which completely altered the theological tone; viz. (α) New systems of
speculative philosophy; of Jacobi, who followed out the _material_ element
of Kant’s philosophy (p. 235); and of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who
followed out the _formal_ (p. 238). (β) The “romantic” school of poetry
(p. 239). (γ) The moral tone, generated by the liberation wars of 1813.
(p. 240.) (δ) The excitement caused by the theses of Harms at the
tercentenary of the Reformation in 1817. (pp. 240, 241.)
The result of these is seen (p. 241) in
(1) An improved doctrinal school under Schleiermacher (pp. 241-250),
(description of his _Glaubenslehre_, p. 245 seq.); and under his
successors, Neander, &c. (pp. 250-252.) (2) An improved critical tone (p.
252 seq.) as seen in De Wette and Ewald, which is illustrated by an
explanation of the Pentateuch controversy (pp. 254-258).
Concluding notice of two other movements to be treated in the next lecture
(p. 259); viz.
(1) an attempt, different from that of Schleiermacher, in the school of
Hegel, to find a new philosophical basis for Christianity; and (2) the
return to the biblical orthodoxy of the Lutheran church.
Remarks on the benevolence of Providence in overruling free inquiry to the
discovery of truth. (pp. 259-261).
Lecture VII.
_Free Thought in Germany subsequently to 1835; and in France during the
present century._
FREE THOUGHT IN GERMANY (continued).—History of the transition from Period
II. named in the last lecture, to Period III. (pp. 262-274.)
Explanation of the attempt, noticed pp. 242, 259, of the Hegelian school
to find a philosophy of Christianity. Critical remarks on Hegel’s system,
(pp. 263-267-267); its tendency to create an “ideological” spirit in
religion (p. 264):—the school which it at first formed is seen best in
Marheinecke. (p. 265.)
The circumstance which created an epoch in German theology was the
publication of Strauss’s _Leben Jesu_ in 1835 (p. 266). Description of it
(α) in its critical aspect (pp. 267, 270), which leads to an explanation
of the previous discussions in Germany concerning the origin and
credibility of the Gospels (pp. 268, 269); and (β) in its philosophical,
as related to Hegel (p. 270); together with an analysis of the work (p.
271). Statement of the effects produced by it on the various theological
parties. (pp. 272, 273.)
PERIOD III. As the result of the agitation caused by Strauss’s work, four
theological tendencies are seen; viz.
(1) One external to the church, thoroughly antichristian, as in Bruno
Bauer, Feuerbach, and Stirner. (pp. 274-276.) (2) The historico-critical
school of Tübingen, founded by Chr. Bauer. (pp. 277-279.) (3) The
“mediation” school, seen in Dorner and Rothe, (pp. 279-282.) (4) A return
to the Lutheran orthodoxy, (pp. 282-285,) at first partly created by an
attempt to unite the Lutheran and Reformed churches, (p. 282); seen in the
“Neo-Lutheranism” of Hengstenberg and Hävernick, (p. 282), and the
“Hyper-Lutheranism” of Stahl and the younger members of the school. (pp.
283, 285.)
Mention of the contemporaneous increase of spiritual life in Germany. (p.
285.)
Concluding estimate of the whole movement, (pp. 286, 287); and lessons for
students in reference to it. (pp. 288, 289.)
FREE THOUGHT IN FRANCE during the present century (pp. 290-305),
(continued from Lect. IV. p. 194.)
In its tone it is constructive of belief, if compared with that of the
eighteenth century.
From 1800-1852.
The speculative thought has exhibited four distinct forms. (p. 290.)
(1) The ideology of De Tracy, in the early part of the century. (2) The
theological school of De Maistre, &c. to re-establish the dogmatic
authority of the Romish church. (3) Socialist philosophy, St. Simon,
Fourier, Comte. (4) The Eclectic school (Cousin, &c.)
Remarks on the first school.—The recovery of French philosophy and thought
from the ideas of this school, partly due to the literary tone of
Chateaubriand. (pp. 290, 291.)
Influence of the Revolution of 1830 in giving a stimulus to thought. (p.
291.)
Remarks on the third school.—Explanation of socialism as taught by St.
