compared in some cases, though with striking differences of tone, with
those German rationalists like Paulus who have rationalized the miracles,
but in more cases with those who like Strauss have idealized them. His
method however is an appeal to general probability rather than to literary
criticism.
The next form that Deism assumed has reference more to the internal than
the external part of Christianity, the doctrines rather than the
evidences. Less critical than the last-named tendency, it differs from the
earlier one of Toland in looking at religion less on the speculative side
as a revelation of dogma, and more on the practical as a revelation of
duties. While it combined into a system the former objections, critical or
philosophical, the great weapon which it uses is the authority of the
moral reason, by which it both tests revelation and suggests a substitute
in natural religion, thus using it both destructively and for
construction.
Dr. Tindal,(440) the first writer of this class, had early given offence
to the church by his writings; but it was not till 1730, in his extreme
old age, that he published his celebrated dialogue, “Christianity as old
as the Creation, or, the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of
Nature.” This was not only the most important work that deism had yet
produced, composed with care, and bearing the marks of thoughtful study of
the chief contemporary arguments, Christian as well as Deist, but derives
an interest from the circumstance that it was the book to which more than
to any other single work bishop Butler’s Analogy was designed as the
reply.
Tindal’s object is to show that natural religion is absolutely perfect,
and can admit of no increase so as to carry obligation. For this purpose
he tries to establish, first, that revelation is unnecessary,(441) and
secondly, that obligation to it is impossible. His argument in favour of
the first of these two positions is, that if man’s perfection be the
living according to the constitution of human nature,(442) and God’s laws
with the penalties attached be for man’s good,(443) nothing being required
by God for its own sake;(444) then true religion, whether internally or
externally revealed, having the one end, human happiness, must be
identical in its precepts.(445) Having denied the necessity, he then
disputes the possibility, of revelation, on the ground that the
inculcation of positive as distinct from moral duties, is inconsistent
with the good of man, as creating an independent rule.(446) Assuming the
moral faculty to be the foundation of all obligation, he reduces all
religious truth to moral. It is in thus showing the impossibility of any
revelation save the republication of the law of nature that he notices
many of the difficulties in scripture which form the mystery to the
theologian, the ground of doubt to the objector. Some of these are of a
literary character, such as the assertion of the failure of the fulfilment
of prophecies, and of marks of fallibility in the scripture writers, like
the mistake which he alleges in respect to the belief in the immediate
coming of Christ.(447) Others of them are moral difficulties, points where
the revealed system seems to him to contradict our instincts, such as the
destruction of the Canaanites.(448) In reference to this last example,
which may be quoted as a type of his assertions, he argues against the
possibility of a divine commission for the act, on the principle asserted
by Clarke,(449) that a miracle can never prove the divine truth of a
doctrine which contravenes the moral idea of justice; or, in more modern
phrase, that no supposed miracle can be a real one, if it attest a
doctrine which bears this character. In the present work Tindal denied the
necessity and possibility of a new revelation distinct from natural
religion. He did not live to complete the concluding part of his book,
wherein he intended to show that all the truths of Christianity were as
old as the creation; i.e. were a republication of the religion of nature.
Tindal is an instance of those who have unconsciously kindled their torch
at the light of revelation. The religion of nature of which he speaks is a
logical idea, not an historic fact. The creation of it is analogous to the
mention of the idea of compact as the basis of society, a generalization
from its present state, not a fact of its original history. It is the
residuum of Christianity when the mysterious elements have been
subtracted. But in adopting the idea, the Deists were on the same level as
the Christians. Both alike travelled together to the end of natural
religion.(450) Here the Deist halted, willing to accept so much of
Christianity as was a republication of the moral law. The Christian, on
the other hand, found in reason the necessity for revelation, and
proceeded onward to revealed doctrines and positive precepts.
The works of the two writers Morgan and Chubb in part supply the defect
left in Tindal, the omission on the part of deism to show that Christian
truths were a republication of natural religion; the former especially
attacking the claims of the Jewish religion to be divine, the latter the
claims of the Christian.
Morgan’s chief work,(451) the “Moral Philosopher,” was published in 1737.
