Much has been said, and is now being said for or against this complex
political and social phenomenon which in the brief period of six years
has taken complete hold of Italian life and, spreading beyond the
borders of the Kingdom, has made itself felt in varying degrees of
intensity throughout the world. But people have been much more eager
to extol or to deplore than to understand--which is natural enough in
a period of tumultuous fervor and of political passion. The time has
not yet arrived for a dispassionate judgment. For even I, who noticed
the very first manifestations of this great development, saw its
significance from the start and participated directly in its first
doings, carefully watching all its early uncertain and changing
developments, even I do not feel competent to pass definite judgment.
Fascism is so large a part of myself that it would be both arbitrary
and absurd for me to try to dissociate my personality from it, to
submit it to impartial scrutiny in order to evaluate it coldly and
accurately. What can be done, however, and it seldom is attempted, is
to make inquiry into the phenomenon which shall not merely consider
its fragmentary and adventitious aspects, but strive to get at its
inner essence. The undertaking may not be easy, but it is necessary,
and no occasion for attempting it is more suitable than the present
one afforded me by my friends of Perugia. Suitable it is in time
because, at the inauguration of a course of lectures and lessons
principally intended to illustrate that old and glorious trend of the
life and history of Italy which takes its name from the humble saint
of Assisi, it seemed natural to connect it with the greatest
achievement of modern Italy, different in so many ways from the
Franciscan movement, but united with it by the mighty common current
of Italian History. It is suitable as well in place because at
Perugia, which witnessed the growth of our religious ideas, of our
political doctrines and of our legal science in the course of the most
glorious centuries of our cultural history, the mind is properly
disposed and almost oriented towards an investigation of this nature.
First of all let us ask ourselves if there is a political doctrine of
Fascism; if there is any ideal content in the Fascist state. For in
order to link Fascism, both as concept and system, with the history of
Italian thought and find therein a place for it, we must first show
that it is thought; that it is a doctrine. Many persons are not quite
convinced that it is either the one or the other; and I am not
referring solely to those men, cultured or uncultured, as the case may
be and very numerous everywhere, who can discern in this political
innovation nothing except its local and personal aspects, and who know
Fascism only as the particular manner of behavior of this or that
well-known Fascist, of this or that group of a certain town; who
therefore like or dislike the movement on the basis of their likes and
dislikes for the individuals who represent it. Nor do I refer to those
intelligent, and cultivated persons, very intelligent indeed and very
cultivated, who because of their direct or indirect allegiance to the
parties that have been dispossessed by the advent of Fascism, have a
natural cause of resentment against it and are therefore unable to
see, in the blindness of hatred, anything good in it. I am referring
rather to those--and there are many in our ranks too--who know Fascism
as action and feeling but not yet as thought, who therefore have an
intuition but no comprehension of it.
It is true that Fascism is, above all, action and sentiment and that
such it must continue to be. Were it otherwise, it could not keep up
that immense driving force, that renovating power which it now
possesses and would merely be the solitary meditation of a chosen few.
Only because it is feeling and sentiment, only because it is the
unconscious reawakening of our profound racial instinct, has it the
force to stir the soul of the people, and to set free an irresistible
current of national will. Only because it is action, and as such
actualizes itself in a vast organization and in a huge movement, has
it the conditions for determining the historical course of
contemporary Italy.
But Fascism is thought as well and it has a theory, which is an
essential part of this historical phenomenon, and which is responsible
in a great measure for the successes that have been achieved. To the
existence of this ideal content of Fascism, to the truth of this
Fascist logic we ascribe the fact that though we commit many errors of
detail, we very seldom go astray on fundamentals, whereas all the
parties of the opposition, deprived as they are of an informing,
animating principle, of a unique directing concept, do very often wage
their war faultlessly in minor tactics, better trained as they are in
parliamentary and journalistic manoeuvres, but they constantly break
down on the important issues. Fascism, moreover, considered as action,
is a typically Italian phenomenon and acquires a universal validity
because of the existence of this coherent and organic doctrine. The
originality of Fascism is due in great part to the autonomy of its
theoretical principles. For even when, in its external behavior and in
its conclusions, it seems identical with other political creeds, in
reality it possesses an inner originality due to the new spirit which
animates it and to an entirely different theoretical approach.
