There is, moreover, a widespread belief among naval officers of the

highest repute, among whom may be named the author of the "Influence of

Sea Power upon History," than whom no one has thought more profoundly on

the subject of naval war, that it is bad economy to concentrate in a few

very large ships the power which might be more conveniently and

effectively employed if distributed in a great number of ships of more

moderate size.

Surely, so long as naval opinion is divided about the tactical and

strategical wisdom of a new type of battleship, it is rash to continue

building battleships exclusively of that type, and it would be more

reasonable to make an attempt to have naval opinion sifted and

clarified, and thus to have a secure basis for a shipbuilding programme,

than to hurry on an enormous expenditure upon what may after all prove

to have been a series of doubtful experiments.

All the questions above discussed seem to me to be more important than

that of mere numbers of ships. Numbers are, however, of great

importance in their proper place and for the proper reasons. The policy

adopted and carried out by the British navy, at any rate during the

latter half of the war against the French Empire, was based on a known

superiority of force. The British fleet set out by blockading all the

French fleets, that is, by taking stations near to the great French

harbours and there observing those harbours, so that no French fleet

should escape without being attacked. If this is to be the policy of the

British navy in future it will require a preponderance of force of every

kind over that of the enemy, and that preponderant force will have to be

fully employed from the very first day of the war. In other words, it

must be kept in commission during peace. But, in addition, it is always

desirable to have a reserve of strength to meet the possibility that the

opening of a war or one of its early subsequent stages may bring into

action some additional unexpected adversary. There are thus two reasons

that make for a fleet of great numerical strength. The first, that only

great superiority renders possible the strategy known as blockade, or,

as I have ventured to call it, of "shadowing" the whole of the enemy's

forces. The second, that only great numerical strength renders it

possible to provide a reserve against unexpected contingencies.

XV.

ENGLAND'S MILITARY PROBLEM

After the close of the South African war, two Royal Commissions were

appointed. One of them, known as the War Commission, was in a general

way to inquire into and report upon the lessons of the war. This mission

it could fulfil only very imperfectly, because its members felt

precluded from discussing the policy in which the war had its origin and

incapable of reviewing the military conduct of the operations. This was

very like reviewing the play of "Hamlet" without reference to the

characters and actions either of Hamlet or of the King, for the

mainsprings which determine the course, character, and issue of any war

are the policy out of which it arises and the conduct of the military

operations. The main fact which impressed itself on the members of the

War Commission was that the forces employed on the British side had been

very much larger than had been expected at the beginning of the war, and

the moral which they drew was contained in the one sentence of their

report which has remained in the public mind, to the effect that the

Government ought to make provision for the expansion of the army beyond

the limit of the regular forces of the Crown.

About the same time another Commission, under the chairmanship of the

Duke of Norfolk, was appointed to inquire and report whether any, and,

if any, what changes were required in order to secure that the Militia

and Volunteer forces should be maintained in a condition of military

efficiency and at an adequate strength. The Norfolk Commission

recommended certain changes which it thought would lead to a great

improvement in the efficiency of both forces, while permitting them to

maintain the requisite numerical strength. With regard to the Volunteer

force, the report said:--

"The governing condition is that the Volunteer, whether an officer,

non-commissioned officer, or private, earns his own living, and that if

demands are made upon him which are inconsistent with his doing so he

must cease to be a Volunteer. No regulations can be carried out which

are incompatible with the civil employment of the Volunteers, who are

for the most part in permanent situations. Moreover, whatever may be the

goodwill and patriotism of employers, they cannot allow the Volunteers

they may employ more than a certain period of absence. Their power to

permit their workmen to attend camp or other exercises is controlled by

the competition which exists in their trade. Those who permit Volunteers

in their service to take holidays longer than are customary in their

trade and district, are making in the public interest a sacrifice which

some of them think excessive."

The report further laid stress on the cardinal principle that no

Volunteer, whatever his rank, should be put to expense on account of his

service. Subject to this governing condition and to this cardinal

principle, the Commission made recommendations from which it expected a

marked improvement and the gradual attainment of a standard much in

advance of anything which until then had been reached.

Most of these recommendations have been adopted, with modifications, in

the arrangements which have since been made for the Volunteers under the

new name "The Territorial Force."

The Norfolk Commission felt no great confidence in the instructions

given it by the Government on the subject of the standard of efficiency

and of numerical strength. Accordingly the Commission added to its

report the statement:--

"We cannot assert that, even if the measures

recommended were fully carried out, these forces

would be equal to the task of defeating a modern

continental army in the United Kingdom."

