History of Free Thought
in Reference to
The Christian Religion
Eight Lectures
Preached Before The
University of Oxford, in the year M.DCCC.LXII., on the Foundation of the
Late Rev. John Bampton, M.A., Canon of Salisbury.
By
Adam Storey Farrar, M.A.
Michel Fellow of Queen’s College, Oxford.
New York:
D. Appleton And Company,
443 & 445 Broadway.
1863
CONTENTS
Will of Rev. John Bampton.
Preface.
Analysis of the lectures.
Lecture I. On The Subject, Method, And Purpose Of The Course Of Lectures.
Lecture II. The Literary Opposition of Heathens Against Christianity in
the Early Ages.
Lecture III. Free Thought During The Middle Ages, and At The Renaissance;
Together With Its Rise in Modern Times.
Lecture IV. Deism in England Previous to A.D. 1760.
Lecture V. Infidelity in France in the Eighteenth Century, and Unbelief in
England Subsequent to 1760.
Lecture VI. Free Thought In The Theology Of Germany From 1750-1835.
Lecture VII. Free Thought: In Germany Subsequently To 1835; And In France
During The Present Century.
Lecture VIII. Free Thought in England in the Present Century; Summary of
the Course of Lectures; Inferences in Reference to Present Dangers and
Duties.
Notes.
Lecture I.
Lecture II.
Lecture III.
Lecture IV.
Lecture V.
Lecture VI.
Lecture VII.
Lecture VIII.
Index.
Footnotes
WILL OF REV. JOHN BAMPTON.
Extract From The Last Will And Testament Of The Late Rev. John Bampton,
Canon Of Salisbury.
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“——I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to the Chancellor, Masters,
and Scholars of the University of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all
and singular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the intents and
purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to say, I will and appoint that
the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford for the time being shall
take and receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and (after
all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions made) that he pay all the
remainder to the endowment of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be
established for ever in the said University, and to be performed in the
manner following:
-------------------------------------
“I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in Easter Term, a
Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads of Colleges only, and by no others,
in the room adjoining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in
the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight Divinity Lecture
Sermons, the year following, at St. Mary’s in Oxford, between the
commencement of the last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week
in Act Term.
“Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons shall
be preached upon either of the following Subjects—to confirm and establish
the Christian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics—upon the
divine authority of the holy Scriptures—upon the authority of the writings
of the primitive Fathers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive
Church—upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ—upon the
Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the Articles of the Christian Faith as
comprehended in the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds.
“Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity Lecture Sermons
shall be always printed, within two months after they are preached; and
one copy shall be given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy
to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor of the city of
Oxford, and one copy to be put into the Bodleian Library; and the expense
of printing them shall be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates
given for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the Preacher
shall not be paid nor be entitled to the revenue before they are printed.
“Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be qualified to preach
the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless he hath taken the degree of Master of
Arts at least, in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge; and
that the same person shall never preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons
twice.”
PREFACE.
The object of this Preface is to explain the design of the following
Lectures, and to enumerate the sources on which they are founded.
What is the province and mode of inquiry intended in a “Critical History
of Free Thought”?(1) What are the causes which led the author into this
line of study?(2) What the object proposed by the work?(3) What the
sources from which it is drawn?(4)—these probably are the questions which
will at once suggest themselves to the reader. The answers to most of them
are so fully given in the work,(5) that it will only be necessary here to
touch upon them briefly.
The word “free thought” is now commonly used, at least in foreign
literature(6), to express the result of the revolt of the mind against the
pressure of external authority in any department of life or speculation.
Information concerning the history of the term is given elsewhere.(7) It
will be sufficient now to state, that the cognate term, _free thinking_,
was appropriated by Collins early in the last century(8) to express Deism.
It differs from the modern term _free thought_, both in being restricted
to religion, and in conveying the idea rather of the method than of its
result, the freedom of the mode of inquiry rather than the character of
the conclusions attained; but the same fundamental idea of independence
and freedom from authority is implied in the modern term.
Within the sphere of its application to the Christian religion, free
thought is generally used to denote three different systems; viz.
Protestantism, scepticism, and unbelief. Its application to the first of
these is unfair.(9) It is true that all three agree in resisting the
dogmatism of any earthly authority; but Protestantism reposes implicitly
on what it believes to be the divine authority of the inspired writers of
the books of holy scripture; whereas the other two forms acknowledge no
authority external to the mind, no communication superior to reason and
science. Thus, though Protestantism by its attitude of independence seems
similar to the other two systems, it is really separated by a difference
of kind, and not merely of degree.(10) The present history is restricted
accordingly to the treatment of the two latter species of free
thought,—the resistance of the human mind to the Christian religion as
communicated through revelation, either in part or in whole, neither the
scepticism which disintegrates it, or the unbelief which rejects it: the
former directing itself especially against Christianity, the latter
against the idea of revelation, or even of the supernatural generally.
