The Road to Revolution,
1763-1775
[Sidenote: "_For imposing taxes on us without our concent...._"]
The Grenville Program, 1763-1765
In April 1763 George III had to abandon his chief minister and
confidant, the hated Lord Bute, and turn the government over to George
Grenville, leader of the largest Whig block in parliament and
brother-in-law of William Pitt. Grenville's strengths were his
knowledge of trade and public finance, a penchant for hard work and
administrative detail, a systematic mind, and, in an era of corruption,
integrity. His weaknesses were a cold personality and a limited
conception of broad political and constitutional issues. It was said
that Grenville lost the American colonies because he read the
dispatches from America and was well acquainted with the growing
economic maturation and apparent ability of the colonies to bear
heavier taxes. George III, who disliked Grenville immensely, the more
so because he had been forced to accept the Whigs, described him as a
man "whose opinions are seldom formed from any other motives than such
as may be expected to originate in the mind of a clerk in a counting
house." An astute observer might have told George that with the
national debt at £146,000,000 and rising, a man with the logical mind
of a counting clerk might be the answer. Still it was this logical mind
which was Grenville's undoing. As British historian Ian Christie notes,
"all the various provisions of the years 1763 to 1765 made up a
logical, interlocking system. Its one fatal flaw was that it lacked the
essential basis of colonial consent."[10]
[10] Ian R. Christie, Crisis of Empire, Great Britain and the
American Colonies, 1754-1783 (Norton: New York, 1966), 54. The
King's comment on Grenville is cited on p. 39.
Three overriding colonial problems faced Grenville: a new governmental
policy for the former French and Spanish North American territories; a
means to defend these territories from the avowed intentions of the
French and Spanish to reestablish control; and a means to pay the costs
of imperial government and defense.
Western Lands and Defense
There was an immediate need for English government in the former
English and French lands. In October 1763 the Board of Trade proposed,
and the king in council established, a temporary program for western
lands. Under the Proclamation of 1763 a governor-general would run
Quebec (an attempt to get the French colonists to use an elected
assembly failed), the French were confirmed in their land grants, and
the Roman Catholic Church was retained. East and West Florida became
separate colonies. In the disputed lands beyond the Appalachians into
which English settlers had moved as soon as General Forbes occupied
Fort Duquesne in 1758 and where the Indians under Chief Pontiac were in
rebellion against these incursions, no English settlers were allowed
until permanent treaties could be worked out with tribes owning the
lands.
The Grenville ministry had several aims for its western lands policy.
The Proclamation of 1763 would separate the Indians and whites while
preventing costly frontier wars. Once contained east of the mountains,
the colonials would redirect their natural expansionist tendencies
southward into the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida, and northward into
Nova Scotia. Strong English colonies in former Spanish and French
territories would be powerful deterrents to future colonial wars. There
is no indication Grenville believed the Americans would be more easily
governed if contained east of the mountains. His prime aim was orderly,
controlled, peaceful, and inexpensive growth.
The Proclamation of 1763 hurt Virginia land speculators more than
individual colonists. For the Ohio Land Company whose stockholders were
mostly Northern Neck and Maryland gentry, including the Washingtons and
Lees, it was a crushing blow to their hopes for regaining the Forks of
the Ohio and lands on the southern bank of the Ohio granted to them by
the crown in 1749. The rival Loyal Land Company led by Speaker
Robinson, Attorney-General Randolph, and the Nelsons, lost their claims
to the Greenbriar region, but with less invested, they had less to
lose. Also dashed were the hopes of many French and Indian War veterans
who had been paid in western land warrants for their service. Many
veterans ignored the proclamation, went over the mountains, squatted on
the lands, and stayed there with the concurrence of amiable Governor
Fauquier. Most Virginians were little injured by the order for they fit
into Grenville's plan for colonial growth. The general flow of Virginia
migration after 1740 was southward along the Piedmont into the
Carolinas or southwestward through the Valley of Virginia, not north
and northwest to the Forks of the Ohio. In 1768 and 1770 by the
treaties of Fort Stanwix (N.Y.) and Fort Lochaber (S.C.) the Six
Nations and Cherokee Indians gave up their claims to the Kentucky
country as far west as the Tennessee River. The Virginian occupation,
led by John Donelson and Daniel Boone, quickly moved in through the
Cumberland Gap. Not until the Quebec Act of 1774 thwarted their claims
to land north of the Ohio did Virginians react strongly against British
land policy.
To defend the new territories and maintain the old, Grenville proposed
retaining 10,000 British troops in America, stationing them mainly in
Halifax, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and the West Indies from which
they could be moved to trouble spots as needed. The British had learned
from the unpredictable response by the colonies during the French and
Indian War and the nearly disastrous Pontiac Rebellion in early 1763
that the colonies would not, or could not, provide cooperatively for
their own defense even in the face of clear danger. There were too many
inter-colonial rivalries and there was stubborn adherence to the
English tradition that local militia was not to serve outside its own
jurisdiction or for long periods of time. Moreover, the western lands
were primarily an imperial responsibility. Thus, the decision was made
to station British troops in America.[11]
[11] There are those who suggest the troops were sent to America
on a pretext. The ministry, knowing it could not reduce the army
to peacetime size in face of French threats, also knew there was
strong English resentment against "a standing army" in England.
The colonial condition offered an excuse for retaining the men in
arms See Bernhard Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution,
1759-1766 (New York, 1960), chapters 5-9.
In April 1765 parliament passed the Quartering Act, similar to one in
England, requiring colonies, if requested, to provide quarters in
barracks, taverns, inns, or empty private buildings. Although the act
did not apply directly to them, Virginians sided with the hard-hit New
Yorkers who bitterly denounced it as another form of taxation without
representation. So strong was the reaction in New York that her
assembly virtually shut down rather than acquiesce. Finally the New
Yorkers gave in, making the Quartering Act to New York what the Stamp
Act was to Virginia, a symbol of "oppression and slavery." What
parliament could do to one colony she could do to all.
A New Revenue Program
At the heart of the Grenville program were his financial schemes. The
program had three parts: 1) to strengthen and enforce existing Acts of
Trade; 2) to ease inflation and stabilize colonial trade with a uniform
currency act; and 3) to raise additional revenue by applying stamp
taxes to the colonies. Even then Grenville expected to raise only about
one-half the expenses the new empire required. The rest would have to
come from British sources.
To close the loopholes in the Navigation Acts and make them profitable,
Grenville submitted the American Revenue Act of 1764, popularly known
as the Sugar Act. Although the sugar trade provisions were the most
dramatic example of a redirection in the Navigation Acts, the American
Revenue Act contained radical departures from past attitudes and
practices. Heavy duties were applied to foreign goods allowed to enter
the colonies directly, including white sugar, Madeira wine, and coffee.
Many goods formerly allowed to enter the colonies directly were placed
on the list of enumerated articles which must pass through England
before being shipped to the colonies. The act, although slightly
reducing the duty on French West Indian foreign molasses, contained
strict provisions for its collection omitted from the laxly enforced
Molasses Act of 1733. The British fleet was stationed along the
American coast to assist the customs service in enforcing the act.
Parliament created a new vice-admiralty court to sit at Halifax without
a jury as an alternative to the colonial vice-admiralty courts whose
juries were notoriously biased against the customs officers and whose
judges often were colonials engaged in illicit trade.
