On the 26th of May Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with the Covington and

two other gunboats, was at Hamburg, on the Tennessee, a few miles from

the Mississippi State line. Here he ferried across 1,500 cavalry and

four light field-pieces from Corinth, in Mississippi, under Colonel

Cornyn. This little body made a forced march upon Florence, forty

miles distant, in rear of the left of the Confederate army at

Columbia, captured the place and destroyed a large amount of property,

including three cotton-mills. An attempt was made by the enemy to cut

this force off on its return to the boats, but without success.

Early in July a very daring raid was made by General J.H. Morgan of

the Confederate army into the States of Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio.

Crossing the Ohio River at Brandenburg, he moved in an easterly

direction through the southern part of Indiana and Ohio, burning

bridges, tearing up railroads, destroying public property, capturing

small bodies of troops, and causing general consternation. Fitch

heard of him, and at once started up the river with his lightest

vessels to cut off the retreat of the raiders. Leaving some boats to

patrol the river below, he himself, in the Moose, came up with them on

the 19th, at a ford a mile and a half above Buffington Island, and two

hundred and fifty miles east of Cincinnati. The retreating enemy had

placed two field-pieces in position, but the Moose's battery of

24-pound howitzers drove them off with shell and shrapnel. The troops

in pursuit had come up, so the Confederates, finding their retreat

stopped, broke and ran up the stream in headlong flight, leaving their

wounded and dismounted men behind. The Moose followed, keeping always

on their right flank, and stopping two other efforts made to cross.

Only when the water became too shoal for even his little paddle

steamer of one hundred and sixty tons to go on, did Fitch stop the

chase, which had led him five hundred miles from his usual station.

His efforts and their useful results were cordially acknowledged by

Generals Burnside and Cox, at Cincinnati.

During the siege of Port Hudson the enemy on the west bank of the

Mississippi made several demonstrations against Donaldsonville and

Plaquemine, with a view to disturbing General Banks's communications;

threatening also New Orleans, which was not well prepared for defence.

Farragut stationed the Princess Royal, Commander Woolsey, at

Donaldsonville; the Winona, Lieutenant-Commander Weaver, above at

Plaquemine, and the Kineo, Lieutenant-Commander Watters, some distance

below. The Confederates attacked the fort at Donaldsonville in force

at midnight of June 27th. The Princess Royal kept under way above the

fort, engaging the assailants, the Winona arriving at 4 A.M. and

joining with her. The Kineo also came up from below, but not in time

to take part. The storming party of the enemy succeeded in getting

into the fort, but the supports broke and fled under the fire of the

gunboats, leaving the advance, numbering 120, prisoners in the hands

of the garrison. On the 7th of July, as the Monongahela was coming up

the river, some field batteries of the enemy attacked her, and her

commander, Abner Read, an officer of distinguished activity and

courage, was mortally wounded. Her other loss was 1 killed and 4

wounded; among the latter being Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, on his

way to assume command of the Richmond and of the naval forces off Port

Hudson.

CHAPTER VII.

TEXAS AND THE RED RIVER.

Upon the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson two objects in the

Southwest were presented to the consideration of the Government at

Washington--Mobile and Texas. General Banks, commanding the Department

of the Gulf, was anxious to proceed against the former; a desire fully

shared by the navy, which knew that sooner or later it must be called

upon to attack that seaport, and that each day of delay made its

defences stronger. Considerations of general policy, connected with

the action of France in Mexico and the apparent unfriendly attitude of

the Emperor Napoleon III. toward the United States, decided otherwise.

On the 10th of June, 1863, just a month before the fall of the

strongholds of the Mississippi, the French army entered the city of

Mexico. On the 24th of July General Banks was instructed to make

immediate preparations for an expedition to Texas. This was speedily

followed by other urgent orders to occupy some point or points of

Texan territory, doubtless as an indication that the course of

interference begun in the weaker republic would not be permitted to

extend to lands over which the United States claimed authority, though

actually in revolt. The expectation that France would thus attempt to

interfere was far from lacking foundation, and was shared, with

apprehension, by the Confederate Government. A year before, M. Theron,

a French consul in Texas, acting in his official capacity, had

addressed a letter to the Governor of the State, suggesting that the

re-establishment of the old republic of Texas, in other words, the

secession of the State from the Confederacy, might be well for his

"beloved adopted country;" and ended by saying that the Governor's

answer would be a guide to him in his political correspondence with

the government he represented. In consequence of this letter, M.

Theron and the French consul at Richmond, who had also been meddling

with Texan affairs, were ordered to leave the Confederate States. The

object evidently was to set up an independent republic between the new

empire in Mexico and whichever power, Union or Confederacy, should

triumph in the Civil War.

The Commander-in-Chief, General Halleck, expressed his own preference

for a movement by the Red River to Shreveport, in the northwest corner

of Louisiana, and the military occupation from that point of northern

Texas, but left the decision as to taking that line of operation, or

some other, to General Banks. The latter, for various reasons,

principally the great distance of Shreveport, seven hundred miles from

New Orleans, and the low state of the Red River, which entirely

precluded water transportation, chose to operate by the sea-coast, and

took as the first point of attack Sabine Pass and city, three hundred

miles from Southwest Pass, where the river Sabine, separating the

States of Louisiana and Texas, enters the Gulf. If he could make good

his footing here at once, he hoped to be able to advance on Beaumont,

the nearest point on the railroad, and thence on Houston, the capital

and railway centre of the State, which is less than one hundred miles

from Sabine City, before the enemy could be ready to repel him.

Owing to lack of transportation, all the troops for the destined

operations could not go forward at once. The first division of 4,000,

under Major-General Franklin, sailed from New Orleans on the 5th of

September. Commodore Henry H. Bell, commanding the Western Gulf

Squadron in the absence of Farragut, detailed the gunboats Clifton,

Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City to accompany the expedition,

Lieutenant Frederick Crocker of the Clifton being senior officer. With

the exception of the Clifton they were all of very light armament, but

were the only available vessels of sufficiently small draught, the

naval-built gunboats of the Cayuga class drawing too much water to

cross the bar.

The transports arrived off the Pass on the morning of the 7th, the

gunboats coming in the same evening. The next morning at eight the

Clifton, followed soon after by the other gunboats and the transports,

crossed the bar and anchored inside about two miles from the fort. At

3.30 P.M. the Clifton, Sachem, and Arizona advanced to attack the

works. At four the Sachem received a shot in her boilers and was at

once enveloped in steam. A few minutes later the Clifton grounded and

also was struck in the boilers, but kept up her fire for twenty or

thirty minutes longer; then both the disabled vessels hauled down

their flags. The army now abandoned the expedition, and the transports

with the remaining gunboats withdrew during the night. In this

unfortunate affair the Clifton lost 10 killed and 9 wounded, the

Sachem 7 killed, the wounded not being given. There were 39 missing

from the two vessels, many of whom were drowned.

The hopes of success being dependent upon a surprise, this route was

now abandoned. Banks entertained for a little while the idea of

advancing from Berwick Bay by land, crossing the Sabine at Niblett's

Bluff; but the length of the communication and difficulty of the

country deterred him. The Red River Route would not be available

before the spring rise. To carry out the wish of the Government he

next determined to land at the extreme end of the Texas coast line,

near the Rio Grande, and work his way to the eastward. A force of

3,500 men, under General Dana, was organized for this expedition,

which sailed from New Orleans on the 26th of October, Banks himself

going with it. The transports were convoyed by the ships-of-war

Monongahela, Owasco, and Virginia, Captain James H. Strong of the

Monongahela being senior officer. The fleet was somewhat scattered by

a norther on the 30th, but on the 2d of November a landing was made on

Brazos Island at the mouth of the Rio Grande. The next day another

detachment was put on shore on the main-land, and Brownsville, thirty

miles from the mouth of the river, was occupied on the 6th. Leaving a

garrison here, the troops were again embarked on the 16th and carried

one hundred and twenty miles up the coast to Corpus Christi, at the

southern end of Mustang Island, where they landed and marched to the

upper end of the island, a distance of twenty-two miles. Here was a

small work, mounting three guns, which was shelled by the Monongahela

and surrendered on the approach of the army. The troops now crossed

the Aransas Pass and moved upon Pass Cavallo, the entrance to

Matagorda Bay. There was here an extensive work called Fort Esperanza,

which the army invested; but on the 30th the enemy withdrew by the

peninsula connecting with the main-land, thus leaving the control of

the bay in the hands of the Union forces. The light gunboats Granite

City and Estrella were sent inside.

So far all had gone well and easily; the enemy had offered little

resistance and the United States flag had been raised in Texas. Now,

however, Banks found powerful works confronting him at the mouth of

the Brazos River and at Galveston. To reduce these he felt it

necessary to turn into the interior and come upon them in the rear,

but the forces of the enemy were such as to deter him from the

attempt unless he could receive reinforcements. Halleck had looked

with evident distrust upon this whole movement, by which a small force

had been separated from the main body by the width of Louisiana and

Texas, with the enemy's army between the two, and the reinforcements

were not forthcoming; but recurring to his favorite plan of operating

by the Red River and Shreveport, without giving positive orders to

adopt it, the inducement was held out that, if that line were taken

up, Steele's army in Arkansas and such forces as Sherman could detach

should be directed to the same object. The co-operation of the

Mississippi squadron was also promised.

It was necessary, however, that this proposed expedition should be

taken in hand and carried through promptly, because both Banks's own

troops and Sherman's would be needed in time to take part in the

spring and summer campaigns east of the Mississippi; while at the same

time the movement could not begin until the Red River should rise

enough to permit the passage of the gunboats and heavy transports over

the falls above Alexandria, which would not ordinarily be before the

month of March.

The two months of January and February were spent in inactivity in the

Department of the Gulf, but frequent communications were held between

the three generals whose forces were to take part in the movement. On

the 1st of March Sherman came to New Orleans to confer with Banks, and

it was then arranged that he should send 10,000 men under a good

commander, who should meet Porter at the mouth of the Red River,

ascend the Black, and strike a hard blow at Harrisonburg, if possible,

and at all events be at Alexandria on the 17th of March. Banks on his

part was to reach there at the same date, marching his army from

Franklin by way of Opelousas, and to conduct his movement on

Shreveport with such celerity as to enable the detachment from

Sherman's corps to get back to the Mississippi in thirty days from the

time they entered the Red River. General Steele was directed by Grant

to move toward Shreveport from Little Rock, a step to which he was

averse, and his movements seem to have had little, if any, effect upon

the fortunes of the expedition. Having finished his business, Sherman

went back at once, resisting the urgent invitation of General Banks,

whose military duties seem to have been somewhat hampered by civil

calls, to remain over the 4th of March and participate in the

inauguration of a civil government for Louisiana, in which the Anvil

Chorus was to be played by all the bands in the Army of the Gulf, the

church bells rung, and cannons fired by electricity.

General Franklin, who was to command the army advancing from Franklin

by Opelousas, did not receive his orders to move till the 10th, which

was too late to reach Alexandria, one hundred and seventy-five miles

away, by the 17th. Moreover, the troops which had been recalled from

the Texas coast, leaving only garrisons at Brownsville and Matagorda,

had just arrived at Berwick Bay and were without transportation; while

the cavalry had not come up from New Orleans. The force got away on

the 13th and 14th and reached Alexandria on the 25th and 26th.

Meanwhile, Sherman, having none but military duties to embarrass him,

was in Vicksburg on the 6th, and at once issued his orders to General

A.J. Smith, who was to command the corps detached up the Red river. On

the 11th Smith was at the mouth of the River, where he met Porter, who

had been there since the 2d, and had with him the following vessels:

Essex, Commander Robert Townsend; Eastport, Lieutenant-Commander S.L.

Phelps; Black Hawk, Lieutenant-Commander K.R. Breese; Lafayette,

Lieutenant-Commander J.P. Foster; Benton, Lieutenant-Commander J.A.