The Commission's chief doubt was whether, under the conditions

inseparable at any rate from the volunteer system, any scheme of

training would give to forces officered largely by men who are not

professional soldiers the cohesion of armies that exact a progressive

two-years' course from their soldiers and rely, except for expanding the

subaltern ranks on mobilisation, upon professional leaders. The

Commission then considered "Measures which may provide a Home Defence

Army equal to the task of defeating an invader." They were unable to

recommend the adoption of the Swiss system, partly because the initial

training was not, in their judgment, sufficient for the purpose, and

partly because they held that the modern method of extending the

training to all classes, while shortening its duration, involves the

employment of instructors of the highest possible qualifications. The

Commission concluded by reporting that a Home Defence Army capable, in

the absence of the whole or the greater portion of the regular forces,

of protecting this country against invasion can be raised and maintained

only on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of military

age and sound physique to be trained for the national defence and to

take part in it should emergency arise.

The Norfolk Commission gave expression to two different views without

attempting to reconcile them. On the one hand it laid down the main

lines along which the improvement of the militia and volunteers was to

be sought, and on the other hand it pointed out the advantages of the

principle that it is the citizen's duty to be trained as a soldier and

to fight in case of need. To go beyond this and to attempt either to

reconcile the two currents of thought or to decide between them, was

impossible for a Commission appointed to deal with only a fraction of

the problem of national defence. The two sets of views, however,

continue to exist side by side, and the nation yet has to do what the

Norfolk Commission by its nature was debarred from doing. The

Government, represented in this matter by Mr. Haldane, is still in the

position of relying upon an improved militia and volunteer force. The

National Service League, on the other hand, advocates the principle of

the citizen's duty, though it couples with it a specific programme

borrowed from the Swiss system, the adoption of which was deprecated in

the Commission's Report. The public is somewhat puzzled by the

appearance of opposition between what are thought of as two schools, and

indeed Mr. Haldane in his speech introducing the Army Estimates on March

4, 1909, described the territorial force as a safeguard against

universal service.

The time has perhaps come when the attempt should be made to find a

point of view from which the two schools of thought can be seen in due

perspective, and from which, therefore, a definite solution of the

military problem may be reached.

By what principle must our choice between the two systems be determined?

By the purpose in hand. The sole ultimate use of an army is to win the

nation's battles, and if one system promises to fulfil that purpose

while the other system does not, we cannot hesitate.

Great Britain requires an army as one of the instruments of success in a

modern British war, and we have therefore to ascertain, in general, the

nature of a modern war, and in particular the character of such wars as

Great Britain may have to wage.

The distinguishing feature of the conflict between two modern great

States is that it is a struggle for existence, or, at any rate, a

wrestle to a fall. The mark of the modern State is that it is identified

with the population which it comprises, and to such a State the name

"nation" properly belongs. The French Revolution nationalised the State

and in consequence nationalised war, and every modern continental State

has so organized itself with a view to war that its army is equivalent

to the nation in arms.

The peculiar character of a British war is due to the insular character

of the British State. A conflict with a great continental Power must

begin with a naval struggle, which will be carried on with the utmost

energy until one side or the other has established its predominance on

the sea. If in this struggle the British navy is successful, the effect

which can be produced on a continental State by the victorious navy will

not be sufficient to cause the enemy to accept peace upon British

conditions. For that purpose, it will be necessary to invade the enemy's

territory and to put upon him the constraint of military defeat, and

Great Britain therefore requires an army strong enough either to effect

this operation or to encourage continental allies to join with it in

making the attempt.

In any British war, therefore, which is to be waged with prospect of

success, Great Britain's battles must be fought and won on the enemy's

territory and against an army raised and maintained on the modern

national principle.

This is the decisive consideration affecting British military policy.

In case of the defeat of the British navy a continental enemy would,

undoubtedly, attempt the invasion and at least the temporary conquest of

Great Britain. The army required to defeat him in the United Kingdom

would need to have the same strength and the same qualities as would be

required to defeat him in his own territory, though, if the invasion had

been preceded by naval defeat, it is very doubtful whether any military

success in the United Kingdom would enable Great Britain to continue

her resistance with much hope of ultimate success.

For these reasons I cannot believe that Great Britain's needs are met by

the possession of any force the employment of which is, by the

conditions of its service, limited to fighting in the United Kingdom. A

British army, to be of any use, must be ready to go and win its

country's battles in the theatre of war in which its country requires

victories. That theatre of war will never be the United Kingdom unless

and until the navy has failed to perform its task, in which case it will

probably be too late to win battles in time to avert the national

overthrow which must be the enemy's aim.