In the Sugar Act, Grenville and parliament took the existing Navigation
Acts and reasserted parliamentary authority over imperial trade,
reaffirmed the 17th Century colonial philosophy that the colonies
existed to promote the welfare of the mother country and the empire,
granted trade monopolies to British merchants and manufacturers where
none existed before, and discriminated in favor of one set of colonies,
the British West Indies, and against another set, the North American
colonies. To this was added a new principle--the Navigation Acts should
not only regulate trade, they should produce revenue. Cleverly designed
within the constitutional system, the Sugar Act brought howls of
protests from New England and Middle Colony traders, smugglers and
legitimate operators alike, who had flourished under the benevolence of
"salutary neglect" for the past half-century. For many Americans the
new act with its favoritism to British and West Indian merchants, its
use of the navy as law enforcer, and the founding of a vice-admiralty
court in Nova Scotia with jurisdiction over all America was an abuse of
parliament's power. As events developed the Sugar Act was a failure.
The old act designed for regulatory purposes, cost approximately three
times as much to enforce as the revenues collected; the new act,
expected to produce annual revenues of about £100,000, averaged about
£20,000 in revenues at an annual cost of over £200,000.
The Currency Act of 1764
Virginians, only indirectly effected by the Sugar Act, were deeply
effected by the second part of the Grenville program--the Currency Act
of 1764. During the French and Indian War Virginia had printed several
paper money issues to finance the war and provide currency in the
specie-short colony. The various issues, eventually totaling over
£500,000, circulated for a fixed number of years and then were to be
redeemed upon presentation to the treasurer, Speaker John Robinson. As
the war lengthened and the number of paper money issues increased,
considerable confusion developed over the amount of money outstanding,
the rate of exchange, and its use as legal tender for personal debts as
well as public taxes. Although backed by the "good will" of the General
Assembly, this money (called "current money") was discounted when used
to pay debts contracted in pounds sterling. Although the official
exchange rate set by the assembly was £125, Virginia current money
equalled £130-£165 per £100 sterling, averaging £155-£160 in 1763 and
early 1764. The citizens were compelled by law to accept inflated
Virginia paper currency as legal tender for debts which they had
contracted in pounds sterling. The fiscal problems were most critical
in Virginia, but they also existed in most colonies outside New England
whose colonies parliament restricted under a currency act in 1751. In
response to pleas from London merchants, Grenville devised and
parliament passed the Currency Act of 1764, prohibiting the issuing of
any more paper money and commanding all money in circulation to be
called in and redeemed.
The result in Virginia was sheer consternation, especially among the
hard-pressed Tidewater planters. In the process of calling in the money
a severe currency shortage developed and some financial hardship
occurred at the same time the Stamp Act took effect. More significant
than the economic impact was the political impact of the Currency Act
on Virginia politics and the political fortunes of key Virginians.
Among the many Virginians caught up in the Currency Act none was more
involved than Speaker John Robinson. At his death in May 1766 an audit
revealed massive shortages in his treasurer's account books resulting
from heavy loans to many Tidewater gentry and political associates. The
Robinson scandal brought about a redistribution of political leadership
in Virginia and brought into the leadership circle the Northern Neck
and Piedmont planters who formerly were excluded.[12]
[12] For a favorable and convincing view of Virginia's motives in
passing the paper money bills, see Joseph Ernst, "Genesis of the
Currency Act of 1764, Virginia Paper Money and the Protection of
British Investments", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., XXII,
3-32, and "The Robinson Scandal Redivius", Virginia Magazine of
History and Biography, LXXVII, 146-173. Ernst is critical of
Robinson's political use of the funds. For a more charitable view
of Robinson's actions, see the outstanding biography by David
Mays, Edmund Pendleton 1721-1803 (Harvard Press, 1952), 2 vols.
Pendleton was the executor of the Robinson estate.
The third facet of the Grenville revenue plan was the infamous Stamp
Act. Grenville and his aides perceived the tax bill as a routine piece
of legislation which would extend to the colonies a tax long used in
Britain. Grenville announced in March 1764 the ministry's intention to
present to the commons a stamp tax bill at the February 1765 session of
parliament. He "hoped that the power and sovereignty of parliament,
over every part of the British dominions, for the purpose of raising or
collecting any tax, would not be disputed. That if there was a single
man doubted it, he would take the sense of the House...." As another
observer put it, "Mr. Grenville strongly urg'd not only the power but
the right of parliament to tax the colonys and hop'd in Gods Name as
his Expression was that none would dare dispute their Sovereignty."[13]
The House of Commons, as quick as the Virginia House of Burgesses to
proclaim its sovereignty rose to Grenville's bait and declared in a
resolution of March 17, 1764 that "toward defending, protecting, and
securing the British colonies and Plantations in America, it may be
proper to charge certain Stamp Duties in the said Colonies and
Plantations...." In that simple phrase parliament declared its full
sovereignty over the colonies and from it never retreated.
[13] Both quotes cited in Edmund and Helen Morgan, The Stamp Act
Crisis paperback edition (Collier Books: New York, 1962), 76.
This is the standard work on the Stamp Act.
Virginia and the Stamp Act, 1764
That Grenville might have hoped that the "power and sovereignty of
Parliament ... would not be disputed" suggests the degree to which he
did not comprehend 18th Century colonial constitutional developments.
Virginia reaction was immediate, clear, unequivocal, and illustrative
of just how deeply ingrained were Virginia's constitutional positions
about the limits of parliamentary authority. In 1759 the General
Assembly had elected a joint committee to correspond regularly with its
London agent and to instruct him on matters of policy and legislation
pending in England. This committee was meeting on July 28, 1764, in
Williamsburg drafting instructions to agent Edward Montagu on the Sugar
Act when word arrived from Montagu about the commons resolution. The
Committee of Correspondence's reply was instantaneous:
That no subjects of the King of great Britain can be justly made
subservient to Laws without either their personal Consent,
or their Consent by their representatives we take to be the most
vital Principle of the British Constitution; it cannot be denyed
that the Parliament has from Time to Time ... made such Laws as
were thought sufficient to restrain such Trade to what was judg'd
its proper Channel, neither can it be denied that, the Parliament,
out the same Plentitude of its Power, has gone a little Step
farther and imposed some Duties upon our Exports....
P.S. Since writing the foregoing Part ... we have received your
letter of the parliam'ts Intention to lay an Inland Duty upon us
gives us fresh Apprehension of the fatal Consequences that may
arise to Posterity from such a precedent.... We conceive that no
Man or Body of Men, however invested with power, have a Right to do
anything that is contrary to Reason and Justice, or that can tend
to the Destruction of the Constitution.[14]
[14] Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XII, 10, 13.
Comprising the committee were Councilors John Blair, William
Nelson, Thomas Nelson, Sr., Robert Carter, and Burgesses Peyton
Randolph, George Wyth, Robert Carter Nicholas, and Dudley Digges.
Navigation Acts were acceptable, Stamp Acts were a "Destruction of the
Constitution."
In May Grenville met with the colonial agents in London and possibly
suggested (his intent has been disputed) that a stamp tax might not be
imposed if the colonial legislatures came up with alternative taxes. At
least Montagu thought this is what Grenville suggested. The Virginia
committee even told Montagu in its July letter, "if a reasonable
apportionm't be laid before the Legislature of this Country, their past
Compliance with his Majesty's several Requisitions during the late
expensive War, leaves no room to doubt that they will do everything
that can be reasonably expected of them." It made no difference, for
even before the agents could receive replies from their various
colonies, Grenville had fixed upon the stamp act itself. This was
probably just as well for the Virginians, once they reflected on the
requisition scheme, came to believe that taxes imposed by the General
Assembly to offset a threatened tax by parliament were as unpalatable
and unconstitutional as a tax passed by parliament.
