The Sultan and the Sack

Let us arrange in some order a number of converging considerations that

all point in this direction. (1) It is broadly true, no doubt, that the

weapon of the employer has hitherto been the threat of dismissal, that

is, the threat of enforced starvation. He is a Sultan who need not order

the bastinado, so long as he can order the sack. But there are not a few

signs that this weapon is not quite so convenient and flexible a one

as his increasing rapacities require. The fact of the introduction of

fines, secretly or openly, in many shops and factories, proves that it

is convenient for the capitalists to have some temporary and adjustable

form of punishment besides the final punishment of pure ruin. Nor is it

difficult to see the commonsense of this from their wholly inhuman

point of view. The act of sacking a man is attended with the same

disadvantages as the act of shooting a man: one of which is that you can

get no more out of him. It is, I am told, distinctly annoying to blow a

fellow creature’s brains out with a revolver and then suddenly remember

that he was the only person who knew where to get the best Russian

cigarettes. So our Sultan, who is the orderer of the sack, is also the

bearer of the bow-string. A school in which there was no punishment,

except expulsion, would be a school in which it would be very difficult

to keep proper discipline; and the sort of discipline on which the

reformed capitalism will insist will be all of the type which in free

nations is imposed only on children. Such a school would probably be in

a chronic condition of breaking up for the holidays. And the reasons

for the insufficiency of this extreme instrument are also varied and

evident. The materialistic Sociologists, who talk about the survival of

the fittest and the weakest going to the wall (and whose way of looking

at the world is to put on the latest and most powerful scientific

spectacles, and then shut their eyes), frequently talk as if a

workman were simply efficient or non-efficient, as if a criminal were

reclaimable or irreclaimable. The employers have sense enough at least

to know better than that. They can see that a servant may be useful in

one way and exasperating in another; that he may be bad in one part of

his work and good in another; that he may be occasionally drunk and yet

generally indispensable. Just as a practical school-master would know

that a schoolboy can be at once the plague and the pride of the school.

Under these circumstances small and varying penalties are obviously the

most convenient things for the person keeping order; an underling can be

punished for coming late, and yet do useful work when he comes. It will

be possible to give a rap over the knuckles without wholly cutting

off the right hand that has offended. Under these circumstances the

employers have naturally resorted to fines. But there is a further

ground for believing that the process will go beyond fines before it is

completed.

(2) The fine is based on the old European idea that everybody possesses

private property in some reasonable degree; but not only is this not

true to-day, but it is not being made any truer, even by those who

honestly believe that they are mending matters. The great employers will

often do something towards improving what they call the “conditions”

of their workers; but a worker might have his conditions as carefully

arranged as a racehorse has, and still have no more personal property

than a racehorse. If you take an average poor seamstress or factory

girl, you will find that the power of chastising her through her

property has very considerable limits; it is almost as hard for the

employer of labour to tax her for punishment as it is for the Chancellor

of the Exchequer to tax her for revenue. The next most obvious thing to

think of, of course, would be imprisonment, and that might be effective

enough under simpler conditions. An old-fashioned shopkeeper might have

locked up his apprentice in his coal-cellar; but his coal-cellar would

be a real, pitch dark coal-cellar, and the rest of his house would be a

real human house. Everybody (especially the apprentice) would see a most

perceptible difference between the two. But, as I pointed out in the

article before this, the whole tendency of the capitalist legislation

and experiment is to make imprisonment much more general and automatic,

while making it, or professing to make it, more humane. In other words,

the hygienic prison and the servile factory will become so uncommonly

like each other that the poor man will hardly know or care whether he

is at the moment expiating an offence or merely swelling a dividend. In

both places there will be the same sort of shiny tiles. In neither place

will there be any cell so unwholesome as a coal-cellar or so wholesome

as a home. The weapon of the prison, therefore, like the weapon of

the fine, will be found to have considerable limitations to its

effectiveness when employed against the wretched reduced citizen of our

day. Whether it be property or liberty you cannot take from him what he

has not got. You cannot imprison a slave, because you cannot enslave a

slave.

Utopia of Usurers and Other Essays · 第 24 / 71 题