Common Origins and Common Background of Modern Political Doctrines:
From Liberalism to Socialism
Modern political thought remained, until recently, both in Italy and
outside of Italy under the absolute control of those doctrines which,
proceeding from the Protestant Reformation and developed by the
adepts of natural law in the XVII and XVIII centuries, were firmly
grounded in the institutions and customs of the English, of the
American, and of the French Revolutions. Under different and sometimes
clashing forms these doctrines have left a determining imprint upon
all theories and actions both social and political, of the XIX and XX
centuries down to the rise of Fascism. The common basis of all these
doctrines, which stretch from Longuet, from Buchanan, and from
Althusen down to Karl Marx, to Wilson and to Lenin is a social and
state concept which I shall call mechanical or atomistic.
Society according to this concept is merely a sum total of
individuals, a plurality which breaks up into its single components.
Therefore the ends of a society, so considered, are nothing more than
the ends of the individuals which compose it and for whose sake it
exists. An atomistic view of this kind is also necessarily
anti-historical, inasmuch as it considers society in its spatial
attributes and not in its temporal ones; and because it reduces social
life to the existence of a single generation. Society becomes thus a
sum of determined individuals, viz., the generation living at a given
moment. This doctrine which I call atomistic and which appears to be
anti-historical, reveals from under a concealing cloak a strongly
materialistic nature. For in its endeavors to isolate the present from
the past and the future, it rejects the spiritual inheritance of ideas
and sentiments which each generation receives from those preceding and
hands down to the following generation thus destroying the unity and
the spiritual life itself of human society.
This common basis shows the close logical connection existing between
all political doctrines; the substantial solidarity, which unites all
the political movements, from Liberalism to Socialism, that until
recently have dominated Europe. For these political schools differ
from one another in their methods, but all agree as to the ends to be
achieved. All of them consider the welfare and happiness of
individuals to be the goal of society, itself considered as composed
of individuals of the present generation. All of them see in society
and in its juridical organization, the state, the mere instrument and
means whereby individuals can attain their ends. They differ only in
that the methods pursued for the attainment of these ends vary
considerably one from the other.
Thus the Liberals insist that the best manner to secure the welfare of
the citizens as individuals is to interfere as little as possible with
the free development of their activities and that therefore the
essential task of the state is merely to coordinate these several
liberties in such a way as to guarantee their coexistence. Kant, who
was without doubt the most powerful and thorough philosopher of
liberalism, said, "man, who is the end, cannot be assumed to have the
value of an instrument." And again, "justice, of which the state is
the specific organ, is the condition whereby the freedom of each is
conditioned upon the freedom of others, according to the general law
of liberty."
Having thus defined the task of the state, Liberalism confines itself
to the demand of certain guarantees which are to keep the state from
overstepping its functions as general coordinator of liberties and
from sacrificing the freedom of individuals more than is absolutely
necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose. All the efforts are
therefore directed to see to it that the ruler, mandatory of all and
entrusted with the realization, through and by liberty, of the
harmonious happiness of everybody, should never be clothed with undue
power. Hence the creation of a system of checks and limitations
designed to keep the rulers within bounds; and among these, first and
foremost, the principle of the division of powers, contrived as a
means for weakening the state in its relation to the individual, by
making it impossible for the state ever to appear, in its dealings
with citizens, in the full plenitude of sovereign powers; also the
principle of the participation of citizens in the lawmaking power, as
a means for securing, in behalf of the individual, a direct check on
this, the strongest branch, and an indirect check on the entire
government of the state. This system of checks and limitations, which
goes by the name of constitutional government resulted in a moderate
and measured liberalism. The checking power was exercised only by
those citizens who were deemed worthy and capable, with the result
that a small élite was made to represent legally the entire body
politic for whose benefit this régime was instituted.
It was evident, however, that this moderate system, being
fundamentally illogical and in contradiction with the very principles
from which it proceeded, would soon become the object of serious
criticism. For if the object of society and of the state is the
welfare of individuals, severally considered, how is it possible to
admit that this welfare can be secured by the individuals themselves
only through the possibilities of such a liberal régime? The
inequalities brought about both by nature and by social organizations
are so numerous and so serious, that, for the greater part,
individuals abandoned to themselves not only would fail to attain
happiness, but would also contribute to the perpetuation of their
condition of misery and dejection. The state therefore cannot limit
itself to the merely negative function of the defense of liberty. It
must become active, in behalf of everybody, for the welfare of the
people. It must intervene, when necessary, in order to improve the
material, intellectual, and moral conditions of the masses; it must
find work for the unemployed, instruct and educate the people, and
care for health and hygiene. For if the purpose of society and of the
state is the welfare of individuals, and if it is just that these
individuals themselves control the attainment of their ends, it
becomes difficult to understand why Liberalism should not go the whole
distance, why it should see fit to distinguish certain individuals
from the rest of the mass, and why the functions of the people should
be restricted to the exercise of a mere check. Therefore the state, if
it exists for all, must be governed by all, and not by a small
minority: if the state is for the people, sovereignty must reside in
the people: if all individuals have the right to govern the state,
liberty is no longer sufficient; equality must be added: and if
sovereignty is vested in the people, the people must wield all
sovereignty and not merely a part of it. The power to check and curb
the government is not sufficient. The people must be the government.