On December 18, 1765, the Virginia General Assembly confirmed the
constitutional stance taken by its committee in July. Unanimously the
House of Burgesses and the council sent a polite address to the king,
an humble memorial to the House of Lords, and a firm remonstrance to
the commons. The commons' resolution of March 17 was against "British
Liberty that Laws imposing Taxes on the People ought not be made
without the Consent of Representatives chosen by themselves; who at the
same time that they are acquainted with the Circumstances of their
Constituents, sustain a Proportion of the Burthen laid upon them."[15]
From this position, Virginia never retreated.
[15] William Van Schreeven and Robert Scribner, Revolutionary
Virginia: The Road to Independence, Vol. I. A. Documentary Record
(University Press of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1973), 9-14. This
volume contains the main revolutionary statements of the
assembly, conventions, and certain county and quasi-legal local
gatherings, 1763-1774.
By the time parliament took up the Stamp Act in February 1765, the die
was already cast. Members of parliament were outraged by the
presumptuous claims of the colonial assemblies to sovereignty co-equal
with itself. Only a few members questioned the wisdom of the act. Issac
Barré won fame as a patriot member of parliament for his eloquent
defense of the colonies as he called on the Commons to "remember I this
Day told you so, that same Spirit of Freedom which actuated that people
at first, will accompany them still." Yet even Barré would not deny
parliament's right to pass the tax. The House of Commons refused even
to receive the petitions from the colonial legislatures and passed the
act into law on March 22, 1765.
Covering over 25 pages in the statute book, the Stamp Act imposed a tax
on documents and paper products ranging from nearly all court
documents, shipping papers, and mortgages, deeds, and land patents to
cards, dice, almanacs, and newspapers, including the advertisements in
them. Charges ranged from 3d to 10s, with a few as high as £10, all to
be paid in specie. Virtually no free man in Virginia was left untouched
by the tax. Edmund Pendleton, upon hearing of its passage, lamented
"Poor America".
The law was to become effective on November 1, 1765.
The Stamp Act Resolves, May 1765
That the May 1765 session of the Virginia General Assembly became one
of the most famous in the state's history was totally unanticipated by
all political experts. The only reason Governor Fauquier called the
session was to amend the frequently revised tobacco planting and
inspection law. The Stamp Act already had been taken care of by the
remonstrance in December. A new issue did develop when Governor
Fauquier announced that all outstanding Virginia paper currency must be
redeemed by March 1st, after which it no longer would be legal tender.
As the money poured into the treasurer's office, it rapidly became
apparent what Richard Henry Lee had suspected as early as 1763 and what
many debt-ridden Tidewater planter-burgesses personally knew--Robinson
was tens of thousands of pounds short in his accounts. The shortage,
which turned out to be £106,000, derived from the speaker-treasurer's
habit of lending his fellow planters tax funds to pay private debts to
British merchants. The speaker, whom Jefferson called "an excellent
man, liberal, friendly, and rich", had anticipated improvement in the
economic climate would bring the money in. Meanwhile he could always
rely on his own great private fortune. He failed to count on the
continued economic depression, the passage of the Currency Act, or the
living standards of his debtors. Something had to be done and quickly.
While the tobacco revision was working its way through committees, the
speaker and his debtor-burgess friends devised a public loan office
plan to take up the debts, provide an alternative source for funds, and
relieve Robinson of his burden. Such a plan would have raised the ire
of Richard Henry Lee, but the burgess from Westmoreland was sitting out
this supposedly "short, uneventful meeting." He had made a monumental
error in political judgment, having applied to the crown to be the
Stamp Act agent in Virginia. Robinson knew this and quietly warned Lee
that he should stay home. Robinson did not anticipate the unlikely duo
which would bring down the public loan office. Leading the opposition
in the House was Patrick Henry, first-term burgess from Louisa County.
Directing his attack against favoritism and special interest
legislation, Henry, who had developed a thriving legal trade
representing creditors against debtors, knew whereof he spoke when he
exclaimed, "What, sir, is it proposed then to reclaim the spendthrift
from his dissipation and extravagance, by filling his pockets with
money?" Robinson had the votes and carried the house, but lost in the
council whose members disliked all public finance schemes. Chief
opponent was Richard Corbin, wealthy, receiver-general of royal
revenues and later Tory. In words nearly identical to Henry's, Corbin
noted, "To Tax People that are not in Debt to lend to those that are is
highly unjust, it is in Fact to tax the honest, frugal, industrious
Man, in order to encourage the idle, the profligate, the Extravagant,
and the Gamester". Council defeated the loan plan. With the tobacco
laws revised and the loan scheme defeated and only routine legislation
in committee, most burgesses left town.
Exactly when or why Patrick Henry, George Johnston of Fairfax, and John
Fleming of Cumberland decided to offer the Stamp Act Resolves is lost
in obscurity. Our sources are principally Thomas Jefferson, then a
college student at William and Mary, Paul Carrington, a pro-Henry
burgess from Charlotte County, and an unknown French traveler who stood
with Jefferson at the house chamber doors. Jefferson and Carrington did
not record their thoughts until a half-century later, during which the
sequence of events became blurred by time. The Frenchman, who stood
with Jefferson at the house chamber doors, missed the subtleties of the
language and parliamentary procedure. One thing is clear--men who heard
Patrick Henry never forgot the impression he made on them.
Governor Fauquier suggested that many burgesses were not satisfied with
the remonstrance against the Stamp Act in December. Although he
described the remonstrance as "very warm and indecent", he told the
Board of Trade the original version was much more inflammatory and its
language was "mollified" so that the Assembly could convey its
opposition to the Stamp Tax without giving the "least offense" to crown
and parliament. Fauquier also observed that economic uncertainties had
made Virginians "uneasy, peevish, and ready to murmur at every
Occurrence." Henry suggests that he drew up the Resolves when he found
no one else was willing to do so after hearing of the actual passage of
the Tax Act. Whatever the reason, Henry and his associates were ready
to abandon the niceties of formal address and constitutional subtleties
and to give "offense", especially in view of parliament's refusal to
hear the remonstrance.
Only 39 of the 119 elected burgesses were sitting on May 29, 1765 when
Patrick Henry introduced and George Johnston seconded seven resolutions
for consideration by the house. The first five stated:
Resolved, That the first Adventurers and Settlers of this his
Majesty's Colony and Dominion brought with them and transmitted to
their Posterity and all other his Majesty's Subjects since
inhabiting in this his Majesty's said Colony, all the Privileges,
Franchises and Immunities that have at any time been held, enjoyed,
and possessed by the people of Great Britain.
Resolved, That by two royal Charters granted by King James first
the Colonists aforesaid are declared intituled to all the
Privileges, Liberties, and Immunities of Denizens and natural-born
Subjects, to all Intents and Purposes as if they had been abiding
and born within the Realm of England.
Resolved, That the Taxation of the People by themselves or by
Persons chosen by themselves to represent them, who can only know
what Taxes the People are able to bear, and the easiest Mode of
raising them, and are equally affected by such Taxes Themselves, is
the distinguishing Characteristic of British Freedom and without
which the ancient Constitution cannot subsist.
Resolved, That his Majesty's liege People of this most ancient
Colony have uninterruptedly enjoyed the Right of being thus
governed by their own assembly in the article of the Taxes and
internal Police, and that the same hath never been forfeited or any
other way given up but hath been constantly recognized by the Kings
and People of Great Britain.
Resolved, Therefore that the General Assembly of this Colony have
the only and sole exclusive Right and Power to lay Taxes and
Impositions upon the Inhabitants of this Colony and that every
Attempt to vest such Power in any Person or Persons whatsoever,
other than the General Assembly aforesaid, has a manifest Tendency
to destroy British as well as American Freedom.
