Among all the friends and retainers of Hideyoshi the most prominent and
able was Tokugawa Ieyasu. He was six years younger than Hideyoshi, and
therefore in A.D. 1598, when the Taikō died, he was fifty-six years old.
He was born at the village of Matsudaira in the province of Mikawa A.D.
1542. His family counted its descent from Minamoto Yoshi-ie, who in the
eleventh century had by his military prowess in the wars against the Ainos
earned the heroic name of Hachiman-Tarō. Therefore he was, as custom and
tradition now for a long time had required for those holding the office of
shōgun, a descendant from the Minamoto family.(190) The name Tokugawa,
which Ieyasu rendered famous, was derived from a village in the province
of Shimotsuke, where his ancestors had lived. His first experiences in war
were under Nobunaga, side by side with Hideyoshi. He proved himself not
only a capable soldier, prudent and painstaking, but also a good
administrator in times of peace. Hideyoshi had such confidence in him, and
so much doubt about the wisdom of requiring the guardians to wait until
his son, a mere child five years old, had grown up to years of
responsibility, that he is represented as having said to Ieyasu: “I
foresee that there will be great wars after my decease; I know too that
there is no one but you who can keep the country quiet. I therefore
bequeath the whole country to you, and trust you will expend all your
strength in governing it. My son Hideyori is still young. I beg you will
look after him. When he is grown up, I leave it to you to decide whether
he will be my successor or not.”(191)
As soon as the Taikō was dead, and the attempt was made to set in motion
the machinery he had designed for governing the country, troubles began to
manifest themselves. The princes whom he had appointed as members of his
governing boards, began immediately to quarrel among themselves. On Ieyasu
devolved the duty of regulating the affairs of the government. For this
purpose he resided at Fushimi, which is a suburb of Kyōto. His most active
opponent was Ishida Mitsunari, who had been appointed one of the five
_bugyō_, or governors, under the Taikō’s arrangement. They grew jealous of
Ieyasu, because, under the existing order of things, the governors were of
very minor importance. Mitsunari had acquired his influence with the
Taikō, not through military achievements, but by intrigue and flattery. He
was cordially detested by such disinterested friends as Katō Kiyomasa and
others.
The ground on which the opposition to Ieyasu was based was that he was not
faithfully performing his duty, as he had promised to the dying Taikō,
towards his child and heir. It is not improbable that even at this early
day it was seen that Ieyasu proposed to disregard the pretensions of the
youthful son of Hideyoshi, in the same way that he in his day had
disregarded the claims of the heir of Nobunaga. The rough and warlike
times, and the restless and ambitious manners of the feudal lords of these
times, made it impossible to entrust the country to the hands of a child.
Under this strained relation, the members of the regency divided into two
parties. Speaking broadly, it was again a contest between the north and
the south of Japan. Ieyasu’s association had been from the beginning with
the Kwantō, and now more than ever his power was centred about Yedo.
Mitsunari on the contrary had leagued himself with the princes of Chōsū
and Satsuma, and with others of minor importance, all more or less
representative of the southern half of the empire. The Christians chiefly
sided with Hideyori and his adherents. Mitsunari himself was a Christian
convert, and the Jesuit fathers explain that his position and that of the
other Christian leaders were due to their conscientious desire to fulfil
their oath of fidelity to Hideyori. That Ieyasu should have been derelict
in such a solemn duty was a sufficient cause for their opposition to him.
Events now rushed rapidly to a culmination. One of the most powerful of
the princes allied against Ieyasu was Uesugi Kagekatsu, the lord of Echigo
and Aizu. He had retired to Aizu after having solemnly made a
covenant(192) with the others engaged in the plot to take measures against
Ieyasu. He was summoned to Kyōto to pay his respects to the emperor, but
on some trivial excuse he declined to come. Ieyasu now saw that nothing
but war would settle the disputes which had arisen. He repaired to Yedo
and to Shimotsuké, and made preparations for the conflict which he saw
impending.
In the meantime the members of the league were busy. Mitsunari sent an
urgent circular to all the feudal princes, charging Ieyasu with certain
misdeeds and crimes, the chief of which was that instead of guarding the
inheritance of the Taikō for his son, he was with the blackest guilt
endeavoring to seize it for himself. A formidable army was gathered at
Ōsaka consisting of 128,000 men.(193) Made up as it was from different
provinces and officered by its provincial leaders, it lacked that element
of unity and accord which is so essential to an army. The first movement
was against the castle of Fushimi, which was the centre from which Ieyasu
governed the country. After a short siege it fell and then, it is said,
was accidentally burned to the ground.