An analogous reason to that which excludes the history of Protestantism,
excludes also that of the opposition made to Christianity by heresy, and
by rival religions:(11) inasmuch as they repose on authorities, however
false, and do not profess to resort to an unassisted study of nature and
truth.
This account of the province included under free thought will prepare the
way for the explanation of the mode in which the subject is treated.
It is clear that the history, in order to rise above a chronicle, must
inquire into the causes which have made freedom of inquiry develop into
unbelief. The causes have usually been regarded by theologians to be of
two kinds, viz. either superhuman or human; and, if of the latter kind, to
be either moral or intellectual. Bishop Van Mildert, in his History of
Infidelity, restricted himself entirely to the former.(12) Holding
strongly that the existence of evil in the world was attributable, not
only indirectly and originally, but directly and perpetually, to the
operation of the evil spirit, he regarded every form of heresy and
unbelief to be the attempt of an invisible evil agent to thwart the truth
of God; and viewed the history of infidelity as the study of the results
of the operation of this cause in destroying the kingdom of righteousness.
Such a view invests human life and history with a very solemn character,
and is not without practical value; but it will be obvious that an
analysis of this kind must be strictly theological, and removes the
inquiry from the province of human science. Even when completed, it leaves
unexplored the whole field in which such an evil principle operates, and
the agencies which he employs as his instruments.
The majority of writers on unbelief accordingly have treated the subject
from a less elevated point of view, and have limited their inquiry to the
sphere of the operation of human causes, the _media axiomata_ as it
were,(13) which express the motives and agencies which have been
manifested on the theatre of the world, and visible in actual history. It
will be clear that within this sphere the causes are specially of two
kinds; viz. those which have their source in the will, and arise from the
antagonism of feeling, which wishes revelation untrue, and those which
manifest themselves in the intellect, and are exhibited under the form of
difficulties which beset the mind, or doubts which mislead it, in respect
to the evidence on which revelation reposes. The former, it may be feared,
are generally the ground of unbelief; the latter the basis of doubt.
Christian writers, in the wish to refer unbelief to the source of
efficient causation in the human will, with a view of enforcing on the
doubter the moral lesson of responsibility, have generally restricted
themselves to the former of these two classes; and by doing so have
omitted to explore the interesting field of inquiry presented in the
natural history of the variety of forms assumed by scepticism, and their
relation to the general causes which have operated in particular ages:—a
subject most important, if the intellectual antecedents thus discovered be
regarded as causes of doubt; and not less interesting, if, instead of
being causes, they are merely considered to be instruments and conditions
made use of by the emotional powers.
A history of free thought seems to point especially to the study of the
latter class. A biographical history of free thinkers would imply the
former; the investigation of the moral history of the individuals, the
play of their will and feelings and character; but the history of free
thought points to that which has been the product of their characters, the
doctrines which they have taught. Science however no less than piety would
decline entirely to separate the two;(14) piety, because, though admitting
the possibility that a judgment may be formed in the abstract on free
thought, it would feel itself constantly drawn into the inquiry of the
moral responsibility of the freethinker in judging of the concrete
cases;—science, because, even in an intellectual point of view, the
analysis of a work of art is defective if it be studied apart from the
personality of the mental and moral character of the artist who produces
it. If even the inquiry be restricted to the analysis of intellectual
causes, a biographic treatment of the subject, which would allow for the
existence of the emotional, would be requisite.(15)
The province of the following work accordingly is, the examination of this
neglected branch in the analysis of unbelief. While admitting most fully
and unhesitatingly the operation of emotional causes, and the absolute
necessity, scientific as well as practical, of allowing for their
operation, it is proposed to analyse the forms of doubt or unbelief in
reference mainly to the intellectual element which has entered into them,
and the discovery of the intellectual causes which have produced or
modified them. Thus the history, while not ceasing to belong to church
history, becomes also a chapter in the history of philosophy, a page in
the history of the human mind.
The enumeration of the causes into which the intellectual elements of
doubt are resolvable, is furnished in the text of the first Lecture.(16)
If the nature of some of them be obscure, and the reader be unaccustomed
to the philosophical study necessary for fully understanding them;
information must be sought in the books to which references are elsewhere
given, as the subject is too large to be developed in the limited space of
this Preface.