There were two other resolves which apparently were defeated during
debate while the house was in committee. The record is not clear. In
one sense it makes no difference. All seven were printed and circulated
in the other colonies and in London as if they were the official
actions of the Virginia House of Burgesses. They read:
Whereas, the honorable house of Commons in England have of late
drawn into question how far the general assembly of this colony
hath power to enact laws for laying of taxes and imposing duties,
payable by the people of this, his majesty's most ancient colony:
for settling and ascertaining the same to all future times, the
house of burgesses of this present general assembly have come to
the following resolves:
Resolved, That his majesty's liege people, the inhabitants of this
colony, are not bound to yield obedience to any law or ordinance
whatever, designed to impose any taxation whatsoever upon them,
other than the laws or ordinances of the general assembly
aforesaid,
Resolved, That any person who shall, by speaking or writing, assert
or maintain that any person or persons, other than the general
assembly of this colony, have any right or power to impose or lay
any taxation on the people here, shall be deemed an enemy to his
majesty's colony.[16]
[16] Ibid., 15-18; resolves 6 and 7 are cited in Meade, Henry, I,
171.
The first four resolves were straightforward restatements of the
remonstrance and Bland's earlier declarations against parliamentary
authority. The fifth went beyond control over taxes to exclude all
duties, even navigation duties for regulatory purposes. The sixth and
seventh were "pure Patrick Henry", reminiscent of his statements before
the Hanover jury in the Parsons' Cause, probably treasonous, certainly
incendiary and revolutionary.
Discussion lasted all through the 29th with the opposition led by
Richard Bland, George Wythe, Peyton Randolph, Speaker Robinson, and
Benjamin Harrison contending that the time was inappropriate for more
resolutions. Both house and council were already on record against the
Stamp Act which no Virginian wanted. More resolutions were unnecessary,
especially resolutions which were as inflammatory as these. Sometime
during these debates the sixth and seventh resolves were eliminated.
Probably the next day, May 30th, the first four resolves passed by
votes of 22-17 with little real objection to the substance only to the
wisdom of more resolutions.
The fifth resolution was another story. The stumbling block was the
phrase "only and sole exclusive Right and Power to lay Taxes".
Jefferson called the debate "most bloody". Henry, in his will, called
them "violent Debates. Many threats were uttered, and much abuse cast
on me...." Some time during the debates, observers agree, Henry
exclaimed the theme of his immortal phrase:
Tarquin and Caesar had each his Brutus, Charles the First his
Cromwell, and George the Third--'Treason' proclaimed Speaker
Robinson--may profit by their Example. If this be Treason, Make the
most of it.
His speech may have been embellished by time. There can be no denying,
however, what Jefferson 40 years later remembered. "Torrents of sublime
eloquence from Mr. Henry, backed by the solid reasoning of Johnson,
prevailed."
The fifth measure carried by one vote, 20-19, causing Peyton Randolph
to mutter as he pushed through the door past Jefferson, "by God, I
would have given 500 guineas for a single vote."[17]
[17] A guinea equalled 21 shillings or £525. Later Jefferson said
100 guineas. Jefferson's comments are found in Stan. V. Henkels,
"Jefferson's Recollections of Patrick Henry," Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, XXXIV, 385-418.
How had these two men, Henry and Johnston brought it off. One was 29,
the other 65; one was a first-time burgess, the other a veteran member.
(Henry was not as unknown as popular myth would have it. He had been in
Williamsburg during the debates over the remonstrance and had
represented a client in an election fraud case before the house.)
First, they had benefited from the departure of two-thirds of the
burgesses; second, there was the frustration over parliament's outright
refusal to even read the remonstrance; third, there was the formation,
probably by Johnston, of a coalition of the younger generation of
planter-gentry living in the Piedmont, the ambitious backcountry
burgesses, and the Northern Neck faction led by Francis Lighfoot Lee of
Loudoun and Thomas Ludwell Lee of Stafford; fourth, there was Henry
himself, of whom Jefferson at a time when he had come to dislike Henry,
still could say "he was the best humoured man in society I almost ever
knew, and the greatest orator that ever lived. He had a consummate
knowledge of the human heart, which directing the efforts of his
eloquence enabled him to attain a degree of popularity with the people
at large never perhaps equalled."[18]
[18] The record is sparse because no recorded votes were kept; so
the only known votes in favor of the Resolves were: Henry of
Louisa, Johnston of Fairfax, John Fleming of Cumberland, Henry
Blagrave and William Taylor of Lunenburg, Robert Munford and
Edmund Taylor of Mecklenburg, and Paul Carrington and Thomas
Reade of Charlotte. As the twists of fate would have it, all
these counties except Fairfax were named for the Hanoverians. It
is almost certain the Lee brothers voted "yes".
With the five resolves passed, Henry departed Williamsburg. Enough
Tidewater votes were corralled by Robinson and Councilor Peter Randolph
the following day, the 31st, to rescind and expunge from the record the
fifth resolve. Much to the chagrin of Fauquier, no attempt was made to
remove the first four.
As with the sixth and seventh resolves, this last-ditch effort made no
difference. The public printer, conservative Joseph Royle of the
Virginia Gazette, refused to publish the resolves at all. What
went into print outside the colonies were the four true resolves, plus
the three spurious ones, often made more radical in tone as they were
reprinted. The effect was electric. If this was the expression of the
Virginia House of Burgesses, long thought to be the most reasoned in
its approach to constitutional issues, then a new day had arrived. No
wonder patriots in Philadelphia, Newport, New York, and Boston shouted
with joy when they read them and responded with equally vigorous
statements, although all stopped short of the direct words of the sixth
and seventh resolves. Massachusetts, which for once had lagged behind,
called for a Stamp Act Congress to meet in New York in October.
Virginia did not attend, for Governor Fauquier would not call the
assembly into session to elect representatives. Virginians did not need
to be there. Everyone knew where they stood. The Stamp Act Congress
quickly picked up the spirit, although not the strident language of the
Henry Resolves, and declared all taxes, internal and external, should
be repealed.
Too much should not be made of the division between the Henry-Johnston
forces and the Robinson-Randolph-Bland-Wythe group. The division was
not one of concern about the goal, but rather the means to be used to
reach the unanimously agreed-upon goal--how to retain rights Virginians
believed were theirs and which they thought they were about to lose.
What Henry had done was to imbue "with all the fire of his passion the
protest which the House of Burgesses had made in 1764 in rather tame
phraseology. In neither case was there a difference of principle; in
both, all the difference in the world in power and effect."[19]
[19] Hamilton J. Eckenrode, Revolution in Virginia (New York,
1916), 22.
The effect was permanent. Said Jefferson, "By these resolutions Mr.
Henry took the lead out of the hands of those (who) had heretofore
guided the proceedings of the House, that is to say, of Pendleton,
Wythe, Bland, Randolph, Nicholas. These were honest and able men, who
had begun the opposition on the same grounds, but with a moderation
more adapted to their age and experience. Subsequent events favored the
bolder spirits of Henry, the Lees, Pages, Mason etc." And as soon as he
could join them, Jefferson.
The Stamp Act Crisis: 1765-1766
The Stamp Act brought violence, rioting, and destruction in several
colonies. Virginia met the act with rigid non-compliance, reasoned
arguments, "friendly persuasion", non-importation of British goods, and
finally, nullification of the act altogether. Virginians of all ranks
united against the Stamp Act as they were not to unite against any
British action thereafter. No one defended the act. Virginians were
aided by the complicity and courage of soft-spoken Governor Francis
Fauquier.