There are, however, certain subsidiary services for which any British

military system must make provision.

These are:--

(1) Sufficient garrisons must be maintained during peace in India, in

Egypt, for some time to come in South Africa, and in certain naval

stations beyond the seas, viz., Gibraltar, Malta, Ceylon, Hong Kong,

Singapore, Mauritius, West Africa, Bermuda, and Jamaica. It is generally

agreed that the principle of compulsory service cannot be applied for

the maintenance of these garrisons, which must be composed of

professional paid soldiers.

(2) Experience shows that a widespread Empire, like the British,

requires from time to time expeditions for the maintenance of order on

its borders against half civilised or savage tribes. This function was

described in an essay on "Imperial Defence," published by Sir Charles

Dilke and the present writer in 1892 as "Imperial Police."

It would not be fair, for the purpose of one of these small expeditions,

arbitrarily to call upon a fraction of a force maintained on the

principle of compulsion. Accordingly any system must provide a special

paid reserve for the purpose of furnishing the men required for such an

expedition.

An army able to strike a serious blow against a continental enemy in his

own territory would evidently be equally able to defeat an invading army

if the necessity should arise. Accordingly the military question for

Great Britain resolves itself into the provision of an army able to

carry on serious operations against a European enemy, together with the

maintenance of such professional forces as are indispensable for the

garrisons of India, Egypt, and the over-sea stations enumerated above

and for small wars.

XVI.

TWO SYSTEMS CONTRASTED

I proceed to describe a typical army of the national kind, and to show

how the system of such an army could be applied in the case of Great

Britain.

The system of universal service has been established longer in Germany

than in any other State, and can best be explained by an account of its

working in that country. In Germany every man becomes liable to military

service on his seventeenth birthday, and remains liable until he is

turned forty-five. The German army, therefore, theoretically includes

all German citizens between the ages of seventeen and forty-five, but

the liability is not enforced before the age of twenty nor after the age

of thirty-nine, except in case of some supreme emergency. Young men

under twenty, and men between thirty-nine and forty-five, belong to the

Landsturm. They are subjected to no training, and would not be called

upon to fight except in the last extremity. Every year all the young men

who have reached their twentieth birthday are mustered and classified.

Those who are not found strong enough for military service are divided

into three grades, of which one is dismissed as unfit; a second is

excused from training and enrolled in the Landsturm; while a third,

whose physical defects are minor and perhaps temporary, is told off to a

supplementary reserve, of which some members receive a short training.

Of those selected as fit for service a few thousand are told off to the

navy, the remainder pass into the army and join the colours.

The soldiers thus obtained serve in the ranks of the army for two years

if assigned to the infantry, field artillery, or engineers, and for

three years if assigned to the cavalry or horse artillery. At the

expiration of the two or three years they pass into the reserve of the

standing army, in which they remain until the age of twenty-seven, that

is, for five years in the case of the infantry and engineers, and for

four years in the case of the cavalry and horse artillery. At

twenty-seven all alike cease to belong to the standing army, and pass

into the Landwehr, to which they continue to belong to the age of

thirty-nine. The necessity to serve for at least two years with the

colours is modified in the case of young men who have reached a certain

standard of education, and who engage to clothe, feed, equip, and in the

mounted arms to mount themselves. These men are called "one year

volunteers," and are allowed to pass into the reserve of the standing

army at the expiration of one year with the colours.

In the year 1906, 511,000 young men were mustered, and of these 275,000

were passed into the standing army, 55,000 of them being one year

volunteers. The men in any year so passed into the army form an annual

class, and the standing army at any time is made up, in the infantry, of

two annual classes, and in the cavalry and horse artillery of three

annual classes. In case of war, the army of first line would be made up

by adding to the two or three annual classes already with the colours

the four or five annual classes forming the reserve, that is, altogether

seven annual classes. Each of these classes would number, when it first

passed into the army, about 275,000; but as each class must lose every

year a certain number of men by death, by diseases which cause physical

incapacity from service, and by emigration, the total army of first line

must fall short of the total of seven times 275,000. It may probably be

taken at a million and a half. In the second line come the twelve annual

classes of Landwehr, which will together furnish about the same numbers

as the standing army.

Behind the Landwehr comes the supplementary reserve, and behind that

again the Landsturm, comprising the men who have been trained and are

between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-five, the young men under

twenty, and all those who, from physical weakness, have been entirely

exempted from training.