The work however professes to be not merely a narrative, but a “critical
history.” The idea of criticism in a history imparts to it an ethical
aspect. For criticism does not rest content with ideas, viewed as facts,
but as realities. It seeks to pass above the relative, and attain the
absolute; to determine either what is right or what is true. It may make
this determination by means of two different standards. It may be either
independent or dogmatic;—independent if it enters upon a new field
candidly and without prepossessions, and rests content with the inferences
which the study suggests;—dogmatic, when it approaches a subject with
views derived from other sources, and pronounces on right or wrong, truth
or falsehood, by reference to them.
It is hoped that the reader will not be unduly prejudiced, if the
confession be frankly made, that the criticism in these Lectures is of the
latter kind. This indeed might be expected from their very character. The
Bampton Lecture is an establishment for producing apologetic treatises.
The authors are supposed to assume the truth of Christianity, and to seek
to repel attacks upon it. They are defenders, not investigators. The
reader has a right to demand fairness, but not independence; truth in the
facts, but not hesitation in the inferences. While however the writer of
these Lectures takes a definite line in the controversy, and one not
adopted professionally, but with cordial assent and heartfelt conviction,
he has nevertheless considered that it is due to the cause of scientific
truth to intermingle his own opinions as little as possible with the facts
of the history. A history without inferences is ethically and religiously
worthless: it is a chronicle, not a philosophical narrative. But a history
distorted to suit the inferences is not only worthless, but harmful. It is
for the reader to judge how far the author has succeeded in the result:
but his aim has been not to allow his opinions to warp his view of the
facts. History ought to be written with the same spirit of cold analysis
which belongs to science. Caricature must not be substituted for portrait,
nor vituperation for description.(17)
Such a mode of treatment in the present instance was the more possible,
from the circumstance that the writer, when studying the subject for his
private information, without any design to write upon it, had endeavoured
to bring his own principles and views perpetually to the test; and to
reconsider them candidly by the light of the new suggestions which were
brought before him. Instead of approaching the inquiry with a spirit of
hostility, he had investigated it as a student, not as a partisan. It may
perhaps be permitted him without egotism to explain the causes which led
him to the study. He had taken holy orders, cordially and heartily
believing the truths taught by the church of which he is privileged to be
an humble minister. Before doing so, he had read thoughtfully the great
works of evidences of the last century, and knew directly or indirectly
the character of the deist doubts against which they were directed. His
own faith was one of the head as well as the heart; founded on the study
of the evidences, as well as on the religious training of early years. But
he perceived in the English church earnest men who held a different view;
and, on becoming acquainted with contemporary theology, he found the
theological literature of a whole people, the Germans, constructed on
another basis; a literature which was acknowledged to be so full of
learning, that contemporary English writers of theology not only
perpetually referred to it, but largely borrowed their materials from
German sources. He wished therefore fully to understand the character of
these new forms of doubt, and the causes which had produced them. He may
confess that, reposing on the affirmative verities of the Christian faith,
as gathered from the scriptures and embodied in the immemorial teaching of
Christ’s church, he did not anticipate that he should discover that which
would overthrow or even materially modify his own faith; but he wished,
while exploring this field, and gratifying intellectual curiosity, to
re-examine his opinions at each point by the light of those with which he
might meet in the inquiry. The serious wish also to fulfill his duty in
the sphere in which he might move, made him desire to understand these new
views; that if false, he might know how to refute them when they came
before him, and not be first made aware of their existence from the harsh
satire of sceptical critics. His own studies were accordingly conducted in
a spirit of fairness—the fairness of the inquirer, not of the doubter; and
a habit of mind formed by the study of the history of philosophy, was
brought to bear upon the investigation of this chapter in church history:
first, of modern forms of doubt, and afterwards the consecutive history of
unbelief generally. Accordingly, while he hopes that he has taken care to
leave the student in no case unguided, who may accompany him in these
pages through the history, he has wished to place him, as he strove to
place himself, in the position to see the subject in its true light before
drawing the inferences; to understand each topic to a certain extent, as
it appears when seen from the opposite point of view, as well as when seen
from the Christian. And when this has been effected, he has criticised
each by a comparison with those principles which form his standard for
testing them, the truth of which the study has confirmed to the writer’s
own mind. The criticism therefore does not profess to be independent, but
dogmatic; but it is hoped that the definite character of the results will
not be found to have prevented fairness in the method of inquiry. If the
student has the facts correctly, he can form his own judgment on the
inferences.
