Chapter I.

Ver.04.07.00*END*

This Project Gutenberg Etext Prepared by David Schwan

Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909

by Franklin Hichborn

The well-being of the State requires that the opponents to the machine

in Senate and Assembly, regardless of party label, organize the

Legislature. But back of this is the even more important requirement

that there be elected to the Legislature American citizens, with the

responsibility of their citizenship upon them, rather than partisans,

burdened, until their good purposes are made negative, by the

responsibility of their partisanship.

San Francisco

Press of The James H. Barry Company

1909

CONTENTS

Chapter

I. Breaking Ground

II. Organization of the Senate

III. Organization of the Assembly

IV. The Machine in Control

V. Election of United States Senator

VI. The Anti-Racetrack Gambling Bill

VII. Passage of the Anti-Racetrack Gambling Bill

VIII. The Direct Primary Bill

IX. The Machine Defeated in the Senate

X. Fight Over the Assembly Amendments

XI. Machine Amends Direct Primary Bill

XII. The Railroad Regulation Issue

XIII. Machine Defeats the Stetson Bill

XIV. Railroad Measures

XV. Defeat of the Commonwealth Club Bills

XVI. How the Change of Venue Bill Was Passed

XVII. Passage of the Wheelan Bills

XVIII. Defeat of the Local Option Bill

XIX. Defeat of the Initiative Amendment

XX. Defeat of the Anti-Japanese Bills

XXI. The Rule Against Lobbying

XXII. The Machine Lobbyist at Work

XXIII Influence of the San Francisco Delegation

XXIV. Attacks on and Defense of the Fish Commission

XXV. The Rewarding of the Faithful

XXVI. The Holdover Senators

XXVII. The Retiring Senators

XXVIII. Conclusion

Appendix

Tables of Votes

Postal Direct Primary

Dr. Montgomery's Report

The Anti-Japanese Resolution

PREFACE.

In writing the Story of the Session of the California Legislature of

1909, the purpose has been, not only to show what was done at Sacramento

last Winter, but, what is by far more important, how it was done. To

this end, the several measures are divided under three heads, namely,

those dealing with moral, with political and with industrial issues.

Instead of scattering on all the measures introduced, or even a

considerable part of them, the principal issue of each group, that which

meant the most to The People, and upon which the machine centered its

efforts, has been selected for detailed consideration. On the score of

the moral issues, the Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill has been taken as the

most important; while the Direct Primary bill is dealt with as the chief

political issue, and the railroad regulation measures as involving the

chief industrial issue. The story of the fight over these bills is the

story of the session of 1909. The events attending the passage of the

Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill, the amendment of the Direct Primary bill,

and the defeat of the Stetson Railroad Regulation bill, with the

attending incident of the passage of the Wright Railroad bill, show, as

nothing else can, how the machine controls and manipulates a

Legislature - and such is the purpose of this little volume.

The efforts of justice-loving men to simplify the criminal codes, to the

end that rich and poor alike may have equal opportunity in the trial

courts - not in theory alone but in fact - and the successful efforts of the

machine to block this reform, have made detailed consideration of the

defeat of the Commonwealth Club bills and the passage of the Wheelan

bills, and the so-called Change of Venue bill timely. And the story of

these measures illustrates again how the machine element defeats the

purpose of The People, and overrides what are the constitutional

rights - and should be rights in fact - of every American citizen.

Measures which involved no particular contest between the good

government and the machine forces - measures patched up by interested

parties and slipped through the Legislature without opposition and

generally without comment - although many of them of great importance, are

not touched upon. The histories of those selected for consideration show

the machine, or if you like, the system, at its work of passing

undesirable measures, and of blocking the passage of good measures. If

the Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1909 assist

the citizens of California to understand how this is done; if it give

them that knowledge of the weakness, the strength, the purposes, and the

affiliations of the Senators and Assemblymen who sat in the Legislature

of 1909, a knowledge of which the machine managers have had heretofore a

monopoly; if it point the way for a new method of publicity to crush

corruption and to promote reform - a way which others better prepared for

the work than I, may, in California and even in other States, follow - the

labor of preparing this volume for the press will have been justified.

Franklin Hichborn.

Santa Clara, Cal., July 4, 1909.

Chapter I.

Breaking Ground.

Although the Reform Element had a Majority in Both Senate and Assembly,

Good Bills Were Defeated, and Vicious Measures Passed - Three Reasons for

This: (1) Reform Element Was Without Plan of Action, (2) Was Without

Organization; (3) The Machine Was Permitted to Organize Both Senate and

Assembly.

The personnel of the California Legislature of 1909, was, all things

considered, better than that of any other Legislature that has assembled

in California in a decade or more. There were, to be sure, in both

Senate and Assembly men who were constantly on the wrong side of every

question affecting the moral, political or industrial well-being of the

State, but a majority of each House labored for the passage of good

laws, laws which would not only silence and satisfy constituents, but

prove effective and accomplish the purpose for which they had been

drawn. Just as earnestly as they worked for the passage of good laws, a

majority of the members of the Senate as well as a majority of the

members of the Assembly opposed the passage of vicious measures, and of

measures ostensibly introduced to work needed reform but drawn in such a

manner as to be, from a practical standpoint, ineffective.