Starting from the moral point of view, the sole supremacy and sufficiency
of the moral law, the writer exhibits the necessity of applying the moral
test as the only certain criterion on the questions of religion, and
declines admitting the authority of miracles and prophecy to avail against
it,(452) an investigation suggested partly by the questions just named of
the ground of unbelief, and partly by the circumstance that the Christian
writers were beginning to dwell more strongly on the external evidences
when unbelievers professed the internal to be unsatisfactory. The adoption
of this test of truth prevents the admission of an historic revelation
with positive duties. He thinks with Tindal that natural religion is
perfect in itself, but seems to admit that it is so weak as to need
republication,(453) which is a greater admission than Tindal made in his
extant volume. When however he passes from the decision on the general
possibility of revelation to particular historic forms, the Mosaic and
Christian, he discredits both. The infallibility of the moral sense is
still the canon by which his judgment is determined. On this ground he
disbelieves the Jewish religion,(454) selecting successive passages of the
national history, such as the sacrifice of Isaac, the oracle of Urim,(455)
the ceremonial religious system,(456) as the object of his attack. A
degree of interest attaches to his criticism on these points, in that it
was the means of calling forth the celebrated work of Warburton on the
Divine Legation of Moses.
The same principles of criticism mislead him in his examination of
Christianity. The hallowed doctrine of the atonement forms a
stumblingblock to him, on the ground of the transfer of merit by
imputation.(457) He regards Christianity as a Jewish gospel, until it was
altered by the apostles, whose authority he discredits by arguments not
unlike the ancient ones of Celsus. The method of Morgan is more
constructive than that of his predecessors. Not denying the historic
element of Christianity by idealizing it as Collins, he attempts a natural
explanation of the historic facts. The central thought which guides him
throughout is the supreme authority of the moral reason. His works open up
the broad question whether the moral sense is to pronounce on revelation
or to submit to it, and thus form a fresh illustration of the intimate
dependence of particular sceptical opinions and methods upon metaphysical
and ethical theories.
In the period which we are now examining, deism was almost entirely
confined to the upper classes. It was in the latter part of the century
that it spread to the lower, political antipathy against the church giving
point to religious unbelief. Chubb,(458) whom we next consider, is one of
the few exceptions. He was a working man, endowed with strong native
sense; who manifested the same inclination to meddle with the deep subject
of religion which afterwards marked the character of Thomas Paine and
others, who influenced the lower orders later in the century. In his
general view of religion, Chubb denied all particular providence, and by
necessary consequence the utility of prayer, save for its subjective value
as having a reflex benefit on the human heart.(459) He was undecided as to
the fact of the existence of a revelation, but seemed to allow its
possibility.(460) He examined the three great forms of religion which
professed to depend upon a positive revelation, Judaism,(461)
Mahometanism, and Christianity. The claims of the first he wholly
rejected, on grounds similar to those explained by Morgan, as incompatible
with the moral character of God. In reference to the second he anticipated
the modern opinions on Mahometanism, by asserting that its victory was
impossible, if it had not contained truth which the human spirit needed.
In examining the third he attacked, like Morgan, the evidence of
miracles(462) and prophecy,(463) and asserted the necessity of moral right
and wrong as the ground of the interpretation of scripture.
One of his most celebrated works was an explanation of “the true gospel of
Jesus Christ,” which is one of the many instances which his works afford
of the unfairness produced by the want of moral insight into the woes for
which Christianity supplies a remedy, and into the deep adaptation of the
scheme of redemption to effect the object proposed by a merciful
Providence in its communication.(464) It will be perceived that the three
last writers whose systems have been explained, resemble each other so
much as to form a class by themselves. They restrict their attack to the
internal character of revelation, employ the moral rather than the
historical investigation, embody the chief speculations of their
predecessors, and offer, as has been already stated, a constructive as
well as a destructive system; morality or natural religion in place of
revealed.(465)
An anonymous work was published in 1744, which merits notice as indicating
a slight alteration in the mode of attack on the part of the deists. It
was entitled, _The Resurrection of Jesus considered_, and is attributed to
P. Annet, who died in the wretchedness of poverty.(466) It was designed in
reply to some of the defences of this subject which the writings of
Woolston and others had provoked. Its object was to show that the writings
which record the statement of Christ’s prediction of his own death are a
forgery; that the narrative of the resurrection is incredible on internal
grounds, and the variety in the various accounts of it are evidences of
fraud. It indicates the commencement of the open allegation of literary
imposture as distinct from philosophical error, which subsequently marked
the criticism of the French school of infidelity, and affected the English
unbelievers of the latter half of the century.
Deism had now reached its maximum. The attention of the age was turned
aside from religion to politics by the political dangers incident to the
attempts of the Pretender; and when Hume’s scepticism was promulgated in
1749 it was received without interest, and Bolingbroke’s posthumous
writings published in 1754 fell comparatively dead. These two names mark
the period which we called the decline of deism. Bolingbroke’s views(467)
however depict deistical opinions of the period when it was at its height,
and are a transition into the later form seen in Hume, and therefore
require to be stated first, though posterior in the date of publication.