During their two or three years with the colours the men receive an

allowance or pay of twopence halfpenny a day. Their service is not a

contract but a public duty, and while performing it they are clothed,

lodged, and fed by the State. When passed into the reserve they resume

their normal civil occupation, except that for a year or two they are

called up for a few weeks' training and manoeuvres during the autumn.

In this way all German citizens, so far as they are physically fit, with

a few exceptions, such as the only son and support of a widow, receive a

thorough training as soldiers, and Germany relies in case of war

entirely and only upon her citizens thus turned into soldiers.

The training is carried out by officers and non-commissioned officers,

who together are the military schoolmasters of the nation, and, like

other proficient schoolmasters, are paid for their services by which

they live. Broadly speaking, there are in Germany no professional

soldiers except the officers and non-commissioned officers, from whom a

high standard of capacity as instructors and trainers during peace and

as leaders in war is demanded and obtained.

The high degree of military proficiency which the German army has

acquired is due to the excellence of the training given by the officers

and to the thoroughness with which, during a course of two or three

years, that training can be imparted. The great numbers which can be put

into the field are due to the practice of passing the whole male

population, so far as it is physically qualified, through this training,

so that the army in war represents the whole of the best manhood of the

country between the ages of twenty and forty.

The total of three millions which has been given above is that which was

mentioned by Prince Bismarck in a speech to the Reichstag in 1887. The

increase of population since that date has considerably augmented the

figures for the present time, and the corresponding total to-day

slightly exceeds four millions.

* * * * *

The results of the British system are shown in the following table,

which gives, from the Army Estimates, the numbers of the various

constituents of the British army on the 1st of January 1909. There were

at that date in the United Kingdom:---

Regular forces ........................ 123,250

Army reserve .......................... 134,110

Special reserves ...................... 67,780

Militia ............................... 9,158

Territorial force ..................... 209,977

Officers' training corps .............. 416

________

Total in the United Kingdom ...... 544,691

In Egypt and the Colonies:--

Regular forces ........................ 45,002

The British troops in India are paid for by the Indian Government and do

not appear in the British Army Estimates. Of the force maintained in the

United Kingdom, it will be observed that it falls, roughly, into three

categories.

In the first place come the first-rate troops which may be presumed to

have had a thorough training for war. This class embraces only the

regulars and the army reserve, which together slightly exceed a quarter

of a million. In the second class come the 68,000 of the special

reserve, which, in so far as they have enjoyed the six months' training

laid down in the recent reorganisation, could on a sanguine estimate be

classified as second-class troops, though in view of the fact that their

officers are not professional and are for the most part very slightly

trained, that classification would be exceedingly sanguine. Next comes

the territorial force with a maximum annual training of a fortnight in

camp, preceded by ten to twenty lessons and officered by men whose

professional training, though it far exceeds that of the rank and file,

falls yet very much short of that given to the professional officers of

a first-rate continental army. The territorial force, by its

constitution, is not available to fight England's battles except in the

United Kingdom, where they can never be fought except in the event of a

defeat of the navy.

This heterogeneous tripartite army is exceedingly expensive, its cost

during the current year being, according to the Estimates, very little

less than 29 millions, the cost of the personnel being 23-1/2 millions,

that of _matériel_ being 4 millions, and that of administration 1/2

millions.

The British regular army cannot multiply soldiers as does the German

army. It receives about 37,000 recruits a year. But it sends away to

India and the Colonies about 23,000 each year and seldom receives them

back before their eight years' colour service are over, when they pass

into the first-class reserve. There pass into the reserve about 24,000

men a year, and as the normal term of reserve service is four years, its

normal strength is about 96,000 men.

As the regular army contains only professional soldiers, who look, at

any rate for a period of eight years, to soldiering as a living, and are

prepared for six or seven years abroad, there is a limit to the supply

of recruits, who are usually under nineteen years of age, and to whom

the pay of a shilling a day is an attraction. Older men with prospects

of regular work expect wages much higher than that, and therefore do not

enlist except when in difficulties.

XVII.

A NATIONAL ARMY

I propose to show that a well-trained homogeneous army of great

numerical strength can be obtained on the principle of universal service

at no greater cost than the present mixed force. The essentials of a

scheme, based upon training the best manhood of the nation, are: first,

that to be trained is a matter of duty not of pay; secondly, that every

trained man is bound, as a matter of duty, to serve with the army in a

national war; thirdly, that the training must be long enough to be

thorough, but no longer; fourthly, that the instructors shall be the

best possible, which implies that they must be paid professional

officers and non-commissioned officers.

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