OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH AUSTRIA.
1865-1866.
The arrangement made at Gastein could not be permanent; it was only a
temporary expedient to put off the conflict which henceforward was
inevitable--inevitable, that is, if the Emperor of Austria still refused
to sell Holstein to Prussia. It was, however, so far as it went, a great
gain to Prussia, because it deprived Austria of the esteem of the other
German States. Her strength had hitherto lain in her strict adhesion to
popular feeling and to what the majority of the Germans, Princes and
people alike, believed was justice; by coming to a separate agreement
with Prussia, she had shaken their confidence. Bavaria especially was
much annoyed by this change of front, and it seemed probable that the
most important of the southern States would soon be ranged on the side
of Prussia. This was a consummation which Bismarck ardently desired, and
to which he addressed himself with much energy.
The attitude of France was more important than that of the German
States, and in the autumn Bismarck made a fresh visit to that country.
Just as he had done the year before, he went to take the sea-baths at
Biarritz. This step was the more remarkable because Napoleon had
received the news of the Treaty of Gastein with marked displeasure, and
had given public expression to his opinions. Bismarck saw Drouyn de
Lhuys at Paris and then went on to Biarritz where the Emperor was; for
ten days he lived there in constant association with the Imperial
family. The personal impression which he made was very favourable: "A
really great man," wrote Mérimée, "free from feeling and full of
_esprit_." He saw Napoleon again on his return through Paris; the two
succeeded in coming to an understanding. Napoleon assured him that he
might depend on the absolute neutrality of France, in case of a war
between Prussia and Austria; it was agreed also that the annexation of
the Duchies to Prussia would not be an increase of territory which would
cause any uneasiness at Paris; Napoleon would view it with favour.
Bismarck went farther than this; he opened the subject of a complete
reform of the German Constitution on the lines that Prussia was to have
a free hand in the north of Germany; he pointed out
"that the acquisition of the Duchies would only be an earnest for
the fulfilment of the pledge which history had laid upon the
State of Prussia; for the future prosecution of it we need the
most friendly relations with France. It seems to me in the
interest of France to encourage Prussia in the ambitious
fulfilment of her national duty."
The Emperor acquiesced; as we know, the division of Europe into large
national States was what he meant by Napoleonic ideas; he was willing
enough to help in Germany a change such as that he had brought about in
Italy. It was agreed that events should be allowed to develop
themselves; when the time came it would be easy enough to come to some
definite agreement.
This however was not all; it was not to be expected that Napoleon should
render Prussia so valuable a service without receiving something in
exchange; we know Bismarck's opinion of a statesman who, out of sympathy
for another country, would sacrifice the interests of his own. The
creation of a strong consolidated State in the north of Germany could
not be in the interests of France; the power of France had always been
founded on the weakness of Germany. Even if Napoleon himself, with his
generous and cosmopolitan sympathies, was willing to make the sacrifice,
France was not; Napoleon knew, and Bismarck knew, that Napoleon could
not disregard the feeling of the country; his power was based on
universal suffrage and the popularity of his name; he could not, as a
King of Prussia could, brave the displeasure of the people. France must
then have some compensation. What was it to be? What were to be the
terms of the more intimate and special understanding? We do not know
exactly what was said; we do know that Bismarck led both the Emperor and
his Ministers to believe that Prussia would support them in an extension
of the frontier. He clearly stated that the King would not be willing
to surrender a single _Prussian_ village; he probably said that they
would not acquiesce in the restoration to France of any _German_
territory. France therefore must seek her reward in a French-speaking
people. It was perhaps an exaggeration if Drouyn de Lhuys said "he
offered us all kinds of things which did not belong to him," but
Napoleon also in later years repeated that Bismarck had promised him all
kinds of recompenses. No written agreement was made; that was reserved
for later negotiations, but there was a verbal understanding, which both
parties felt was binding. This was the pendant to the interview of
Plombières. But Bismarck had improved on Cavour's example; he did not
want so much, he asked only for neutrality: the King of Prussia would
not be called upon, like Victor Emmanuel, to surrender the old
possessions of his House.