Simon (pp. 292, 293); as taught by Fourier (pp. 293, 294); and difference
from English socialism. (p. 294.)
Positivism, both as an offshoot of the last school, and in itself as a
religion and a philosophy. (pp. 295, 296.)
Remarks on the fourth school.—Eclecticism as taught by Cousin, viewed as a
philosophy and a religion. (pp. 297-299.)
Remarks on the second school; viewed as an attempt to refute the preceding
schools. (p. 300.)
From 1852-1862.
New form of eclecticism under the empire (p. 302), viz. the historic
method, based on Hegel, as Cousin’s was based on Schelling.—E. Renan the
type. (pp. 302-304.)
Free thought in the Protestant church (pp. 304, 305) regarded as an
attempt to meet by concession doubts of contemporaries.
Lecture VIII.
_Free Thought in England in the present century: Summary of the Course of
Lectures: and Inferences in reference to present dangers and duties._
MODERN UNBELIEF IN ENGLAND (continued from Lect V.):—Introductory remarks
on the alteration of its tone. (pp. 306, 307.)—The cause of which is
stated to be a general one, the subjective tone created (p. 308) by such
influences as, (1) the modern poetry (p. 309), and (2) the two great
attempts by Bentham and Coleridge to reconstruct philosophy. (pp. 309,
310.)
The doubt and unbelief treated in the following order (p. 311):
(1) That which appeals to Sensational experience and to Physical science
as the test of truth; viz. (α) Positivism among the educated (p. 312). (β)
Secularism or Naturalism among the masses (p. 313); and in a minor degree,
(γ) The doubts created by Physical science (p. 314). (2) That which
appeals to the faculty of Intuition (p. 315);—expressed in literature, by
Carlyle, (pp. 316, 317); and by the American, Emerson. (p. 317.) Influence
also of the modern literature of romance, (p. 318.) (3) Direct attacks on
Christianity, critical rather than philosophical: viz. (α) The examination
of the historic problem of the development of religious ideas among the
Hebrews, by R. W. Mackay (pp. 319, 320). (β) A summary of objections to
revelation, by Mr. Greg, _The Creed of Christendom_ (p. 321). (γ) The
examination of the psychical origin of religion and Christianity, by Miss
S. Hennell, _Thoughts in aid of Faith_, (p. 323.) (4) The deism, and
appeal to the Intuitional consciousness, expressed by Mr. Theodore Parker
(pp. 325, 326), and Mr. F. Newman (pp. 326-329). (5) The traces of free
thought within the Christian church (p. 330); viz.: (α) The philosophical
tendency which originates with Coleridge. (pp. 330-333.) (β) The critical
tendency, investigating the facts of revelation. (pp. 334-336.) (γ) The
critical tendency, the literature which contains it. (pp. 336, 337.)
This completes the history of the fourth crisis of faith (p. 339), the
history of which began near the end of Lect. III. at p. 105.
SUMMARY of the course of lectures. (pp. 339-41.)—Recapitulation of the
original purpose, which is stated to have been, while assuming the potency
of the moral, to analyse the intellectual causes of doubt, which have been
generally left uninvestigated.
Refutation of objections which might be made; such as
(1) One directed against the utility of the inquiry. (p. 342.) (2) One
directed against its uncontroversial character.
A critical history shown to be useful in the present age, (1) in an
educational point of view for those who are to be clergymen, and to
encounter current forms of doubt by word or by writing (pp. 342-345); and
(2) in a controversial point of view, by resolving the intellectual
element in many cases of unbelief into incorrect metaphysical philosophy;
the value of which inquiry is real, even if such intellectual causes be
regarded only as the conditions, and not the causes, of unbelief. (p.
345.)
-------------------------------------
Further objections anticipated and refuted in reference (3) to the candour
of the mode of inquiry, and the absence of vituperation which is stated
not to be due to indifference to Christian truth, but wholly to the
demands of a scientific mode of treatment (p. 346); (4) to the absence of
an eager advocacy of any particular metaphysical theory; which is due to
the circumstance that the purpose was to exhibit errors as logical
corollaries from certain theories, without assuming the necessary
existence of these corollaries in actual life (p. 347); (5) to the
insufficiency of the causes enumerated to produce doubt without taking
account of the moral causes; which objection is not only admitted, but
shown to be at once the peculiar property which belongs to the analysis of
intellectual phenomena, and also a witness to the instinctive conviction
that the ultimate cause of belief and unbelief is moral, not intellectual;
which had been constantly assumed. (p. 347.)