The news of the attack upon Fushimi was brought to Ieyasu in Shimotsuké,
and a council of his friends and retainers was held to determine what
steps must be taken to meet the emergency. It was urged that the time had
come when Ieyasu should meet his enemies, and settle by battle the
questions which had risen between them. It was determined that all the
scattered troops should be gathered together, and that they should march
to Fushimi prepared to encounter the enemy in battle at whatever point
they should meet them. The eldest son of Ieyasu, Hideyasu, was put in
charge of Yedo and entrusted with the care of the surrounding provinces.
This was an important trust, because the powerful prince Uesugi lay to the
north of him and would seize the first opportunity to attack him. To
Fukushima was given the command of the vanguard. The principal army was
divided into two parts, one of which was to march along the Tōkaidō under
the command of Ieyasu himself, the other was placed under the charge of
Ieyasu’s second son Hidetada, and was to take the route along the
Nakasendō. The whole army consisted of 75,000 men, a number much smaller
than the army of the league, but which had the advantage of being
controlled by one mastering and experienced commander.
The armies met at Sekigahara,(194) a little village on the Nakasendō,
October, A.D. 1600. One place on the neighboring hill is still pointed out
whence Ieyasu witnessed the battle and issued his orders. Both sides
fought with determined bravery, and the battle lasted the whole day.
Cannon and other firearms were to some extent made use of, but the
old-fashioned weapons, the sword and the spear, were the terrible means by
which the victory was decided. For a long time the battle raged without
either party obtaining a decisive advantage. Notwithstanding his
inferiority in numbers Ieyasu was completely victorious. The carnage was
dreadful. The number of the confederate army said to have been killed was
40,000.(195) This seems like an impossible exaggeration, and the Japanese
annalists are, like those of other nations, given to heightened
statements. But that the loss of life on both sides was very great there
can be no doubt.
Two ghastly mounds called Kubi-zuka, or head piles, are still shown where
the heads of the decapitated confederates were buried. This battle must
always stand with that at Dan-no-ura between the Minamoto and Taira
families, as one of the decisive battles in the history of Japan. By it
was settled the fate of the country for two hundred and fifty years.
It was fortunate that the victor in this battle was a man who knew how to
secure the advantages to be derived from a victory. It is said that at the
close of this battle when he saw success perching on his banners, he
repeated to those around him the old Japanese proverb: “After victory
tighten the strings of your helmet.”(196) The division of Hidetada joined
him after the battle, and he promptly followed up his victory by seizing
the castles on his way and taking possession of Kyōto and Ōsaka. The
feudal princes who had stood aloof or opposed him nearly all came forward
and submitted themselves to his authority. Uesugi and Satake in the north,
who had been among his most active opponents, at once presented themselves
to Hideyasu at Yedo and made their submission. Mōri, the powerful lord of
the western provinces, who had been most active in the confederation
against him, sent congratulations on his victory, but they were coldly
received. Finally he was pardoned, being however deprived of six out of
his eight provinces. He was suffered to retain of all his rich inheritance
only Suō and Nagato. Several of the leaders were captured, among whom were
Mitsunari, Konishi, and Ōtani, who being Christians deemed it unworthy
their faith to commit _hara-kiri_. They were carried to Kyōto where they
were beheaded and their heads exposed in the dry bed of the Kamo-gawa.
The work of reducing to order the island of Kyūshū was entrusted to the
veteran generals Katō Kiyomasa and Kuroda Yoshitaka. The former undertook
the reduction of Hizen, and the latter that of Bungo, Buzen, and Chikuzen.
The house of Shimazu, although it had taken sides against Ieyasu in the
great contest, duly made its submission and was treated with great
consideration. The whole of the territory assigned to it by Hideyoshi
after the war of A.D. 1586 was restored to it, namely, the whole of the
provinces of Satsuma and Ōsumi, and one half of the province of Hyūga. To
Katō Kiyomasa(197) was given the province of Higo, which had, after the
Korean war, been assigned to Konishi in recognition of his services, but
which was now taken from his family because he had been one of Ieyasu’s
active opponents. The Kuroda family received as its inheritance a portion
of the province of Chikuzen with its capital at Fukuoka, which it held
until the abolition of feudal tenures in 1871.