Bismarck returned to Berlin with his health invigorated by the Atlantic
winds and his spirits raised by success. The first step now was to
secure the help of Italy; he had seen Nigra, the Italian Minister, at
Paris, and told him that war was inevitable; he hoped he could reckon on
Italian alliance, but there was still, however, much ground for anxiety
that Austria might succeed in arranging affairs with Italy.
The relations of the four Powers at this time were very remarkable. All
turned on Venetia. The new Kingdom of Italy would not rest until it had
secured this province. Napoleon also was bound by honour to complete his
promise and "free Italy to the Adriatic"; neither his throne nor that
of his son would be secure if he failed to do so. A war between Austria
and Prussia would obviously afford the best opportunity, and his whole
efforts were therefore directed to preventing a reconciliation between
the two German Powers. His great fear was that Austria should come to
terms with Prussia, and surrender the Duchies on condition that Prussia
should guarantee her Italian possessions. When Bismarck visited Napoleon
at Biarritz, the first question of the Emperor was, "Have you guaranteed
Venetia to Austria?" It was the fear of this which caused his anger at
the Treaty of Gastein. On the other hand, Bismarck had his reasons for
anxiety. It was always possible that Austria, instead of coming to terms
with Prussia, might choose the other side; she might surrender Venetia
in order to obtain French and Italian support in a German war. The
situation indeed was this: Austria was liable at any moment to be
attacked by both Italy and Prussia; it would probably be beyond her
strength to resist both assailants at the same time. A wise statesman
would probably have made terms with one or the other. He would have
either surrendered Venetia, which was really a source of weakness, to
Italy, or agreed with Prussia over the Duchies and the German problem,
thereby gaining Prussian support against Italy. The honourable pride of
Mensdorf and the military party in Austria refused to surrender anything
till it was too late.
None the less, the constant fear lest Austria should make terms with one
of her enemies for a long time prevented an alliance between Prussia
and Italy. The Italians did not trust Bismarck; they feared that if they
made a treaty with him, he would allow them to get entangled in war, and
then, as at Gastein, make up his quarrel with Austria. Bismarck did not
trust the Italians; he feared that they and Napoleon would even at the
last moment take Venetia as a present, and, as very nearly happened,
offer Austria one of the Prussian provinces instead. It was impossible
to have any reliance on Napoleon's promises, for he was constantly being
pulled two ways; his own policy and sympathies would lead him to an
alliance with Prussia; the clerical party, which was yearly growing
stronger and had the support of the Empress, wished him to side with the
Catholic power. In consequence, even after his return from France,
Bismarck could not pass a day with full security that he might not find
himself opposed by a coalition of Austria, France, and Italy; the
Austrians felt that they were to be made the victims of a similar
coalition between Prussia, France, and Italy; France always feared a
national union between the two great German Powers.
Bismarck began by completing and bringing to a conclusion the
arrangements for a commercial treaty with Italy; at the beginning of
January the King of Prussia sent Victor Emmanuel the order of the Black
Eagle; Bismarck also used his influence to induce Bavaria to join in the
commercial treaty and to recognise the Kingdom of Italy. Then on January
13th he wrote to Usedom that the eventual decision in Germany would be
influenced by the action of Italy; if they could not depend on the
support of Italy, he hinted that peace would be maintained; in this way
he hoped to force the Italians to join him.
Affairs in the Duchies gave Bismarck the opportunity for adopting with
good grounds a hostile attitude towards Austria; Gablenz, the new
Governor of Holstein, continued to favour the Augustenburg agitation.
