interposing a chasm between the events and the record of them, stimulated
the pursuit of the branch of criticism slightly touched on by their
predecessors, which investigates the origin and date of scripture books.
They transferred to the Hebrew literature the critical method by which
Wolf had destroyed the unity of Homer, and Niebuhr the credibility of
Livy. Not a single book,—history, poetry, or prophecy,—was left
unexamined. The inquiries of this kind, instituted with reference to the
book of Daniel, were alluded to in a former lecture;(785) and those which
relate to the Gospels will occur hereafter.(786) At present it will only
be possible to specify a single instance in illustration of these
inquiries—the celebrated one which relates to the authorship and
composition of the Pentateuch. It is the one to which most labour has been
devoted, and is an excellent instance for exhibiting the slow but
progressive improvement and growing caution shown in the mode of
exercising them.(787)
As early as the time of Hobbes and Spinoza it was perceived that the
Pentateuch contains a few allusions which seem to have been inserted after
the time of Moses; a circumstance which they, as well as R. Simon,
explained, by referring them to the sacred editor Ezra, who is thought to
have arranged the canon: but about the middle of the last century a French
physician, Astruc,(788) pointed out a circumstance which has introduced an
entirely new element into the discussion of the question; viz. the
distinction in the use of the two Hebrew names for God,—Elohim and
Jehovah. It will be necessary to offer a brief explanation of this
distinction, in order that we may be able to perceive the line at which
fact ends and hypothesis commences, and understand the character of the
criticism which we are describing.
It is now generally admitted that the word _Elohim_ is the name for Deity,
as worshipped by the Hebrew patriarchs; _Jehovah_, the conception of Deity
which is at the root of the Mosaic theocracy.(789) El, or the plural
Elohim, means literally “the powers,” (the plural form being either, as
some unreasonably think, a trace of early polytheism, or more probably
merely emphatic,(790)) and is connected with the name for God commonly
used in the Semitic nations. Jehovah(791) means “self-existent,” and is
the name specially communicated to the Israelites. The idea of power or
superiority in the object of worship was conveyed by Elohim; that of
self-existence, spirituality, by Jehovah. Elohim was generic, and could be
applied to the gods of the heathen; Jehovah was specific, the covenant God
of Moses. (33)
In this age, when words are separated from things, we are apt to lose
sight of the importance of the difference of names in an early age of the
world. The modern investigations however of comparative mythology enable
us to realize the fact, that in the childhood of the world words implied
real differences in things; not merely in our conceptions, but in the
thing conceived.(792) But the explanations above offered will show that,
independently of the general law of mind just noticed, a really different
moral conception was offered by Providence to the Hebrew mind through the
employment of these two words.
Nor was the difference unknown or forgotten in later ages of Jewish
history. The fifty-third Psalm, for example, is a repetition of the
fourteenth with the name Elohim altered into Jehovah. In the two first of
the five books into which the Psalms are divided, the arrangement has been
thought to be not unconnected with the distinction of these names.(793) In
the book of Job also the name Jehovah is used in the headings of the
speeches of the dialogues; but in the speeches of Job’s friends, as not
being Israelites, the name Elohim is used.(794) In the book of Nehemiah
the name Elohim is almost always used, and in Ezra, Jehovah; and in the
composition of proper names, which in ancient times were not merely, as
now, symbolical, the names El and Jah respectively are employed in all
ages of the Hebrew nation: and, though no exact law can be detected, it
seems probable that in the great regal and prophetic age the name Jehovah
was especially used. (34)
These remarks will both explain the difference of conception existing in
the Hebrew names of Deity, and show that the Jews were aware of the
distinction to a late period. When we advance farther, we pass from the
region of fact into conjecture.
