CHAPTER XV.

THIRTEENTH CONGRESS. MAY 27, 1813.

Democratic gain in Congress -- Spirit in which the two

parties met -- Russian mediation offered and accepted, and

commerce opened -- State of the Treasury -- Debate

respecting a reporter's seat -- Direct Tax -- Webster's

resolutions -- Governor Chittenden -- Strange conduct of

parties in New Hampshire -- The embargo -- England proposes

peace -- Commissioners appointed -- Army bill -- Webster's

speech upon it -- Sketch of him -- The loan bill -- Defended

by Mr. Eppes -- Sketch of Mr. Pickering, with his speech --

Sketch of John Forsyth, and his speech -- Calhoun --

Grosvenor -- Bill for the support of military establishments

-- Speech of Artemus Ward -- Resolutions of Otis in the

Massachusetts Senate -- Repeal of the embargo -- Calhoun and

Webster -- Strange reversal of their positions -- Strength

of our navy and army, 319

HISTORY OF THE SECOND WAR WITH ENGLAND.

CHAPTER I.

A REVIEW OF THE CAUSES LEADING TO THE SECOND WAR WITH ENGLAND.

Duplicity and oppressive acts of the British Government

contrasted with the forbearance of the United States --

Character of Madison -- Debates in Congress on War measures

-- Declaration of War.

The peace which closed our revolutionary struggle was like a wound

healed only at the surface, and which must be opened anew before a

permanent cure can be effected. The desire for territory had become

the ruling passion of the British Empire, and the loss of the most

promising part of her vast possessions could not, therefore, be borne

with equanimity. The comparatively barren and inhospitable tract lying

north of the St. Lawrence and the lakes, which still belonged to her,

was but a sorry substitute for the rich alluvial bottoms that

stretched along the western rivers, while the mouth of the St.

Lawrence furnished but a meagre outlet compared with the noble rivers

and capacious harbors that seamed the inland and indented the coasts

of the Atlantic slope. Some have supposed that England had never

abandoned the design of recovering a part, if not the whole of the

possessions she had lost on this continent. If this be true, that

purpose was doubtless a very vague one, and it depended entirely on

circumstances whether it ever assumed a definite form. One thing,

however, is certain, she had determined to narrow down our limits

wherever it was practicable, and to the fullest extent of her power.

This is evident from the eagerness with which she urged us to

acknowledge the various Indian tribes on our frontier, as independent

nations. She wished to have them placed on a footing with other

sovereign States, so that they could form treaties and dispose of

territory to foreign governments. Numerous and powerful tribes then

roamed undisturbed over vast tracts which have since become populous

States. Could Great Britain have purchased these, or had them

colonized by other foreign powers, nearly the whole line of lakes and

the territory west of Lake Erie would have presented an impenetrable

barrier to our growth in the north-west. Not succeeding in this

policy, she determined that the Indians should retain possession of

the land as her allies. This is evident from the constant disturbance

kept up on our north-western frontiers--from Lord Dorchester's

speeches instigating the Indians to war, and from the fact that an

English fort was erected within the territory of the republic. So

resolved was the British Government on this course that it for a long

time refused to carry out the stipulations of the treaty of 1783, and

still retained American posts captured by its forces during the

revolutionary war. The defeat of General Harmar, in 1790, and of St.

Clair, in 1791, were not wholly owing to our inefficiency or to Indian

prowess, but to British interference and encouragement.

The victory of Wayne, which followed these disastrous expeditions,

proved this true. Canadian militia and volunteers were found in the

Indian armies, while the battle that completed their overthrow ended

under the walls of a British fort standing on American ground. These

violations of a sacred treaty, and undisguised encroachments upon our

territory on the frontier, were afterwards surpassed by still greater

outrages at sea.

The French revolution exploding like a volcano in the heart of Europe,

followed by a republic whose foundation stones were laid in the

proudest blood of France--the extinction of the Bourbon dynasty, and

the loud declaration of rights which startled every despot from the

Archangel to the Mediterranean like a peal of thunder, had covered the

continent with hostile armies. The European powers who rejoiced in the

success of the revolutionary struggle on these distant shores, because

it inflicted a blow on their proud rival, saw with consternation the

principle that sustained it at work in their midst. Like the first

crusade against the infidels, which at once healed all the animosities

of the princes of Europe, a second crusade, harmonizing powers

hitherto at variance, was formed against this principle of human

rights, and the allied armies moved down upon the infant republic of

France. The devastating flood of feudalism would soon have swept

everything under but for the appearance of that strange embodiment of

power, Napoleon Bonaparte. Rolling it back from the French borders, he

commenced that long and fearful struggle which ended only at Waterloo.