Greer; Louisville, Lieutenant-Commander E.K. Owen; Carondelet,

Lieutenant-Commander J.G. Mitchell; Osage, Lieutenant-Commander T.O.

Selfridge; Ouachita, Lieutenant-Commander Byron Wilson; Lexington,

Lieutenant G.M. Bache; Chillicothe, Lieutenant S.P. Couthouy;

Pittsburg, Lieutenant W.B. Hoel; Mound City, Lieutenant A.R.

Langthorne; Neosho, Lieutenant Samuel Howard; Ozark, Lieutenant G.W.

Browne; Fort Hindman, Lieutenant John Pearce; Cricket, Master H.H.

Gorringe; Gazelle, Master Charles Thatcher.

Most of these vessels will be recognized as old acquaintances. The

last three were light-draughts, the Cricket and Gazelle being but

little over 200 tons. The Ouachita was a paddle-wheel steamer,

carrying in broadside, on two docks, a numerous battery of howitzers,

eighteen 24-pounders and sixteen 12-pounders (one of the latter being

rifled); and besides these, five 30-pounder rifles as bow and stern

guns. The Ozark, Osage, and Neosho, were ironclads of very light

draught, having a single turret clad with 6-inch armor in which were

mounted two XI-inch guns. They were moved by stern paddle-wheels

covered with an iron house, of ¾-inch plates, which was higher than

the turret, and from a broadside view looked like a gigantic beehive.

The Essex did not go farther than the mouth of the river.

Early on the morning of March 12th the gunboats started up, the

transports following. There was just enough water to allow the larger

boats to pass. The transports, with the Benton, Pittsburg, Louisville,

Mound City, Carondelet, Chillicothe, Ouachita, Lexington, and Gazelle

turned off into the Atchafalaya, the admiral accompanying this part

of his squadron; while Lieutenant-Commander Phelps with the other

vessels continued up the Red River to remove obstructions, which the

enemy had planted across the stream eight miles below Fort de Russy.

The army landed at Simmesport on the 13th, taking possession there of

the camping-ground of the enemy, who retreated on Fort de Russy. The

next day at daylight they were pursued, and Smith's corps, after a

march of twenty-eight miles, in which it was delayed two hours to

build a bridge, reached the fort in time to assault and take it before

sundown. The Confederate General Walker had withdrawn the main body of

his troops, leaving only 300 men, who could offer but slight

resistance. Eight heavy guns and two field-pieces were taken.

The detachment of vessels under Lieutenant-Commander Phelps were at

first delayed by the difficulty of piloting the Lafayette and Choctaw,

long vessels of heavy draft, through the narrow and crooked river. The

13th thus wore away slowly, and on the 14th they reached the

obstructions. Two rows of piles had been driven across the channel,

braced, and tied together; immediately below them was a raft well

secured to either bank and made of logs which did not float. Finally a

great many trees had been cut and floated down upon the piles from

above. The Fort Hindman removed a portion of the raft, and then the

Eastport got to work on the piles, dragging out some and starting

others by ramming. By four o'clock in the afternoon a large enough gap

had been made, and the Eastport, followed by the Hindman, Osage, and

Cricket, hastened up the river. Rapid artillery firing was heard as

they drew near the works, but being ignorant of the position of the

Union troops, few shots were fired for fear of injuring them. The

slight engagement was ended by the surrender, a few moments after the

boats came up. An order from the admiral to push on at once to

Alexandria was delayed five hours in transmission. When it was

received, the fastest vessels, the Ouachita and Lexington, were sent

on, followed by the Eastport, but got there just as the last of the

Confederate transports passed over the Falls. One of them grounded and

was burnt.

These advance vessels reached Alexandria on the evening of the 15th,

the admiral with the rest on the 16th; at which time there had also

come up from 7,000 to 8,000 of Smith's corps, the remainder being left

at Fort de Russy.

Alexandria was the highest point reached by the fleet the May before.

Shreveport, the object of the present expedition, is three hundred and

forty miles farther up the Red River. It was the principal dépôt of

the Confederates west of the Mississippi, had some machine-shops and

dockyards, and was fortified by a line of works of from two to three

miles radius, commanding the opposite bank. Between the two places the

river, which gets its name from the color of its water, flows through

a fertile and populous country, the banks in many places being high,

following in a very crooked channel a general southeasterly direction.

In this portion of its course it has a width of seven hundred to eight

hundred feet, and at low water a depth of four feet. The slope from

Shreveport to Alexandria at high water is a little over a hundred

feet, but immediately above the latter place there are two small

rapids, called the Falls of Alexandria, which interrupt navigation

when the water is low. The annual rise begins in the early winter, and

from December to June the river is in fair boating condition for its

usual traffic; but water enough for the gunboats and transports to

pass the Falls could not be expected before the spring rise in March.

The river, however, can never be confidently trusted. For twenty years

before 1864 it had only once failed to rise, in 1855; but this year

it was exceptionally backward, and so caused much embarrassment to the

fleet.

General Banks came in on the 26th of March and the last of Franklin's

corps on the 28th. Smith's command was then moved on to Bayou Rapides,

twenty-one miles above Alexandria. The slow rise of the river was

still detaining the vessels. There was water enough for the lighter

draughts, but, as the enemy was reported to have some ironclad vessels

not far above, the Admiral was unwilling to let them go up until one

of the heavier gunboats had passed. The Eastport was therefore sent up

first, being delayed two or three days on the rocks of the rapids, and

at last hauled over by main force. She at once passed ahead of Smith's

corps. The Mound City, Carondelet, Pittsburg, Louisville, Chillicothe,

Ozark, Osage, Neosho, Lexington, and Hindman also went above the

Falls, as did some thirty transports. At this time the Marine Brigade,

which was now under the army and formed part of Smith's command, was

summoned back to Vicksburg, taking 3,000 men from the expedition. The

river continuing to rise slowly, it was thought best to keep two lines

of transports, one above and one below the Falls, and to transship

stores around them. This made it necessary to establish a garrison at

Alexandria, which further reduced the force for the field.

Banks's own army marched by land to Natchitoches, eighty miles

distant, arriving there on the 2d and 3d of April; but Smith's command

went forward on transports convoyed by the gunboats and reached Grand

Ecore, four miles from Natchitoches, on the 3d. Here it landed, except

one division of 2,000 men under General T. Kilby Smith, who took

charge of the transports, now numbering twenty-six, many of them large

boats. These Smith was directed to take to the mouth of Loggy Bayou,

opposite Springfield, where it was expected he would again

communicate with the army. So far the water had been good, the boats

having a foot to spare; but as the river was rising very slowly, the

admiral would not take his heavy boats any higher. Leaving

Lieutenant-Commander Phelps in command at Grand Ecore, with

instructions to watch the water carefully and not be caught above a

certain bar, a mile lower down, Porter went ahead with the Cricket,

Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho, Chillicothe, and the transports, on

the 7th of April.

The army marched out on the 6th and 7th, directed upon Mansfield. The

way led through a thickly wooded country by a single road, which was

in many places too narrow to admit of two wagons passing. On the night

of the 7th Banks reached Pleasant Hill, where Franklin then was; the

cavalry division, numbering 3,300 mounted infantry, being eight miles

in advance, Smith's command fifteen miles in the rear. The next day

the advance was resumed, and, at about fifteen miles from Pleasant

Hill, the cavalry, which had been reinforced by a brigade of infantry,

became heavily engaged with a force largely outnumbering it. After

being pushed back some little distance, this advanced corps finally

gave way in confusion. Banks had now been some time on the field. At

4.15 P.M. Franklin came up, and, seeing how the affair was going, sent

word back to General Emory of his corps, to form line of battle at a

place he named, two miles in the rear. The enemy came on rapidly, and

as the cavalry train of one hundred and fifty wagons and some eighteen

or twenty pieces of artillery were close in rear of the discomfited

troops, it was not possible, in the narrow road, to turn and save

them. Emory, advancing rapidly in accordance with his orders, met

flying down the road a crowd of disorganized cavalry, wagons,

ambulances, and loose animals, through which his division had to force

its way, using violence to do so. As the enemy's bullets began to

drop among them, the division reached a suitable position for

deploying, called by Banks Pleasant Grove, three miles in rear of the

first action. Here the line was formed, and the enemy, seemingly not

expecting to meet any opposition, were received when within a hundred

yards by a vigorous fire, before which they gave way in about fifteen

minutes. By this time it was dark, and toward midnight the command

fell back to Pleasant Hill, where it was joined by A.J. Smith's corps.

The following day, at 5 P.M., the enemy again attacked at Pleasant

Hill, but were repulsed so decidedly that the result was considered a

victory by the Union forces, and by the Confederates themselves a

serious check; but for various reasons Banks thought best to fall back

again to Grand Ecore. The retreat was continued that night, and on the

night of the 11th the army reached Grand Ecore, where it threw up

intrenchments and remained ten days. As yet there was no intention of

retreating farther.

Meanwhile the navy and transports had pressed hopefully up the river.

The navigation was very bad, the river crooked and narrow, the water

low and beginning to fall, the bottom full of snags and stumps, and

the sides bristling with cypress logs and sharp, hard timbers. Still,

the distance, one hundred and ten miles, was made in the time

appointed, and Springfield Landing reached on the afternoon of the

10th. Here the enemy had sunk a large steamer across the channel, her

bow resting on one shore and her stern on the other, while the body

amidships was broken down by a quantity of bricks and mud loaded upon

her. Porter and Kilby Smith were consulting how to get rid of this

obstacle, when they heard of the disaster and retreat of the army.

Smith was ordered by Banks to return, and there was no reason for

Porter to do otherwise. The following day they fell back to

Coushattee Chute, and the enemy began the harassment which they kept

up throughout the descent to, and even below, Alexandria. The first

day, however, the admiral was able to keep them for the most part in

check, though from the high banks they could fire down on the decks

almost with impunity. The main body of the enemy was on the southern

bank, but on the north there was also a force under a General Liddell,

numbering, with Harrison's cavalry, perhaps 2,500 men.

On the 12th a severe and singular fight took place. At four in the

afternoon the Hastings, transport, on which Kilby Smith was, having

disabled her wheel, had run into the right bank for repairs. At the

same moment the Alice Vivian, a heavy transport, with four hundred

cavalry horses, was aground in the middle of the stream; as was the

gunboat Osage, Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge. Two other transports

were alongside the Vivian, and a third alongside the Osage, trying to

move them. Another transport, called the Rob Roy, having on her decks

four siege guns, had just come down and was near the Osage. The

Lexington, gunboat, Lieutenant Bache, was near the northern shore, but

afloat. The vessels being thus situated, a sudden attack was made from

the right bank by 2,000 of the enemy's infantry and four field pieces.

The gunboats, the Rob Roy with her siege guns, and two field pieces on

the other transports all replied, the Hastings, of course, casting off

from her dangerous neighborhood. This curious contest lasted for

nearly two hours, the Confederate sharpshooters sheltering themselves

behind the trees, the soldiers on board the transports behind bales of

hay. There could be but one issue to so ill-considered an attack, and

the enemy, after losing 700 men, were driven off; their commander,

General Thomas Green, a Texan, being among the slain. The large loss

is accounted for by the fact that besides the two thousand actually

engaged there were five thousand more some distance back, who shared

in the punishment.

The following day an attack was made from the north bank, but no more

from the south before reaching Grand Ecore on the 14th and 15th. The

admiral himself, being concerned for the safety of his heavy vessels

in the falling river, hurried there on the 13th, and on his arrival

reported the condition of things above to Banks, who sent out a force

to clear the banks of guerillas as far as where the transports lay.

