact, such votes mean little,

for the misplaced "courtesy of the Senate," under which schemers betray

the people, makes it possible for even recognized "reformers" to be

forced to vote against most desirable measures. The other fellows of the

Perkins stripe when brought to book on their "record" can always give in

defense: 'Why, your reformer, Senator So and So, did the same thing.' To

be sure, a La Follette does kick over the traces once in a while, in

which event he usually votes alone, while the solemn victims of

"courtesy" vote against him according to Senatorial custom, not to use

the more expressive word, stupidity.

Thus, when Perkins craftily invited his opponents to attack him on his

record, they dodged the trap gingerly, all save Callan. Callan didn't

walk, he rushed into it, sending a scathing letter to Perkins on that

gentleman's Senatorial record. Perkins' reply and explanation came as a

counter blow. The fire was tempered out of Callan's letter. Callan had

permitted Perkins to select the fighting ground, and Perkins had

exhibited admirable judgment.

The attack on Perkins had better been made on his attitude toward the

shipping interests of California - the development of the isthmian route

to New York, for example; on his attitude toward the machine, whose

strangle-hold upon the State is locked with federal patronage; on his

attitude toward the so-called "Roosevelt policies"; on his attitude

toward the Roosevelt administration, upon which he hung with the dead

weight of crafty, persistent obstruction. There were plenty of

vulnerable points in the Perkins armor, but naturally in selecting the

point of attack, Perkins carefully avoided them. So Callan's bolt

rebounded harmlessly, to the astonishment of the various well-meaning

reformers, and the intense satisfaction of the machine, whose somewhat

anxious leaders recognized full well that Callan's discomfiture would

discourage attacks from other possibly effective sources.

The next move against Perkins came the week before the Legislature

convened. A number of anti-machine Republicans met at San Francisco to

canvass the situation, and formulate a plan to defeat Perkins if

possible. It was found that on joint Senate and Assembly ballot, the

Democrats would have twenty-nine votes and the Republicans ninety-one.

Sixty-one votes are required for the election of a Senator. The

Republicans at the meeting considered these twenty-nine votes as with

them in the selection of an anti-machine Republican for Perkins' place.

The anti-machine Republicans thus in revolt against the machine,

themselves numbered twenty Senators and Assemblymen, which made

forty-nine votes against Perkins. In addition, an even dozen Republican

Senators and Assemblymen were counted upon as willing to vote against

Perkins if his defeat could be shown to be certain. This would have

given the anti-Perkins element sixty-one votes, just enough to elect.

For one of their number to fail, meant a deadlock; for two, if

Republicans, to fail meant Perkins' election. It was a slender chance,

but the possibility of success kept the movement alive until the hour of

the Senatorial caucus.

Those who were promoting the movement were not at the time aware that

six of the Democratic Assemblymen and one of the Democratic Senators

were governed by such high conceptions of their duties as citizens and

responsibilities as legislators, that they were to cast their votes in

the Senatorial election for a San Francisco saloon keeper, on the ground

that he is a "good fellow" and had "spent money liberally for the

party." This of itself made the defeat of Perkins impossible.

The anti-Perkins forces were also handicapped by the fact that they had

no candidate. The machine had been craftily booming Perkins for years;

the reformers had boomed nobody[19]. They were, then, without material

for a positive fight; all they could do was negative, which is always

confession of weakness. In addition, aside from the Bulletin, there was

no San Francisco publication that could be counted upon to back their

movement. The Call was openly supporting Perkins. The movement against

Perkins, while it admittedly represented the attitude of the majority of

the electors of the State, and the feeling of a safe majority of both

Houses of the Legislature, was without one element of real strength[20].

Under the United States Revised Statutes, the Legislature was called

upon, to proceed on the second Tuesday after organization, to elect

Senator Perkins' successor. As the Legislature had organized on January

4, the second Tuesday fell on January 12. The call for the Republican

caucus to go through the form of selecting a candidate for the Senate,

was circulated the third and fourth days of the session. The Republican

Senators all signed it, not a few of them with the non-resistance of a

wretch in the hands of a hangman.

More opposition developed in the Assembly. Callan and three or four

others kept up their resistance to the last, but when the caucus

assembled on Friday evening, January 8, all the Republican Senators and

Assemblymen who could do so were in attendance[21].

The caucus was of course hopelessly programmed for Perkins.

Nevertheless, the better element of the party endeavored to secure some

expression from Senator Perkins as to his attitude toward the Western

transportation problem. This led to a heated debate which kept the

caucus in session until a late hour. The debate turned on the celebrated

Bristow letter.

For years, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company has been able to

prevent effective water competition by way of the Isthmus of Panama. The

Government has a line of steamers running from New York to the Isthmus,

and a railroad line across the Isthmus. With an additional line of

steamers running from San Francisco to Panama, the Government would have

a through line from San Francisco to New York. This would give genuine

competition with the Southern Pacific system, and free the State from

the grasp of the transportation monopoly.

In August, 1907, Hon. J. L. Bristow, now United States Senator from

Kansas, was appointed a Special Panama Railroad Commissioner, to

investigate the necessity and feasibility of putting on the Pacific

line. Mr. Bristow, in a report that fairly sizzled with criticism of

Southern Pacific and Pacific Mail Steamship Company methods, recommended

that the government line be established. When Pacific freight rates were

arbitrarily raised just before the Legislature convened, shippers of the

State appealed, not to Senator Perkins or to Senator Flint, but to

Senator Bristow from interior Kansas, asking that he concern himself

with having government steamers put on the San Francisco-Panama route.

