72 “Empirical,” as in Lessing and Paulus; “Spiritual,” as in the later

schools. See Lect. VI. and VII.

73 A brief view of the history of the Christian evidences will be found

in Note 49 appended to these Lectures.

74 Viz. toward the close of Lect. VIII.

75 The moral causes of unbelief have been frequently discussed, but the

intellectual rarely. Van Mildert has collected, in his _Boyle

Lectures_ (note to Lect. XXIV.), references to many valuable authors

where the moral sins of pride and impiety are discussed; and J. A.

Fabricius (_Delect. Argument._ 1725.) has devoted a chapter to the

literature of the subject (c. 36. p. 653.) Dr. Ogilvie wrote in 1783

a separate work on the causes of the recent unbelief; but the causes

alleged by him, though well treated in the details, are superficial.

A satisfactory discussion of this and cognate topics connected with

unbelief is given in a popular but instructive book, _Infidelity,

its aspects, causes, and agencies_, a Prize Essay (1853) of the

Evangelical Alliance, by the Rev. T. Pearson, Eyemouth, N. B.

76 Compare some remarks on this point in Whately’s _Rhetoric_ (part 2.

ch. I. § 2.)

77 Proof being of two kinds, viz. _antecedent probability_, εἰκός,

(Arist. Rhet. i. 2. § 15) which shows the _cause_; and _evidence_,

σημεῖον, which shows the _fact_; it is clear that the latter, if of

the positive kind, τεκμήριον, is demonstrative; but if merely of the

probable kind, or of the nature of circumstantial evidence, ἀνώνυμον

σημεῖον, requires the antecedent probability in addition for the

purpose of effecting conviction. Otherwise the evidence may seem to

be an accidental concatenation of circumstances, unless explained by

the antecedent probability that existed for the occurrence of the

main fact which the accumulation of circumstances is adduced to

attest.

78 See below, the commencement of Lect. V.; and on the influence of

social disaffection in causing modern unbelief, see Pearson’s

_Infidelity_, part 2. ch. 3. p. 373 seq.

79 Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837), a native of the trans-Apennine Roman

states. His works were published (1845-49), consisting of

philological pieces, poems, papers on philosophy, and letters. The

Italians consider him to have been a prodigy in philological power

that might have rivalled Niebuhr. As a poet he was one of the finest

of his country in the present century. His letters are very

classical in expression, and have been said to rival the

correspondence of the best ages of Italy. His fine mind was darkened

with the deepest shades of doubt. Shelley is the nearest English

representative. A masterly sketch of his mental and literary

character was given in the _Quarterly Review_ (No. 172. March 1850),

generally supposed to be from the pen of an English statesman well

known for his knowledge of the Italian literature and his sympathy

with constitutional government.

80 Carlo Bini (1806-1842), a native of Tuscany of less note, who

belonged to the Republican party in politics, and like Leopardi

burned with an unquenchable love of _la patria_. A monument with an

inscription by his friend Mazzini has been recently erected over his

grave at Livorno. The tender pathos shown in his poetry has been

compared to that of Jean Paul. One of his poems, _L’Anniversario

della Nascita_ 1833, expressive of deep and afflicting scepticism

and life-weariness, will be found in the Collection of Italian

Poetry edited by Arrivabene (1 vol. 12mo. 1855.)

81 Shelley’s mental character is discussed near the close of Lect. V.

82 Heinrich Heine (1799-1856), a poet who betook himself to Paris,

about 1830, in disgust with the political state of Germany. His

poetry was chiefly subsequent to this event. He had a mixture of

German imagination with French esprit. In tone he has been compared

to Byron. Vapéreau (_Diction. des Contemp._) compares his wit to

that of Swift or Rabelais. His collected works have been published

at Philadelphia; and his poems were translated into English by E. A.

Bowring, 1861. In later life Heine laid aside the extreme unbelief

of his earlier years. An article respecting him appeared in the

_Westminster Review_ (Jan. 1856.)

83 A brief statement of the difficulties raised on this point is given

by Professor Baden Powell in the article _Deluge_ in Kitto’s

Cyclopædia (first edition).

84 These discrepancies formed part of the subject of an early work of

De Wette (ueber die glaubwuerdigkeit der buccher der Chronik 1806),

and are noticed in his _Einleitung ins Alt. Test._ (See the chapters

which refer to these books); also in Dr. S. Davidson’s _Introduction

to the Old Testament_ 1862, vol. ii. _Chronicles_ § 6 and 8. Mr. F.