Lieutenant-Commander Phelps had already moved all the vessels below

the bar at Grand Ecore, but had recalled four to cover the army when

it returned. The admiral now sent them all below to move slowly toward

Alexandria. His position was one of great perplexity. The river ought

to be rising, but was actually falling; there was danger if he delayed

that he might lose some of the boats, but on the other hand he felt it

would be a stain upon the navy to look too closely to its own safety,

and it was still possible that the river might take a favorable turn.

He had decided to keep four of the light-draughts above the bar till

the very last moment, remaining with them himself, when he received

news that the Eastport had been sunk by a torpedo eight miles below.

The accident happened on the 15th, the vessel having been previously

detained on the bar nearly twenty-four hours. The admiral left

Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge in charge at Grand Ecore and at once

went to the scene, where he found the Eastport in shoal water but sunk

to her gun-deck, the water on one side being over it. The Lexington

and a towboat were alongside helping to pump her out. Giving orders

that she should be lightened, he kept on down to Alexandria to start

two pump-boats up to her and to look after the affairs of the squadron

both along the Red River and in the Mississippi. On his return, two

days later, he found her with her battery and ammunition out and the

pump-boats alongside. By this time it was known that the army would

not advance again, and that Banks was anxious to get back to

Alexandria. The officers and crew of the Eastport worked night and day

to relieve her, and on the 21st she was again afloat, with fires

started, but as yet they had not been able to come at the leak. That

day she made twenty miles, but at night grounded on a bar, to get over

which took all the 22d. Four or five miles farther down she again

grounded, and another day was spent in getting her off. Two or three

times more she was gotten clear and made a few more miles down the

river by dint of extreme effort; but at last, on the 26th, she

grounded on some logs fifty miles below the scene of the accident, in

a position evidently hopeless.

Selfridge's division of light ironclads had been compelled by the

falling water to drop below the bar at Grand Ecore, and, as they were

there of no further use to the army, had continued down to Alexandria,

except the Hindman, which was kept by the Eastport. On the 22d the

army evacuated Grand Ecore and marched for Alexandria. On this retreat

the advance and rear-guard had constant skirmishing with the enemy. At

Cane River the Confederates had taken position to dispute the

crossing, and the advance had a serious fight to drive them off. The

rear-guard also had one or two quite sharp encounters, but the army

reached Alexandria without serious loss on the 26th.

The Eastport and Fort Hindman were now in a very serious position,

aground in a hostile river, their own army sixty miles away, and

between it and them the enemy lining the banks of the river. The

admiral, having seen the rest of his fleet in safety, returned to the

crippled boat, taking with him only two tinclads, the Cricket and

Juliet; but the Osage and Neosho were ordered to move up forty miles,

near the mouth of Cane River, so as to be in readiness to render

assistance. On the 26th, the commander of the Eastport, whose calmness

and hopefulness had won the admiral's admiration and led him to linger

longer than was perhaps prudent, in the attempt to save the vessel,

was obliged to admit that there was no hope. The river was falling

steadily, the pilots said there was already too little water for her

draught on the bars below, and the crew were worn out with six days of

incessant labor. The attempt was made to remove her plating, but it

was not possible to do so soon enough. Orders were therefore given to

transfer the ship's company to the Fort Hindman, whose captain,

Lieutenant Pearce, had worked like her own to save her, and to blow

the Eastport up. Eight barrels of powder were placed under her forward

casemate, a like number in the stern, and others about the machinery,

trains were laid fore and aft, and at 1.45 P.M. Phelps himself lit the

match and left the vessel. He had barely time to reach the Hindman

before the explosions took place in rapid succession; then the flames

burst out and the vessel was soon consumed.

The three remaining gunboats and the two pump-boats now began a

hazardous retreat down the river. Just as the preparations for blowing

up the Eastport were completed, a rush was made by twelve hundred men

from the right bank to board the Cricket, which was tied up. Her

captain, Gorringe, backed clear, and opening upon them with grape and

canister, supported by a cross fire from the other boats, the attack

was quickly repelled. They were not again molested until they had gone

twenty miles farther, to about five miles above the mouth of Cane

River. Here they came in sight of a party of the enemy, with eighteen

pieces of artillery, drawn up on the right bank. At this time the

Cricket was leading with the admiral's flag; the Juliet following,

lashed to one pump-boat; the Hindman in the rear. The Cricket opened

at once, and the enemy replied. Gorringe stopped his vessel, meaning

to fight and cover those astern, but the admiral directed him to move

ahead. Before headway was gained the enemy was pouring in a pelting

shower of shot and shell, the two broadside guns' crews were swept

away, one gun disabled, and at the same instant the chief engineer was

killed, and all but one of the men in the fire-room wounded. In these

brief moments the Juliet was also disabled by a shot in her machinery,

the rudder of the pump-boat lashed to her was struck, and the boiler

of the other was exploded. The captain of the latter, with almost the

entire ship's company, numbering two hundred,[20] were scalded to

death, while the boat, enveloped in steam, drifted down and lodged

against the bank under the enemy's battery, remaining in their power.

The pilot of the boat towing the Juliet abandoned the wheel-house--an

act unparalleled among a class of men whose steadiness and devotion

under the exposure of their calling elicited the highest praise from

Porter and others; the crew also tried to cut the hawsers, but were

stopped by Watson, the captain of the gunboat. A junior pilot named

Maitland, with great bravery and presence of mind, jumped to the wheel

and headed the two boats up river. This confusion in the centre of the

line prevented the Hindman from covering the admiral as Phelps wished,

but he now got below the Juliet and engaged the enemy till she was out

of range. Meanwhile the admiral had found the pilot of the Cricket to

be among the wounded, and taking charge of the vessel himself, ran by

the battery under the heaviest fire[21] he ever experienced. When

below he turned and engaged the batteries in the rear, but seeing that

the Hindman and the others were not coming by he continued down to the

point where he expected to meet the Osage and Neosho.

In this truly desperate fight the Cricket, a little boat of one

hundred and fifty-six tons, was struck thirty-eight times in five

minutes, and lost 25 killed and wounded, half her crew. Soon after

passing below she ran aground and remained fast for three hours, so

that it was dark when she reached the Osage, lying opposite another

battery of the enemy, which she had been engaging during the day.

During that night the vessels still above were busy repairing damages

and getting ready for the perils of the next day. Fearing the enemy

might obstruct the channel by sinking the captured pump-boat across

it, a shell was fired at her from time to time. The repairs were made

before noon, but the Juliet being still crippled, the Hindman took her

alongside, and so headed down for the batteries. Before going far the

Juliet struck a snag, which made it necessary to go back and stop the

leak. Then they started again, the remaining pump-boat following. When

within five hundred yards the enemy opened a well-sustained fire, and

a shot passed through the pilot-house of the Hindman, cutting the

wheel-ropes. This made the vessel unmanageable, and the two falling

off broadside to the stream drifted down under fire, striking now one

shore and now the other but happily going clear. The guns under these

circumstances could not be used very effectively, and the pump-boat

suffered the more from the enemy's fire. Maitland was still piloting

her, and when nearly opposite the batteries he was wounded in both

legs by a shell. He dropped on his knees, unable to handle the wheel,

and the boat ran into the bank on the enemy's side. Another shell

struck the pilot-house, wounding him again in several places, and a

third cut away a bell-rope and the speaking-tube. Rallying a little,

Maitland now got hold of and rang another bell and had the boat backed

across the river. The crew attempted to escape, but were all taken

prisoners, the captain and one other having been killed. In the two

days encounters the Juliet was hit nearly as often as the Cricket and

lost 15 killed and wounded; the Hindman, though repeatedly struck and

much cut up, only 3 killed and 5 wounded. The fire of the enemy's

sharpshooters was very annoying for some miles farther down, but

twelve miles below the batteries they met the Neosho going up to their

assistance.

The main interest of the retreat of the squadron centres in the

Eastport and her plucky little consorts, but the other vessels had had

their own troubles in getting down the river. The obstacles to be

overcome are described as enough to appal the stoutest heart by the

admiral, who certainly was not a man of faint heart. Guns had to be

removed and the vessels jumped over sand-bars and logs, but the

squadron arrived in time to prevent any attack on the reserve stores

before the main body of the army came up.

At Alexandria the worst of their troubles awaited them, threatening to

make all that had yet been done vain. The river, which ordinarily

remains high till June, had not only failed to reach its usual height

but had so fallen that they could not pass the rapids. General W.T.

Sherman, who had lived at Alexandria before the war, thought twelve

feet necessary before going up, a depth usually found from March to

June. At the very least seven were needed by the gunboats to go down,

and on the 30th of April of this year there were actually only three

feet four inches. The danger was the greatest that had yet befallen

the fleet, and seemingly hopeless. A year before, in the Yazoo bayous,

the position had been most critical, but there the peril came from the

hand of man and was met and repelled by other men. Here Nature herself

had turned against them, forsaking her usual course to do them harm.

Ten gunboats and two tugs were thus imprisoned in a country soon to

pass into the enemy's hands by the retreat of the army.

Desperate as the case seemed, relief came. Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph

Bailey, of the Fourth Wisconsin Volunteers, was at this time acting as

Chief Engineer of the Nineteenth Army Corps, General Franklin's. He

was a man who had had much experience on the watercourses of the

Northwestern country, and had learned to use dams to overcome

obstacles arising from shallow water in variable streams. The year

before he had applied this knowledge to free two transport steamers,

which had been taken when Port Hudson fell, from their confinement in

Thompson's Creek, where the falling water had left them sunk in the

sand. As the army fell back, and during its stay at Grand Ecore, he

had heard rumors about the scant water at the Falls, and the thought

had taken hold of his mind that he might now build a dam on a greater

scale and to a more vital purpose than ever before.

His idea, first broached to General Franklin, was through him conveyed

to Banks and Porter, and generally through the army. Franklin, himself

an engineer, thought well of it, and so did some others; but most

doubted, and many jeered. The enemy themselves, when they became aware

of it, laughed, and their pickets and prisoners alike cried

scoffingly, "How about that dam?" But Bailey had the faith that moves

mountains, and he was moreover happy in finding at his hands the

fittest tools for the work. Among the troops in the far Southwest were

two or three regiments from Maine, the northeasternmost of all the

States. These had been woodmen and lumbermen from their youth, among

their native forests, and a regiment of them now turned trained and

willing arms upon the great trees on the north shore of the Red River;

and there were many others who, on a smaller scale and in different

scenes, had experience in the kind of work now to be done. Time was

pressing, and from two to three thousand men were at once set to work

on the 1st of May. The Falls are about a mile in length, filled with

rugged rocks which, at this low water, were bare or nearly so, the

water rushing down around, or over, them with great swiftness. At the

point below, where the dam was to be built, the river is 758 feet

wide, and the current was then between nine and ten miles an hour.

From the north bank was built what was called the "tree dam," formed

of large trees laid with the current, the branches interlocking, the

trunks down stream and cross-tied with heavy timber; upon this was

thrown brush, brick, and stone, and the weight of water as it rose

bound the fabric more closely down upon the bottom of the river. From

the other bank, where the bottom was more stony and trees less plenty,

great cribs were pushed out, sunk and filled with stone and brick--the

stone brought down the river in flat-boats, the bricks obtained by

pulling down deserted brick buildings. On this side, a mile away, was

a large sugar-house; this was torn down and the whole building,

machinery, and kettles went to ballast the dam. Between the cribs and

the tree dam a length of 150 feet was filled by four large coal

barges, loaded with brick and sunk. This great work was completed in

eight working days, and even on the eighth, three of the lighter

vessels, the Osage, Neosho, and Fort Hindman, were able to pass the

upper falls and wait just above the dam for the chance to pass; but

the heavier vessels had yet to delay for a further rise. In the

meantime the vessels were being lightened by their crews. Nearly all

the guns, ammunition, provisions, chain cables, anchors, and

everything that could affect the draught, were taken out and hauled

round in wagons below the falls. The iron plating was taken off the

Ozark, and the sides of our old friends the Eads gunboats, the four

survivors of which were here, as ever where danger was. This iron, for

want of wagons, could not be hauled round, so the boats ran up the

river and dumped it overboard in a five-fathom hole, where the

shifting sand would soon swallow it up. Iron plating was then too

scarce and valuable to the Confederates to let it fall into their

hands. Eleven old 32-pounders were also burst and sunk.