Enforcing the Stamp Act depended upon having a law to enforce, a
commissioner to administer it, and stamps to attach to the documents.
Colonel George Mercer, prominent planter who had won the commissioner's
post from Richard Henry Lee, arrived in Williamsburg from London on
October 30, 1765. The law was to take effect on November 1. As Mercer's
ill-luck would have it, the Virginia General Court was in session and
hundreds of citizens were in town, many of them the leading gentry and
lawyers. Hearing that Mercer had arrived, a crowd quickly gathered and
moved on the Mercer family residence. Learning of their coming, Mercer
set out to meet them. At once they demanded to know whether or not he
would resign his post. Mercer pleaded for time and promised an answer
before the law would become effective. With that he went to what is now
Mrs. Christiana Campbell's coffee house where the governor was eating.
The crowd followed. After talking with Mercer briefly, the governor
invited him to the palace and walked unescorted with Mercer through the
assembled hundreds. Privately to the Board of Trade, Fauquier remarked
that he would have called the crowd a "mob, did I (not) know that it
was chiefly if not altogether composed of Gentlemen of property in the
Colony, some of them at the Head of their Respective counties, and
Merchants of the Country, whether English, Scotch, or Virginia."
Mercer, after talking with the governor, returned to his father's house
and discussed the situation with his brothers. The next morning he
found 2,000 Virginians assembled and awaiting his answer. Concluding it
was "an Impossibility to execute the Act" and "being obliged to submit
to Numbers", he resigned as commissioner and wrote Fauquier that he had
no stamps with which to execute the act. With that the crowd carried
him off in triumph to the coffee house.
Virginia developed a clever legal stratagem to allow the tobacco fleet
to sail without the required stamps. Here the agreement of governor,
gentry, merchants, and ship captains was essential. Once Mercer had
resigned and stated he had no stamps for the customs office, Councilor
Peter Randolph, in his capacity of Surveyor General of His Majesty's
Customs, declared the ships could sail for England with the stamps on
the ships' manifests. Governor Fauquier then followed with sealed
certificates for each ship captain attesting to this fact and relieving
the captains of any responsibility for non-compliance. With that the
tobacco fleet sailed off to England and Scotland.
The other Virginia institution most effected by the tax was the court
system. The General Court closed. Many county courts did likewise. At
the suggestion of Richard Henry Lee, the Westmoreland County court on
September 24, 1765 stated it would not sit again until the Stamp Act
was repealed. Northampton County court took a radically different
approach proposed by Littleton Eyre and stayed open, declaring the
Stamp Act "did not bind, affect or concern the inhabitants of this
colony, inasmuch as they conceive the same to be unconstitutional." The
neighboring Eastern Shore county of Accomac followed suit. Edmund
Pendleton advised James Madison, Sr., that justices of the peace should
serve on the county courts and the courts should stay open, for the
justices had taken an oath to uphold the law since the Stamp Act was
unconstitutional, they would not be violating their oaths if they held
court without the stamps. It was a strange restructuring of British
constitutional procedure which saw Virginia county courts and
individual justices of the peace declaring the laws of parliament
unconstitutional. Nullification of the law was at hand.
Most county courts stayed closed to pursue Lee's tactics of applying
pressure on British merchants who needed the courts to enforce
contracts and collect debts. By closing the courts and boycotting
British imports, the Virginians put pressure on the merchants who put
pressure on the government. Asserting pressure in a more direct manner,
Lee and his fellow gentry, and any other freeholders who wanted to
attend, gathered at Leedstown, Westmoreland County, on February 27,
1766 and drew up an "association". They restated the Stamp Act Resolves
and asserted that should anyone comply with the Stamp Act the
"associators--will with the utmost Expedition convince all such
Profligates, that immediate danger and disgrace shall attend their
prostitute Purpose." Should any associator suffer as a result of his
action, the others pledged "at the utmost risk of our Lives and
Fortunes to restore such Associate to his Liberty." The next day the
associators crossed over the Rappahannock to Hobb's Hole and
"convinced" Tory merchant Archibald Ritchie to forego his announced
intention to use stamps. A similar association in Norfolk, the Sons of
Liberty, actually tarred and feathered ship captain William Smith, tied
him to a pony cart and dragged him through Norfolk streets to Market
House. Along the way by-standers, including Mayor Maximilian Calvert,
heaved rocks and rotten eggs at the hapless captain whose final
humiliation came when he was tossed into the harbor beside his
ship.[20] Small wonder ship captains did not sail to Virginia and
London merchants were quickly submitting petitions against the Stamp
Act.
[20] The resolution of the Westmoreland and Northumberland
courts, and Leadstown Association, and the Norfolk Sons of
Liberty are found in Van Schreeven and Scribner, Revolutionary
Virginia, I, 19-26, 25-48.
Repeal and the Declaratory Act, 1766
In July 1766 for reasons unrelated to the American crisis, George III
replaced the Grenville ministry with a new ministry, headed by the
Marquis of Rockingham, which included the Duke of Newcastle, Henry
Conway, and the Duke of Grafton. Missing was the Old Whigs principal
leader, William Pitt, who preferred to pursue his independent and
mercurial ways. The Rockingham ministry, most of whose members had
disliked the Stamp Act from the beginning, drew their greatest strength
from the merchant communities. By the time parliament opened in
December, Rockingham and his supporters were in agreement--the act must
be repealed. But how? The violence and riots in Boston and Newport had
raised cries against property destruction while the extreme
constitutional position attributed to Virginia and the Stamp Act
Congress challenged the very heart of parliament's sovereignty. Pitt
hardly helped Rockingham by excoriating Grenville and exclaiming, "I
rejoice that America resisted."
Pitt did, however, inadvertently propose the solution when he concluded
his denunciation by saying:
... the Stamp Act (must) be repealed absolutely, totally, and
immediately. That a reason be assigned, because it was founded on
an erroneous principle. At the same time, let the sovereign
authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as
strong terms of legislation whatsoever. That we may bind their
trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power
whatsoever, except that of taking their money out of their pockets
without their consent.[21]
[21] Cited in Morgans, Stamp Act, 335. The discussion which
follows accepts as convincing the Morgan's contention, pgs.
15-154, that the colonists made no distinction between internal
and external taxes in theory, only between taxes in general and
navigation acts for regulatory purposes.
Pitt, following the resolution of the Stamp Act Congress, defined
"legislation" to mean laws governing trade for regulation and general
government, but not internal or external taxes.
By January the clamor for repeal in financially-stricken London rose to
fever pitch, but no solution which admitted that the act was based on
"erroneous principle" would pass. Finally, a Declaratory Act was passed
embodying the ambivalent statement to the effect that parliament did
have the power to make laws binding on the colonies "in all Cases
whatsoever." Though Pitt and the colonists interpreted laws to mean
everything except taxes, others interpreted it to mean taxes; and still
others interpreted it to mean internal but not external taxes. But the
ambivalence was removed when Pitt and Isaac Barre sought to remove the
phrase "in all cases whatsoever" to prevent it being used to justify
taxes. They failed. Thus, when the Declaratory Act passed, most members
of parliament were convinced they had declared their authority to levy
taxes even though they had repealed a specific tax, the Stamp Tax.