Bolingbroke’s writings command respect from their mixture of clearness of
exposition with power of argument. They form also the transition to the
literature of the next age, in turning attention to history. Bolingbroke
had great powers of psychological analysis, but he despised the study of
it apart from experience. His philosophy was a philosophy of history. In
his attacks on revelation we have the traces of the older philosophical
school of deists; but in the consciousness that an historical, not a
philosophical, solution must be sought to explain the rise of an
historical phenomenon such as Christianity, he exemplifies the historic
spirit which was rising, and anticipates the theological inquiry found in
Gibbon; and, in his examination of the external historic evidence, both
the documents by which the Christian religion is attested, and the effects
of tradition in weakening historic data, he evinces traces of the
influence of the historical criticism which had arisen in France under his
friend Pouilly.(468)
His theological writings(469) are in the form of letters, or of essays,
the common form of didactic writings in that age. We shall briefly state
his views on deity, futurity, and revelation.
He teaches the existence of a deity, but was led, by the sensational
philosophy which he adopted from Locke, to deny the possibility of an _à
priori_ proof of the divine existence,(470) and contends strongly that the
divine attributes can only be known by observation of nature, and not by
the analogy of man’s constitution. He considers too that the deity whose
existence he has thus allowed, exercises a general but not a special
providence;(471) the world being a machine moving by delegated powers
without the divine interference. The philosophy expressed in Pope’s
didactic poetry gives expression to Bolingbroke’s opinions(472) on
providence.
In his views of human duty Bolingbroke refers conduct to self-love as a
cause, and to happiness as an end; and doubts a future state,(473) either
on the ground of materialism, or possibly because his favourite principle,
that “whatever is, is best,” led him to disbelieve the argument for a
future life adduced from the inequality of present rewards. Future
punishment is rejected, on the ground that it can offer no end compatible
with the moral object of punishment, which is correction.
When he passes from natural religion to revealed, he allows the
possibility of divine inspiration, but doubts the fact; rebuking those
however who doubt things merely because they cannot understand them. In
criticising the Jewish revelation,(474) he puts no limits to his words of
severity. He dares to pronounce the Jewish history to be repugnant to the
attributes of a supreme, all-perfect Being. His attack on the records is
partly on account of the materials contained in them, such as the
narrative of the fall, the numerical statistics, the invasion of the
Canaanites, the absence of eternal rewards as sanctions of the Mosaic law;
and partly on the ground of the evidence being, as he alleges, not
narrated by contemporaries. In giving his opinion of Christianity, he
repeats the weak objection already used by Chubb, of a distinction
existing between the gospel of Christ and of Paul;(475) and tries to
explain the origin of Christianity and of its doctrines, suggesting the
derivation of the idea of a Trinity from the triadic notions of other
religions. But he is driven to concede some things denied by former
deists. He grants, for example, that if the miracles really occurred, they
attest the revelation;(476) and he therefore labours to show that they did
not occur, by attacking the New Testament canon(477) as he had before
attacked the Old; attempting to show that the composition of the gospels
was separated by an interval from the alleged occurrence of the events;
applying, in fact, Pouilly’s incipient criticism on history which has been
so freely used in theology by more recent critics.
These remarks will exhibit Bolingbroke’s views, both in their cause and
their relation to those of former deists. It will be observed that they
are for the most part a direct result either of sensational metaphysics or
of the incipient science of historical criticism.
The inquiry was now becoming more historical on the part both of deists
and Christians. Philosophy was still the cause of religious controversy,
but it had changed in character. It was now criticism weighing the
evidence of religion rather than ethics or metaphysics testing the
materials of it. The question formerly debated had been, how much of the
internal characteristics of scripture can be supported by moral
philosophy; and when the conviction at length grew up, that the mysteries
could not be solved by any analogy, but were unique, it became necessary
to rest on the miraculous evidence for the existence of a revelation, and
make the fact guarantee the contents of it. Inasmuch however as the
revelation is contained in a book, it became necessary to substantiate the
historical evidence of its genuineness and authenticity. Bolingbroke’s
attacks are directed against a portion of this literary evidence.
Historical criticism, in its appreciation of literary evidence, may be of
four kinds. It may (1) examine the record from a dogmatic point of view,
pronouncing on it by reference to prepossessions directed against the
facts; or (2) make use of the same method, but direct the attack against
the evidence on which the record rests; or (3) it may examine whether the
record is contemporary with the events narrated; or (4) consider its
internal agreement with itself or with fact.