Thus, logically developed, Liberalism leads to Democracy, for
Democracy contains the promises of Liberalism but oversteps its
limitations in that it makes the action of the state positive,
proclaims the equality of all citizens through the dogma of popular
sovereignty. Democracy therefore necessarily implies a republican form
of government even though at times, for reasons of expediency, it
temporarily adjusts itself to a monarchical régime.
Once started on this downward grade of logical deductions it was
inevitable that this atomistic theory of state and society should pass
on to a more advanced position. Great industrial developments and the
existence of a huge mass of working men, as yet badly treated and in a
condition of semi-servitude, possibly endurable in a régime of
domestic industry, became intolerable after the industrial revolution.
Hence a state of affairs which towards the middle of the last century
appeared to be both cruel and threatening. It was therefore natural
that the following question be raised: "If the state is created for
the welfare of its citizens, severally considered, how can it tolerate
an economic system which divides the population into a small minority
of exploiters, the capitalists, on one side, and an immense multitude
of exploited, the working people, on the other?" No! The state must
again intervene and give rise to a different and less iniquitous
economic organization, by abolishing private property, by assuming
direct control of all production, and by organizing it in such a way
that the products of labor be distributed solely among those who
create them, viz., the working classes. Hence we find Socialism, with
its new economic organization of society, abolishing private ownership
of capital and of the instruments and means of production, socializing
the product, suppressing the extra profit of capital, and turning over
to the working class the entire output of the productive processes. It
is evident that Socialism contains and surpasses Democracy in the same
way that Democracy comprises and surpasses Liberalism, being a more
advanced development of the same fundamental concept. Socialism in its
turn generates the still more extreme doctrine of Bolshevism which
demands the violent suppression of the holders of capital, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, as means for a fairer economic
organization of society and for the rescue of the laboring classes
from capitalistic exploitation.
Thus Liberalism, Democracy, and Socialism, appear to be, as they are
in reality, not only the offspring of one and the same theory of
government, but also logical derivations one of the other. Logically
developed Liberalism leads to Democracy; the logical development of
Democracy issues into Socialism. It is true that for many years, and
with some justification, Socialism was looked upon as antithetical to
Liberalism. But the antithesis is purely relative and breaks down as
we approach the common origin and foundation of the two doctrines, for
we find that the opposition is one of method, not of purpose. The end
is the same for both, viz., the welfare of the individual members of
society. The difference lies in the fact that Liberalism would be
guided to its goal by liberty, whereas Socialism strives to attain it
by the collective organization of production. There is therefore no
antithesis nor even a divergence as to the nature and scope of the
state and the relation of individuals to society. There is only a
difference of evaluation of the means for bringing about these ends
and establishing these relations, which difference depends entirely on
the different economic conditions which prevailed at the time when the
various doctrines were formulated. Liberalism arose and began to
thrive in the period of small industry; Socialism grew with the rise
of industrialism and of world-wide capitalism. The dissension
therefore between these two points of view, or the antithesis, if we
wish so to call it, is limited to the economic field. Socialism is at
odds with Liberalism only on the question of the organization of
production and of the division of wealth. In religious, intellectual,
and moral matters it is liberal, as it is liberal and democratic in
its politics. Even the anti-liberalism and anti-democracy of
Bolshevism are in themselves purely contingent. For Bolshevism is
opposed to Liberalism only in so far as the former is revolutionary,
not in its socialistic aspect. For if the opposition of the Bolsheviki
to liberal and democratic doctrines were to continue, as now seems
more and more probable, the result might be a complete break between
Bolshevism and Socialism notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate
aims of both are identical.