The dam was finished, the water rising, and three boats below, when,

between 7 and 10 A.M. of the 9th, the pressure became so great as to

sweep away two of the barges in midstream and the pent-up water poured

through. Admiral Porter rode round to the upper falls and ordered the

Lexington to pass them at once and try to go through the dam without a

stop. Her steam was ready and she went ahead, passing scantly over the

rapids, the water falling all the time; then she steered straight for

the opening, where the furious rushing of the waters seemed to

threaten her with destruction. She entered the gap, which was but 66

feet wide, with a full head of steam, pitched down the roaring

torrent, made two or three heavy rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks

below, and then, sweeping into deep water with the current, rounded to

at the bank, safe. One great cheer rose from the throats of the

thousands looking on, who had before been hushed into painful silence,

awaiting the issue with beating hearts. The Neosho followed, but

stopping her engine as she drew near the opening, was carried

helplessly through; for a moment her low hull disappeared in the

water, but she escaped with a hole in her bottom, which was soon

repaired. The Hindman and Osage came through without touching.

The work on the dam had been done almost wholly by the soldiers, who

had worked both day and night, often up to their waists and even to

their necks in the water, showing throughout the utmost cheerfulness

and good humor. The partial success, that followed the first

disappointment of the break, was enough to make such men again go to

work with good will. Bailey decided not to try again, with his limited

time and materials, to sustain the whole weight of water with one dam;

and so, leaving the gap untouched, went on to build two wing-dams on

the upper falls. These, extending from either shore toward the middle

of the river and inclining slightly down stream, took part of the

weight, causing a rise of 1 foot 2 inches, and shed the water from

either side into the channel between them. Three days were needed to

build these, one a crib-and the other a tree-dam, and a bracket-dam a

little lower down to help guide the current. The rise due to the main

dam when breached was 5 feet 4½ inches, so that the entire gain in

depth by this admirable engineering work was 6 feet 6½ inches. On the

11th the Mound City, Carondelet, and Pittsburg came over the upper

falls, but with trouble, the channel being very crooked and scarcely

wide enough. The next day the remaining boats, Ozark, Louisville, and

Chillicothe, with the two tugs, also came down to the upper dam, and

during that and the following day they all passed through the gap,

with hatches closely nailed down and every precaution taken against

accident. No mishap befell them beyond the unshipping of rudders, and

the loss of one man swept from the deck of a tug. The two barges which

had been carried out at the first break of the dam stuck just below

and at right angles to it, and there staid throughout, affording an

excellent cushion on the left side of the shoot. What had been a

calamity proved thus a benefit. The boats having taken on board their

guns and stores as fast as they came below, that work was completed,

even by the last comers, on the 13th, and all then steamed down the

river with the transports in company. The water had become very low in

the lower part, but providentially a rise of the Mississippi sent up

so much back-water that no stoppage happened.

[Illustration: Red River Dam.]

For the valuable services rendered to the fleet in this hour of great

danger, Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey was promoted to the rank of

brigadier-general and received the thanks of Congress. The stone cribs

of the dam have long since been swept away, but the tree-dam has

remained until this day, doubtless acquiring new strength from year to

year by the washing of the river. Its position has forced the channel

over to the south shore, encroaching seriously upon the solid land,

especially when the water is high. A very large part of the front of

Alexandria, at the upper suburb, has thus been washed away, and the

caving still continues.

While the fleet and army were at Alexandria, the enemy had passed

round the city and appeared on the banks below, where they made the

passage of light steamers very dangerous. Two light-draught gunboats,

the Covington and Signal, were thus lost to the service. They had gone

down convoying a transport called the Warner. The Warner was put in

advance, the gunboats following in line ahead. The enemy began with

heavy musketry and two field pieces, by which the Warner's rudders

were disabled; she continued on a short distance till a bend was

reached, and here, being unable to make the turn, she went ashore,

blocking also the channel to the two armed vessels. A heavy force of

infantry with artillery now opened on the three, the gunboats replying

for three hours, when the Warner hoisted a white flag. Lieutenant Lord

of the Covington still kept up his fire and sent to burn the

transport; but learning from the colonel in charge that there were

nearly 125 killed and wounded on board he desisted. Soon after this

the Signal was disabled. The Covington then rounded to and took the

others in tow up stream, but her own rudders were disabled and the

Signal went adrift. The latter then anchored, and the Covington

running to the left bank tied up with her head up stream. In this

position the action was continued with the enemy, reinforced now by

the first battery which had been brought down, till the steam-drum was

penetrated and a shot entering the boilers let out all the water; the

ammunition gave out and several guns were disabled, one officer and

several men being killed. Lord set the vessel on fire and escaped with

the crew to the banks. On mustering, 9 officers and 23 men were found

out of a crew of 76. Most of those who reached the banks escaped

through the woods to Alexandria. The Covington was riddled, having

received some fifty shots. The disabled Signal was fought with equal

obstinacy by her commander, Lieutenant Morgan, but after the

destruction of the Covington was surrendered, not burned; it being

found impossible to remove the wounded under the fire of the enemy.

The army marched out of Alexandria on the 14th toward Simmesport,

which they reached on the 16th. Having no regular pontoon train, the

Atchafalaya, which is here about six hundred yards wide, was crossed

by a bridge of transport steamers moored side by side; an idea of

Colonel Bailey's. The crossing was made on the 20th, and on that same

day General Banks was relieved by General Canby, who had been ordered

to command the Department of the West Mississippi, with headquarters

at New Orleans. A.J. Smith's corps embarked and went up the river, and

the expedition was over. The disastrous ending and the lateness of the

season made it impracticable to carry out Grant's previous plan of

moving on Mobile with force sufficient to insure its capture.

After the Red River expedition little is left to say, in a work of

this scope, of the operations of the Mississippi Squadron during the

rest of the war. Admiral Porter was relieved during the summer,

leaving Captain Pennock in temporary charge. Acting Rear-Admiral S.P.

Lee took the command on the 1st of November. The task and actions of

the squadron were of the same general character as those described in

Chapter VI. Guerillas and light detached bodies of the enemy continued

to hover on the banks of the Mississippi, White, Arkansas, Tennessee,

and Cumberland Rivers. The Red River was simply blockaded, not

occupied, and much of the Yazoo Valley, having no present importance,

had been abandoned to the enemy. The gunboats scattered throughout

those waters were constantly patrolling and convoying, and often in

action. The main operations of the army being now far east of the

Mississippi, the work and exposure of the boats became greater. Masked

batteries of field pieces were frequently sprung upon them, or upon

unarmed steamers passing up and down; in either case the nearest

gunboat must hasten and engage it. Weak isolated posts were suddenly

attacked; a gunboat, usually not far off, must go to the rescue.

Reconnoissances into the enemy's country, as the Yazoo Valley, were to

be made, or troops carried in transports from point to point;

gunboats went along with their heavy yet manageable artillery,

feeling doubtful places with their shells and clearing out batteries

or sharpshooters when found. The service was not as easy as it sounds.

It would be wrong to infer that their power was always and at once

recognized. Often they were outnumbered in guns, and a chance shot in

a boiler or awkward turn of a wheel, throwing the vessel aground,

caused its loss. Even when victorious they were often hardly used. The

limits of this book will permit the telling of but two or three

stories.

In the latter part of June, 1864, General Steele, commanding the Union

troops in Arkansas, wished to move some round in transports from

Duval's Bluff on the White River to the Arkansas, hoping to reach

Little Rock in this way. One attempt was made, but, the enemy being

met in force on the Arkansas, the transports were turned back.

Lieutenant Bache assured him that the trip could not be made, but as

the General thought otherwise, he consented to try again and left the

Bluff with a large convoy on the 24th, having with him of armed

vessels the Tyler, his own, the Naumkeag and Fawn. The two latter were

tinclads, the first an unarmored boat. When about twenty miles down,

two men were picked up, part of the crew of the light-draught Queen

City, which had been captured by the Confederates five hours before.

It was then nine o'clock. Bache at once turned the transports back and

went ahead fast himself to take or destroy the lost boat before her

guns could be removed. Before reaching Clarendon two reports were

heard, which came from the Queen City, blown up by the enemy when the

others were known to be coming. The three boats formed line ahead, the

Tyler leading, Naumkeag second, and Fawn third, their broadsides

loaded with half-second shrapnel and canister. As they drew near, the

enemy opened with seven field pieces and some two thousand infantry

and put one of their first shots through the pilot-house of the Tyler,

the vessels being then able to reply only with an occasional shell

from their bow guns. As they came nearly abreast they slowed down and

steamed by, firing their guns rapidly. When under the batteries the

Fawn received a shot through her pilot-house, killing the pilot and

carrying away the bell gear, at the same time ringing the engine-room

bell, causing the engineers to stop the boat under fire. Some little

delay ensued in fixing the bells, the paymaster took the wheel, and

the Fawn, having another shot in the pilot-house, passed on. As soon

as the Tyler and Naumkeag were below they turned and steamed up again,

delivering a deliberate fire as they passed, in the midst of which the

enemy ran off, leaving behind them most of their captures, including a

light gun taken from the Queen City. The boats were struck twenty-five

times, and lost 3 killed and 15 wounded. The Queen City had been taken

by surprise, and her engines disabled at the first fire. She lost 2

killed and 8 wounded, including her commander; and, while many of her

crew escaped to the opposite bank, many were taken prisoners.

The main course of the war in the West having now drifted away from

the Mississippi Valley to the region south and southeast of Nashville,

embracing Southern and Eastern Tennessee and the northern parts of

Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, the convoy and gunboat service on

the Tennessee and Cumberland assumed new importance. An eleventh

division was formed on the upper waters of the Tennessee, above Muscle

Shoals, under the command of Lieutenant Moreau Forrest;

Lieutenant-Commander Shirk had the lower river, and Fitch still

controlled the Cumberland. When Hood, after the fall of Atlanta, began

his movement toward Tennessee in the latter part of October, General

Forrest, the active Confederate cavalry leader, who had been stationed

at Corinth with his outposts at Eastport and on the Tennessee River,

moved north along the west bank, and with seventeen regiments of

cavalry and nine pieces of artillery appeared on the 28th before Fort

Heiman, an earthwork about seventy-five miles from Paducah. Here he

captured two transports and a light-draught called the Undine. On the

2nd of November he had established batteries on the west bank both

above and below Johnsonville, one of the Union army's bases of

supplies and a railway terminus, thus blockading the water approach

and isolating there eight transports, with barges, and three

light-draughts, the Key West, Elfin, and Tawah. Nevertheless, the

three boats went down and engaged the lower battery, and though they

found it too strong for them they retook one of the transports.

Meantime Shirk had telegraphed the Admiral and Fitch, and the latter

came to his assistance with three of the Cumberland River

light-draughts. Going on up the Tennessee Fitch picked up three other

light-draughts, and on the morning of the 4th approached the lower

battery from below, Lieutenant King, the senior officer above, coming

down at the same time. The enemy then set fire to the Undine, but the

channel was so narrow and intricate that Fitch did not feel justified

in attempting to take his boats up, and King was not able to run by.