Newman, in his work, _The Hebrew Monarchy_, has made great use of

these difficulties for destructive criticism. Movers

(_Untersuchungen ueber die Chronik_ 1834), and C. F. Keil

(_Apologetischer Versuch ueber die Chronik_ 1833), endeavour to

remove them. Also see the translation of the Commentary of Keil and

Bertheau on Kings and Chronicles, the former of the two being based

on the work of the same author previously named.

85 J. A. Bengel (1689-1752), author of the _Gnomon of the New

Testament_ (translated, with Life prefixed to vol. iv.) Cfr. also

the article by Hartmann in Herzog’s _Real. Encyclopædie_ and Burt’s

_Life_ of him (translated 1837.) The labour of his life, to fix the

text of the New Testament, was prompted by the alarm which his pious

mind felt at the uncertainty thrown on the sacred books, the

inspiration of which he believed to extend to the words.

86 The denial of responsibility for belief may either be a denial of

all responsibility whatever, in consequence of the opinion that our

characters are formed for us by circumstances, or else a denial of

our responsibility for our belief, as distinct from our

responsibility for the agreement of our conduct with our belief; the

moral responsibility, according to this view, lying in our adherence

to a standard, irrespective of the truthfulness of the standard. The

former of these views is the fatalism advocated in the system called

(English) Socialism (See Morell’s _History of Philosophy_, i. 472

seq.); the latter has occasionally been imputed to teachers of the

utilitarian school of Ethics, perhaps with less justice; their

assertions in reference to it being intended to apply only to

political and not to moral responsibility.

87 Such an attitude of mind, for example, was presented in the

seventeenth century by Huet, and in the present by De Maistre. On

the former, see Bartholmess’ _Le Scepticisme Theologique_ (1852);

for reference to sources for the study of the latter, see Lect. VII.

Consult Morell’s _History of Philosophy_ (vol. ii. ch. 6. § 2) for

the history of this kind of philosophical scepticism.

88 Psalm lxxiii. 15-17.

89 See pp. 7, 12.

90 See pp. 8-12.

91 The names “lower” and “higher” for the two respective branches into

which literary criticism is divisible, are commonly used in all

modern German works of criticism.

92 See previous footnote.

93 The work which will most clearly explain my purpose in the following

history is Mr. J. D. Morell’s _Historical and Critical View of the

Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the nineteenth century_. (1847.)

It exhibits the influence of metaphysical philosophy on various

branches of knowledge. (See sect 1 and 5 of the introduction to vol.

i., and in vol. ii. ch. 9.) Also in his _Lectures on the

Philosophical Tendencies of the Age_ (1848), he treats the same

subject with direct reference to religion. Compare also on the same

points Cousin’s _Histoire de la Philosophie du 8__e__ siècle_, vol.

ii. leçon 30; Pearson on _Infidelity_, part ii. ch. 2. p. 340 seq.

94 Tennyson’s _In Memoriam_, § 94.

95 An instructive comparison of Milton, Cowper, and Wordsworth, which

will further illustrate this subject, may be found in _Macmillan’s

Magazine_ for Jan. 1862.

96 See p. 21.

97 The cause is, that whatever difficulties may be presented by it are

the statements of rival teaching opposed to the Christian;

conclusions, not premises; whereas those which arise from the

psychological branch are rival premises; not difference of belief

merely, but causes of such difference. Therefore the difficulties

suggested by Ontology belong to those described above in p. 21, 22.

Many illustrations of this branch may be found in Bartholmess’

_Hist. Crit. des Doctrines Religieuses de la Philosophie Moderne_,

1855.

98 The classification of faculties here intended, with their respective

functions, will be illustrated by referring to Morell’s _Hist. of

Phil._, vol. ii. p. 338; and his _Philosophy of Religion_, ch. 1.

and 2. The altered scheme given in his subsequent works on

Psychology (1853 and 1861,) ought also to be compared with the

former one. See also Coleridge’s _Aids to Reflection_, i. 168 seq.

The terms Sensationalist, Idealist, and Mystic, are nearly always

used in the present lectures in the sense in which Morell, following

Cousin, uses them; viz. to express those who place the ultimate test

of truth in sense, innate ideas, or feeling, respectively.

99 E.g. In the history of the eighteenth century in France. (See Lect.

V.) In estimating the effects of philosophical opinions, care must

be used, to distinguish the results which may be thought by

opponents to flow from such opinions by logical inference, from

those which have been proved by history to flow from them in fact.