Bristow replied that he would do what he could, that he was receiving

many letters from Western shippers who favored the plan, but that the

chief difficulty in the way was the opposition of the California

delegation in the Senate.

This Bristow letter caused all the trouble at the Perkins caucus. The

suggestion was made that Perkins owed it to the State to explain the

charges brought against him by the Senator from Kansas. A resolution was

accordingly introduced providing that a telegram be sent Senator Perkins

calling upon him to state whether the charge made by Senator Bristow

were true.

Immediately the pro-Perkins people assumed the dignified position that

such a telegram would be an insult to the venerable Senator from

California. Nobody seems to have taken the trouble to state that the

Bristow charges were untrue, but that the requesting of the Senator to

answer them would be an insult to that dignitary was made subject of the

warmest oratory. So warm was it, that the opposition to Perkins melted

away like wax - or putty, if putty melts - until but five members of the

caucus had the courage to vote to ask Perkins to declare himself on the

transportation problem. Callan of San Francisco voted for it, so did

Drew of Fresno, so did Young of Berkeley and two others. But 77 members

of the caucus voted against the resolution. Senator Perkins was

permitted to maintain a dignified silence on the Bristow charges. After

the vote on the resolution, Assemblyman Callan left the caucus.

But even with the Republican caucus nomination, Perkins did not receive

the entire Republican vote. In the Assembly, Callan voted for Chester

Rowell of Fresno, and Sackett for Thomas R. Bard of Ventura. Fifty-six

of the Assembly votes, however, were cast for Perkins.

In the Senate, Perkins received thirty-two votes. The thirty regular

Republicans voted for him, as did Senator Bell, the

Independent-Republican, and Senator Caminetti, Democrat. Senator

Caminetti voted for Perkins because Caminetti regarded Perkins, as

nearly as could be determined, the choice of the electors to whom

Caminetti owed his election. Caminetti believes that the United States

Senator should be selected by the people of the State. The nearest he

could get to this was to ascertain the wishes of the people of his

district. He was convinced that the people of his district wished to see

Perkins re-elected. So, regardless of partisan considerations, Caminetti

the Democrat voted for Perkins the Republican. Caminetti's explanation

of his vote is worthy of the most careful consideration[22].

The regular candidate of the minority for the Democratic complimentary

vote was J. O. Davis, a gentleman of the highest character. But eight of

the Democratic members voted against him. Seven of the eight,

Assemblymen Black, Collum, Hopkins, Lightner, O'Neil and Wheelan and

Senator Hare voted for Harry P. Flannery, a San Francisco saloon-keeper;

the eighth, Senator Kennedy, voted for William H. Langdon. Six

Democratic Senators and thirteen Democratic Assemblymen voted for Mr.

Davis. They were: Senators Campbell, Cartwright, Curtin, Holohan,

Miller, and Sanford; Assemblymen Baxter, Gibbons, Gillis, Irwin, Johnson

of Placer, Juilliard, Maher, Mendenhall, Odom, Polsley, Preston,

Stuckenbruck and Webber.

[19] It is interesting to note that when a good citizen gives effective

resistance to the machine, that the machine invariably starts the cry -

"He is a candidate for the United States Senate." The open candidacy -

and liberal advertising - of a machine man for the Federal Senatorship

causes no adverse comment. For an anti-machine man to so aspire - or the

suspicion in machine breasts that he so aspires - is heralded as

evidence of his complete unworthy and irresponsibility.

[20] But when the machine Republicans of a State unite with Democrats to

elect a machine man to the Federal Senate, no such difficulties attend

them. Note the election by a coalition of machine Republicans and

machine Democrats in Illinois of "Billy" Lorimer, the notorious "blond

boss" of the stockyards, to the United States Senate.

[21] Senator Bell, although a Republican, was excluded because he would

not make his peace with Walter Parker, the Southern Pacific boss of the

political district lying south of Tehachepi. See Chapter 11,

Organization of the Senate.

[22] Caminetti's explanation of his vote, as printed in the Senate

Journal, is in full as follows:

"Mr. President: During the campaign of 1906, in the Tenth Senatorial

District, resulting in my election as Senator, I made the question of

'The election of United States Senators by direct vote of the people'

one of the leading issues upon which I asked the suffrage of the people.

I then pledged myself in all my speeches and in the press, to endeavor

to secure the passage of a law by the Legislature in case of my election

having that object in view, and in case of failure in the effort I would

nevertheless follow that principle and vote for the choice of a majority

of the qualified electors of that district in the selection of a Senator

during my term of off cue.

"The last session of the Legislature failed to enact the necessary

legislation on the subject, but the people of my district have

nevertheless plainly indicated to me that Hon. George C. Perkins was at

the last election, and now is, their choice for the United States

Senatorship.

"Under these circumstances I feel in honor bound by my pledges to the

people of the Tenth Senatorial District, to record the choice of a

majority of the qualified electors thereof for Hon. George C. Perkins

for United States Senator, hoping in so doing that it will never again

be necessary for a member of the Legislature to vote the choice of the

people of his district in this, or any other, indirect way, but that

this Legislature will rise superior to partisanship and give to the

people hereafter an opportunity, under suitable laws, to vote directly

for candidates for that office. Should this Legislature fail in this

high duty to the public, I trust that the people, in whom all power

resides, will hereafter take up this matter in the way the people of the

Tenth Senatorial District did two years ago, and thus be able in all

legislative districts of the State to record their choice for the

exalted office of United States Senator."

Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909 · 第 5 / 20 章