The standard of truth here adopted, as the point of view in criticism, is
the teaching of Scripture as expressed in the dogmatic teaching of the
creeds of the church; or, if it will facilitate clearness to be more
definite, three great truths may be specified, which present themselves to
the writer’s mind as the very foundation of the Christian religion: (1)
the doctrine of the reality of the vicarious atonement provided by the
passion of our blessed Lord; (2) the supernatural and miraculous character
of the religious revelation in the book of God; and (3) the direct
operation of the Holy Ghost in converting and communing with the human
soul. Lacking the first of these, Christianity appears to him to be a
religion without a system of redemption; lacking the second, a doctrine
without authority; lacking the third, a system of ethics without spiritual
power. These three principles accordingly are the measure, by agreement
with which the truth and falsehood of systems of free thought are
ultimately tested.(18)
The above remarks, together with those which occur in the text, where
fuller explanation is afforded, will illustrate the province of the
inquiry, and the spirit in which it is conducted.(19)
The explanation also of the further question concerning the object which
the writer proposed to effect, by the treatment of such a subject in a
course of Bampton Lectures, is given so fully elsewhere, that a few words
may here suffice in reference to it.(20) Experience of the wants of
students in this time of doubt and transition, which those who are
practically acquainted with the subject will best understand, as well as
observation of the tone of thought expressed in our sceptical literature,
led him to believe that a history, natural as well as literary, of doubt;
an analysis of the forms and a statement of the intellectual causes of it,
would have a value, direct and indirect, in many ways. His desire, he is
willing to confess, was to guide the student, rather than to refute the
unbeliever. He did not expect to furnish the combatant with ready-made
weapons, which would make him omnipotent in conflict; but he hoped to give
him some suggestions in reference to the tactics for conducting the
contest. The Lectures have a polemical aspect, but they seek to obtain
their end by means of the educational. The writer has aimed at assisting
the student, in the struggle with his doubts, in the inquiry for truth, in
the quiet meditative search for light and knowledge, preparatory to
ministering to others. The survey of a new region, which ordinary works on
the history of infidelity rarely touch, may lay bare unsuspected or
undetected causes of unbelief; and thus indirectly offer a refutation of
it; for intellectual error is refuted, when the origin of it is referred
to false systems of thought. The anatomy of error is the first step to its
cure.
In another point of view, independently of the value of the line of
inquiry generally, and the special suitability of it to individual minds,
there is a further use, which in the present day belongs to it in common
with all inquiries into the history of thought.
It is hard to persuade the students of a past generation that the historic
mode of approaching any problem is the first step toward its successful
solution. Yet a little reflection may at least make the meaning of the
assertion understood. If we view the literary characteristic of the
present, in comparison with that of past ages, we are perhaps right in
stating, that its peculiar feature is the prevalence of the method of
historical criticism. If the four centuries since the Renaissance be
considered, the critical peculiarity of the sixteenth and seventeenth will
be found to be the investigation of ancient literature; in the former
directed to _words_, in the latter to _things_. The eighteenth century
broke away from the past, and, emancipating itself from authority, tried
to rebuild truth from its foundations from present materials, independent
of the judgment formed by past ages. The nineteenth century unites both
methods. It ventures not to explore the universe, unguided by the
experience of the past; but, while reuniting itself to the past, it does
not bow to it. It accepts it as a fact, not as an authority. The
seventeenth century worshipped the past; the eighteenth despised it: the
nineteenth mediates, by means of criticism. Accordingly, in literary
investigations at present, each question is approached from the historic
side, with the belief that the historico-critical inquiry not only
gratifies curiosity, but actually contributes to the solution of the
problem. Some indeed assert(21) this, because they think that the historic
study of philosophy is the whole of philosophy; and, believing that all
truth is relative to its age, are hopeless of attaining the absolute and
unaltering solution of any problem. We, on the other hand, are content to
believe that the history of philosophy is only the entrance to philosophy.
But in either case, truth is sought by means of a philosophical history of
the past; which, tracking the progress of truth and error in any
particular department, lays bare the natural as well as the literary
history; the causes of the past, as well as its form. Truth and error are
thus discovered, not by breaking with the past, and using abstract
speculations on original data, but by tracing the growth of thought,
gathering the harvest of past investigations, and learning by experience
to escape error.
These considerations bear upon the present subject in this manner: they
show not only the special adaptation to the passing tastes of the age, of
an historic mode of approaching a subject, but exhibit also that the mode
of proof and of refutation must be sought, not on abstract grounds, but
historic. The position of an enemy is not to be forced, but turned; his
premises to be refuted, not his conclusions; the antecedent reasons which
led him into his opinion to be exhibited, not merely evidence offered of
the fact that he is in error.
This view, that doubt might be refuted by the historic analysis of its
operation, by laying bare the antecedent grounds which had produced it,
will explain why the author was led to believe that a chapter of mental
and moral physiology might be useful, which would not merely carry out the
anatomy of actual forms of disease, but discover their origin by the study
of the preceding natural history of the patients.
These remarks will perhaps suffice for explaining the object which was
proposed in writing this history; and may justify the hope that this work,
thus adapted to the wants of the time, may offer such a contribution to
the subject of the Christian evidences, as not only to possess an
intellectual value, but to coincide with the purpose contemplated by the
founder of the Lectures.