The distinctness of conception implied in the two names has been made the
basis of an hypothesis, in which they are used for discovering different
elements in the Pentateuch. Throughout the book of Genesis especially, and
slightly elsewhere,(795) the critics that we are describing have supposed
that they detect at least two distinct narratives, with peculiarities of
style, and differences or repetitions of statement; which they have
therefore regarded as proofs of the existence of different documents in
the composition of the Pentateuch; an Elohistic, in which the name Elohim,
and a Jehovistic, in which the name Jehovah was used; upon the respective
dates of which they have formed conjectures.
Though we may object to these hazardous speculations, we shall perceive
the alteration and increasing caution displayed in the criticism, if we
trace briefly the successive opinions held on this particular subject.
Astruc, who first dwelt on the distinction, regarded the separate works to
be anterior to Moses, and to have been used by him in the construction of
the Pentateuch.(796) Eichhorn took the same view, but advanced the inquiry
by a careful discrimination of the peculiarities which he thought to
belong to each. Vater followed, and allowed the possibility of one
collector of the narratives, but denied that it could be Moses. Thus far
was the work of the older critical school of rationalists. It was purely
anatomical and negative. It is at this point that we perceive the
alteration effected by the school which we are now contemplating.
De Wette strove to penetrate more deeply into the question of the origin,
and to attain a positive result. His discussion was marked by minute
study; and he changed the test for distinguishing the documents from the
simple use of the names to more uncertain characteristics, which depended
upon internal peculiarities of style and manner. The conclusion to which
he came was, that the mass of the Pentateuch is based on the Elohistic
document, with passages supplemented from the Jehovistic; and he referred
the age of both to a rather late part of the regal period. Ewald, with
great learning and delicacy of handling, has reconsidered the
question(797) and, though arriving at a most extraordinary theory as to
the manifold documents which have supplied the materials for the work, has
thrown to a much earlier period the authorship of the main portion; and
the views of later critics are gradually tending in the same direction.
Both study the Pentateuch as uninspired literature; but De Wette absurdly
regarded it as an epic created by the priests, in the same manner as the
Homeric epic by the rhapsodes: Ewald on the contrary considers it to be
largely historic.(798)
This statement of mere results, too brief to exhibit the critical acumen
shown at different points of the inquiry even where it is most full of
peril, will show the increasing learning displayed, and the appreciation
of valuable literary characteristics. It will be perceived that
prepossessions still predominate over this criticism; but they are of a
different kind from those which existed earlier. They are not the result
of moral objections to the narratives, but of the contemporary critical
spirit in secular literature. The discrepancy of result obtained by the
process is a fair practical argument which proves its uncertainty; but its
adherents allow that both in art and literature internal evidence admits
of few canons, and consequently that the result of criticism could only
admit of probability.
The general summary of the movement shows a steady advance in criticism,
as was before shown in doctrine, toward a higher and more spiritual
standard. It is not the recognition of the inspired authority of
scripture, but it is some approach to it. Instead of the hasty
denunciation of narratives or of books as imposture, seen in the
Wolfenbüttel Fragments, or the merely rationalist view of Eichhorn and
Paulus, we perceive the recognition of spiritual and psychological
mysteries as subjects of examination; and even when the result established
is altogether unsatisfactory, valuable materials have been collected for
future students. If we were to abandon our position of traditional
orthodoxy, and accept that of Schleiermacher in doctrine, or of De Wette
in criticism, it would be a retrogression; but for the Germans of their
time it was a progress from doubt towards faith. It was not orthodoxy, but
it was the first approach to it.
This double aspect, philosophical and critical, of the reaction, brings us
to the end of the second period in the history of German theological
thought.
It has already been stated that the elements of other movements existed,
which were hereafter to develope; and that one of these was an attempt,
originating in the philosophy of Hegel, to reconstruct the harmony of
reason and faith from the intellectual, as distinct from the emotional
side. It bore some analogy to the gnosticism of the early church; and the
critical side of it gave birth to Strauss.
We have traced the antecedent causes which produced rationalism, and two
out of the three periods into which we divided the history of it. We are
halting before reaching the final act of the drama; but we already begin
to see the direction in which the plot is developing.