Ieyasu was a peaceful and moderate character, and in the settlement of the
disturbances which had marked his advent to power, he is notable for
having pursued a course of great kindness and consideration. With the
exception of the cases already mentioned there were no executions for
political offences. It was his desire and ambition to establish a system
of government which should be continuous and not liable, like those of
Nobunaga and Taikō Sama, to be overturned at the death of him who had
founded it. By the gift of Taikō Sama he had already in his possession a
large part of the Kwantō. And by the result of the war which had ended at
Sekigahara, he had come into possession of a great number of other fiefs,
with which he could reward those who had been faithful to him. It was the
difficult and delicate part of his work to distribute judiciously among
his supporters and retainers the confiscated estates. To realize how
completely the feudal system as reformed by Ieyasu was bound to him and
constituted to support and perpetuate his family, it is only necessary to
examine such a list of the daimyōs(198) as is given in Appert’s _Ancien
Japon_.(199) Out of the two hundred and sixty-three daimyōs there
enumerated, one hundred and fifty-eight are either vassals or branches of
the Tokugawa family. But while he thus carefully provided the supports for
his own family, he spared many of the old and well-rooted houses, which
had incorporated themselves into the history of the country. He built his
structure on the old and tried foundation stones. With far-sighted
statesmanship he recognized that every new form of government, to be
permanent, must be a development from that which precedes it, and must
include within itself whatever is lasting in the nature of its forerunner.
The dual form of government had for many centuries existed in Japan, and
the customs and habits of thinking, and the modes of administering justice
and of controlling the conduct of men had become adapted to this system.
It was therefore natural that Ieyasu should turn his attention to
reforming and perfecting such a form of government. A scheme of this kind
seemed best adapted to a country in which there existed on the one hand an
emperor of divine origin, honored of all men, but who by long neglect had
become unfit to govern, and in whom was lodged only the source of honor;
and on the other hand an executive department on which devolved the
practical duty of governing, organizing, maintaining, and defending.
Though he was compelled to look back through centuries of misrule, and
through long periods of war and usurpation, he could see straight to
Yoritomo, the first of the shōguns, and could trace from him a clear
descent in the Minamoto family. To this task, therefore, he set himself:
to maintain the empire in all its heaven-descended purity and to create a
line of hereditary shōguns who should constitute its executive department.
In pursuance of this plan, he sent his son Hidetada to the emperor to make
a full report of everything that had been done in the settlement of the
affairs of the country. The emperor was graciously pleased to approve his
acts and to bestow upon him, A.D. 1603, the hereditary title of
Sei-i-tai-shōgun. This was the title borne by Yoritomo when he was the
real ruler of the country. Since that time there had been a long line of
shōguns, the last of whom was Ashikaga Yoshiaki, whom Nobunaga deposed in
1573, and who had died 1597. With this new appointment began a line of
Tokugawa shōguns that ended only with the restoration in 1868.
Ieyasu’s most radical change in the system of government consisted in the
establishment of the seat of his executive department at Yedo. Since A.D.
794 Kyōto had been the capital where successive emperors had reigned, and
where Nobunaga and Hideyoshi exercised executive control. Kamakura had
been the seat of Yoritomo and his successors. But Ieyasu saw advantages in
establishing himself in a new field, to which the traditions of idleness
and effeminacy had not attached themselves, and where the associations of
his own warlike career would act as a stimulus to his contemporaries and
successors. He remained at Fushimi until necessary repairs could be made
to the Castle of Yedo(200) and the roads between it and the capital put in
order. The place which henceforth was to be the principal capital of the
country first comes into notice, as we have before mentioned, as a castle
built by Ōta Dōkwan in A.D. 1456. He had been placed here by the
authorities of Kamakura to watch the movements of the restless princes of
the north. Recognizing the strength and convenience of the high grounds on
the border of Yedo bay, he built a castle which, through many
transformations and enlargements, finally developed into the great feudal
capital of the Tokugawa shōguns. It was here that Ieyasu, after the fall
of Odawara, by the advice of Hideyoshi,(201) established himself for the
government of the provinces of the Kwantō which had been given to him.