-------------------------------------
THE LESSONS derived from the whole historical survey. (p. 348 seq.)
I. What has been the office of doubt in history? (p. 348.)
Opposite opinions on this subject stated. (p. 348.) Examination of the
ordinary Christian opinion on the one hand, which regards it as a mischief
(p. 348), and of Mr. Buckle’s on the other, which regards it as a good.
(p. 349.)
1. The office is shown to be, to bring all truths to the test. (p. 349.)
Historical instances of its value in destroying the Roman catholic errors.
(p. 350.)
2. Free inquiry also shown in some cases to be forced on man by the
presentation of new knowledge, which demands consideration. (p. 350.)
Denial of the statement that the doubts thus created are an entire
imitation of older doubt. (p. 352.)
3. The office of it in the hands of Providence to elicit truth by the very
controversies which it creates (p. 352); the responsibility of the
inquirer not being destroyed, but the overruling providence of God made
visible. (p. 353.)
II. What does the history teach, as to the doubts most likely to present
themselves at this time, and the best modes of meeting them? (p. 353.)
The materials shown to be presented for a final answer to these questions.
(p. 354.)
The probability shown from consideration of the state of the various
sciences, mechanical, physiological (p. 355), and mental (p. 355), that no
new difficulties can be suggested hereafter, distinct in _kind_ from the
present; nor any unknown kinds of evidence presented on behalf of
Christianity.
Analogy of the present age as a whole, in disintegration of belief, to the
declining age of Roman civilization. (p. 356.)
The doubts which beset us in the present age stated to be chiefly three
(p. 357), viz.:
1. The relation of the natural to the supernatural. This doubt is
sometimes expressed in a spirit of utter unbelief; sometimes in a tone of
sadness (p. 358), arising from mental struggles, of which some are
enumerated (p. 358). The intellectual and moral means of meeting these
doubts. (p. 359.)
2. The relation of the atoning work of Christ to the human race. (p. 360.)
Explanation of the defective view which would regard it only as
reconciling man to God, and would destroy the priestly work of Christ; and
statement of the modes in which its advocates reconcile it with
Christianity. (p. 361.)
The importance that such doubts be answered by reason, not merely silenced
by force. (p. 362.)
An answer sought by studying the various modes used in other ages of the
church (p. 362); especially by those who have had to encounter the like
difficulties, e.g. the Alexandrian fathers in the third century, and the
faithful in Germany in the present. (p. 363.)
This method shown to have been to present the philosophical prior to the
historical evidence, in order to create the sense of religious want,
before exhibiting Christianity as the divine supply for it. (p. 364.)
In regard to the historic evidence, three misgivings of the doubter
require to be met for his full satisfaction (p. 366); viz.
(α) The literary question of the trustworthiness of the books of the New
Testament.
The mode of meeting this explained, with the possibility of establishing
Christian dogmas, even if the most extravagant rationalism were for
argument’s sake conceded. (p. 367.)
(β) The doubt whether the Christian dogmas, and especially the atonement,
are really taught in the New Testament. The value of the fathers, and the
progress of the doctrine in church history, shown in reference to this
question. (p. 368.)
(γ) The final difficulty which the doubter may put, whether even apostolic
and miraculous teaching is to overrule the moral sense. (p. 369.)
The possibility shown of independent corroboration of the apostolic
teaching, in the testimony of the living church, and the experience of
religious men. (p. 371.)
The utter improbability of error in this part of scriptural teaching, even
if the existence of error elsewhere were for argument’s sake conceded. (p.
370.)
Difference of this appeal from that of Schleiermacher to the Christian
consciousness.
3. The relation of the Bible to the church, whether it is a record or an
authority. (p. 372.)
Statement of the modes of viewing the question in different ages. (p.