It remains to state the sources which have been used for the literary
materials of the history. Though they are sufficiently indicated in the
notes, a general description of them may be useful.
They may be distributed under four classes;
1. The histories which have been professedly devoted to the subject.
2. The notices of the history of unbelief in general histories of the
church or of literature.
3. (Which ought indeed to rank first in importance;) the original
authorities for the facts, i.e. the works of the sceptical writers
themselves; or of the contemporary authors who have refuted them.
4. The monographs, which treat of particular writers, ages, or schools, of
sceptical thought.
In approaching the subject, a student would probably commence with the
first two classes; and after having thus acquired for himself a _carte du
pays_, would then explore it in detail by the aid of the third and fourth.
1. The works which have professedly treated of the history of infidelity,
as a whole, are not of great importance.
One of the earliest was the _Historia Univ. Atheismi_, 1725, of Reimannus;
and the _De Atheismo_, 1737, of Buddeus. (An explanation of the word
_Atheism_, as employed by them, is given in Note 21. p. 413.) hey furnish,
as the name implies, a history of scepticism, as well as of sceptics; yet,
though the labours of such diligent and learned men can never be useless,
they afford little information now available. Their date also necessarily
precluded them from knowing the more recent forms of unbelief. Perhaps
under this head we ought also to name the chapters on polemical theology
in the great works of bibliography of the German scholars of the same
time, such as Pfaff (_Hist. Litt. Thol._); Buddeus (_Isagoge_); Fabricius
(_Delectus Argum._); Walch’s (_Biblical Theol. Select._); which contain
lists of sceptical works, either directly, or indirectly by naming the
apologists who have answered them. The references to these works will be
found in Note 39. p. 436.
Among French writers, the only one of importance is Houtteville, who
prefixed an Introduction to his work, _La Religion Chrétienne prouvée par
des faits_, 1722, containing an account of the writers for and against
Christianity from the earliest times. (Translated 1739.) It contains
little information concerning the authors or the events, but a clearly and
correctly written analysis of their works and thoughts.
Among the English writers who have attempted a consecutive history of the
whole subject was Van Mildert, afterwards bishop of Durham, who has been
already named. The first volume of his _Boyle Lectures_, in 1802-4, was
devoted to the history of infidelity; the second to a general statement of
the evidences for Christianity. This work, on account of its date,
necessarily stops short before the existence of modern forms of doubt; and
indeed evinces no knowledge concerning the contemporary forms of
literature in Germany, which had already attracted the attention of Dr.
Herbert Marsh. The point of view of the work, as already described, almost
entirely precludes the author from entering upon the analysis of the
causes, either emotional or intellectual, which have produced unbelief.
Its value accordingly is chiefly in the literary materials collected in
the notes; in which respect it bears marks of careful study. Though mostly
drawn from second-hand sources, it exhibits wide reading and thoughtful
judgment.
A portion of the Bampton Lectures for 1852, by the Rev. J. C. Riddle, was
devoted to the subject of infidelity. The author’s object, as the
title(22) implies, was to give the natural history of unbelief, to the
neglect of the literary. Psychological rather than historical analysis was
used by him for the investigation; and his examination of the moral causes
of doubt is better than of the intellectual. The notes contain a
collection of valuable quotations, which supplement those of Van Mildert,
but are unfortunately given, for the most part, without references.
This completes(23) the enumeration of the histories professedly devoted to
infidelity, with the exception of a small but very creditable production
published since several of these lectures were written, _Defence of the
Faith; Part I. Forms of Unbelief_, by the Rev. S. Robins, forming the
first part of a work, of which the second is to treat the evidences; the
third to draw the moral. It does not profess to be a very deep work;(24)
but it is interesting; drawn generally from the best sources, and written
in an eloquent style and devout spirit.
2. The transition is natural from these works, which treat of the history
of unbelief or give lists of the works of unbelievers, to the notices of
sceptical writers contained in general histories of the church or of
literature.
In this, as in the former case, it is only in modern times that important
notices occur concerning forms of unbelief. The circumstance that in the
early ages unbelief took the form of opposition or persecution on the part
of heathens, and that in the middle ages it was so rare, caused the
ancient church historians and mediæval church chroniclers to record little
respecting actual unbelief, though they give information about heresy.
Even in modern times, it is not till the early part of the eighteenth
century that any attention is bestowed on the subject. The earlier
historians, both Protestant, such as the Magdeburg Centuriators, and
Catholic, like Baronius, wrote the history of the past for a controversial
purpose in relation to the contests of their own times: and in the next
period, in the one church, Arnold confined himself to the history of
heresy rather than unbelief; and in the other, Fleury and Tillemont wrote
the history of deeds rather than of ideas, and afford no information,
except in a few allusions of the latter writer to the early intellectual
opposition of the heathens.