England rashly formed a coalition with the continental powers,

anticipating an easy overthrow to the plebeian warrior, but soon found

herself almost alone in the conflict; and instead of treading down her

ancient rival, began to tremble for her own safety. The long and

deadly strife that followed exhausted her resources and crippled her

strength. Her war ships stretched from Copenhagen to the Nile, and to

supply these with seamen, she resorted to impressment not only on her

own shores, amid her own subjects, but on American ships, among

American sailors. Our merchant vessels were arrested on the high seas,

and men, on the groundless charge of being deserters, immediately

coerced into the British service. To such an extent was this carried,

that in _nine months_ of the years 1796 and '97, Mr. King, the

American minister at London, had made application for the release of

_two hundred and seventy-one seamen_,[1] most of whom were American

citizens.

[Footnote 1: Vide letter of Mr. King to the Secretary of State.]

At first the British Government claimed only the right to seize

deserters; but its necessities demanding a broader application to

right of search, her vessels of war arrested American merchantmen to

seek for _British seamen_, and later still, for British

subjects--finally, every sailor was obliged to prove himself a citizen

of the United States on the spot, or he was liable to be forced into

British service. American merchants were thus injured while

prosecuting a lawful commerce, and worse than all, great distress was

visited on the friends and relatives of those who were illegally torn

from their country and pressed into the hated service of a hated

nation. Over six thousand were known to have been thus seized, while

the actual number was much greater.

Not content with committing these outrages on the high seas, English

vessels boarded our merchantmen and impressed our seamen in our own

waters. That line which runs parallel to the sea coast of every

nation, and which is considered its legitimate boundary, presented no

obstacles to British cruisers.

In 1804, the frigate Cambria boarded an American merchantman in the

harbor of New York, and in direct opposition to the port officers,

carried off several of her seamen. To complete the insult, the

commander declared, in an official letter to the British Minister,

that he "considered his ship, while lying in the harbor of New York,

as _having dominion around her within the distance of her buoys_." Not

long after a coasting vessel while going from one American port to

another, was hailed by a British cruiser, and, refusing to stop, was

fired into and one of her crew killed. Thus an American citizen was

murdered within a mile of shore, and while going from port to port of

his own country.[2]

[Footnote 2: Vide Letter of Madison to Mr. Rose, the British Minister,

dated March 5th, 1808.]

These aggressions on land and insults at sea continued, at intervals,

down to 1806, when our commerce received a more deadly blow from the

British orders in council, and Napoleon's famous Berlin and Milan

decrees. To annoy and cripple her adversary, England declared the

whole coast of France, from Brest to the Elbe, in a state of blockade.

Napoleon retaliated by the Berlin decree, in which he declared the

British Islands in a state of blockade. The next year the English

government issued other orders in council, blockading the whole

continent, which were met by Napoleon's Milan decree.

These famous orders in council, so far as they affected us, declared

all American vessels going to and from the harbors of France and her

allies, lawful prizes, except such as had first touched at, or cleared

from an English port. The Berlin and Milan decrees, on the other hand,

pronounced all vessels that had so touched at an English port, or

allowed themselves to be searched by a British cruiser, the property

of France, while British goods, wherever found, were subject to

confiscation. In short, if we did not confine our commerce to England,

the latter would seize our merchantmen, wherever found, as lawful

prizes, while if we did trade with her, or even touch at her ports at

all, France claimed them as her property.

England, without the slightest provocation, had commenced a war

against France, and irritated at her want of success, declared her

coast in a state of blockade--thus violating an established law of

nations. The principle has long been admitted and acted upon by the

principal maritime nations of the world, that neutral flags have a

right to sail from port to port of the belligerent powers, to carry

any merchandise whatever, except those contraband of war, such as

arms, munitions of war, or provisions for the enemy. The only

exception to it is an actual blockade of a port where neutrals are

forbidden an entrance. This principle is founded in common justice;

otherwise two strong maritime nations might make a third neutral power

the greatest sufferer from the war. Besides, if the right to create

paper blockades is allowed, no restrictions can be placed upon it, and

in case of another war with England, she could declare the whole coast

of America, from Maine to Mexico, and that portion of our territory on

the Pacific, in a state of blockade, while the naval force of the

world could not maintain an _actual_ one.

The injustice of these retaliatory measures was severely felt by our

government. They placed us, a neutral power, in a worse attitude than

if allied to one or the other we had been at open war with the third,

for in the latter case our war ships could have defended our commerce,

which would also have been under the protection of the cruisers of our

ally. But now our men-of-war were compelled to look silently on and

see American merchantmen seized, while two nations, instead of one,

claimed the right to plunder us. Our commerce for the last few years

had advanced with unparalleled strides--so that at this time our

canvass whitened almost every sea on the globe, and wealth was pouring

into the nation. Suddenly, as if the whole world, without any

forewarning, had declared war against us; the ocean was covered with

cruisers after American vessels, and the commerce of the country was

paralyzed by a single blow.