Many had expected that Austria would govern Holstein as a part of the
Empire; instead of doing so, with marked design the country was
administered as though it were held in trust for the Prince; no taxes
were levied, full freedom was allowed to the Press, and while the
Prussians daily became more unpopular in Schleswig the Austrians by
their leniency won the affection of Holstein. At the end of January,
they even allowed a mass meeting, which was attended by over 4000 men,
to be held at Altona. This made a very unfavourable impression on the
King, and any action of Austria that offended the King was most useful
to Bismarck. "Bismarck is using all his activity to inspire the King
with his own views and feelings," wrote Benedetti, the French
Ambassador, at this time. At the end of January he felt sufficiently
secure to protest seriously against the Austrian action in Holstein.
"Why," he asked, "had they left the alliance against our common enemy,
the Revolution?" Austria, in return, refused peremptorily to allow
Bismarck any voice in the administration of Holstein. Bismarck, when the
despatch was read to him, answered curtly that he must consider that
henceforth the relations of the two Powers had lost their intimate
character; "we are as we were before the Danish war, neither worse nor
better." He sent no answer to the Austrian despatch and ceased to
discuss with them the affairs of the Duchies.
This was a fair warning to Austria and it was understood; they took it
as an intimation that hostilities were intended, and from this day began
quietly to make their preparations. As soon as they did this, they were
given into Bismarck's hands; the Prussians, owing to the admirable
organisation of the army, could prepare for war in a fortnight or three
weeks' time less than the Austrians would require; Austria to be secure
must therefore begin to arm first; as soon as she did so the Prussian
Government would be able, with full protestation of innocence, to point
to the fact that they had not moved a man, and then to begin their own
mobilisation, not apparently for offence but, as it were, to protect
themselves from an unprovoked attack. In a minute of February 22d Moltke
writes that it would be better for political reasons not to mobilise
yet; then they would appear to put Austria in the wrong; Austria had now
100,000 men in Bohemia and it would be impossible to undertake any
offensive movement against Prussia with less than 150,000 or 200,000; to
collect these at least six weeks would be required, and the preparations
could not be concealed. Six days later a great council was held in
Berlin. "A war with Austria must come sooner or later; it is wiser to
undertake it now, under these most favourable circumstances, than to
leave it to Austria to choose the most auspicious moment for herself,"
said Bismarck. The rupture, he explained, had already really been
effected; that had been completed at his last interview with Karolyi.
Bismarck was supported by most of the Ministers; the King said that the
Duchies were worth a war, but he still hoped that peace would be kept.
The arrangement of the foreign alliances was now pushed on. The King
wrote an autograph letter to Napoleon saying that the time for the
special understanding had come; Goltz discussed with him at length the
terms of French compensation. Napoleon did not ask for any definite
promise, but suggested the annexation of some German territory to
France; it was explained to him that Prussia would not surrender any
German territory, but that, if France took part of Belgium, the Prussian
frontier must be extended to the Maas, that is, must include the
north-east of Belgium.
Again no definite agreement was made, but Napoleon's favouring
neutrality seemed secure. There was more difficulty with Italy, for here
an active alliance was required, and the Italians still feared they
would be tricked. It was decided to send Moltke to Florence to arrange
affairs there; this, however, was unnecessary, for Victor Emmanuel sent
one of his generals, Govone, nominally to gain some information about
the new military inventions; for the next three weeks, Govone and
Barrel, the Italian Minister, were engaged in constant discussions as to
the terms of the treaty. Of course the Austrians were not entirely
ignorant of what was going on. The negotiations with Italy roused among
them intense bitterness; without actually mobilising they slowly and
cautiously made all preliminary arrangements; a despatch was sent to
Berlin accusing the Prussians of the intention of breaking the Treaty of
Gastein, and another despatch to the German Courts asking for their
assistance. Karolyi waited on Bismarck, assured him that their military
preparations, were purely defensive, and asked point-blank whether
Prussia proposed to violate the treaty. The answer, of course, was a
simple "No," but according to the gossip of Berlin, Bismarck added, "You
do not think I should tell you if I did intend to do so." On March 24th
a despatch was sent to the envoys at all the German Courts drawing their
attention to the Austrian preparations, for which it was said there was
no cause; in view of this obvious aggression Prussia must begin to arm.