In that same series of debates and those which followed on repeal
itself, the idea grew in the minds of many members that the colonists
had made a distinction between "internal" and "external" taxes--the one
levied on goods and services inside the colony and the other levied
outside the colony or before the goods reached the colony. The first
might be the prerogative of the colonial assembly, the other of
parliament. Undoubtedly, many seized upon the distinction between
"internal-external" as a principle they could accept in the midst of a
serious setback and failure. If so, they were helped along by a
magnificent presentation by Benjamin Franklin, agent for Pennsylvania,
who presented the colonial case to the commons. In his astute and often
clever way, Franklin dodged the internal-external issue, knowing full
well most house members would not accept the idea of complete colonial
autonomy on tax matters, while the colonists would accept nothing less.
He hoped repeal would remove the immediate difficulty and parliament
would avoid the taxation issue in the future. His brilliant
presentation was instrumental in gaining repeal of the Stamp Act, but
the short-term solution created long-term confusion.[22]
[22] ibid., 327-352.
Nevertheless, repeal was achieved and a collective sigh of relief was
heard in London and in the colonies. The colonists rejoiced in their
victory. A few men like George Mason read the Declaratory Act and the
debates carefully and concluded that the act did not disavow
parliament's taxing power. Until a specific disclaimer was included,
the problem was not solved. Mason was particularly defiant and
sarcastic about the claims by London merchants that they had been able
to gain repeal only by promising good behavior from the colonies in the
future and warning the Virginians not to challenge parliament again. In
his reply Mason mockingly declared:
The epithets of parent and child have been so long applied to Great
Britain and her colonies, that ... we rarely see anything from your
side of the water free from the authoritative style of a master to
a schoolboy:
"We have with infinite difficulty and fatigue got you excused this
one time; pray be a good boy for the future, do what your papa and
mama bid you, and hasten to return them your most grateful
acknowledgements for condescending to let you keep what is your own
... and if you should at any time hereafter happen to transgress,
your friends will all beg for you and be security for your good
behaviour; but if your are a naughty boy,... then everybody will
hate you, and say you are a graceless and undutiful child; your
parents and masters will be obliged to whip you severely...."[23]
[23] Robert A. Rutland, ed., Papers of George Mason, 3 vols.
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1970), I, 65-73.
One other Virginian did not rest until he had challenged the notion,
much discussed in parliament by commons member Soame Jenyns, that the
colonists, like all British citizens, were "virtually" represented in
parliament. To Richard Bland nothing could be more vital to the rights
of British subjects than to be represented "directly" by those whom
they knew and whom they chose to represent them. In March 1766 he
published his magnificent defense of Virginia rights, An Inquiry
into the Rights of the British Colonies. He would not concede to
parliament the notion that the colonies and colonists were represented
"virtually" in that body just as the nine out of ten Englishmen were
who did not have the vote, or because members of commons were elected
from districts in which they did not live or own property, or because
nearly every profession and "interest", be it merchant, farmer, west
Indian planter, physicians, soldier, clergy, and even a few Americans
sat in parliament. The Inquiry was a hard-hitting defense of
"direct representation". Interlaced with citations to the ancient
charters of Virginia were terms of fury--"detestable Thought",
"Ungenerous Insinuation", "despicable Opinion", "slavery",
"oppression", terms which suggest the level to which rhetoric had risen
even for as rational a man as the moderate burgess from Prince George
County, now grown "tough as whitleather" with "something of the look of
musty old Parchments which he handleth and studieth much". The
Inquiry was widely read in Virginia and England and its
statement on "direct representation" became the standard American
defense against "virtual representation" and any half-way measure which
would have given the colonies a few seats in parliament in the manner
of Scotland or Wales.
Still the conservative Bland, who said things in a most radical way,
was among those most happy to read Governor Fauquier's proclamation of
June 9, 1766 announcing Repeal.[24]
[24] For the full text of Bland's Inquiry, see Van Schreeven and
Scribner, Revolutionary America, I, 27-44.
British Politics and the Townshend Act, 1766-1770.
The fluid British political situation shifted again in July 1767. The
conciliatory Rockingham ministry, having brought off the Stamp Act
repeal and modification of the Sugar Act of 1764, could not sustain
itself in office. Members of both commons and lords had fought doggedly
against repeal and accepted defeat only after considerable patronage
pressures from the ministry. These ministry opponents were determined
to reassert, on the first opportunity, parliament's authority over the
colonies, believing to delay such a confrontation was a sign of
weakness. Within the Rockingham ministry personality conflicts
developed which eventually brought the ministry to a standstill.
George III correctly perceived that his government faced an emergency.
In this crisis he turned to Pitt to lead a new ministry. In one way the
king and Pitt were alike. They were "probably the only men in the
eighteenth century to believe absolutely in (their) own slogans about
patriotism, purity, and a better system of conducting government."[25]
On the other hand they differed as to what these terms meant. The
intent was good, the timing was wrong. Pitt, for reasons still somewhat
obscure, accepted a peerage and became Lord Chatham and opened the door
to cries of corruption and sell-out by the "Great Commoner." More
significantly, Chatham was trying to lead a ministry from the House of
Lords. He could not bring it off and sank deeper into that melancholia
which left him mentally incapacitated during much of his ministry's
short life.
[25] J. Steven Watson, THE REIGN OF GEORGE III (Oxford, 1960), 4.
American affairs fell into the hands of the brilliant, egotistical,
unstable, and ambitious Charles Townshend, whom Pitt called in as his
chancellor of the exchequer. Townshend was one of those junior
government officials who, during the French and Indian War, had
discovered the economic richness and maturity of the colonies and their
constitutional rebelliousness. He had opposed repeal and represented
the gradual infiltration of ministry positions by men who believe the
colonists should pay for their government in a manner which
forthrightly established parliamentary supremacy. In the 1750's he had
developed a plan to bring the colonies into check. Once given the
opportunity by Chatham, he seized it with enthusiasm. That opportunity
came with the huge deficit in American defense costs for 1766 and New
York's intransigent defiance of the Mutiny Act of 1765 (the Quartering
Act.)
The Revenue Act of 1767 (the Townshend Act) was a direct challenge to
colonial self-government and a true measure of the chancellor's
insensitivity and folly. Citing the supposed distinction between
"internal" and "external" taxes, a distinction which he, himself, did
not believe existed, Townshend proposed import duties on glass, paints,
lead, paper, and tea, of which only tea was a potential producer of any
real revenue. The funds from these import duties were assigned to pay
the salaries of colonial governors and other royal officials and were
not for defense expenditures. Had Townshend calculated a means for
arousing the ire of the colonists, he could not have chosen a better
device. It was an injustice that Townshend died suddenly before he had
to wrestle with the consequence of his actions.
By 1769 Chatham finally realized he could not longer govern and
resigned the government to his hero-worshipping follower, the Duke of
Grafton, ostensibly over the decision of Chatham's own ministers to
dismiss General Jeffrey Amherst as titular governor of Virginia and
replace him with Norbonne Berkeley, Baron de Boutetourt.[26] Actually,
Chatham's policies in Europe and America had been repudiated and
"hardliners" were regaining power. Grafton managed to hold on and to do
nothing until February 1770 when the Whig majority completely fell
apart and the king turned to Lord North and the Tories to run the
country.
[26] Ibid. (From 1710 to 1768 the governor for Virginia did not
reside in the colony, choosing instead to accept a fixed salary
and agreeing to send in his stead a lieutenant-governor who
actually exercised all the power. This system ended with Amherst
and his lieutenant-governor, Francis Fauquier, who died in March
1768.)
One result of this political infighting and personality conflict was
support for the king. Amidst the factionalism, corruption, and greed,
independent members of parliament saw the crown as the only means for
creative, effective leadership. For that reason George, after 1770, not
only had a minister he could work with, he had a more tractable
parliament aided by the complete disintegration of the Whigs and a
hardening attitude toward the Americans whose actions bordered on
disloyalty, if not treason.