Some portion of Cousin’s brilliant criticism, in the _Hist. de la

Phil. Française du_ 18e _siècle_, and in the _Ecole Sensualiste_, is

thought to be open to exception on this ground. It is from a

conviction of the importance of not attributing to a philosopher

that which we merely conceive to be a corollary, though a logical

one, from his opinions, that the writer has abstained from

introducing here into the text examples of the different views

sketched, and has treated the subject in this page broadly and

without minuteness. The religious results here stated to appertain

to particular metaphysical opinions must accordingly be regarded as

logical tendencies, not as necessary effects. The truth of opinions

must not be tested merely by supposed consequences, though the

practical value of such a test ought to be allowed its due weight.

100 A statement of the steps of proof similar to those described here,

by which we ascend to the knowledge of a Deity, is to be found in

the Sermons of the late lamented Rev. Shergold Boone (Sermons 2-7;

and especially 2 and 3; 1853). Compare also the steps of proof which

Rousseau gives in the Confession of the Savoyard Vicar of the

_Emile_, analysed in Lect. V.

101 These charges are frequently made indiscriminately against all who

hold that expedience is a sufficient explanation of the origin of

moral ideas. They were true in a great degree against Utilitarians

of the last century, together with some of those in the early years

of the present. But when applied at the present time, they only

indicate a tendency, not a fact; as may be seen in the delicate

manner in which Mr. J. S. Mill has explained the doctrine of

Utility, in a series of papers in _Fraser’s Magazine_ for 1861.

102 The first of these two views is seen in Kant, with whom the forms of

thought are only regulatively true; the second in Schelling and

Cousin. The references for studying Kant’s religious views will be

found in a note to Lecture VI.

103 The dangers of such a view arise from those results which have been

pointed out in Sir W. Hamilton’s _Dissertations_ (Diss. I. on

Cousin). In reference to the office of the intuition in science, Dr.

Whewell’s view, in the _Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, may

be adduced as one which appears to possess the advantage designed by

Schelling’s theory, and not be open to those criticisms which have

been directed against it. Possibly a true philosophy of the action

of the intellectual faculties in reference to religion might be

obtained by transferring to it the analysis which Dr. Whewell has

given of their action in reference to science. Dr. McCosh, in his

work on the _Intentions of the Mind_ (1859), has done much towards

effecting it.

104 In Morell’s _Philosophy of Religion_ (c. 5 and 6,) are remarks on

the relation of intuition to inspiration, to which attention may be

directed, but only in a _psychological_ point of view. Pious minds

that believe in miraculous inspiration will rightly hesitate before

holding any particular psychological theory of the field of its

operation; yet it would seem, if we may hazard a conjecture, that it

is the intuitive power of the mind which is mostly the organ to

which the divine revelation is unveiled, and on which the inspiring

influence acts. It is certain that we cannot understand the _modus

operandi_, but we may without irreverence humbly seek to discover

the field on which God’s Spirit condescends to operate. In this view

inspiration would be analogous to natural genius _psychologically_,

but wholly different _theologically_, inasmuch as all who believe in

its miraculous character must hold firmly that it is due to a

_supernatural_ elevation of this mental power by _immediate_

operation of divine agency, whereas the discoveries of ordinary

genius are due to the _unassisted_ and normal condition of the

faculty. Morell, in the passage referred to, will probably be

thought to be right in the psychological question, and wrong in the

theological.

105 The mysticism of the Quakers of the seventeenth century, and of

Swedenborg in the eighteenth, is of this character. The excessive

self-mortification of the Franciscan order in the middle ages may be

set down to the influence, perhaps not consciously analysed, of the

same standard used for guidance. On Mysticism, see Morell’s _History

of Philosophy_, ii. 332 seq. and 356 seq.; and his _Lectures on the

Philosophical Tendencies of the Age_ (Lect. III.); on Swedenborg,

see _National Review_ No. 12; and on mystics generally, consult the

interesting work of the lamented Rev. R. A. Vaughan, _Hours with the

Mystics_, 1856.

106 As in Spinoza, or the school of Schelling.

107 As in Herbert in the seventeenth century, and Theodore Parker in the

nineteenth. On the intuitional theology, see McCosh, _Divine

Government_, b. iv. ch. 2. § 4. (note.)