But about the middle of the eighteenth century, in the period of cold
orthodoxy and solid learning which immediately preceded the rise of
rationalism, as well as in that of incipient free thought, we meet not
only with the historians of theological literature already named above,
but with historians of thought like Brucker, and of the church like
Mosheim, possessed of large taste for inquiry, and wide literary
sympathies, who contribute information on the subject: and towards the
close of the century we find Schröckh, who, in his lengthy and careful
history of the church since the Reformation,(25) has taken so extensive a
view of the nature of church history, that he has included in it an
account of the struggle with freethinkers. Among the same class, with the
exception that he differs in being marked by rationalist sympathies, must
be ranked Henke.(26)
In the present century the spread of the scientific spirit, which counts
no facts unworthy of notice, together with the attention bestowed on the
history of doctrine, and the special interest in understanding the
fortunes of free thought, which sympathy in danger created during the
rationalist movement, prevented the historians from passing lightly over
so important a series of facts. It may be sufficient to instance, in
proof, the notices of unbelief which occur in Neander’s _Church History_.
General histories also of literature, like Schlosser’s _History of
Literature in the Eighteenth Century_, or the more theological one of
Hagenbach (_Geschichte des 18__n__ Jahrhunderts_) incidentally afford
information.
The various works just named are the chief of this class which furnish
assistance.
3. After a general preliminary idea of the history has been obtained from
these sources, in order to prevent being confused with details; it is
necessary to resort next to the original sources of information, without
careful study of which the history must lack a real basis.
In reference to the early unbelievers, the direct materials are lost; but
the contemporary replies to these writings remain. In the case of later
unbelievers, both the works and the answers to them exist. It will be
presumed that in so large a subject the writer cannot have read all the
sceptical works which have been written, and are here named. With the
exception however of Averroes and of the Paduan school,(27) in which cases
he has chiefly adopted second-hand information, and merely himself
consulted a few passages of the original writers, he has in all other
instances read the chief works of the sceptical writers, sufficiently at
least to make himself acquainted with their doubts, and in many cases has
even made an analysis of their works. The reader will perceive by the
foot-notes the instances in which this applies.
It may be due to some of the historians who have made a special study of
particular periods from original sources, to state, that so far as his
limited experience extends he can bear witness to their exactness.
Leehler’s work on English deism, for example,(28) is a singular example of
truthful narrative; and Leland’s,(29) though controversial, is worthy of
nearly the same praise.
4. There remains a fourth source of materials in the separate monographs
on particular men, opinions, or schools of thought. We shall enumerate
these according to the order of the lectures; dwelling briefly on the
majority of them, as being described elsewhere; and describing at greater
length those only which relate to the history of the theological movements
in Germany described in Lectures VI. and VII.; inasmuch as references are
there frequently made to these works without a specific description of
their respective characters.
In relation to the early struggle of Paganism against Christianity,(30)
the work of Lardner, _Collection of Ancient Jewish and Heathen Testimonies
to the Truth of the Christian Religion_ (1764-7) (Works, vols. vii.-ix.),
is well known for carefulness of treatment and the value of its
references. Portions also of the works of J. A. Fabricius, especially his
_Bibliotheca Græca_ and _Lux Evangelii_ (1732) are useful in reference to
the lost works, and for bibliographical knowledge: also a monograph by
Kortholt, _Paganus Obtrectator_ (1703), on the objections made by
Christians in the early ages, gathered from the Apologies.
Among recent works it is only necessary to specify one, viz. the second
series of the _Histoire de l’Eglise Chrétienne_, by E. de Pressensé
(1861), containing _La Grande Lutte du Christianisme contre le Paganisme_,
the account of the struggle both of deeds and ideas on the part of the
heathens against Christianity, and of the apology of the Christians in
reply. The sketches of the arguments used both by the heathens, as
recovered from fragments, and by the Christian apologists, are most ably
executed. The frequent references to it in the foot-notes will show the
importance which the writer attaches to this work.(31)
The long period of the middle ages, together with early modern(32)
history, so far as the latter bears upon the present subject, is spanned
by the aid of four works; Cousin’s Memoir on Abelard (1836); the _La
Reforme_ of Laurent (1861), a professor at Ghent; the _Averroes_ of E.