Virginia Politics, 1766-1768
Political leadership in Virginia also underwent a change after 1766.
Unlike Britain, the changes in Virginia broadened political leadership
to include the new elements which emerged during the Stamp Act debates,
the Lee-Henry group. It also brought into power those who were less
likely to be satisfied with political addresses and constitutional
niceties should parliament pass into law the powers it claimed in the
Declaratory Act.
In May 1766 Speaker-Treasurer John Robinson died. His death coincided
with the murder by his son-in-law, Colonel John Chiswell, of Robert
Routledge of Cumberland County in a tavern fight. Although his
father-in-law and his Randolph relatives managed to gain his release
from jail pending trial, Chiswell believed he was going to be convicted
if the case came to trial and chose suicide to jail. Both events shook
the Robinson-Randolph leadership and the gentry everywhere. Robinson's
death brought into the open the extent of his financial problems and
persons to whom he had loaned money.
In 1766 Virginians were treated to another new phenomenon--an open and
free press. From 1732 when William Parks set up the Virginia Gazette
until 1766 there had been only one paper in the colony. Besides the
paper relied heavily upon the government, both royal and assembly, for
printing contracts, the Gazette tended to print only news which would
not offend. After 1766 there were three Virginia Gazettes, being
published simultaneously in Williamsburg by William Hunter, William
Rind, and Alexander Purdie. In aggressively seeking subscribers and
advertisers in lieu of government printing contracts the two new papers
gave extensive coverage to the Robinson scandals, the Chiswell murder
case, and the running debates between the various candidates for
Robinson's offices. From 1766 on Virginians had a public forum for
political debates in the letters-to-the-editor columns on British
policies and actions.
The immediate result of Robinson's death was the division of his two
offices. After vigorous campaigning previously unknown in Virginia,
Peyton Randolph won out as speaker over the Lee candidate, Richard
Bland. Robert Carter Nicholas, who had conducted the first newspaper
campaign in Virginia, was elected treasurer. John Randolph replaced his
brother as attorney-general. Major changes came in the house committees
where Lee, Henry, and friends were placed on the powerful Committee on
Elections and Privileges. The death of Robinson did not result in an
overthrow of the Tidewater leadership. Virginia leadership has seldom
changed in a dramatic fashion. Instead, the prevailing groups have
tended to expand just enough to include those who gained political
power, but not those who have demagogically courted it.
Lee, with his great planter family tradition, was merely admitted to a
house leadership at a time when most members were sharing his
passionate dislike of the British. Henry won his spurs not before the
crowd but on the floor of the House of Burgesses. At a time when the
British were falling into greater factionalism, the Virginians were
healing breaches. The willingness of Richard Bland, a cousin of Peyton
Randolph, to run for the speakership with Lee-Henry backing is one
example of this truth.
The Townshend Act in Virginia, 1767-1771
Reaction to the Townshend Act was greatest in the northern colonies
which it most directly affected. Reaction was sharpest in
Massachusetts. There the legislature passed and distributed a circular
letter in February 1768 urging all colonies to join in a petition to
the king against the intent of the act--to make the governor and other
officials financially independent from the legislatures over which they
presided. The situation in Massachusetts, as it had in the latter
stages of the Stamp Act Crisis, quickly degenerated into violence, and
General Gage had to send British troops to restore order in Boston.
The Virginia General Assembly was in session when the circular letter
arrived in April 1768. The house formed a committee headed by Bland to
draw up another petition to the king, memorial to the lords, and
remonstrance to the commons. Moderate in tone, but forceful in defense
of Virginian's rights, the 1767 Remonstrance protested parliament's
passage of the tax package and perhaps most forcefully denounced
parliament's action in closing the New York legislature for opposing
the Mutiny Act. The council concurred in these addresses. Before the
assembly could move on to bolder actions, the meeting was prorogued by
President John Blair. The assembly did not meet again until May 1769.
In the interim Lord Botetourt arrived to replace Fauquier who had died
in March 1768.
By the time the burgesses reassembled other colonies had formed
non-importation agreements and were boycotting British goods. On May 16
the House of Burgesses adopted resolutions reasserting its exclusive
right to levy taxes in Virginia and condemning recent parliamentary
proposals to transport colonists accused of treason to England for
trial. George Washington introduced a non-importation plan devised by
Richard Henry Lee and George Mason. Before the house could act
Botetourt dissolved the assembly. This time most of the house moved up
the street to the Raleigh Tavern where 89 of them signed a
non-importation association on May 18, 1769. Lee, Mason, and Washington
proposed a ban on tobacco exports as well, but lost. The association
called for a ban on British imports, a reduced standard of living to
lessen dependence of British credit, and the purchase of goods produced
in America. Hopefully, the British merchants again would bring pressure
on parliament.
The association, which was voluntary and lacked enforcement procedures,
was only partially successful in Virginia. A second association was
announced in May 1770 following repeal of all the Townshend duties
except the tea duty. By late summer the boycott had collapsed although
the association was not dissolved until 1771.
Neither in Virginia nor the other colonies did the Townshend protests
arouse the passions or unanimity of support generated by the Stamp Act.
The lack of strong reaction may have been the result of a number of
factors. The Townshend duties applied to goods which were less widely
used than those affected by the Stamp Act. The Virginia economy was
still struggling to recover its forward momentum, and the merchants who
had to bear the greatest burden in the boycott were reluctant to
protest too strongly. In addition, the colonists had a feeling the
duties would be repealed. Most importantly, the imposition of a duty to
pay for the governor's salary was no issue in Virginia where the
assembly had given the governor a permanent salary in 1682.
In 1770 the duties, except for the Tea Tax, were repealed. George
Mason, Thomas Nelson, Jr., and Thomas Jefferson lamented the retention
of the Tea Tax as a symbol of British oppression and supported the
half-hearted "association". Most Virginians agreed with Robert Carter
Nicholas' plea:
Let things but return to their old channel, and all will be well;
We shall once more be a happy people.
The False Interlude, 1770-1773
The Chesapeake tobacco economy rebounded sharply upward in the early
1770's. The recovery from the recession of the 1760's soothed many
ruffled feelings and Virginians were "once more a happy people."
Unfortunately it was a false prosperity. The old economic problems
reappeared in 1773. Overproduction of tobacco, overextension of credit
by British merchants, speculation in lands and tobacco, and inflated
prices caused the tobacco economy to collapse. The crisis first
appeared when several leading Glasgow merchants failed. They were
unable to pay their own creditors and unable to call in money from
Virginia. Several large London firms followed the Scots into
bankruptcy, and a general retrenchment of tobacco credit followed
throughout 1773 and into 1774.
The calm produced by repeal of the duties also was false. There were
many Englishmen who understood the problem. Said Edmund Burk, the most
creditable opponent of the various tax schemes and the most cogent
defender of colonial liberty in parliament:
The Americans have made a discovery, or think they have made one,
that we mean to oppress them. We have made a discovery, or think we
have made one, that they intend to rise in rebellion against us...
we know not how to advance; they know not how to retreat....
Lord North put his finger squarely on the issue as it remained
unresolved after 1770:
The language of America is, We are not subjects of the king; with
parliament we have nothing to do.
That is the point at which the factions have been aiming; upon that
they have been shaking hands.
The empire was being held together by a king. Affection for the crown
and love for the British constitution as the best government in the
world was the hallmark of Virginia loyalty. Not until the eve of
independence did Virginians come to believe that the king, himself, had
subverted the constitution. When they did they could no longer "shake
hands". Only outside the empire could the blessings of the true
constitution be retained.