That this was a mere pretext is shewn by a confidential note of Moltke
of this same date; in it he states that all the Austrian preparations up
to this time were purely defensive; there was as yet no sign of an
attempt to take the offensive. Two days later, a meeting of the Prussian
Council was held and the orders for a partial mobilisation of the army
were given, though some time elapsed before they were actually carried
out.
Under the constant excitement of these weeks Bismarck's health again
began to break down; except himself, there was in fact scarcely a single
man who desired the war; the King still seized every opportunity of
preserving the peace; England, as so often, was beginning to make
proposals for mediation; all the Prussian diplomatists, he complained,
were working against his warlike projects. He made it clear to the
Italians that the result would depend on them; if they would not sign a
treaty there would be no war. The great difficulty in arranging the
terms of the treaty was to determine who should begin. The old suspicion
was still there: each side expected that if they began they would be
deserted by their ally. The suspicion was unjust, for on both sides
there were honourable men. The treaty was eventually signed on April
9th; it was to the effect that if Prussia went to war with Austria
within the next three months, Italy would also at once declare war;
neither country was to make a separate peace; Prussia would continue the
war till Venetia was surrendered. On the very day that this treaty was
signed, Bismarck, in answer to an Austrian despatch, wrote insisting
that he had no intention of entering on an offensive war against
Austria. In private conversation he was more open; to Benedetti he said:
"I have at last succeeded in determining a King of Prussia to break the
intimate relations of his House with that of Austria, to conclude a
treaty of alliance with Italy, to accept arrangements with Imperial
France; I am proud of the result."
Suddenly a fresh impediment appeared: the Austrians, on April 18th,
wrote proposing a disarming on both sides; the Prussian answer was
delayed for many days; it was said in Berlin that there was a difference
of opinion between Bismarck and the King; Bismarck complained to
Benedetti that he was wavering: when at last the answer was sent it was
to accept the principle, but Bismarck boasted that he had accepted it
under such conditions that it could hardly be carried out. The
reluctance of the King to go to war caused him much difficulty; all his
influence was required; it is curious to read the following words which
he wrote at this time:
"It is opposed to my feelings, I may say to my faith, to attempt
to use influence or pressure on your paternal feelings with
regard to the decision on peace or war; this is a sphere in
which, trusting to God alone, I leave it to your Majesty's heart
to steer for the good of the Fatherland; my part is prayer,
rather than counsel";
and then he again lays before the King the insuperable arguments in
favour of war.
Let us not suppose that this letter was but a cunning device to win the
consent of the King. In these words more than in anything else we see
his deepest feelings and his truest character. Bismarck was no Napoleon;
he had determined that war was necessary, but he did not go to the
terrible arbitrament with a light heart. He was not a man who from
personal ambition would order thousands of men to go to their death or
bring his country to ruin. It was his strength that he never forgot that
he was working, not for himself, but for others. Behind the far-sighted
plotter and the keen intriguer there always remained the primitive
honesty of his younger years. He may at times have complained of the
difficulties which arose from the reluctance of the King to follow his
advice, but he himself felt that it was a source of strength to him that
he had to explain, justify, and recommend his policy to the King.
All anxiety was, however, removed by news which came the next day. A
report was spread throughout the papers that Italy had begun to
mobilise, and that a band of Garibaldians had crossed the frontier. The
report seems to have been untrue. How it originated we know not; when
Roon heard of it he exclaimed, "Now the Italians are arming, the
Austrians cannot disarm." He was right. The Austrian Government sent a
message to Berlin that they would withdraw part of their northern army
from Bohemia, but must at once put the whole of their southern army on a
war footing. Prussia refused to accept this plea, and the order for the
mobilisation of the Prussian army went out.
As soon as Austria had begun to mobilise, war was inevitable; the state
of the finances of the Empire would not permit them to maintain their
army on a war footing for any time. None the less, another six weeks
were to elapse before hostilities began.