It is when a great movement of mind or of society can be thus viewed as a
whole, in its antecedents and its consequents, that we can form a judgment
on its real nature, and estimate its purpose and use. As in viewing works
of art, so in order to observe correctly the great works of God’s natural
providence, we must reduce them to their true perspective. It is the
peculiarity of great movements of mind, that when so viewed they do not
appear to be all shadow and formless, nor acts of meaningless impiety.
They are products of intellectual antecedents, and perform their function
in history. In nothing is the Divine image stamped on humanity, or the
moral providence of God in the world, more visible, than in the
circumstance, of which we have already had frequent proofs, that thought
and honest inquiry, if allowed to act freely, without being repressed by
material or political interference, but checked only by spiritual and
moral influences, gradually attain to truth, appropriating goodness, and
rejecting evil. Thought seems to run on unrestrained, stimulated by human
caprice, sometimes by sinful wilfulness; yet it is seen really to be
restrained by limits that are not of its own creation. In the world of
conscious mind, as in unconscious matter, God hath set a law that shall
not be broken. Reason, which creates the doubts, also allays them. It
rebukes the unbelief of impiety, making the wrath of man to praise God;
and guides the honest inquirer to truth.
A period of doubt is always sad; but it would be an unmixed woe for an
individual or a nation, if it were not made, in the order of a merciful
Providence, the transition to a more deeply-seated faith. It is a means,
not an end.
You tell me, doubt is devil-born.
I know not; one indeed I knew
In many a subtle question versed,
Who touch’d jarring lyre at first,
But ever strove to make it true:
Perplext in faith, but not in deeds,
At last he beat his music out.
There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds.
He fought his doubts, and gathered strength,
He would not make his judgment blind,
He faced the spectres of the mind
And laid them: thus he came at length
To find a stronger faith his own.(799)
Religious truth is open to those who will seek it with humility and
prayer.
In addition to the natural action of reason, the fatherly pity of God is
nigh, to give help to all that ask it, and that endeavour to sanctify
their studies to His honour. Even though the search be long, and a large
portion of life be spent in the agony of baffled effort, the mind reaps
improvement from its heart-sorrows, and at last receives the reward of its
patient faith. “Blessed are they which hunger and thirst after
righteousness, for they shall be filled.”(800) If we are thankful to be
spared the sorrows of the doubter, let us admire the wisdom and mercy
shown in the process by which Providence rescues men or nations from the
state of doubt. “The Lord God omnipotent reigneth;”(801) and He shall
reign for ever and ever.
LECTURE VII. FREE THOUGHT: IN GERMANY SUBSEQUENTLY TO 1835; AND IN FRANCE
DURING THE PRESENT CENTURY.
MATT. xiii. 52.
_Every scribe which is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is
like unto a man that is an householder, which bringeth forth out
of his treasure things new and old._
The last lecture was brought to a close before we reached the final forms
assumed by German theology. In the present one we must complete the
narrative; and afterwards carry on the history of free thought in France,
as affected by the influence of German literature, from the period at
which the narrative was previously interrupted to the present time.
We have noticed the traces of the reaction in favour of orthodoxy, which
was produced in Germany by the influence of Schleiermacher. We treated the
philosophical side of the movement, the vindication of the distinctness of
religion and ethics; and also witnessed the improved tone in the critical,
tending, if not to the recognition of a supernatural character in the holy
scriptures, yet to a more spiritual appreciation of their literary
characteristics, and of the psychological peculiarity of the facts
recorded. We adverted also, in conclusion, to a rival philosophical
influence, springing from the teaching of Hegel, which assisted the
reaction by seeking a philosophical reconstruction of religion, though
from a different point of view from Schleiermacher.