In October of 1770, the beloved governor, Lord Botetourt died. His
successor, the Earl of Dunmore, arrived in July of 1771.
The Road to Revolution, 1773-1774
Virginia tobacco planters and merchants were not alone in their
distress. From India came word of serious, even disastrous, troubles
plaguing the East India Company. The company not only controlled the
tea market, it also governed India for the British. Collapse of the
company would be a major disaster for the crown, company, country, and
colony together. To save the company the north ministry proposed, and
parliament approved, laws to improve company management, lend it money,
lower but enforce the duty on tea, and grant the company a monopoly on
tea sales in England and America.
Reaction in Virginia was quick and pointed. The Tea Act of 1773 raised
two highly volatile issues: the right to tax and the granting of a
trade monopoly on tea. In both instances the principle was most
bothersome. The tea tax was small, but as Bland had said of the Pistole
Fee, "the question then ought not to be the smallness of the demand,
but the Lawfulness of it." A small tax successfully collected would
lead to other levies. Also, a successful monopoly of the tea trade
granted to the East India Company could be followed by similar actions
to the detriment of all American traders, merchants, and consumers. The
discriminatory uses of both taxing power and the Navigation Acts became
pointedly clear in a time of economic decline in which no one was
proposing loans and special privileges for Virginia tobacco planters.
Bland had been right--"LIBERTY and PROPERTY are like those precious
Vessels whose soundness is destroyed by the least flaw and whose use is
lost by the smallest hole."
Virginia was already prepared for intercolonial action. In June 1772
the British ship, Gaspee, ran aground while on customs duty in
Narragansett Sound. Rhode Islanders burned the ship to the water line,
injuring the captain in the process. When the guilty colonists, who
were well-known members of the Providence community, were not
apprehended, a royal proclamation was issued decreeing trial in England
for any of the culprits caught and granting use of troops to help
apprehend them. A royal commission was dispatched to Rhode Island. Such
a commission, if once the precedent was established, could be used
against all the colonies.
For a long time Richard Henry Lee had been advocating an intercolonial
committee of correspondence. Now the time had come to act and for all
the colonies to be more alert to these "transgressions" and "intrusions
upon justice." On March 12, 1773 the House of Burgesses, on a motion by
Dabney Carr, burgess from Albemarle County and brother-in-law to
Jefferson, established a Committee of Correspondence composed of Bland,
Richard Henry Lee, Henry, Jefferson, Robert Carter Nicholas, Benjamin
Harrison, Edmund Pendleton, Dudley Digges, Carr, and Archibald Cary to
inquire into the Gaspee affair. More importantly, the resolution called
upon all the other assemblies to "appoint some person or persons of
their respective bodies to communicate from time to time, with the said
committee."[27] Said an unknown "Gentleman of Distinction" (probably a
Lee) in the Virginia Gazette the following day, "... we are
endeavoring to bring our Sister Colonies into the strictest Union with
us; that we may resent, in one Body, any Steps that may be taken by
Administration to deprive any one of us the least Particle of our
Rights and Liberties." Within months every colony had a committee of
correspondence. And within months the "Administration" would deprive
Boston of its rights and liberties.
[27] For the resolution see, Van Schreeven and Scribner,
Revolutionary Virginia, I, 89-92. Also note that this committee
consists of men who ware on opposite sides of the fence in the
Stamp Act debate in 1765.
The Boston Tea Party and the Intolerable Acts
Reaction to the Tea Act was nearly unanimous. The tax should not be
paid and a boycott on tea imposed. A boycott developed in Virginia.
Merchants exhausted their stocks and refused to replenish them. Most
Virginians ceased drinking tea. No one, however, was prepared to resort
to violence, so there was little sympathy among Virginians for the
destruction of tea in Boston harbor by a "tribe of Indians" on December
16, 1774. Old colonial friends in England including Burke, Chatham,
Rose Fuller, and even Isaac Barré were also shocked.
Parliament saw the issue as order, government by law, protection of
private property, and even treason. The long history of riotous actions
by Bostonians was recalled. The commons decided that the time had come
to stand firm. Repeal of the Stamp Act and Townshend Duties had not
brought respect for and acceptance of authority. Mason's "dutiful
child" now was to be "whipped". Boston must be brought into line for
her obstreperousness. The response of parliament was slow, measured,
and calculated. The Coercive Acts (the English name, not the colonial)
took two months to pass. By these acts: 1) the port of Boston was
closed until the destroyed tea was paid for; 2) the Massachusetts
government was radically restructured, the governor's powers enhanced,
and the town meetings abolished; 3) trials of English officials accused
of felonies could be moved to England; and 4) a new Quartering Act
applicable to all colonies went into effect.
At the same time, and unconnected with the Coercive Act, parliament
rendered its final solution to the western land problems by passing the
Quebec Act of 1774. Most of the provisions of the Proclamation of 1763
respecting government were made permanent. All the land north of the
Ohio was to be in a province governed from Quebec. Lost was the hope of
many Virginia land company speculators and those in other colonies as
well. Not only was the land now in the hands of their former French
enemies in Quebec, but the land would be distributed from London and
fall into the hands of Englishmen, not colonials. Coming as it did just
after Governor Dunmore and Colonel Andrew Lewis and his land-hungry
valley frontiersmen had driven the Shawnees north of the Ohio in the
bloody battle of Point Pleasant (1774) (also called Dunmore's War), the
Quebec Act was seen in Virginia as one more act of an oppressive
government, one more act in which the Americans had suffered at the
expense of another part of the empire. That the act was a reasonable
solution to a knotty problem was overlooked.
When the Virginians talked about the Coercive Acts, they called them
the Intolerable Acts and included not just the four Massachusetts laws
but the Quebec Act as well.
Word of the Boston Port Bill and the intent of the other Intolerable
Acts reached Virginia just as the assembly prepared to meet on May 5,
1774. Public indignation built rapidly even among small planters and
farmers who knew little of the constitutional grievances. They could
not understand the "mailed fist" stance implicit in the acts. With the
necessary legislation out of the way, the house on May 24, 1774
appealed to the public at large to send aid to their blockaded
fellow-colonists in Boston. They then declared June 1st, the day the
Boston port was to be closed, "a day of Public Fasting, Prayer, and
Humiliation." A sense of inter-colonial camaraderie was building. Any
reservations Virginians had about the propriety of the Tea Party was
lost in the furious reaction to the Intolerable Acts. Governor Dunmore
on May 26 dissolved the assembly for its action. He could not prevent
the day of fasting and prayer from occurring on June 1st. Nor could he
halt the determined burgesses.
On May 27th the burgesses reassembled informally in Raleigh Tavern,
elected Speaker Randolph to be their moderator, and formed an
association which was signed by 89 burgesses. At the urging of Richard
Henry Lee, the most ardent exponent of intercolonial action, the
burgesses issued a call for the other colonies to join in a Continental
Congress. They then agreed to reassemble in Williamsburg on August 1st
to elect and instruct delegates to the congress and to formulate plans
for a non-importation, non-exportation agreement to bring total
pressure on British merchants.
It would be a year before Lexington and Concord and two years before
the Declaration of Independence, but the revolution in Virginia had
already begun in the true meaning of John Adams' words "the Revolution
was in the minds and hearts of the people." After May 17 the center of
Virginia government moved from the General Assembly to the Virginia
Conventions. The assembly would meet briefly in June 1775, but the real
"mind and heart" of Virginia would be in the convention.