108 The above are only a very few instances, of which many will occur

hereafter; but they will sufficiently indicate that the French

infidelity is mostly connected with the appeal to the first test of

truth, sensation; German rationalism, the result of an appeal to an

intuitive faculty “transcending consciousness;” English deism, and

the earlier forms of German rationalism, the appeal to the ordinary

reason, as able to create religion for itself. The separate appeal

to feeling has generally, it will be perceived, caused too much

belief, instead of too little; mysticism instead of scepticism.

109 This was the view presented in the teaching of Cousin and the

Eclectic school of France. Many of the younger thinkers of Europe

now consider that the history of philosophy constitutes the whole of

philosophy, and is not merely, as here maintained, the preliminary

to it. This new view is probably unconsciously derived from Hegel,

and is the residuum left by his philosophy. Two able living French

critics, Renan and Scherer, have so very clearly expressed this view

of the function of philosophy, that it may be well to quote their

words (see Note 9); the more so, as this subject will be named again

in Lect. VII. Renan has also expressed the same ideas in the Revue

des deux Mondes (Jan. 15, 1860), _De la Metaphysique et de son

avenir_.

110 It is not from any wish to evade the real question that the writer

thus avoids taking a side in the metaphysical dispute. His object is

to explain the various effects of metaphysical theories on religious

belief; and while considering that the respective evil effects of

these systems are a logical corollary from them, as well as an

historical result, he is prepared to admit, as previously remarked,

that men are sometimes better than their systems, and do not always

draw the logical conclusions from their own premises; and therefore

he has not thought it right to make these lectures a direct argument

on behalf of some favourite metaphysical system, and attack on some

rival one. In such case, the history would lose its independent

character. While therefore he has never concealed his opinions on

the subject of religion, he has thought it more proper not to

obtrude, except indirectly, his opinions on that of metaphysics.

111 This is the question at issue between modern Positivists and their

opponents. Comte declared the possibility of discovering the fixed

laws on which society depends as really as the physical ones of

matter. Mr. Mill, in his account of the logic of history (_Logic_,

b. vi. c. 4. (6-10)), lays down more maturely the theory of such a

process. On the contrary, Mr. Kingsley, in his inaugural lecture at

Cambridge, 1861, asserts the very opposite position; and, in his

wish to elevate the influence of individual men on the course of

events, almost reduces history to a series of biographies.

112 The kind of analysis here alluded to may be illustrated by referring

to one of the _Essays_ of Mr. D. Masson, in which he has compared in

a very striking manner Shakspeare and Goëthe, by regarding their

respective works as reflecting the mental peculiarity of each

writer. He considers the meditative melancholy of Shakspeare’s

youth, as expressed in his Sonnets, to be the clue to the reflective

analysis that in later life could depict the doubts of Hamlet.

113 Christian Maerklin (1807-1849), a fellow student of Strauss at

Tübingen, whose views were unsettled, partly by a tone like that of

the Renaissance derived from the contrast of classic and Christian

culture, and partly by the philosophical speculations of the time.

He embraced pantheism and the mythical idea of Christianity. For ten

years after 1840 he undertook ministerial work, and then left the

church, and till his death in 1849 devoted himself with assiduity to

the business of education. A short memoir of him was written by

Strauss in 1851, _C. Maerklin, ein Lebens-und-Character-Bild aus der

Gegenwart_; a brief review of which is given in the _National

Review_, No. 7.

114 Sterling (1806-1844), a clergyman, curate to archdeacon Hare. His

works were edited, with a memoir prefixed, by the archdeacon in

1848; and a life written of him by Carlyle (1851.)

115 Blanco White (1775-1841), a Spanish priest, who became a protestant,

and a refugee in England. He was much respected in Oxford, and the

University gave him a degree. He afterwards turned unitarian, and

perhaps at last deist. His life was published in 1845; and his

mental character analysed in the _Quarterly Review_ No. 151, and the

_Christian Remembrancer_ vol. 10.

116 Mr. F. Newman. See Lect. VIII.

117 See further remarks concerning the purpose of the course of Lectures

in Lect. VIII.

118 John xx. 26-29.

119 E.g. Mr. J. J. Conybeare (1824), on the _History and Limits of the

Secondary Interpretation of Scripture_; Dr. Burton (1829), _The

Heresies of the Apostolic Age_; Dr. Hampden (1832), _The Scholastic

Philosophy in relation to Christian Theology_; as well as several

works which investigate doctrines historically, such as the Lectures

on the Atonement by Dr. Thomson (1853), by Dr. Hessey on the Sabbath

(1860).