It was this school which gave origin to the subsequent movements in
Germany. The sudden alteration in German thought induced by Strauss, which
ushers in the modern period, arose from the union of the philosophical
principles of this school with the criticism of that of De Wette. We must
therefore endeavour to understand this movement, which forms the turning
point between the reaction before described, which is the second of the
three general divisions made of this portion of history,(802) and the
forms which succeed constituting the third division. Hegel,(803) a name
almost as important in its influence on the German mind as that of Goethe,
has been already mentioned(804) as the last of that band of philosophers
which strove to develop the mental as distinct from the material
principle, presented in Kant’s philosophy. Kant had completed the process
of turning man’s search inward, which Descartes had begun. Philosophy
became psychology; the discovery of the limits of knowledge, rather than
of the nature of the thing known. We have seen that Fichte and Schelling,
not content with this result, had sought, though by opposite processes, to
escape from this limited knowledge; to attain an ontology as well as a
psychology. All philosophy aims at attaining a knowledge of reality,
either _à posteriori_ by means of generalisation, or _à priori_ from the
data of mind. These two philosophers strove to attain it by the latter
mode; but their method either lacked system, or failed in its results:
their philosophy was poetry rather than logic. Hegel followed in their
steps, but adopted a basis which admitted of being developed in a formal
system. The logical rigour of his method, and the encyclopædic grasp which
it gave over knowledge, partly accounted, as in the case of Spinoza or of
Wolff, for its popularity. The universe was to be interpreted from the
mind; the laws of thought were the laws of things. The microcosm and the
macrocosm were one; thought, and the mind that thinks; or, more truly,
both were phases of the universal mind which was unfolding. The mind of
man could transcend the limits of the finite and phenomenal; and, being
able to apprehend the idea, the νοούμενον, absolutely, without condition,
thus possessed the solution of any branch of universal knowledge by an _à
priori_ process. The problem of philosophy was, to find the laws of this
evolution in thought, to catch the ideal when it strives to become
immanent and to manifest itself in the actual.
Without attempting here to explain the kind of threefold process, (35)
according to which this evolution takes place, it is better, as in the
case of the former philosophies named, to exhibit the influence of the
general method rather than the effects of particular theories inculcated
by it.
The method had many advantages, in displacing a low materialism, in
stimulating loftiness of conception, and generating an historic study of
every subject, by its view of the universe as a development; and also
created a largeness of sympathy with differing views, by regarding all
things as in transition, relative, true only in reference to their
contradictory; and by considering all hypotheses to contain a germ of
right, and to be the result of partial views of truth; but it will also be
obvious, that the method had its evil effects. For, when applied to any
department, it produced a disposition to seize the principle, the idea, of
which the concrete is the embodiment; to descend from the type upon the
individual. Its method was deductive and idealistic; giving being to
abstractions, like the realism of the middle ages. It lost the fact in the
principle; it personified the genus. Philosophy became a vast mythology.
When applied to Christianity, for example, it did not attempt to find a
philosophic ground for it psychologically in the human aspirations, as
Schleiermacher had done,(805) but objectively in the dogma. It discovered
the ideal truth in religion, and regarded Christianity and Christ as being
the manifestation of the effort of the great Spirit of the universe to
convert the idea into act; the symbol which expressed the speculative
truth of the essential unity of the ideal and the real, of the divine and
the human. Like the ancient Gnosticism, it believed in dogmatic
Christianity, because it descended upon it from an _á priori_ principle,
in which it found the explanation of it. Religion and philosophy were
reconciled, because religion was made a phase of philosophy.