Fascism as an Integral Doctrine of Sociality Antithetical to the
Atomism of Liberal, Democratic, and Socialistic Theories
The true antithesis, not to this or that manifestation of the
liberal-democratic-socialistic conception of the state but to the
concept itself, is to be found in the doctrine of Fascism. For while
the disagreement between Liberalism and Democracy, and between
Liberalism and Socialism lies in a difference of method, as we have
said, the rift between Socialism, Democracy, and Liberalism on one
side and Fascism on the other is caused by a difference in concept. As
a matter of fact, Fascism never raises the question of methods, using
in its political praxis now liberal ways, now democratic means and at
times even socialistic devices. This indifference to method often
exposes Fascism to the charge of incoherence on the part of
superficial observers, who do not see that what counts with us is the
end and that therefore even when we employ the same means we act with
a radically different spiritual attitude and strive for entirely
different results. The Fascist concept then of the nation, of the
scope of the state, and of the relations obtaining between society and
its individual components, rejects entirely the doctrine which I said
proceeded from the theories of natural law developed in the course of
the XVI, XVII, and XVIII centuries and which form the basis of the
liberal, democratic, and socialistic ideology.
I shall not try here to expound this doctrine but shall limit myself
to a brief résumé of its fundamental concepts.
Man--the political animal--according to the definition of Aristotle,
lives and must live in society. A human being outside the pale of
society is an inconceivable thing--a non-man. Humankind in its
entirety lives in social groups that are still, today, very numerous
and diverse, varying in importance and organization from the tribes of
Central Africa to the great Western Empires. These various societies
are fractions of the human species each one of them endowed with a
unified organization. And as there is no unique organization of the
human species, there is not "one" but there are "several" human
societies. Humanity therefore exists solely as a biological concept
not as a social one.
Each society on the other hand exists in the unity of both its
biological and its social contents. Socially considered it is a
fraction of the human species endowed with unity of organization for
the attainment of the peculiar ends of the species.
This definition brings out all the elements of the social phenomenon
and not merely those relating to the preservation and perpetuation of
the species. For man is not solely matter; and the ends of the human
species, far from being the materialistic ones we have in common with
other animals, are, rather, and predominantly, the spiritual
finalities which are peculiar to man and which every form of society
strives to attain as well as its stage of social development allows.
Thus the organization of every social group is more or less pervaded
by the spiritual influxes of: unity of language, of culture, of
religion, of tradition, of customs, and in general of feeling and of
volition, which are as essential as the material elements: unity of
economic interests, of living conditions, and of territory. The
definition given above demonstrates another truth, which has been
ignored by the political doctrines that for the last four centuries
have been the foundations of political systems, viz., that the social
concept has a biological aspect, because social groups are fractions
of the human species, each one possessing a peculiar organization, a
particular rank in the development of civilization with certain needs
and appropriate ends, in short, a life which is really its own. If
social groups are then fractions of the human species, they must
possess the same fundamental traits of the human species, which means
that they must be considered as a succession of generations and not as
a collection of individuals.
It is evident therefore that as the human species is not the total of
the living human beings of the world, so the various social groups
which compose it are not the sum of the several individuals which at a
given moment belong to it, but rather the infinite series of the past,
present, and future generations constituting it. And as the ends of
the human species are not those of the several individuals living at a
certain moment, being occasionally in direct opposition to them, so
the ends of the various social groups are not necessarily those of the
individuals that belong to the groups but may even possibly be in
conflict with such ends, as one sees clearly whenever the preservation
and the development of the species demand the sacrifice of the
individual, to wit, in times of war.
Fascism replaces therefore the old atomistic and mechanical state
theory which was at the basis of the liberal and democratic doctrines
with an organic and historic concept. When I say organic I do not wish
to convey the impression that I consider society as an organism after
the manner of the so-called "organic theories of the state"; but
rather to indicate that the social groups as fractions of the species
receive thereby a life and scope which transcend the scope and life of
the individuals identifying themselves with the history and finalities
of the uninterrupted series of generations. It is irrelevant in this
connection to determine whether social groups, considered as fractions
of the species, constitute organisms. The important thing is to
ascertain that this organic concept of the state gives to society a
continuous life over and beyond the existence of the several
individuals.
The relations therefore between state and citizens are completely
reversed by the Fascist doctrine. Instead of the liberal-democratic
formula, "society for the individual," we have, "individuals for
society" with this difference however: that while the liberal
doctrines eliminated society, Fascism does not submerge the individual
in the social group. It subordinates him, but does not eliminate him;
the individual as a part of his generation ever remaining an element
of society however transient and insignificant he may be. Moreover the
development of individuals in each generation, when coordinated and
harmonized, conditions the development and prosperity of the entire
social unit.