373.)
The Bible an authority; but the importance shown of using wisdom in not
pressing the difficulties of scripture on an inquirer, so as to quench
incipient faith. (p. 374.)
The mention of the emotional causes of doubt conjoined with the
intellectual, a warning that, in addition to all arguments, the help of
the divine Spirit to hallow the emotions must be sought and expected. (p.
375.)
Final lesson to Christian students, that in all ages of peril, earnest men
have found the truth by the method of study united to prayer. (pp.
376-379.)
LECTURE I. ON THE SUBJECT, METHOD, AND PURPOSE OF THE COURSE OF LECTURES.
LUKE vii. 51.
_Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you,
nay; but rather division._
The present course of lectures relates to one of the conflicts exhibited
in the history of the Church; viz. the struggle of the human spirit to
free itself from the authority of the Christian faith.
Christianity offers occasion for opposition by its inherent claims,
independently of accidental causes. For it asserts authority over
religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural communication from God,
and claims the right to control human thought in virtue of possessing
sacred books which are at once the record and the instrument of this
communication, written by men endowed with supernatural inspiration. The
inspiration of the writers is transferred to the books, the matter of
which, so far as it forms the subject of the revelation, is received as
true because divine, not merely regarded as divine because perceived to be
true. The religion, together with the series of revelations of which it is
the consummation, differs in kind from ethnic religions, and from human
philosophy; and the sacred literature differs in kind from other books.
Each is unique, a solitary miracle of its class in human history.
The contents also of the sacred books bring them into contact with the
efforts of speculative thought. Though at first glance they might seem to
belong to a different sphere, that of the soul rather than the intellect,
and to possess a different function, explaining duties rather than
discovering truth; yet in deep problems of physical or moral history, such
as Providence, Sin, Reconciliation, they supply materials for limiting
belief in the very class of subjects which is embraced in the compass of
human philosophy.
A conflict accordingly might naturally be anticipated, between the
reasoning faculties of man and a religion which claims the right on
superhuman authority to impose limits on the field or manner of their
exercise; the intensity of which at various epochs would depend, partly
upon the amount of critical activity, and partly on the presence of causes
which might create a divergence between the current ideas and those
supplied by the sacred literature.
The materials are wanting for detecting traces of this struggle in other
parts of the world than Europe; but the progress of it may be fully
observed in European history, altering concomitantly with changes in the
condition of knowledge, or in the methods of seeking it; at first as an
open conflict, philosophical or critical, with the literary pagans,
subsiding as Christianity succeeded in introducing its own conceptions
into every region of thought; afterwards reviving in the middle ages, and
gradually growing more intense in modern times as material has been
offered for it through the increase of knowledge or the activity of
speculation; varying in name, in form, in degree, but referable to similar
causes, and teaching similar lessons.
It is the chief of these movements of free thought in Europe which it is
my purpose to describe, in their historic succession and their connection
with intellectual causes.
We must ascertain the facts; discover the causes; and read the moral.
These three inquiries, though distinct in idea, cannot be disjoined in a
critical history. The facts must first be presented in place and time: the
history is thus far a mere chronicle. They must next be combined with a
view to interpretation. Yet in making this first combination, taste guides
more than hypothesis. The classification is artistic rather than logical,
and merely presents the facts with as much individual vividness as is
compatible with the preservation of the perspective requisite in the
general historic picture. At this point the artistic sphere of history
ceases, and the scientific commences as soon as the mind searches for any
regularity or periodicity in the occurrence of the facts, such as may be
the effect of fixed causes. If an empirical law be by this means
ascertained to exist, an explanation of it must then be sought in the
higher science which investigates mind. Analysis traces out the ultimate
typical forms of thought which are manifested in it; and if it does not
aspire to arbitrate on their truth, it explains how they have become
grounds on which particular views have been assumed to be true. The
intellect is then satisfied, and the science of history ends. But the
heart still craves a further investigation. It demands to view the moral
and theological aspects of the subject, to harmonize faith and discovery,
or at least to introduce the question of human responsibility, and
reverently to search for the final cause which the events subserve in the
moral purposes of providence. The drama of history must not develope
itself without the chorus to interpret its purpose. The artistic,—the
scientific,—the ethical,—these are the three phases of history. (1)
The chief portion of the present lecture will be devoted to explain the
mode of applying the plan just indicated; more especially to develop the
second of these three branches, by stating the law which has marked the
struggle of free thought with Christianity, and illustrating the
intellectual causes which have been manifested in it.