We have seen how throughout these complications Bismarck had desired, if
he fought Austria, to fight, not for the sake of the Duchies, but for a
reform of the German Confederation.
In March he had said to the Italians that the Holstein question was not
enough to warrant a declaration of war. Prussia intended to bring
forward the reform of the Confederation. This would take several months.
He hoped that among other advantages, he would have at least Bavaria on
his side; for the kind of proposal he had in his mind, though at this
time he seems to have had no clear plan, was some arrangement by which
the whole of the north of Germany should be closely united to Prussia,
and the southern States formed in a separate union with Bavaria at the
head. He had always pointed out, even when he was at Frankfort, that
Bavaria was a natural ally of Prussia. In a great war the considerable
army of Bavaria would not be unimportant.
At the beginning of April Bismarck instructed Savigny, his envoy at the
Diet, to propose the consideration of a reform in the Constitution. The
proposal he made was quite unexpected. No details were mentioned as to
changes in the relations of the Princes, but a Parliament elected by
universal suffrage and direct elections was to be chosen, to help in the
management of common German affairs. It is impossible to exaggerate the
bewilderment and astonishment with which this proposal was greeted. Here
was the man who had risen into power as the champion of monarchical
government, as the enemy of Parliaments and Democracy, voluntarily
taking up the extreme demand of the German Radicals. It must be
remembered that universal suffrage was at this time regarded not as a
mere scheme of voting,--it was a principle; it was the cardinal
principle of the Revolution; it meant the sovereignty of the people. It
was the basis of the French Republic of 1848, it had been incorporated
in the German Constitution of 1849, and this was one of the reasons why
the King of Prussia had refused then to accept that Constitution. The
proposal was universally condemned. Bismarck had perhaps hoped to win
the Liberals; if so, he was disappointed; their confidence could not be
gained by this sudden and amazing change--they distrusted him all the
more; "a Government that, despising the laws of its own country, comes
forward with plans for Confederate reform, cannot have the confidence of
the German people," was the verdict of the National party. The Moderate
Liberals, men like Sybel, had always been opposed to universal suffrage;
even the English statesmen were alarmed; it was two years before
Disraeli made his leap in the dark, and here was the Prussian statesman
making a far bolder leap in a country not yet accustomed to the natural
working of representative institutions. He did not gain the adhesion of
the Liberals, and he lost the confidence of his old friends. Napoleon
alone expressed his pleasure that the institutions of the two countries
should become so like one another.
There was, indeed, ample reason for distrust; universal suffrage meant
not only Democracy,--it was the foundation on which Napoleon had built
his Empire; he had shewn that the voice of the people might become the
instrument of despotism. All the old suspicions were aroused; people
began to see fresh meaning in these constant visits to France; Napoleon
had found an apt pupil not only in foreign but in internal matters. It
could mean nothing more than the institution of a democratic monarchy;
this was Bonapartism; it seemed to be the achievement of that change
which, years ago, Gerlach had foreboded. No wonder the King of Hanover
began to feel his crown less steady on his head.
What was the truth in the matter? What were the motives which influenced
Bismarck? The explanation he gave was probably the true one: by
universal suffrage he hoped to attain a Conservative and monarchical
assembly; he appealed from the educated and Liberal middle classes to
the peasants and artisans. We remember how often he had told the
Prussian House of Commons that they were not the true representatives of
the people.
"Direct election and universal suffrage I consider to be greater
guarantees of Conservative action than any artificial electoral
law; the artificial system of indirect election and elections by
classes is a much more dangerous one in a country of monarchical
traditions and loyal patriotism. Universal suffrage, doing away
as it does with the influence of the Liberal bourgeoisie, leads
to monarchical elections."