Renan (1851), one of the ablest among the younger writers of France; and
the _Essais de Philosophie Religieuse_ of E. Saisset (1859). All these
works are full of learning; some of them are works of mind as well as of
erudition. Cousin’s treatise is well known,(33) and may be said to have
reopened the study of medieval philosophy. The contents of Laurent’s work
are specified elsewhere.(34) That of Renan, besides containing a sketch of
the life and philosophy of Averroes, studies his influence in the three
great spheres where it was felt,—the Spanish Jews, the Scholastic
philosophers, and the Peripatetics of Padua. The work of Saisset is a most
instructive critical sketch on religious philosophy.
The period of English Deism(35) is treated in two works; the well-known
work of Leland above cited, and the one also named above by Lechler, now
general superintendent at Leipsic; a work full of information, and
exceedingly complete; one of the carefully executed monographs with which
many of the younger German scholars first bring their names into notice.
Though the interest of the subject is limited, it well merits a
translator.(36)
There is a deficiency of any similar work on the history of infidelity in
France,(37) treating it separately and exhaustively. The work which most
nearly deserves the description is vol. vi. of Henke’s
_Kirchengeschichte_.(38) This want however is the less felt, because
almost every portion of the period has been treated in detail by French
critics of various schools; among which some of the sketches of
Bartholmess, _Histoire Critique des Doctrines Religieuses de la
Philosophie Moderne_, 1855; and of Damiron, _Mémoires pour servir à
l’Histoire de Philosophie au 18__e__ siècle_;(39) are perhaps the most
useful for our purpose. One portion of Mr. Buckle’s _History of
Civilisation_, the best written part of his first volume, also affords
much information, in the main trustworthy, in reference to the
intellectual condition of France of the same period.(40)
A description of the events of a period so complex as that of the German
theological movement of the last hundred years(41) would have been an
object too ambitious to attempt, especially when it must necessarily, from
the size of the subject, be grounded on an acquaintance with single
writers of a school, or single works of an author used as samples of the
remainder; if it were not that abundant guidance is supplied in the
memoirs by German theologians of all shades of opinion, who have studied
the history of their country, and not only narrated facts, but
investigated causes. A few narratives of it also exist by scholars of
other countries; but these are founded on the former. We shall in the main
preserve the order of their publication in enumerating these various
works.
The materials for the condition of Germany at the beginning of the last
century, antecedently to the introduction of the new influences which
created rationalism,(42) are conveyed in Weismann, _Introductio in
Memorabilia Eccl. Hist._ (1718), and in Schröckh, _Christliche
Kirchengeschichte_ (1768-1812). The first distinct examination however of
the peculiar character of the movement which ensued, called Rationalism,
occurred in the discussion as to its meaning and province; in which
Tittmann, Röhr, Staüdlin, Bretschneider, Hahn, &c., were engaged; an
account of which, with a list of their works,(43) is given under the
explanation of the word “Rationalism” in Note 21, p. 416. The chief value
of these works at present is, partly to enable us to understand how
contemporaries viewed the movement while in progress; partly to reproduce
the state of belief which existed in the older school of rationalists, and
its opponents, before the reaction toward orthodoxy had fully altered
theological thought.
Whilst the dispute between rationalism and supernaturalism was still going
on, and the latter was gradually gaining the victory, through the reaction
under Schleiermacher just alluded to, an English writer, Mr. Hugh James
Rose,(44) published some sermons preached at Cambridge in 1825, which were
the means of directing attention to the subject both at home and abroad,
and stimulating investigation into the history. As this work, and
especially the reply of one writer to it, are often here quoted, it may be
well to narrate the interesting literary controversy, now forgotten, which
ensued upon its publication.
Mr. Rose described the havoc made by the rationalist speculations, alike
in dogma, in interpretation, and in church history, and attributed the
evil chiefly to the absence of an efficient system of internal church
government which would have suppressed such a movement. He was answered
(1828) by Mr. (now Dr.) Pusey, then a junior Fellow of Oriel, who, having
visited Germany, and become acquainted with the forms of German thought,
and the circumstances which had marked its development, conceived justly
that the reasons of a moral phenomenon like the overthrow of religious
faith in Germany must be sought in intrinsic causes, and not merely in an
extrinsic cause, such as the absence of efficient means of ecclesiastical
repression. In this work,(45) marked by great knowledge of the subject,
and characterized by just and philosophical reflections, the author
pointed out an internal law of development in the events of the history,
and traced the ultimate cause of the movement to the divorce between dogma
and piety which had characterized the age preceding the rise of
rationalism. His motive for entering the contest was, not the wish to
defend the movement, for his own position was fixed upon the faith of the
creeds; but seems to have been partly a love of truth, which did not like
to see an imperfect view of a great question set forth; and partly the
wish to prevent attention being diverted by Mr. Rose’s explanation, from
perceiving the extreme resemblance of the contemporary time in England to
that of the age which preceded rationalism.