And yet, regardless of the purpose of this majority, the so-called

"Change of Venue" [1] bill was passed, and the "Judicial Column" bill,

intended to take the Judiciary out of politics, was denied passage. The

infamous "Wheelan bills," aimed at the complication of the Grand jury

system, went through both Houses, while the Commonwealth Club bills,

drawn to simplify the methods of criminal procedure, were held up and

eventually defeated. The ineffective Wright Railroad Regulation bill

became a law, while the Stetson Railroad measure effective as finally

amended - was rejected. The provision in the Direct Primary bill for the

selection of United States Senators by State-wide vote was stricken out,

and the meaningless advisory, district vote plan substituted.

Certainly, the accomplishment of the Legislature does not line with the

purpose of a majority of its members. The voter is naturally asking why

the majority in both Houses standing for good legislation and opposing

bad, accomplished so little; how it was that a minority, at practically

every turn, defeated a majority.

There were three principal reasons for this outcome.

(1) The machine, as its name indicates, is a definite organization, with

recognized leaders. The anti-machine element was without organization or

recognized leaders.

(2) The reform-advocating majority, except in the anti-racetrack

gambling fight, was without definite plan of action. The majority was,

for example, for the passage of a direct primary law that would, first,

take the control of politics out of the hands of political bosses big

and little, and, second, give the people of California the privilege of

naming their United States Senators, a privilege already enjoyed by the

people of the more progressive States of the Union. But the reform

element knew little or nothing of the details of direct primary

legislation.

They were equally unprepared on other reform issues. They recognized the

necessity of passing an effective railroad regulation law, for example,

but had little or no conception of what the provisions of the measure

should be. They recognized that the criminal laws cannot be impartially

enforced against rich and poor alike until the methods of criminal

procedure be simplified, put on a common sense basis. But even here they

had no definite policy and when told by machine claquers that the

proposed reforms were revolutionary, even the most insistent of the

reform element were content to let the simplifying amendments to the

codes die in committees or on the files.

On the other hand, the machine element, even before a member had reached

Sacramento, had their work for the session carefully outlined. This

session the bulk of the machine's work was negative; that is to say,

with a majority in both houses opposed to machine policies, the machine

recognized the difficulties of passing bad laws except by trick - and

spent the session in amending good measures into ineffectiveness, or,

where they could, in preventing their passage. Down to a comma the

machine leaders knew what they wanted for a direct primary law, for an

anti-racetrack gambling law, for a railroad regulation law. From the

hour the Legislature opened until the gavels fell at the moment of

adjournment the machine element labored intelligently and constantly,

and as an organized working unit, to carry its ends. There were no false

plays; no waste of time or energy; every move was calculated. By

persistent hammering the organized machine minority was able to wear its

unorganized opponents out.[2]

(3) The third reason for the failure of the reform majority is found in

the fact that the minority was permitted to organize both Senate and

Assembly. In the Assembly the machine element named the Speaker without

serious opposition. The Speaker named the Assembly committees. It

developed at the test that the important committees of the Assembly

were, generally speaking, controlled by the machine.

The Lieutenant-Governor is, under the State Constitution, presiding

officer of the Senate, under the title of President of the Senate. But

the Senators elect the President pro tem., who, in the absence of the

President, has the same power as the President. The reform element,

although in the majority, permitted the election of Senator Edward I.

Wolfe as President pro tem. Wolfe was admittedly leader of the machine

element in the Senate. At critical times during the session, the fact

that both the President and President pro tem. of the Senate were

friendly to machine interests gave the machine great advantage over its

anti-machine opponents.[3]

The reform majority in the Senate made the further mistake of leaving

the appointment of the Senate committees in the hands of

Lieutenant-Governor Warren Porter. Governor Porter flaunts his machine

affiliations; is evidently proud of his political connections; indeed,

in an address delivered before the students of the University of

California, Porter advised his hearers to be "performers" in politics

rather than "reformers." It was not at all surprising, then, that the

Senate committees were appointed, not in the interest of the reform

element, but of the machine. And yet, the reform element, being in the

majority, could have taken the appointment of the committees out of

Porter's hands. In the concluding chapter it will be shown there is

ample precedent for such a course. But the reform element let the

opportunity pass, and Warren Porter named the committees. Thus in both

Senate and Assembly the strategic committee positions were permitted to

fall into machine hands.

The importance of this on legislation can scarcely be over-estimated.

Under the system in vogue in California, the real work of a legislative

session is done in committee. When a bill is introduced in either House,

it is at once referred to a committee. Until the committee reports on

the measure no further action can be taken. Thus a committee can prevent

the passage of a bill by deliberately neglecting to report it back to

the main body.