120 See above, p. 8.

121 By Dr. Burton in 1829, _An Inquiry into the Heresies of the

Apostolic Age._

122 Burton was such a careful student, that he hardly omitted anything

on the subject which had been published up to his time. Subsequent

investigations have added little material directly for the knowledge

of Gnosticism, but much for a better appreciation of those sources

from which it sprung. The oriental philosophy, as is shown in note 3

to Lect. I, is much better known; in like manner the Neo-Platonic.

The Jewish Cabbala has also been made known by A. Franck (_Memoires

sur la Cabbale_). The speculations too of the new Tübingen school,

of which Baur’s work on _Gnosis_, 1835, is an example, have been

specially directed to the study of the _origines_ of the Christian

church and of Gnostic heresy, and however unsatisfactory in results,

present much valuable research. Kurtz in his _Kirchengeschichte_ §

48-50, and Hase, _Id._ § 75-82, refer to several other monographs of

the same kind. See also the discussion on Gnostic sects in Professor

Norton’s _Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels_, vol. ii.

123 Such instances are seen in the Renaissance, in the state of France

during the eighteenth century, and in some of the writings of the

English deists and German critics, as will be shown in subsequent

lectures. A general view is given, in the introduction to

Houtteville’s _Le Christianisme prouvé par des faits_, of “the

method of the principal authors for and against Christianity from

its beginning,” (translated 1739.) Hase also quotes a work of D.

Baumgarten-Crusius, De Scriptoribus sæc. II. qui novam relig.

impugnarunt, 1845.

124 There are four sources of information in reference to the opinions

of the heathens concerning Christianity; viz. (1) the slight notices

which occur in heathen literature, on which see note 12; (2) the

works written expressly against Christianity, which are sufficiently

analysed in the text and foot-notes; (3) the special replies to

these attacks, on which see notes 13, 17, 19; (4) the general

treatises on evidence in the early fathers, on which see note 49.

The recent publication of Pressensé’s work, 2e série, t. 2, where

the analysis of the two latter sources is ably executed, renders

unnecessary the publication of an analysis of each. Several of them

are also analysed in Schramm, _Analysis Patrum_, 1782.

125 It has been recently made a matter of dispute whether Plato’s own

description of the teaching of the Sophists is not rendered

untrustworthy by these faults. See Grote’s _History of Greece_, vol.

viii. ch. 67.

126 These tendencies are discussed so fully and with such great learning

by Neander (_Kirchengeschichte_, vol. i. Introduction), and by

Pressensé, _Hist. de l’Eglise Chrétienne_, (2e série, t. ii. ch. 1),

to whom I am largely indebted, that it is unnecessary to quote the

original sources. Neander exhibits an analogous process in the

Jewish religion, in sects of the later times of the nation. See also

Döllinger’s _Judenthum und Heidenthum_ (translated 1862.)

127 The mental character of Lucretius has been well analysed by Mr.

Sellar, in the volume of _Oxford Essays_, 1855.

128 Pressensé (ut sup. 2e série, t. ii. 77 seq.) has ably sketched the

character of Lucian. His utter scepticism is seen in the Ζεὺς

τραγῳδός (47-49).

129 Instances, with references, may be seen in the introductory chapter

in Neander, p. 18 seq.

130 The Greek literature offers the opportunity for studying the whole

process. See Grote, i. ch. 16, previously quoted.

131 The character Cæcilius, in the dialogue of Minucius Felix, is made

to express this view, (c. 8. and elsewhere.) A useful modern edition

of this dialogue is given by H. A. Holden, 1853.

132 This reaction deserves to be made the subject of special study.

Pressensé is one of the few writers who have pointed out its

importance, (2e série, t. ii. ch. 1.) Also compare the remarks in

Benjamin Constant’s posthumous work _Du Polytheisme Romain_, 1833.

(t. ii. I. 12, 13, 15.) Kurtz refers on this subject to Tzchirner’s

_der Fall des Heidenthum_, i. 404, (1829.); E. Kritzler’s

_Helden-zeiten des Christenthum_, vol. i. (1856), and Vogt’s

_Neo-Platonismus und Christenthum_ (1836.) Also Cfr. Tzchirner’s

_Apologetik_ (1804.) c. 2, parts 2 and 3.

History of Free Thought in Reference to The Christian Religion · 第 42 / 51 段