We have instances of each of these methods in the examination of the
literary evidence on which miracles are believed. The first, the
prepossession concerning the philosophical impossibility of miracles, is
seen in Spinoza; the second, the impossibility of using testimony as a
proof of them, in Hume; the third, the question whether they were attested
by eyewitnesses, is the ground which Bolingbroke touches; the fourth, the
cross-examination of the witnesses, is seen in Woolston. Of these, the
first most nearly resembles the great mass of the deist objections to
revelation, being philosophical rather than critical. The second forms a
transition to the two latter, being philosophy applied to criticism, and
is the form which deism now took. The two latter are those which it
subsequently assumed.(478)
These remarks will explain Hume’s position,(479) and show how he forms the
transition between two modes of inquiry; his point of view being critical,
the cause of it philosophical. His speculations in reference to religion
are chiefly contained in his Essays on the Human Understanding. A brief
explanation is necessary to show the dependence of his theology on his
philosophy.
The speculations of Locke, as we have before had occasion to notice, gave
an impulse to psychological investigations. He clearly saw that knowledge
is limited by the faculties which are its source, which he considered to
be reducible to sensation and reflection; but while denying the existence
of innate ideas, he admitted the existence of innate faculties. Hartley
carried the analysis still farther, by introducing the potent instrument
offered by the doctrine of the association of ideas. Hume, adopting this
principle, applied it, in a manner very like the independent
contemporaneous speculations of Condillac in France, to analyse the
faculties themselves into sensations, and to furnish a more complete
account of the nature of some of our most general ideas, such, for
example, as the notion of cause. The intellectual element implied in
Locke’s account of the process of reflection here drops out. Faculties are
regarded as transformed sensations; the nature of knowledge as coextensive
with sensation. According to such a theory therefore, the idea of physical
cause can mean nothing more than the invariable connexion of antecedent
and consequent. The notion of force or power which we attach to causation
becomes an unreality; being an idea not given in sensation, which can
merely detect sequence.
Such was Hume’s psychology; an attempt to push analysis to its ultimate
limits; valuable in its method, even if defective in its results; a
striking example of the acuteness and subtle penetration of its author.
There is another branch of his philosophy in which he is regarded as a
metaphysical sceptic, in reference to the passage of the mind outwards, by
means of its own sensations and ideas, into the knowledge of real being,
wherein he takes part with Berkeley, extending to the inner world of soul
the scepticism which that philosopher had applied to the outer world of
matter. In the psychological branch Hume is a sensationalist, in the
ontological a sceptic. The latter however has no relation to our present
subject. It is from the former that his views on religion are deduced. In
no writer is the logical dependence of religious opinion on metaphysical
principles visible in a more instructive manner. For we perceive that the
influence adverse to religion in his case was not merely the result of
rival metaphysical dogmas opposed to religion, such as were seen in the
Pantheists of Padua, or in Spinoza; nor even the opposition caused by the
adoption of a different standard of truth for pronouncing on revelation,
as in his fellow English deists; but it sprung from the application of the
subjective psychological inquiry into the limits of religious knowledge,
as a means for criticising not only the logical strength of the evidence
of religion, but specially the historic evidence of testimony. We
consequently see the influence exercised by the subjective branch of
metaphysical inquiries in the discussion not only of the logic of
religion, but also of the logic of the historic aspect of it.
Hume’s religious speculations(480) relate to three points:—to the argument
for the attributes of God, drawn from final causes; to the doctrine of
Providence, and future rewards and punishments; and to the evidence of
testimony as the proof of miracles. Though he does not conduct an open
assault in reference to any of them, but only suggests doubts, yet in each
case his insinuations sap so completely the very proof, that it is clear
that they are intended as grounds not merely for doubt, but for disbelief.
His doctrine of sensation is the clue to his remarks on the two former. He
argues that we can draw no sound inferences on the questions, because the
subjects lie beyond the range of sensational experience. It is however in
consequence of his remarks on the last of the three subjects in his essay
on Miracles that his name has become famous in the history of free
thought.
The essay consists of two parts. In the first he shows that miracles are
incapable of proof by testimony. Belief is in proportion to evidence.
Evidence rests on sensational experience. Accordingly the testimony to the
uniformity of nature being universal, and that which exists in favour of
the occurrence of a miracle, or violation of the laws of nature, being
partial, the former must outweigh the latter. In the second he shows, that
if this is true, provided the testimony be of the highest kind, much more
will it be so in actual cases; inasmuch as no miracle is recorded, the
evidence for which reaches to this high standard. He explains the elements
of weakness in the evidence; such as the predisposition of mankind to
believe prodigies, forged miracles, the decrease of miracles with the
progress of civilization, the force of rival testimony in disproof of
them, which he illustrates by historic examples, such as the alleged
miracles of Vespasian, Apollonius, and the Jansenist Abbé Paris.(481) The
conclusion is, that miracles cannot be so shown to occur as to be used as
the basis of proof for a revelation; and that a revelation, if believed,
must rest on other evidence.