When a measure passes either Senate or Assembly, it goes to the other

House, and is once again referred to a committee. Again does the fate of

the bill hang on committee action. Thus, every measure before it can

pass the Legislature must, in the ordinary course of legislation, pass

the scrutiny of two legislative committees, either one of which may

delay its passage or even deny Senate or Assembly, or both, opportunity

to act upon it.

To be sure, one of the rules of the Assembly of 1909 required that all

bills referred to committees should be reported back within ten days,

while the Senate rules provided that committees must act on bills

referred to them as soon as "practicable," with the further provision

that a majority vote of the Senate could compel a report on a bill at

any time. But these rules were employed to little advantage. In the

Assembly, for example, the Commonwealth Club bills, referred to the

Judiciary Committee on January 15, were not acted upon by the committee

at all. These bills, in spite of the ten days' rule, remained in the

committee sixty-seven days. The Direct primary bill was held up in the

Senate Committee on Election Laws from January 8 until February 16, and

at that late day came out of the committee with practically unfavorable

recommendation. It was noticeable that few, if any, important reform

measures were given favorable recommendation by a Senate committee. Thus

the Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill, the Direct Primary bill, the Local

Option bill, received the stamp of Senate committee disapproval. They

were returned to the Senate with the recommendation that they do not

pass. The same is largely true of the action of the Assembly

Committees.[4]

If machine-controlled committees could delay action on reform measures,

they could at the same time expedite the passage of bills which the

machine element favored, or which had been amended to the machine's

liking. Thus the Change of Venue bill, which reached the Senate on March

15, was returned from the Senate Judiciary Committee the day following,

March 16, with the recommendation that it "do pass." The Wheelan bills

reached the Senate on March 17, and were at once referred to the

Judiciary Committee. The Judiciary Committee that very day reported them

back with favorable recommendation. Had they been delayed in the

committee even 48 hours, their final passage would have been improbable.

Curiously enough, the Judiciary Committee was the one Senate committee

whose members President Porter did not name. Following a time-honored

custom, every attorney at law in the Senate was made a member of the

committee. It so happened that ten of the nineteen lawyers in the Senate

were on the side of reform as against machine policies, eight generally

voted with the machine, while the nineteenth gave evidence of being in a

state of chronic doubt. This gave the reform element a majority of the

Senate Judiciary Committee. But President Porter had the naming of the

chairman of the committee, and the order of the rank of its members. The

Lieutenant-Governor's fine discrimination is shown by the fact that the

Chairman of the Committee and the four ranking members were counted on

the side of the machine.

The Assembly committees acted quite as expeditiously on measures which

had passed the Senate in a form satisfactory to machine interests. Thus,

the Wright Railroad Regulation bill, which reached the Assembly on March

12, was reported back to the Assembly by the Assembly Committee on

Common Carriers the day following, March 13.

It will be seen that the reform majority unquestionably weakened its

position by permitting the machine minority to organize the Legislature.

This phase of the problem which confronts the State will be dealt with

in the concluding chapter.

[1] One of the best witnesses to the viciousness of this measure is

Governor Gillett, surely an unprejudiced observer. In giving his reasons

for vetoing the bill, Governor Gillett said:

"I have several reasons for saying that I will veto the bill. One reason

is that I have always been opposed to it. When I was in the Senate in

1897 I was against it and again in 1899 I fought it in the Judiciary

Committee. Two years ago I ignored another such measure that had passed

through the Legislature, so that I would not be living up to my policy

of the past if I should sign this bill."

"But even if I had never had the opportunity to record my opposition on

these different occasions, I should have vetoed the bill anyway, because

it is a vicious bill. The bill is not a change of venue bill in the

strict sense of the word. It simply gives the man on trial the right to

disqualify the Judge on the ground of bias on the slightest pretext."

"The worst feature about the bill is that it grants this right to the

accused after the jury has been secured. Why, if the defendant didn't

like the adverse rulings of the Judge he could easily claim bias and the

law would upheld his demand for another Judge. Think of how that would

operate in the Calhoun trial in San Francisco. Such a law would cost the

State thousands of dollars. It's vicious and I will not sign it."

[2] Most suggestively shown in the amendment of the Direct Primary bill.

[3] The seriousness of the mistake made by the reform element in

acquiescing in Wolfe's election, was emphasized at the time of the

deadlock in the Senate over the Direct Primary bill. The President of

the Senate, Lieutenant-Governor Porter - and in his absence the

President pro tem., Wolfe, - was charged with the duty of calling the

Senate to order. Inasmuch as it did not suit the machine's interests

that the Senate should be called to order, the Senators were obliged to

sit in idleness for hours at a time, while the machine leaders and

lobbyists were working openly on the floor of the Senate to force

certain of the pro-primary Senators to join the machine forces. Had

the President pro tem. been one of the group of Senators who were

opposing the machine he would have called the Senate to order, thus

permitting the regular work of the session to proceed. See Chapter 10,

"Fight on Assembly Amendments."

[4] The action of the Assembly Committee on Public Morals on the

Anti-Racetrack Gambling bill was a notable exception to this. See

chapters 6 and 7.

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