There was in his mind a vague ideal, the ideal of a king, the father of
his country, supported by the masses of the people. He had a genuine
interest in the welfare of the poorest; he thought he would find in them
more gratitude and confidence than in the middle classes. We know that
he was wrong; universal suffrage in Germany was to make possible the
Social Democrats and Ultramontanes; it was to give the Parliamentary
power into the hands of an opponent far more dangerous than the Liberals
of the Prussian Assembly. Probably no one had more responsibility for
this measure than the brilliant founder of the Socialist party. Bismarck
had watched with interest the career of Lassalle; he had seen with
admiration his power of organisation; he felt that here was a man who in
internal affairs and in the management of the people had something of
the skill and courage which he himself had in foreign affairs. He was a
great demagogue, and Bismarck had already learnt that a man who aimed at
being not only a diplomatist, but a statesman and a ruler, must have
something of the demagogic art. From Lassalle he could learn much. We
have letters written two years before this in which Lassalle, obviously
referring to some previous conversation, says: "Above all, I accuse
myself of having forgotten yesterday to impress upon you that the right
of being elected must be given to all Germans. This is an immense means
of power; the moral conquest of Germany." Obviously there had been a
long discussion, in which Lassalle had persuaded the Minister to adopt
universal suffrage. The letters continue with reference to the machinery
of the elections, and means of preventing abstention from the poll, for
which Lassalle professes to have found a magic charm.
One other remark we must make: this measure, as later events were to
prove, was in some ways characteristic of all Bismarck's internal
policy. Roon once complained of his strokes of genius, his unforeseen
decisions. In foreign policy, bold and decisive as he could be, he
was also cautious and prudent; to this he owes his success; he could
strike when the time came, but he never did so unless he had tested
the situation in every way; he never began a war unless he was sure
to win, and he left nothing to chance or good fortune. In internal
affairs he was less prudent; he did not know his ground so well, and
he exaggerated his own influence. Moreover, in giving up the simpler
Conservative policy of his younger years, he became an opportunist; he
would introduce important measures in order to secure the support of a
party, even though he might thereby be sacrificing the interests of his
country to a temporary emergency. He really applied to home affairs the
habits he had learned in diplomacy; there every alliance is temporary;
when the occasion of it has passed by, it ceases, and leaves no
permanent effect. He tried to govern Germany by a series of political
alliances; but the alliance of the Government with a party can never be
barren; the laws to which it gives birth remain. Bismarck sometimes
thought more of the advantage of the alliance than of the permanent
effect of the laws.
Even after this there was still delay; there were the usual abortive
attempts at a congress, which, as in 1859, broke down through the
refusal of Austria to give way. There were dark intrigues of Napoleon,
who even at the last moment attempted to divert the Italians from their
Prussian alliance. In Germany there was extreme indignation against the
man who was forcing his country into a fratricidal war. Bismarck had
often received threatening letters; now an attempt was made on his life;
as he was walking along _Unter den Linden_ a young man approached and
fired several shots at him. He was seized by Bismarck, and that night
put an end to his own life in prison. He was a South German who wished
to save his country from the horrors of civil war. Moltke, now that all
was prepared, was anxious to begin. Bismarck still hesitated; he was so
cautious that he would not take the first step. At last the final
provocation came, as he hoped it would, from Austria. He knew that if he
waited long enough they would take the initiative. They proposed to
summon the Estates of Holstein, and at the same time brought the
question of the Duchies before the Diet. Bismarck declared that this was
a breach of the Treaty of Gastein, and that that agreement was therefore
void; Prussian troops were ordered to enter Holstein. Austria appealed
for protection to the Diet, and moved that the Federal forces should be
mobilised. The motion was carried by nine votes to seven. The Prussian
Envoy then rose and declared that this was a breach of the Federal law;
Prussia withdrew from the Federation and declared war on all those
States which had supported Austria. Hanover and Hesse had to the end
attempted to maintain neutrality, but this Bismarck would not allow;
they were given the alternative of alliance with Prussia or disarmament.
The result was that, when war began, the whole of Germany, except the
small northern States, was opposed to Prussia. "I have no ally but the
Duke of Mecklenburg and Mazzini," said the King.
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