Fitch, whose judgment and courage were well proved, said that the

three blocked gunboats were fought desperately and well handled, but

that they could not meet successfully the heavy rifled batteries then

opposed to them in such a channel. All three were repeatedly struck

and had several of their guns disabled. They then retired to the fort,

where the enemy opened on them in the afternoon with a battery on the

opposite shore. After firing away nearly all their ammunition, and

being further disabled, Lieutenant King, fearing that they might fall

into the enemy's hands, burnt them with the transports. The place was

relieved by General Schofield twenty-four hours later, so that if King

had patiently held on a little longer his pluck and skill would have

been rewarded by saving his vessels. At about the same time, October

28th, General Granger being closely pressed in Decatur, Alabama, above

the Muscle Shoals, the light-draught General Thomas, of the Eleventh

Division, under the command of Acting-Master Gilbert Morton, at great

risk got up in time to render valuable service in repelling the

attack.

The Union forces continued to fall back upon Nashville before the

advance of Hood, who appeared before the city on the 2d of December,

and by the 4th had established his lines round the south side. His

left wing struck the river at a point four miles below by land, but

eighteen by the stream, where they captured two steamers and

established a battery. Fitch, receiving word of this at 9 P.M., at

once went down with the Carondelet and four light-draughts to attack

them. The boats moved quietly, showing no lights, the Carondelet and

Fairplay being ordered to run below, giving the enemy grape and

canister as they passed in front, and then to round to and continue

the fight up stream, Fitch intending to remain above with the other

boats. The Carondelet began firing when midway between the upper and

lower batteries, and the enemy replied at once with heavy musketry

along the whole line and with his field pieces. The river at this

place is but eighty yards wide, but the enemy, though keeping up a hot

fire, fortunately aimed high, and the boats escaped without loss in an

action lasting eighty minutes. The two steamers were retaken and the

enemy removed their batteries; but they were shortly reestablished.

On the 6th Fitch again engaged them with the Neosho and Carondelet,

desiring to pass a convoy below, but the position was so well chosen,

behind spurs of hills and at a good height above the river, that only

one boat could engage them at one time and then could not elevate her

guns to reach the top without throwing over the enemy. The Neosho

remained under a heavy fire, at thirty yards distance, for two and a

half hours, being struck over a hundred times and having everything

perishable on decks demolished; but the enemy could not be driven

away. The river being thus blockaded the only open communication for

the city was the Louisville Railroad, and during the rest of the time

the gunboats, patrolling the Cumberland above and below, prevented the

enemy's cavalry from crossing and cutting it.

When Thomas made his attack of the 15th, which resulted in the entire

defeat and disorganization of Hood's army, Fitch, at his wish, went

down and engaged the attention of the batteries below until a force of

cavalry detached for that special purpose came down upon their rear.

These guns were taken and the flotilla then dropped down to the scene

of its previous fights and engaged till dark such batteries as it

could see. The routed and disorganized army of the enemy were pressed

as closely as the roads allowed down to the Tennessee, where

Lieutenant Forrest of the Eleventh District aided in cutting off

stragglers. Admiral Lee, who was at once notified, pressed up the

river with gunboats and supply steamers as far as the shoals; but the

low state of the river prevented his crossing them. The destruction of

boats and flats along the river, however, did much to prevent

stragglers from crossing and rejoining their army.

This was the last of the very important services of the Mississippi

Squadron. Five months later, in June, 1865, its officers received the

surrender of a small naval force still held by the Confederates in the

Red River. Our old friend, the ram Webb, which had heretofore escaped

capture, ran out of the Red River in April with a load of cotton and

made a bold dash for the sea. She succeeded in getting by several

vessels before suspected, and even passed New Orleans; but the

telegraph was faster than she, and before reaching the forts she was

headed off by the Richmond, run ashore, and burned. On the 14th of

August, 1865, Admiral Lee was relieved and the Mississippi Squadron,

as an organization, ceased to be. The vessels whose careers we have

followed, and whose names have become familiar, were gradually sold,

and, like most of their officers, returned to peaceful life.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] These were mostly slaves who were running from their masters.

[21] Colonel Brent, Taylor's Chief of Artillery, reported that there

were only four Confederate pieces, two 12-pounders and two howitzers,

in this attack; instead of eighteen, as stated by Porter. Brent was not

present, and Captain Cornay, commanding the battery, was killed. The

pilot Maitland, who was captured the next day, states, in a separate

report made two months later, that he heard among the enemy that the

number was eighteen. Phelps, who, like the admiral, was hardened to

fire, speaks of them as numerous. The reader must decide for himself

the probability of four smooth-bore light pieces striking one small

boat thirty-eight times in five minutes, besides badly disabling three

others.

CHAPTER VIII.

MOBILE.

Admiral Farragut resumed the command of his squadron on January 18th,

1864. His wish was to attack at once the defences of Mobile before the

Confederates had finished the ironclads they were building; but troops

were needed for the reduction of the forts, and the Red River

expedition had diverted those that might have been available.

The city of Mobile is thirty miles from the Gulf, at the head of a

great bay of the same name. The width of the bay varies from fifteen

miles at the lower end to six at the upper; the depth throughout the

greater part is from twelve to fourteen feet, shelving gently near the

shores, but at the lower end there is a deep hole extending from the

mouth north-northwest for six miles, with an average width of two and

a half. In this the depth is from twenty to twenty-four feet. The

principal entrance is from the Gulf direct, between Mobile Point, a

long low projection from the mainland, on the east, and Dauphin Island

on the west, the latter being one of the chain which bounds

Mississippi Sound. The distance between these points is nearly three

miles, but from Dauphin Island a bank of hard sand makes out under

water both east and south, defining one side of the main ship channel,

which closely skirts Mobile Point, and narrowing it to a little less

than two thousand yards. Near the southeast point of this bank there

rise two small islands, called Sand Islands, distant three miles from

Mobile Point. The channel on the other side is bounded by a similar

sand bank running seaward from the Point, the two approaching so that

at Sand Islands they are not more than seven hundred and fifty yards

apart. Vessels of very light draught could also enter the bay from

Mississippi Sound, but it was not practicable for the fleet.

The entrance from the Gulf was guarded by two works, Fort Morgan on

Mobile Point and Fort Gaines on Dauphin Island. The approach by

Mississippi Sound was covered by Fort Powell, a small earthwork on

Tower Island, commanding the channel which gave the most water, known

as Grant's Pass. Gaines was too far distant from the main ship channel

to count for much in the plans of the fleet. It was a pentagonal work

mounting in barbette[22] three X-inch columbiads, five 32-, two 24-,

and two 18-pounder smooth-bore guns, and four rifled 32-pounders;

besides these it had eleven 24-pounder howitzers, siege and for flank

defence. In Fort Powell there were[23] one X-inch, two VII-inch and

one 32-pounder smooth-bore and two VII-inch Brooke rifles; these bore

on the sound and channels, but the rear of the fort toward the bay was

yet unfinished and nearly unarmed. The third and principal work, Fort

Morgan, was much more formidable. It was five sided, and built to

carry guns both in barbette and casemates; but when seized by the

Confederates the embrasures of the curtains facing the channel were

masked and a heavy exterior water battery was thrown up before the

northwest curtain. The armament at this time cannot be given with

absolute certainty.[24] The official reports of the United States

engineer and ordnance officers, made after the surrender, differ

materially, but from a comparison between them and other statements

the following estimate has been made: Main fort seven X-inch, three

VIII-inch and twenty-two 32-pounder smooth-bore guns,[25] and two

VIII-inch, two 6.5-inch and four 5.82-inch rifles.[26] In the water

battery there were four X-inch and one VIII-inch columbiads and two

6.5-inch rifles.[27] Of the above, ten X-inch, three VIII-inch,

sixteen 32-pounders and all the rifles, except one of 5.82 calibre,

bore upon the channel. There were also twenty flanking 24-pounder

howitzers and two or three light rifles, which were useless against

the fleet from their position.

Such were the shore defences. In the waters of the bay there was a

little Confederate squadron under Admiral Franklin Buchanan, made up

of the ram Tennessee and three small paddle-wheel gunboats, the

Morgan, Gaines, and Selma, commanded respectively by Commander George

W. Harrison, and Lieutenants J.W. Bennett and P.U. Murphy. They were

unarmored, excepting around the boilers. The Selma was an open-deck

river steamer with heavy hog frames; the two others had been built for

the Confederate Government, but were poorly put together. The

batteries were: Morgan, two VII-inch rifles and four 32-pounders;

Gaines, one VIII-inch rifle and five 32-pounders; Selma, one VI-inch

rifle, two IX-inch, and one VIII-inch smooth-bore shell-guns. Though

these lightly built vessels played a very important part for some

minutes, and from a favorable position did much harm to the Union

fleet in the subsequent engagement, they counted for nothing in the

calculations of Farragut. There were besides these a few other

so-called ironclads near the city; but they took no part in the fight

in the bay, and little, if any, in the operations before the fall of

Mobile itself in the spring of 1865.

The Tennessee was different. This was the most powerful ironclad

built, from the keel up, by the Confederacy, and both the energy shown

in overcoming difficulties and the workmanship put upon her were most

creditable to her builders. The work was begun at Selma, on the

Alabama River, one hundred and fifty miles from Mobile, in the spring

of 1863, when the timber was yet standing in the forests, and much of

what was to be her plating was still ore in the mines. The hull was

launched the following winter and towed to Mobile, where the plating

had already been sent from the rolling mills of Atlanta.

Her length on deck was 209 feet, beam 48 feet, and when loaded, with

her guns on board, she drew 14 feet. The battery was carried in a

casemate, equidistant from the bow and stern, whose inside dimensions

were 79 feet in length by 29 feet in width. The framing was of yellow

pine beams, 13 inches thick, placed close together vertically and

planked on the outside, first with 5½ inches of yellow pine, laid

horizontally, and then 4 inches of oak laid up and down. Both sides

and ends were inclined at an angle of forty-five degrees, and over the

outside planking was placed the armor, 6 inches thick, in thin plates

of 2 inches each, on the forward end, and elsewhere 5 inches thick.

Within, the yellow pine frames were sheathed with 2½ inches of oak.

The plating throughout was fastened with bolts 1¼ inch in diameter,

going entirely through and set up with nuts and washers inside. Her

gunners were thus sheltered by a thickness of five or six inches of

iron, backed by twenty-five inches of wood. The outside deck was

plated with two-inch iron. The sides of the casemate, or, as the

Confederates called it, the shield, were carried down to two feet

below the water-line and then reversed at the same angle, so as to

meet the hull again six to seven feet below water. The knuckle thus

formed, projecting ten feet beyond the base of the casemate, and

apparently filled in solid, afforded a substantial protection from an

enemy's prow to the hull, which was not less than eight feet within

it. It was covered with four inches of iron, and being continued round

the bows, became there a beak or ram. The pilot-house was made by

carrying part of the forward end of the shield up three feet higher

than the rest. The casemate was covered with heavy iron gratings,

through whose holes the smoke could rise freely, and it was pierced

with ten ports, three in each end and two on each side. The vessel

carried, however, only six guns; one VII-1/8-inch rifle at each end

and two VI-inch rifles on each broadside. These were Brooke guns, made

in the Confederacy; they threw 110-pound and 90-pound solid shot. The

ports were closed with iron sliding shutters, five inches thick; a bad

arrangement, as it turned out.

Though thus powerfully built, armored, and armed, the Tennessee must

have been a very exasperating vessel to her commander. She had two

grave defects; the first, perhaps unavoidable from the slender

resources of the Confederacy, was lack of speed. Her engines were not

built for her, but taken from a high-pressure river steamboat, and

though on her trial trip she realized about eight knots, six seems to

be all that could usually be got from her. She was driven by a screw,

the shaft being connected by gearing with the engines. The other

defect was an oversight, yet a culpable one; her steering chains,

instead of being led under her armored deck, were over it, exposed to

an enemy's fire. She was therefore a ram that could only by a

favorable chance overtake her prey, and was likely at any moment to

lose the power of directing her thrust.