At this juncture the antithesis between the two theories must appear
complete and absolute. Liberalism, Democracy, and Socialism look upon
social groups as aggregates of living individuals; for Fascism they
are the recapitulating unity of the indefinite series of generations.
For Liberalism, society has no purposes other than those of the
members living at a given moment. For Fascism, society has historical
and immanent ends of preservation, expansion, improvement, quite
distinct from those of the individuals which at a given moment compose
it; so distinct in fact that they may even be in opposition. Hence the
necessity, for which the older doctrines make little allowance, of
sacrifice, even up to the total immolation of individuals, in behalf
of society; hence the true explanation of war, eternal law of mankind,
interpreted by the liberal-democratic doctrines as a degenerate
absurdity or as a maddened monstrosity.
For Liberalism, society has no life distinct from the life of the
individuals, or as the phrase goes: solvitur in singularitates. For
Fascism, the life of society overlaps the existence of individuals and
projects itself into the succeeding generations through centuries and
millennia. Individuals come into being, grow, and die, followed by
others, unceasingly; social unity remains always identical to itself.
For Liberalism, the individual is the end and society the means; nor
is it conceivable that the individual, considered in the dignity of an
ultimate finality, be lowered to mere instrumentality. For Fascism,
society is the end, individuals the means, and its whole life consists
in using individuals as instruments for its social ends. The state
therefore guards and protects the welfare and development of
individuals not for their exclusive interest, but because of the
identity of the needs of individuals with those of society as a whole.
We can thus accept and explain institutions and practices, which like
the death penalty, are condemned by Liberalism in the name of the
preeminence of individualism.
The fundamental problem of society in the old doctrines is the
question of the rights of individuals. It may be the right to freedom
as the Liberals would have it; or the right to the government of the
commonwealth as the Democrats claim it, or the right to economic
justice as the Socialists contend; but in every case it is the right
of individuals, or groups of individuals (classes). Fascism on the
other hand faces squarely the problem of the right of the state and of
the duty of individuals. Individual rights are only recognized in so
far as they are implied in the rights of the state. In this
preeminence of duty we find the highest ethical value of Fascism.
The Problems of Liberty, of Government, and of Social Justice in the
Political Doctrine of Fascism
This, however, does not mean that the problems raised by the other
schools are ignored by Fascism. It means simply that it faces them and
solves them differently, as, for example, the problem of liberty.
There is a Liberal theory of freedom, and there is a Fascist concept
of liberty. For we, too, maintain the necessity of safeguarding the
conditions that make for the free development of the individual; we,
too, believe that the oppression of individual personality can find no
place in the modern state. We do not, however, accept a bill of rights
which tends to make the individual superior to the state and to
empower him to act in opposition to society. Our concept of liberty is
that the individual must be allowed to develop his personality in
behalf of the state, for these ephemeral and infinitesimal elements of
the complex and permanent life of society determine by their normal
growth the development of the state. But this individual growth must
be normal. A huge and disproportionate development of the individual
of classes, would prove as fatal to society as abnormal growths are to
living organisms. Freedom therefore is due to the citizen and to
classes on condition that they exercise it in the interest of society
as a whole and within the limits set by social exigencies, liberty
being, like any other individual right, a concession of the state.
What I say concerning civil liberties applies to economic freedom as
well. Fascism does not look upon the doctrine of economic liberty as
an absolute dogma. It does not refer economic problems to individual
needs, to individual interest, to individual solutions. On the
contrary it considers the economic development, and especially the
production of wealth, as an eminently social concern, wealth being for
society an essential element of power and prosperity. But Fascism
maintains that in the ordinary run of events economic liberty serves
the social purposes best; that it is profitable to entrust to
individual initiative the task of economic development both as to
production and as to distribution; that in the economic world
individual ambition is the most effective means for obtaining the best
social results with the least effort. Therefore, on the question also
of economic liberty the Fascists differ fundamentally from the
Liberals; the latter see in liberty a principle, the the Fascists
accept it as a method. By the Liberals, freedom is recognized in the
interest of the citizens; the Fascists grant it in the interest of
society. In other terms, Fascists make of the individual an economic
instrument for the advancement of society, an instrument which they
use so long as it functions and which they subordinate when no longer
serviceable. In this guise Fascism solves the eternal problem of
economic freedom and of state interference, considering both as mere
methods which may or may not be employed in accordance with the social
needs of the moment.
What I have said concerning political and economic Liberalism applies
also to Democracy. The latter envisages fundamentally the problem of
sovereignty; Fascism does also, but in an entirely different manner.