And it was without doubt this earlier experience which led him to select
Yedo as the centre of his feudal government. The reputation which this
eastern region bore for roughness and want of culture, as compared with
the capital of the emperor at Kyōto, seemed to him an advantage rather
than an objection. He could here build up a system of government free from
the faults and weaknesses which had become inseparable from the old seats
of power. After the repairs and enlargements had been completed he took up
his residence there. Besides this castle, Ieyasu had for his private
residence, especially after his retirement from the shōgunate, an
establishment at Sumpu, now called Shizuoka. Here he was visited by
English and Dutch envoys in reference to the terms of allowing trade, and
here, after the manner of his country, he maintained his hold upon the
administration of affairs, notwithstanding his formal retirement.
A continued source of disquietude and danger to the empire, or at least to
the plans of Ieyasu for a dynasty of Tokugawa shōguns, lay in Hideyori,
the son and heir of Taikō Sama. He was born in 1592, and was therefore at
this time, 1614, in his twenty-third year. As long as he lived he would be
naturally and inevitably the centre to which all the disaffected elements
of the country would gravitate. The failure of Ieyasu to support the cause
of his old master’s son would always prove a source of weakness to him,
especially in a country where fidelity to parents and superiors was held
in such high esteem. He determined, therefore, to bring to a conclusion
these threatening troubles which had so long been hanging over him.
Accordingly, on the ground that Hideyori was plotting with his enemies
against the peace of the state, he set out from Sumpu, where he was then
residing as retired shōgun, with an army of seventy thousand men. Hideyori
and his mother had for a long time resided at the castle of Ōsaka, and
against this Ieyasu directed his large army. It was bravely and skilfully
defended, and without the help of artillery, which at this early day was
rarely used in sieges, a long time elapsed before any decided advantage
was gained. At last the defenders were tempted beyond the protection of
their fortifications, and a battle was fought June 3, 1615. It is
described by the Jesuit fathers, two of whom witnessed it, as being
sanguinary beyond the example of the bloody battles of the Japanese civil
wars. It resulted in the complete overthrow of Hideyori’s adherents, and
the destruction of the castle by fire. Both Hideyori and his mother were
said to have perished in the conflagration. Reports were current that they
had, however, escaped and taken refuge in some friendly locality. But no
trace of them was ever found, and it was taken for granted that this was
the end of Hideyori and his party.
Before ending this chapter, which is designed to record the establishment
of the Tokugawa shōguns, reference should be made to the settlement of the
questions left in dispute by Taikō Sama respecting Korea. There remained
after the war, with all its attendant atrocities and sufferings, a feeling
of intense bitterness towards the Japanese on the part both of the Koreans
and Chinese. The absence of any sufficient cause for the invasion, and the
avowed purpose of Taikō Sama to extend his conquests to China had awakened
against him and his armies a hatred which generations could not wipe out.
Soon after the recall of the Japanese troops which followed the death of
Taikō Sama, Ieyasu opened negotiations with Korea through the daimyō of
Tsushima. He caused the government to be informed that any friendly
overtures on its part would be received in a like spirit. The king of
Korea accordingly despatched an embassy with an autograph letter,
addressed to the “King of Japan.” A translation of this letter will be
found in Mr. Aston’s last paper(202) on Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea.
Among other things it says: “The sovereign and subjects of this country
were profoundly grieved, and felt that they could not live under the same
heaven with your country.... However your country has now reformed the
errors of the past dynasty and practises the former friendly relations. If
this be so, is it not a blessing to the people of both countries? We have
therefore sent you the present embassy in token of friendship. The
enclosed paper contains a list of some poor productions of our country. Be
pleased to understand this.” This letter was dated in the year 1607. A
friendly answer was returned to it, and from this time it may be
understood that the relations between the two countries were placed on a
satisfactory basis. These steps were taken on the part of Korea with the
knowledge and approval of China, which now claimed to hold a protectorate
over the peninsula of Korea. The same negotiations therefore which
resulted in peaceful relations with Korea brought about a condition of
amity with China which was not disturbed until very recent times.
The ruinous effects of this invasion, however, were never overcome in
Korea itself. Her cities had been destroyed, her industries blotted out,
and her fertile fields rendered desolate. Once she had been the fruitful
tree from which Japan was glad to gather her arts and civilization, but
now she was only a branchless trunk which the fires of war had charred and
left standing.
[Illustration]
Tokugawa Crest.