Such as she was the Tennessee was ready for service early in March,

1864, when Commander J.D. Johnston was ordered as her captain. She was

taken from the city, through one of the arms of the Alabama, to the

mud flats which reach to a point twenty miles down the bay, and are

called Dog River Bar. The least depth of water to be traversed was

nine feet, but throughout the whole distance the fourteen feet

necessary to float the vessel could not be counted upon. She was

carried over on camels, which are large floats made to fit the hull

below the water line, and fastened to it, on either side, by heavy

chains passing around them and under the keel, while the camels are

filled with water. When the water was pumped out the buoyancy of the

camels lifted the ram five feet, reducing her draught enough to let

her go over the bar. Two months were taken up in building and placing

the camels, during all which time Farragut was begging either for

ironclads or for co-operation by the land forces, in reducing the

forts. In either case he was willing to enter the bay, but he did not

like to run the risk of getting inside with his wooden ships crippled,

the forts intact in his rear, and the enemy's ironclads to contend

with as well. Neither assistance was given, and he was therefore

compelled to look on while the Tennessee was moved from a position in

which she could do no harm to one in which she became the principal

menace to the attacking fleet. On the 18th of May she was finally

towed across and anchored in the lower bay six miles from the

entrance. That night the camels were removed, steam raised, and

everything made ready to cross the outer bar and attack the fleet;

but when the anchor was weighed the ship was found to be hard aground.

The intended attack was given up, and when the tide rose enough to

float her, she was moved down to Fort Morgan, near which she remained

from that time.

The preparations for defence of the enemy were not confined to the

forts and the ships. From the point of Dauphin Island a line of pile

obstructions extended across the sand bank, in the direction of Fort

Morgan, blocking the passage of any light vessels that might try to

pass that way. Where the piles ended, near the edge of the bank, a

triple line of torpedoes in échelon began, extending across the main

ship channel to a red buoy, distant two hundred and twenty-six yards

from the water battery under Fort Morgan. This narrow passage, not

much exceeding one hundred yards from the beach, was left open for

blockade-runners, and through it the admiral intended his fleet to

pass; for the reports of refugees and the examinations made by

officers of the fleet who dared at night to push their search thus

close under the enemy's guns, alike affirmed that there at least no

torpedoes were.

The torpedoes planted in this part of the defences of Mobile were

principally of two kinds, both of the class known as floating

torpedoes. One was made of an ordinary barrel, lager-beer kegs being

preferred, pitched inside and out and with wooden cones secured to the

two ends to keep it from tumbling over. The barrel was filled with

powder and furnished with several, generally five, sensitive primers,

placed near together in that part of the bilge which was to float

uppermost. The primers were exploded by a vessel striking them and

communicated their flame to the charge. The other torpedo was made of

tin, in the form of a truncated cone, the upper diameter being the

greater. It was divided into two parts, the upper being an

air-chamber and the lower containing the charge. On top was a

cast-iron cap so secured that a slight blow, like that from a passing

vessel, would knock it off. The cap was fast to a trigger, and as it

fell, its weight pulled the trigger and exploded the charge. In July,

1864, there were planted forty-six of the former and one hundred and

thirty-four of the latter kind. Besides these which exploded on

contact there are said to have been several electrical torpedoes.

The first six months of 1864 wore away in the monotonous routine of

the blockade, broken only by an attack upon Fort Powell, made from

Mississippi Sound by the admiral with the light-draught vessels. These

could not get nearer than four thousand yards, but at the time,

February 28th, Sherman was on his raid into Mississippi and the attack

was believed to be of service as a diversion. During this half of the

year none but wooden vessels lay before Mobile. Toward the end of July

the co-operation of Canby's forces was assured and the monitor

ironclads began to arrive.

The root idea from which the monitor type of ironclads grew was a raft

carrying a fort; their hulls, therefore, floated low in the water, the

deck being but a foot or two above it. Upon the deck were one or more

circular turrets, made of one-inch rolled wrought-iron plates, the

whole thickness depending upon the number of these thin plates bolted

together. The decks, and the hulls to some distance below the

water-line, were also armored, but less heavily. In the turret two

guns were mounted, of a size varying with the size of the vessel. They

could be moved in and out, but the aim from side to side was changed

by turning the whole turret, which revolved on a central spindle.

After firing, the ports were turned away from the enemy and the

unbroken iron toward him, until the guns were reloaded. Above and

concentric with the turret was another circular structure, of much

less diameter and similarly armored. This, called the pilot-house,

contained the steering-wheel, and was the station in battle of the

captain, helmsman, and pilot if there were one. It was stationary, not

sharing the revolving motion of the gun-turret, and could be entered

only by a hole opening down into the latter, the top being closed by

iron plates, which had been given greater thickness since a shot in

one instance had struck and broken them, killing the captain of the

vessel. Narrow horizontal slits were cut in the armor of the

pilot-house, through which the captain peered, as through the bars of

a helmet, to see his enemy and direct the course of his ship. The

gun-turret could be entered or left by the hull below, which contained

the living rooms of the officers and crew and all the usual and

necessary arrangements of a ship of war, or by the gun-ports, which

were large enough for a man to pass through. In action the hatches

were down, and ordinarily the only exit from the hull below was

through the turret and its ports. Four of these vessels were sent to

Farragut after many askings and months of delay; two from the Atlantic

coast, the Tecumseh and Manhattan, having ten-inch armor on their

turrets, and two from the Mississippi River, the Chickasaw and

Winnebago, with eight-and-a-half-inch armor. The former carried two

XV-inch guns in one turret; the latter four XI-inch guns in two

turrets. They were all screw ships, but the exigencies of the

Mississippi service calling for light draught, those built for it had

four screws of small diameter, two on each quarter. The speed of the

monitors was poor and, as they had iron hulls, varied much as their

bottoms were clean or foul. From a comparison of differing statements

it may be taken at from five to seven knots.

During these six months, though the admiral paid frequent visits to

the fleet off Mobile, the immediate direction of affairs was left to

the divisional commander, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins, of the

Richmond. In the last week of July, however, Farragut took charge in

person, and sent the Richmond, and others of the blockading force that

were to attempt the entry of the bay, to Pensacola to complete their

preparations. The Manhattan had arrived on the 20th and the Chickasaw

came in from New Orleans on the 1st of August. These, with the

Winnebago, were anchored under the lee of Sand Island; but the

Tecumseh did not get down until the Richmond, with the others,

returned on the night of the 4th; and it was only by the untiring

efforts of her commander and Captain Jenkins that she was ready even

then. With her, and the return of the blockaders, the admiral's force

was complete.

The understanding with General Granger, in immediate command of the

troops, was that he should land on the 4th on Dauphin Island and

invest Gaines, as he had not men enough to attack both forts at once.

The admiral was to pass Morgan and enter the bay the same morning.

Granger landed, but Farragut could not fulfil his part of the bargain,

because so many of his ships were still away. The delay, though he

chafed under it, was in the end an advantage, as the enemy used that

last day of his control of the water to throw more troops into Gaines,

who were all taken two days later.

In forming his plan of attack the admiral wanted two favors from

nature; a westerly wind to blow the smoke from the fleet and toward

Morgan, and a flood-tide. In regular summer weather the wind from

sunrise till eight o'clock is light from the southward and then hauls

gradually round to the west and northwest, growing in strength as it

does so. The tide was a matter of calculation, if no exceptional wind

modified its direction. The admiral wished it flood for two reasons:

first, because, as he intended to go in at any cost, it would help a

crippled ship into the harbor; and secondly, he had noticed that the

primers of the barrel-torpedoes were close together on top, and

thought it likely that when the flood-tide straightened out their

mooring-lines the tops would be turned away from the approaching

ships.

As at New Orleans, the preparations were left very much to the

commanders of ships. A general order directed spare spars and boats to

be landed, the machinery protected, and splinter-nettings placed. As

the fleet was to pass between the eastern buoy and the beach, or two

hundred yards from Morgan, little was feared from Gaines, which would

be over two miles away; the preparations[28] were therefore made

mainly on the starboard side, and port guns were shifted over till all

the ports were full. The boats were lowered and towed on the port

side. The admiral himself and the captain of the Brooklyn preferred to

go in with their topsail yards across; but the Richmond and Lackawanna

sent down their topmasts, and the other vessels seem to have done the

same.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY.]

In the order of battle the wooden ships, as at Port Hudson, were to be

lashed in couples, the lighter vessels on the off hand; the four

monitors in a column inshore and abreast of the leading ships, the

Tecumseh, which led, slightly in advance of the van of the other

column. The admiral had intended to lead the latter himself in the

Hartford, but the representations of many officers led him to yield

his own judgment so far as to let the Brooklyn, whose captain

earnestly wished it, go ahead of him. The order of attack, as it stood

at last, was as follows:

MONITORS--STARBOARD COLUMN.

Tecumseh 1,034 tons, 2[29] guns, Commander T.A.M. Craven.

Manhattan 1,034 tons, 2 guns, Commander J.W.A. Nicholson.

Winnebago 970 tons, 4 guns, Commander Thomas H. Stevens.

Chickasaw 970 tons, 4 guns, Lieut.-Com'r George H. Perkins.

WOODEN SHIPS--PORT COLUMN.

{Brooklyn 2,070 tons, 24 guns, Captain James Alden.

{Octorara 829 tons, 6 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Chas. H. Greene.

{Hartford 1,900 tons, 21 guns, {Rear-Admiral David G. Farragut,

{ {Captain Percival Drayton.

{Metacomet 974 tons, 6 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Jas. B. Jouett.

{Richmond 1,929 tons, 20 guns, Captain Thornton A. Jenkins.

{Port Royal 805 tons, 6 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Bancroft Gherardi.

{Lackawanna 1,533 tons, 8 guns, Captain John B. Marchand.

{Seminole 801 tons, 8 guns, Commander Edward Donaldson.

{Monongahela 1,378 tons, 8 guns, Commander James H. Strong.

{Kennebec 507 tons, 5 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Wm. P. McCann.

{Ossipee 1,240 tons, 11 guns, Commander William B. Le Roy.

{Itasca 507 tons, 5 guns, Lieut.-Com'r George Brown.

{Oneida 1,032 tons, 9 guns, Commander J.R.M. Mullany.

{Galena 738 tons, 10 guns, Lieut.-Com'r Clark H. Wells.

The Octorara, Metacomet, and Port Royal were side-wheel double-enders;

the others were screw ships. All had been built for the naval service.

The evening before the action it was raining hard, but toward midnight

stopped and became clear, hot, and calm. The preparations were all

made and the vessels lay quietly at their anchors; the wooden ships

outside, the monitors behind Sand Island. Later a light air sprung up

from the southwest, thus fulfilling the admiral's wish. He was not

well, sleeping restlessly, and about three in the morning sent his

steward to find out how the wind was. When he learned it was

southwest, he said: "Then we will go in this morning." Soon after, the

hands were turned up and hammocks stowed. Between 4 and 5 o'clock the

lighter vessels came alongside and were lashed to their consorts. At

5.30 the signal was made to get under way and the Brooklyn weighed at

once, the other vessels following in order, the monitors at the same

time standing out from their anchorage. The fleet steamed slowly in to

the bar, to allow its members to take and keep their stations, the

crews in the meantime going to quarters and clearing for action. At

6.10 the bar was crossed by the flag-ship, and by 6.30 the order for

battle was fairly formed and the monitors taking their stations; in

doing which a slight delay occurred. At this time all the ships

hoisted the United States flag at the peak and the three mastheads,

and the Tecumseh fired the first two shots at the fort. At five

minutes before seven the fleet went ahead again, and at five minutes

past the fort opened upon the Brooklyn, the leading ship, which

answered at once with her bow rifle, and immediately afterward the

action became general along the line between the fort, the monitors

(except the Tecumseh), and the bow guns of the fleet; at the same time

the enemy's gunboats moved out from behind Morgan and formed in line

ahead, east and west, across the channel just inside the lines of

torpedoes. From this position they had a raking fire upon the fleet,

which was confined to a nearly north course (north by east), until it

had passed the fort and the buoy. At half-past seven the leading ships

had their broadsides bearing fairly on the works, and while they

maintained that position their heavy fire so kept down the enemy's

that the latter did little harm.