In searching for such a law, or such causes, we ought not to forget that,
if we wished to lay a sound basis for generalization, it would be
necessary not to restrict our attention to the history of Christianity,
but to institute a comparative study of religions, ethnic or revealed, in
order to trace the action of reason in the collective religious history of
the race. Whether the religions of nature be regarded as the distortion of
primitive traditions, or as the spontaneous creation of the religious
faculties, the agreement or contrast suggested by a comparison of them
with the Hebrew and Christian religions, which are preternaturally
revealed, is most important as a means of discovering the universal laws
of the human mind; the exceptional character which belongs to the latter
member of the comparison increasing rather than diminishing the value of
the study. All alike are adjusted, the one class naturally and
accidentally, the other designedly and supernaturally, to the religious
elements of human nature. All have a subjective existence as aspirations
of the heart, an objective as institutions, and a history which is
connected with the revolutions of literature and society. (2)
Comparative observation of this kind gives some approach to the exactness
of experiment; for we watch providence as it were executing an experiment
for our information, which exhibits the operations of the same law under
altered circumstances. If, for example, we should find that Christianity
was the only religion, the history of which presented a struggle of reason
against authority, we should pronounce that there must be peculiar
elements in it which arouse the special opposition; or if the phenomenon
be seen to be common to all creeds, but to vary in intensity with the
activity of thought and progress of knowledge, this discovery would
suggest to us the existence of a law of the human mind.
Such a study would also furnish valuable data for determining precisely
the variation of form which alteration of conditions causes in the
development of such a struggle. In the East, the history of religion, for
which material is supplied by the study of the Zend and Sanskrit
literature, (3) would furnish examples of attempts made by philosophers to
find a rational solution of the problems of the universe, and to adjust
the theories of speculative thought to the national creed deposited in
supposed sacred books. And though, in a western nation such as Greece, the
separation of religion from philosophy was too wide to admit of much
parallel in the speculative aspect of free thought, yet in reference to
the critical, many instances of the application of an analogous process to
a national creed may be seen in the examination made of the early
mythology, the attempt to rationalize it by searching for historical data
in it, or to moralize it by allegory.(66) Again, within the sphere of the
Hebrew religion which, though supernaturally suggested, developed in
connexion with human events so as to admit the possibility of the rise of
mental difficulties in the progress of its history, how much hallowed
truth, both theoretical and practical, might be learned from the divine
breathings of pious inquirers, such as the sacred authors of the
seventy-third Psalm, or of the books of Job and Ecclesiastes, which give
expression to painful doubts about Providence, not fully solved by
religion, but which nevertheless faith was willing to leave
unexplained.(67) If in the Oriental systems free thought is seen to
operate on a national creed by adjusting it to new ideas through
philosophical dogmatism; if in the Greek by explaining it away through
scepticism; in the Hebrew it is hushed by the holier logic of the
feelings. The two former illustrate steps in the intellectual progress of
free thought; the last exhibits the moral lesson of resignation and
submission in the soul of the inquirer.
Nor ought this method of comparison to be laid aside even at this point.
It would be requisite, for a full discovery of the intellectual causes
that the generalization should be carried further, and the operations of
free thought watched in reference to other subjects than religion.(68)
Reason in its action, first on Christianity both in Europe and elsewhere,
secondly on Jewish and heathen religions, lastly on any body of truth
which rests on traditional authority,—these would be the scientific steps
necessary for eliminating accidental phenomena, and discovering the real
laws which have operated in this branch of intellectual history. The
suggestion of such a plan of study, though obviously too large to be here
pursued, may offer matter of thought to reflective minds, and may at least
help to raise the subject out of the narrow sphere to which it is usually
supposed to belong. The result of the survey would confirm the view of the
struggle now about to be given which is suggested by European history.