This system was taught by its founder at Berlin from about 1820 to 1830,
contemporary with that of Schleiermacher; and the learned theologian
Marheinecke(806) is the name best known of those who applied it to
theology. It was regarded at that time as an instrument of orthodoxy.(807)
It had the advantage over the old rationalism, in that while using
similarity of method in seeking to explain mysteries, it did not pare them
down, but absorbed them in principles of philosophy; and over the school
of Schleiermacher, in that it was less subjective, less a matter of
feeling, supplying a doctrine and not merely a spirit; and therefore it
satisfied the longing of the mind for dogmatic truth, and at the same time
more readily linked itself, ecclesiastically with churchlike and corporate
tendencies, and politically with conservative and autocratic ones. Yet it
is easy to see that its spirit was really far less Christian than
Schleiermacher’s. For it not only confused again philosophy and religion,
which his system had severed, but it proudly claimed to explain doctrines
rationally where his had only sought to appropriate them intuitionally. It
verged towards pantheism. It was in danger of losing the historic fact in
the idea; of encouraging, as it is now sometimes called, the “ideological
tendency;”(808) whereas with Schleiermacher, the historic belief had only
been regarded as less important than the emotional apprehension. Its _à
priori_ spirit created also a depreciation of the investigations which had
been pursued by the critical school. It gave encouragement to the study of
history; but it was to the history of philosophy, not to the
investigations conducted by historical criticism.
Such was the system which, along with those described in the last lecture,
was regarded as contributing to favour orthodox reaction, and was
disputing theological preeminence with that of Schleiermacher, when a work
was published by one of its disciples, which was the means, through the
ferment produced, of altering completely the whole tone and course of
German thought. It was the celebrated _Life of Jesus_ by Strauss,(809) a
criticism on the four biographies given in the gospels; a work in which
the whole destructive movement was concentrated, with such singular
ability and clearness, that hardly any work of theology has subsequently
been written without some notice of the propositions there maintained.
It presented a double aspect: it was both philosophical and critical.
Strauss added to a general admission of the Hegelian point of view a love
for the critical studies so much neglected by that party. Brought up in
the moderate orthodoxy of Tübingen, he had studied at Berlin under
Schleiermacher, but caught the critical rather than the philosophical side
of that master’s teaching, and especially interested himself in the
solution of the question relating to the origin and credibility of the
Gospels, already partially considered in the critical inquiries of the old
rationalism, and of the school of De Wette. It was an investigation which
in its nature, in the spirit in which it was decided, and in its
similarity to the contemporaneous discussions of classical criticism, bore
a close resemblance to that before described in reference to the
Pentateuch. A few words of explanation concerning it are necessary,
previous to the statement of the nature of Strauss’s work.(810)
As early as the last century the resemblance between the three
“synoptical” Evangelists had excited attention; and examination was
directed to discover the cause. Some, as Wetstein,(811) supposed that one
or two of the Gospels were borrowed from the third; others, as
Michaelis(812) and Eichhorn, that the three were all derived from one
common original, now lost; others, as Schleiermacher, that they were
composed from many detached written narratives; others, as Herder, and
subsequently Gieseler, that they were the committal to writing of the oral
tradition common in the church. Thus, whether the Gospels were regarded as
copies, or as being composed from earlier documents, or from primitive
tradition, the effect was, that they were reduced to the level of natural
testimony, and instead of being three witnesses they became one. The
fourth Gospel also was involved in uncertainty. Bretschneider added the
full examination of it, and provoked a discussion concerning the alleged
disagreement of its tone and statements with those of the synoptists.(813)
Thus a chasm was introduced between the events and the record of them; and
the testimony was reduced to traditional evidence.
This alteration in the critical attempt to shake the evidence of
independent authorship had been accompanied by a corresponding change in
the interpretation, as seen in the assaults made on the credibility of the
facts narrated. In the hands of the English deists and of Reimarus this
attack had been an allegation against the moral character of the writer.
In Eichhorn and Paulus the imputation of collusion had been superseded by
the rationalistic interpretation, which, without denying the historical
recital, denied the supernatural, and explained it away by reference to
the peculiarities of time at which the events were described. The next
step was to transfer the doubt to the recital itself, and to find, in the
absence of contemporary evidence for the events, the possibility for
legend, and, in the antecedent expectation of them, the possibility for
myth.