The Tecumseh, after firing the two first guns, as stated above, had

turned her turret from the enemy and loaded again with steel shot and

the heaviest charge[30] of powder. Intent only upon the Tennessee, she

steamed quietly on, regardless of the fort, a little ahead of the

Brooklyn, the other monitors following her closely. As they drew near

the buoy, Craven from the pilot-house of his ship saw it so nearly in

line with the beach that he turned to his pilot and said, "It is

impossible that the admiral means us to go inside that buoy; I cannot

turn my ship." At the same moment the Tennessee, which till that time

had lain to the eastward of the buoy, went ahead to the westward of

it, and Craven, either fearing she would got away from him or moved by

the seeming narrowness of the open way, gave the order "Starboard" and

pushed the Tecumseh straight at the enemy. She had gone but a few

yards and the lockstring was already taut in the hands of an officer

of the enemy's ship, Lieutenant Wharton, waiting to fire as they

touched, when one or more torpedoes exploded under her. She lurched

from side to side, careened violently over, and went down head

foremost, her screw plainly visible in the air for a moment to the

enemy, that waited for her, not two hundred yards off, on the other

side of the fatal line. It was then that Craven did one of those deeds

that should be always linked with the doer's name, as Sidney's is with

the cup of cold water. The pilot and he instinctively made for the

narrow opening leading to the turret below. Craven drew back: "After

you, pilot," he said. There was no afterward for him; the pilot was

saved, but he went down with his ship.

When the Tecumseh sank, the Brooklyn was about three hundred yards

astern of her and a little outside; the Hartford between one and two

hundred yards from the Brooklyn, on her port quarter; the Richmond

about the same distance from the Hartford and in the Brooklyn's wake.

The Winnebago, the second astern of the Tecumseh, was five hundred

yards from her, and the Manhattan in her station, two hundred yards

ahead of the Winnebago; both, however, skirting the beach and steering

to pass inside of the buoy, as they had been ordered. The sunken

vessel was therefore well on their port bow. Unmoved by the fate of

their leader, the three remaining ironclads steamed on in line ahead,

steadily but very slowly, being specially directed to occupy the

attention of the guns ashore, that were raking the approaching ships.

As they passed, the admiration of the officers of the flag-ship and

Metacomet was aroused by the sight of Commander Stevens, of the

Winnebago, walking quietly, giving his orders, from turret to turret

of his unwieldy vessel, directly under the enemy's guns. Five minutes

later were seen from the Brooklyn certain objects in the water ahead,

which were taken at the moment for buoys to torpedoes. The ship and

her consort were stopped and then began to back, coming down upon the

next astern; at the same time their bows fell off toward the fort and

they soon lay nearly athwart the channel. The Hartford's engines were

at once stopped, but, as she held her way and drifted on with the

flood-tide, her bow approached dangerously near the Brooklyn's stern

and the Richmond was close behind; fortunately the rest of the fleet

had opened out somewhat. While the vessels were thus close the admiral

hailed to know what was the matter. "Torpedoes ahead," was the reply.

Farragut, who did not go heedlessly into action, had reckoned on

torpedoes and counted the cost. Without any seeming hesitation, though

in the story of his life it appears that for a moment he felt overcome

till he could throw himself on a Power greater than his own, he

ordered his own ship and his consort ahead, at the same time making

the signal "Close order." From the position of the Brooklyn it was no

longer possible to pass inside, and accordingly, backing the Metacomet

and going ahead with the flagship, their heads were turned to the

westward and they passed outside of the fatal buoy, about five hundred

yards from the fort. As they went over the line the torpedo cases were

heard knocking against the bottom of the ship and the primers

snapping,[31] but none of the torpedoes themselves exploded and the

Hartford went safely through.

Yet, in the midst of Farragut's grave anxieties about the great issues

touching his fleet, the drowning men on board the Tecumseh had not

been forgotten, and, while still fettered by the Brooklyn's action, he

hailed Captain Jouett, of the Metacomet,[32] to know if he had not a

boat that he could send to save them. Jouett, having seen the

disaster, and not having the other cares on his mind, had by a few

instants forestalled the admiral, and the boat was about leaving the

port quarter of the Metacomet, in charge of Ensign H.C. Nields, an

officer of the Volunteer Navy. She pulled round under the Hartford's

stern and broadside, across the bows of the Brooklyn, toward the

wreck, where she saved the pilot, John Collins, and nine of the ship's

company. While on his way Nields, who was but a lad, did one of those

acts, simple in intention, which appeal strongly to the feelings and

imagination and indicate the calm self-possession of the doer. He was

steering the boat himself, and his captain, who was watching, saw him,

after pulling some fifty yards, look up and back to see if the flag

was flying; missing it, he stooped down, took it out of the cover in

which it is habitually kept and shipped it, unfurled, in its place in

the boat before the eyes of friends and foes. His heroic and merciful

errand was not accomplished without the greatest risk, greater than he

himself knew; for not only did he pass under the continued and furious

fire of the fort and the fleet, but the ensign of the forecastle

division of the Hartford, seeing the boat without a flag and knowing

nothing of its object, but having torpedoes uppermost in his mind,

connected its presence with them, trained one of his hundred-pounders

upon it,[33] and was about to pull the lockstring when one of the

ship's company caught his arm, saying: "For God's sake, don't fire! it

is one of our own boats!" The Hartford had passed on when Nields had

picked up the survivors, and, after putting them aboard the Winnebago,

he pulled down to the Oneida, where he served during the rest of the

action. Two officers and five men had also escaped in one of the

Tecumseh's boats, which was towing alongside, and four swam to the

fort, where they were made prisoners; so that twenty-one were saved

out of a complement of over one hundred souls.

Meanwhile the Brooklyn was lying bows on to the fort, undergoing a

raking fire and backing down upon the starboard bow of the Richmond,

whose engines were stopped, but the vessel drifting up with the young

flood-tide. Her captain, seeing a collision in such critical

circumstances imminent, gave the order to back hard both his own ship

and her consort; fearing that, if the four became entangled, not only

would they suffer damage themselves, but, if sunk by the fire of the

fort, would block the channel to the rest of the squadron. As she

backed, the Richmond's bow fell off to port, bringing her starboard

broadside fairly toward the fort and batteries, on which she kept up a

steady and rapid fire, at a distance of from three hundred to one

hundred and fifty yards, driving the enemy out of the water-battery

and silencing it; being at the same time wrapped in a cloud of smoke

which hid her hull and rose above her lower mast-heads.

As her topmasts were down, the ship was thus so completely hidden that

Buchanan, the Confederate admiral, who had had her captain under him

as a midshipman in days long gone by, and again as first lieutenant of

a corvette during the war with Mexico, asked after the surrender:

"What became of Jenkins? I saw his vessel go handsomely into action

and then lost sight of her entirely." While thus backing and fighting

the ship was in great danger of getting aground, having at times less

than a foot of water under her keel; but her commander thought the

situation so critical as to necessitate the risk. During the same time

the Brooklyn, from her unfortunate position, was unable to use any but

her bow guns, and, even when her hull was obscured by the smoke of the

battle, her position was shown to the gunners of the fort by her tall

spars towering above. These moments of anxiety were ended when she

brought her head once more in the right direction and steamed on; the

Richmond followed with the other ships of the port column, which had

closed up and joined in the action during the delay. Their fire, with

the monitors', kept down that of the fort until the bulk of the fleet

had gone by, but when the heavier ships were out of range the enemy

returned to their guns and severely punished the rear of the line; the

last ship, the Oneida, receiving a VII-inch rifle shell, which passed

through her chain armor and into the starboard boiler, where it burst,

the larger part of the watch of firemen being scalded by the escaping

steam. About the same moment a similar projectile burst in the cabin,

cutting both wheel-ropes, while her forward XI-inch gun and one of the

VIII-inch were disabled. In this condition the Oneida was pulled past

the forts by her consort, the Galena.

As the Hartford advanced over the line of torpedoes the three smaller

gunboats of the enemy took their position on her starboard bow and

ahead, whence they kept up a raking and most galling fire, to which

the Hartford, confined to the direction of the channel, could only

reply with her bow guns, one of which was speedily disabled by a shell

bursting under it. As the flag-ship advanced they retreated, keeping

their distance and range about the same, from one thousand to seven

hundred yards, and fighting mainly the stern guns. At no period of the

action did she suffer as now, and the quarters of her forward division

became a slaughter-pen; a single shot killing ten and wounding five

men, while the splinters and shreds of bodies were hurled aft and on

to the decks of her consort. The greater part of the ship's company

had never been in action, but so admirable was their spirit and

discipline that no wavering was seen, nor was there any confusion even

in reorganizing the more than decimated crews of the guns. The

Tennessee meantime waited for her, Buchanan having set his heart on

sinking the enemy's admiral, but as the ram stood down the Hartford

put her helm to starboard and, having the greater speed, avoided the

thrust without difficulty. Two shots were fired by the ram at the same

moment at such short range that it seemed wonderful they missed. The

Tennessee then followed up the bay till her opponent was about a mile

from his own fleet, when for some reason she gave up the pursuit and

turned to meet the other wooden ships, which were advancing in close

order, the Brooklyn still leading. The Tennessee stood for the latter

vessel, as though intending to ram, but sheered off and went by on her

starboard side, at less than one hundred yards, firing two shots,

which struck and went through and through, and receiving the contents

of the Brooklyn's guns in return. She passed on down the line to the

Richmond, which was ready with her broadside and a party of

musketeers, who kept up a brisk fire into the ram's ports. Whether the

aim was thus disordered or there was not time to lay the guns properly

after reloading, the two shots flew high and no harm was done. The

Tennessee passed the next ship, the Lackawanna, also on the starboard

side, but then made a determined sheer toward the line as though

certainly intending to ram. Captain Strong of the Monongahela seeing

this, headed for her, putting his helm to port and then shifting it so

as to strike at right angles, but the Monongahela could not get her

full speed, from having the gunboat Kennebec in tow alongside; she

therefore struck the ram somewhat glancing and on her port quarter.

The blow threw the Tennessee's stern around and she passed close along

the port side of the Kennebec, injuring the planking on the latter's

bow and leaving one of her boats and its iron davit with the gunboat

as a memento of the collision. As she went by she fired a shell which

entered the berth-deck and exploded, seriously wounding an officer and

four men. The Ossipee, which was on the port quarter of the

Monongahela when the collision took place, seeing how the ram was

heading, also put her helm to port following the Monongahela's motion;

but when the ram swung round under the blow she righted it and the

Tennessee passed between the two, giving the Ossipee two shots, which

entered nearly together below the spar-deck abreast the forward pivot

gun. The ram then passed on the starboard side of the crippled

Oneida, about a hundred yards off, and tried to fire her broadside;

but the primers snapped several times, and she only succeeded in

getting off one gun, the shot from which hit the after XI-inch pivot,

which had just been fired at and struck her. She then passed under the

Oneida's stern, delivering a raking fire, and severely wounding

Commander Mullany, who lost an arm. At this moment the Union

iron-clads which, in obedience to their orders, had delayed before the

fort, occupying its guns until the fleet had passed, drew near the

rear wooden ships and opened their fire on the Tennessee. As the enemy

passed under the stern of the Oneida the Winnebago came up and took

position between the two, upon which the crew of the crippled ship,

who were expecting to be rammed, leaped upon the rail and cheered

Commander Stevens, lately their own captain,[34] he having left them

but a few days before.