Democracy vests sovereignty in the people, that is to say, in the mass
of human beings. Fascism discovers sovereignty to be inherent in
society when it is juridically organized as a state. Democracy
therefore turns over the government of the state to the multitude of
living men that they may use it to further their own interests;
Fascism insists that the government be entrusted to men capable of
rising above their own private interests and of realizing the
aspirations of the social collectivity, considered in its unity and in
its relation to the past and future. Fascism therefore not only
rejects the dogma of popular sovereignty and substitutes for it that
of state sovereignty, but it also proclaims that the great mass of
citizens is not a suitable advocate of social interests for the reason
that the capacity to ignore individual private interests in favor of
the higher demands of society and of history is a very rare gift and
the privilege of the chosen few. Natural intelligence and cultural
preparation are of great service in such tasks. Still more valuable
perhaps is the intuitiveness of rare great minds, their traditionalism
and their inherited qualities. This must not however be construed to
mean that the masses are not to be allowed to exercise any influence
on the life of the state. On the contrary, among peoples with a great
history and with noble traditions, even the lowest elements of society
possess an instinctive discernment of what is necessary for the
welfare of the race, which in moments of great historical crises
reveals itself to be almost infallible. It is therefore as wise to
afford to this instinct the means of declaring itself as it is
judicious to entrust the normal control of the commonwealth to a
selected élite.
As for Socialism, the Fascist doctrine frankly recognizes that the
problem raised by it as to the relations between capital and labor is
a very serious one, perhaps the central one of modern life. What
Fascism does not countenance is the collectivistic solution proposed
by the Socialists. The chief defect of the socialistic method has been
clearly demonstrated by the experience of the last few years. It does
not take into account human nature, it is therefore outside of
reality, in that it will not recognize that the most powerful spring
of human activities lies in individual self-interest and that
therefore the elimination from the economic field of this interest
results in complete paralysis. The suppression of private ownership of
capital carries with it the suppression of capital itself, for capital
is formed by savings and no one will want to save, but will rather
consume all he makes if he knows he cannot keep and hand down to his
heirs the results of his labors. The dispersion of capital means the
end of production since capital, no matter who owns it, is always an
indispensable tool of production. Collective organization of
production is followed therefore by the paralysis of production since,
by eliminating from the productive mechanism the incentive of
individual interest, the product becomes rarer and more costly.
Socialism then, as experience has shown, leads to increase in
consumption, to the dispersion of capital and therefore to poverty. Of
what avail is it, then, to build a social machine which will more
justly distribute wealth if this very wealth is destroyed by the
construction of this machine? Socialism committed an irreparable error
when it made of private property a matter of justice while in truth it
is a problem of social utility. The recognition of individual property
rights, then, is a part of the Fascist doctrine not because of its
individual bearing but because of its social utility.
We must reject, therefore, the socialistic solution but we cannot
allow the problem raised by the Socialists to remain unsolved, not
only because justice demands a solution but also because the
persistence of this problem in liberal and democratic régimes has been
a menace to public order and to the authority of the state. Unlimited
and unrestrained class self-defense, evinced by strikes and lockouts,
by boycotts and sabotage, leads inevitably to anarchy. The Fascist
doctrine, enacting justice among the classes in compliance with a
fundamental necessity of modern life, does away with class
self-defense, which, like individual self-defense in the days of
barbarism, is a source of disorder and of civil war.
Having reduced the problem of these terms, only one solution is
possible, the realization of justice among the classes by and through
the state. Centuries ago the state, as the specific organ of justice,
abolished personal self-defense in individual controversies and
substituted for it state justice. The time has now come when class
self-defense also must be replaced by state justice. To facilitate the
change Fascism has created its own syndicalism. The suppression of
class self-defense does not mean the suppression of class defense
which is an inalienable necessity of modern economic life. Class
organization is a fact which cannot be ignored but it must be
controlled, disciplined, and subordinated by the state. The syndicate,
instead of being, as formerly, an organ of extra-legal defense, must
be turned into an organ of legal defense which will become judicial
defense as soon as labor conflicts become a matter of judicial
settlement. Fascism therefore has transformed the syndicate, that old
revolutionary instrument of syndicalistic socialists, into an
instrument of legal defense of the classes both within and without the
law courts. This solution may encounter obstacles in its development;
the obstacles of malevolence, of suspicion of the untried, of
erroneous calculation, etc., but it is destined to triumph even though
it must advance through progressive stages.