To this work Mr. Rose replied in a Letter to the Bishop of London,
misunderstanding Mr. Pusey’s object, and conveying the impression that he
had made himself responsible for the rationalism which it had been the
object of the sermons to condemn. He felt himself however compelled, in a
second edition of the sermons,(46) to enter more largely into proofs from
German literature of the position which he had assumed; and produced a
collection of literary facts, of value in reference to the movement.
Mr. Pusey replied (1830) with a triumphant vindication alike of his own
meaning, and the truth of his own position.(47) The work is necessarily
less interesting than the former, as it turns more upon personal
questions, and is more polemical; but the literary information conveyed is
equally valuable.
If we may be permitted to form an opinion concerning the controversy, it
may perhaps be true to say, that Mr. Rose’s fault (if indeed we may say so
of one who so worthily received honour in his generation) was, that he
approached the subject from the polemic and practical instead of the
historic side. His work is like the description of a battle-field, which
gives an idea of the mangled remains that strew the field, but does not
recount the causes of contest, nor the progress of the action. The work of
his opponent describes the mustering of the forces preparatory to the
action, and the causes which led to the struggle. Perhaps, in a few
matters of detail, the former writer has taken a truer, though a less
hopeful, view than his opponent, of certain classes of opinions, or of
certain men; but the latter has better preserved the historical
perspective. The former saw mainly the old forms of rationalism, the
latter descried the partial return toward the faith which had already
begun, and has since gone forward so energetically.(48)
These works must always afford much information on the topics which they
embrace. It is proper however to add, that Dr. Pusey, some years ago,
recalled the remaining copies of the edition of his work. On this account
the writer of these lectures, when he has had occasion to give references
to it, has taken care not to quote it for opinions, but only for
facts.(49)
The attack of Mr. Rose on German theology caused replies abroad as well as
at home. Several German theologians were led to a more careful study of
their own history and position, to which references will be found in Mr.
Rose’s replies.(50)
Previously to the publication of Dr. Pusey’s treatises, a work had been
written with a purpose less directly controversial, by Tholuck: _Abriss
Einer Geschichte der umwälzung, welche seit 1750, auf dem Gebiete der
Theologie in Deutschland statt gefunden_, now contained in his _Vermischte
Schriften_, 1839, vol. 2.(51) It is valuable for the earlier history of
Rationalism. The spirit of it is very similar to that of Dr. Pusey’s work.
Indeed the latter author, though not aware of the publication of Tholuck’s
work, was cognisant of his views on these questions, through lectures
heard from him abroad.
These works however were all previous to the great agitation in German
theology, which ensued in consequence of Strauss’s _Leben Jesu_, in 1835.
After the first excitement of that event had passed, we meet with three
works, two French and one German, in which the history is brought down to
a later period. The French ones were, the _Histoire Critique du
Rationalisme_, 1841, of Amand Saintes, translated 1849; and the _Etudes
Critiques sur le Rationalisme Contemporain_, of the Abbé H. de Valroger,
1846; the latter of which works the writer of these lectures has been
unable to see. The German one was, _Der Deutsche Protestantismus_,
1847,(52) and is attributed to Hundeshagen, professor at Heidelberg.
The _Critical History_ of Amand Saintes, though thought by the Germans(53)
to be defective, in consequence of want of sufficiently separating between
the various forms of rationalism, is more replete than any other book with
stores of information, and extracts arranged in a very clear form.(54) It
is very useful, if the reader first possesses a better scheme into which
to arrange the materials. It is written also in a truly evangelical
spirit.
The work of Hundeshagen had a political object as well as a religious. It
was composed just before the revolution of 1848, when Germany was panting
for freedom; and its object was to defend the position of the
constitutional party in church and state; and with a view to establish the
importance of their moral and doctrinal position, he surveyed the recent
history of his country.
Hagenbach’s _Dogmengeschichte_ (translated), which was published nearly
about the same time, also contains a very interesting sketch, with
valuable notes, of the chief writers and works in the movement of German
theology.
The view of the history given in Tholuck and Hundeshagen is that which is
taken by the school called the “Mediation school” in German theology.(55)
The general cause assigned by them for scepticism was the separation of
dogma and piety; the recovery from the rationalistic state being due to
the reunion of these elements, which Hundeshagen shows to have been also
the great feature of the German reformation.
After an interval of about ten years, when the tendencies created by
Strauss’s movement had become definitely manifest, the history was again
surveyed in two works, the one, _Geschichte des Deutschen
Protestantismus_, by Kahnis (translated 1856), who belongs to the Lutheran
reactionary party; the other, _Geschichte der neuesten Theologie_, 1856,
by C. Schwarz, whose work is so candid and free from party bias, that it
is unimportant to remark the party to which he belongs.(56)