About the time that the Tennessee gave up her pursuit of the Hartford,

the flag ship reached the point where she was able to keep away a

little to the westward. As she did so her starboard broadside came to

bear and the Confederate gunboats edged off, though still keeping up a

hot fire from their stern guns. A shot soon struck the Gaines under

the port counter below water, and a shell striking soon after near the

same place on the starboard side exploded, also below water, and

started a heavy leak in the magazine. At this time the admiral

directed the Metacomet to cast off and chase the gunboats, specially

cautioning her commander to let none of them escape to Mobile; and a

signal to the same effect was made to the lighter vessels in the

rear. Jouett, who had been impatiently waiting, cut his fasts, backed

clear, and pressed hard after the three, who retreated up the bay. The

Gaines had to haul off toward Morgan at 8.30, the leak increasing

rapidly, but the other two kept on still. The Metacomet, not being

able to fire straight ahead, yawed once or twice to discharge her bow

gun; but finding she lost too much ground by this discontinued it,

though the enemy were still keeping up a harassing fire. The chase led

her into shoal water, the leadsman in the chains reporting a foot less

than the ship drew. The executive officer, having verified the

sounding, reported it to the captain, who, intent simply upon carrying

out his orders, and seeing that the bottom was a soft ooze, replied:

"Call the man in; he is only intimidating me with his soundings." Soon

after this a heavy squall accompanied by rain and dense mist came up,

and during it the Morgan, which was on the starboard bow of the

Metacomet, first got aground, and then getting off ran down to the

southeastward toward Fort Morgan. The Selma kept straight on, as did

the Metacomet; and when the squall lifted the latter found herself

ahead and on the starboard bow of her chase. One shot was fired,

killing the executive officer and some of the crew of the Selma, and

then the latter hauled down her flag, having lost five killed and ten

wounded. The other Union gunboats being far in the rear and

embarrassed by the mist did not succeed in cutting off the

others--both of which escaped under Fort Morgan. The Gaines being

wholly disabled was burnt; the Morgan made good her escape to Mobile

the same night.

After passing down the Union line, Buchanan said to his flag-captain,

it being then about half-past eight: "Follow them up, Johnston, we

can't let them off that way." Five minutes later the Hartford anchored

four miles from Morgan, and the crew were sent to breakfast. Captain

Drayton went up on the poop and said to the admiral: "What we have

done has been well done, sir; but it all counts for nothing so long as

the Tennessee is there under the guns of Morgan." "I know it," said

the admiral, "and as soon as the people have had their breakfasts I am

going for her."[35] Buchanan by his move thus played directly into

Farragut's hands. From some difficulty in the ground it was found

necessary to bring the head of the Tennessee round toward Morgan, and

this, with the length of time occupied in the manoeuvre and the

improbability of her attacking the whole fleet by daylight, caused the

admiral to think that she had retired under the guns of the fort. He

was soon undeceived. At ten minutes before nine, when the crew had

hardly got seated at their breakfast, the Tennessee was reported

approaching. The mess-gear was hustled aside, and the flag-ship at

once got under way, as did the other vessels that had anchored, and

signal was made to the monitors to destroy the ram and to the

Monongahela, Lackawanna, and Ossipee to ram the enemy's principal

vessel. These ships took ground to carry out their orders, and when

the Tennessee was about four hundred yards from the fleet the

Monongahela struck her fairly amidships on the starboard side. Just

before the blow the ram fired two shells, which passed through her

enemy's berth-deck, one exploding and wounding an officer and two men.

She then passed on the starboard side of the Monongahela and received

a broadside at the distance of ten yards, but without harm. The

Lackawanna followed, striking a square blow on the port side at the

after end of the casemate. The Tennessee listed over heavily and swung

round, so that the two vessels lay alongside head and stern, the port

sides touching; but as the Lackawanna's battery had been mostly

shifted to the starboard side to engage the fort she had only one

IX-inch gun available, the shot from which struck one of the enemy's

port shutters driving fragments into the casemates. The Lackawanna

then kept away, making a circuit to ram again. She had her stem cut

and crushed from three feet above the water-line to five below,

causing some leakage, and the Monongahela had her iron prow carried

away and the butt ends of the planking started on both bows; but the

only damage caused to the Tennessee, protected by her sponsons, was a

leak at the rate of about six inches an hour. The flag-ship now

approached to ram, also on the port side; but the Tennessee turned

toward her so that the bluff of the port bow in each ship took the

blow. The Hartford's anchor was hanging from the hawse-pipe, there not

having been time to cat it, and acted as a fender, being doubled up

under the blow, and the two vessels rasped by, the port sides

touching. Most of the Hartford's battery was also on the starboard

side, but there were still seven IX-inch guns which sent out their

solid shot with their heaviest charge of powder; yet at a distance of

ten feet they did the Tennessee no harm. The primers of the latter

again failed her, being heard by the flagship's people to snap

unsuccessfully several times; one gun finally went off, and the shell

exploding on the berth-deck killed and wounded an officer and several

men. This was the last shot fired by the Tennessee. The Hartford put

her helm to starboard and made a circle to ram again, but in mid

career the Lackawanna ran into her, striking near the person of the

admiral, who had a narrow escape from being killed, and cutting the

flag-ship down to within two feet of the water.

Meanwhile the monitors had come up. The Manhattan had lost the use of

one of her XV-inch guns early in the day by a fragment of iron which

dropped into the vent and could not be got out; she was therefore able

to fire only six of her heavy shot, one of which broke through the

port side of the casemate leaving on the inside an undetached mass of

oak and pine splinters. The Winnebago's turrets could not be turned,

so the guns could only be trained by moving the helm and her fire was

necessarily slow. The Chickasaw was more fortunate; her smoke-stack

had been pierced several times by the fort, so that her speed had run

down and she had not yet reached the anchorage when the Tennessee came

up, but by heaping tallow and coal-tar on the furnaces steam was

raised rapidly and she closed with the enemy immediately after the

Hartford rammed and fired. Passing by her port side and firing as she

did so, she took position under her stern, dogging her steadily during

the remainder of the fight, never over fifty yards distant, and at

times almost touching, keeping up an unremitting fire with her four

XI-inch guns.[36]

The bow and stern port shutters of the Tennessee were now jammed, so

that those guns could not be used. Soon her smoke-stack came down and

the smoke rising from its stump poured through the gratings on to the

gun-deck, where the thermometer now stood at 120°. At about the same

time the tiller-chains were shot away from their exposed position over

the after-deck. Losing thus the power of directing her movements, the

Tennessee headed aimlessly down the bay, followed always by the

unrelenting Chickasaw, under the pounding of whose heavy guns the

after-end of the shield was now seen, by those within, to be

perceptibly vibrating. The Manhattan and Winnebago were also at work,

and the Hartford, Ossipee, and other vessels were seeking their chance

to ram again. During this time Buchanan, who was superintending in

person the working of the battery, sent for a machinist to back out

the pin of a jammed port shutter; while the man was at work a shot

struck just outside where he was sitting, the concussion crushing him

so that the remains had to be shovelled into buckets. At the same

moment the admiral received a wound from an iron splinter, breaking

his leg. The command then fell upon Captain Johnston, who endured the

hammering, powerless to reply, for twenty minutes longer; then, after

consultation with the admiral, he hauled down the flag which was

hoisted on a boat-hook thrust through the grating. As it had before

been shot away the fire of the fleet did not stop, and Johnston

accordingly went on the roof and showed a white flag. As he stood

there the Ossipee was approaching at full speed to ram on the

starboard side, passing the sluggish Winnebago, whose captain, still

outside his turret, exchanged greetings with his more fortunate

competitor. Her helm was put over and engines backed at once, but it

was too late to avoid the collision. As they came together her captain

appeared on the forecastle and, along with the blow, Johnston received

a genial greeting from the most genial of men: "Hallo, Johnston, old

fellow! how are you? This is the United States Steamer Ossipee. I'll

send a boat alongside for you. Le Roy, don't you know me?" The boat

was sent and the United States flag hoisted on board the Tennessee at

ten o'clock.[37]

The fight had lasted a little over an hour. The loss of the Tennessee

was 2 killed and 10 wounded, that of the Union fleet, from the forts

and the enemy's squadron, 52 killed and 170 wounded.[38] Besides the

loss of the smoke-stack and steering-gear, the injuries to the

casemate of the ram were very severe. On the after-side nearly all the

plating was found to be started, the after gun-carriage was disabled

and there were distinct marks of nine XI-inch solid shot having struck

within a few square feet of that port. The only shot that penetrated

the casing was the one XV-inch from the Manhattan. Three port shutters

were so damaged as to stop the firing of the guns.

The Chickasaw, which had so persistently stuck to the ram, now took

her in tow and anchored her near the flag-ship. At half-past two of

the same afternoon the Chickasaw again got under way and stood down to

Fort Powell, engaging it for an hour at a distance of three hundred

and fifty yards. The fort had been built to resist an attack from the

sound and was not yet ready to meet one coming like this from the

rear. That same night it was evacuated and blown up.

On the 6th the Chickasaw went down and shelled Fort Gaines, and the

following day it was surrendered. Fort Morgan still held out. The army

under General Granger was transferred from Dauphin Island to Mobile

Point and a siege train, sent from New Orleans, was landed three miles

in rear of the fort on the 17th. In the meantime batteries had been

constructed; and thirty-four guns had been put in position, with

everything ready for opening, on the evening of Saturday the 20th. On

Monday the 22d, at daylight, the bombardment began from the batteries,

the three monitors, and the ships outside as well as inside the bar.

On the 23d the fort surrendered.

Mobile as a port for blockade-running was thus sealed by the fleet

holding the bay; but the gigantic struggle going on in Virginia,

Tennessee, and Georgia hindered for the time any attempt to reduce the

city. That would have withdrawn from more important fields a large

force for a secondary object, which was put off till the following

spring. In the meantime Admiral Farragut went north in December,

leaving Commodore Palmer in command of the squadron till the following

February, when he was relieved by Acting Rear-Admiral H.K. Thatcher.

Palmer, however, stayed by his own wish until the city fell.

Several streams having a common origin and communicating with one

another enter the head of the bay. Of these the chief and most western

is the Mobile River, formed by the junction of the Alabama and

Tombigbee. It empties by two principal branches, of which the western

keeps the name Mobile, the eastern one being called Spanish River; the

city of Mobile is on the west bank of the former. On the east side of

the bay the Tensaw[39] enters, also by two mouths, of which the

western keeps the name and the eastern is called the Blakely River.

The Tensaw and Spanish Rivers have a common mouth about a mile from

the city. It is therefore practicable to go from the Mobile to Spanish

River, and thence to the Tensaw and Blakely without entering the bay.

The works around the city inland were very strong, but it was not

approached from that side. General Canby, commanding the Army of the

West Mississippi, began to move against it in March 1865. One corps

marched from Fort Morgan up the east side of the bay to a small stream

called Fish River, where a landing was secured; the remainder of the

army were then brought to this point in transports. At the same time a

column under General Steele left Pensacola, directing its march upon

Blakely, a point near the mouth of the Blakely River on the east bank.

A short distance below Blakely was Spanish Fort, upon the defence of

which the fate of the city turned.

The gunboats had not hitherto crossed Dog River Bar, partly on account

of the low water and partly because of the torpedoes, which were known

to be thickly sowed thereabouts. It now became necessary for the navy

to cut off the communication of the fort with Mobile by water, while

the army invested it by land. On the 27th of March the fleet moved up

and the bar was safely crossed by the double-ender Octorara, Lieutenant

Commander W.W. Low; and the ironclads, Kickapoo, Lieutenant-Commander

M.P. Jones; Osage, Lieutenant-Commander William M. Gamble; Milwaukee,

Lieutenant-Commander James H. Gillis; Winnebago, Lieutenant-Commander

W.A. Kirkland; and Chickasaw, Lieutenant-Commander George H. Perkins.

They opened that day on the enemy's works, which were invested by the

army the same night.