But the most extraordinary part of the whole proceeding was, that

while England, by her orders in council, shut the Continent from us

and confiscated as a smuggler every American vessel that attempted to

enter any of its ports, she herself, with _forged_ papers, under the

American flag, carried on an extensive trade. The _counterfeit_

American vessel was allowed to pass unmolested by British cruisers,

while the real American was seized. It was estimated that England made

fifteen thousand voyages per annum in these disguised vessels, thus

appropriating to herself all the advantages to be gained by a neutral

nation in trading with the Continent, and using our flag as a

protection.

These were the prominent causes of the war, sufficient, one would

think, to justify the American Government in declaring it.

One-hundredth part of the provocation which we then endured, would now

bring the two governments in immediate and fierce collision.

But, notwithstanding England's desires and necessities, she would

never have committed these outrages, had she not entertained a supreme

contempt for our power, and cherished an inextinguishable hatred of

the nation, rendering her utterly indifferent to our rights. The

treaty of 1783, by which our independence was acknowledged, was wrung

from her by stern necessity. It was not an amicable settlement of the

quarrel--a final and satisfactory adjustment of all difficulties. On

the part of England it was a morose and reluctant abandonment of a

strife which was costing her too dear--the unwilling surrender of her

best provinces under circumstances dishonorable to her flag, and

humbling to her national pride. This hatred of the rebel colony was

mingled with contempt for our institutions and national character,

exhibited in a proud assumption of superiority and disregard of our

rights and our demands. A nation sunk in helpless weakness may submit

to tyrannical treatment, but one rapidly growing in strength and

resources, is sure to have a day of reckoning, when it will demand a

swift and complete settlement of the long-endured wrongs.

Our wisest statesmen, aware of this state of feeling, foresaw an

approaching rupture. The elder Adams, as far back as 1785, says, in

writing from England: "Their present system (the English) as far as I

can penetrate it, is to maintain a determined peace with all Europe,

in order that they may war singly against America."[3] In 1794,

Washington, in a letter to Mr. Jay, after speaking of the retention of

posts which the British Government had, by treaty, ceded to us, and of

the conduct of its agents in stirring up the Indians to hostilities,

says: "Can it be expected, I ask, so long as these things are known in

the United States, or at least firmly believed, and suffered with

impunity by Great Britain, that there ever will or can be any

cordiality between the two countries? I answer, No. And I will

undertake, without the gift of prophecy, to predict, that it will be

impossible to keep this country in a state of amity with Great Britain

long, if those posts are not surrendered." Still later, Jefferson,

writing home from England, says: "In spite of treaties, England is our

enemy. Her hatred is deep-rooted and cordial, and nothing with her is

wanted but power, to wipe us and the land we live in out of

existence."

[Footnote 3: Letter of Adams to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 19th

of July, 1785.]

Having scarcely recovered from the debility produced by the long

revolutionary struggle--just beginning to feel the invigorating

impulse of prosperity, the nation shrunk instinctively from a war

which would paralyze her commerce and prostrate all her rising hopes.

The Government hesitated to take a bold and decided stand on its

rights, and urge their immediate and complete acknowledgment. This

forbearance on our part, and apparent indifference to the honor of the

nation, only increased the contempt, and confirmed the determination

of the British Government. Still, remonstrances were made. Soon after

the arrival of the British Minister, Mr. Hammond, in 1791, Jefferson

stated the causes of complaint, followed up the next year by an able

paper on the charges made by the former against our Government. This

paper remained unanswered, and two years after Jefferson resigned his

secretaryship.

The next year, 1794, the British Government issued an order of

council, requiring her armed ships to arrest all vessels carrying

provisions to a French colony, or laden with its produce. The American

Government retaliated with an embargo, and began to make preparations

for immediate hostilities. In a few months the order was revoked, and

one less exceptionable issued, that calmed for awhile the waters of

agitation, and Mr. Jay was sent as Minister to England, to negotiate a

new treaty, which was to settle all past difficulties, establish some

principles of the law of nations, especially those affecting

belligerents and neutrals, and to regulate commerce. This treaty

removed many of the causes of complaint, but like all treaties between

a weak and strong government, it secured to England the lion's

portion. But with all its imperfections and want of reciprocity, it

was ratified in the spring of 1796, and became a law. Met at every

step by a determined opposition, its discussion inflamed party spirit

to the highest point, while its ratification was received with as many

hisses as plaudits. Still, it brought a partial, hollow pacification

between the two governments, which lasted till 1806, when the orders

in council before mentioned were issued. Great Britain, however,

hesitated not to impress our seamen and vex our commerce during the

whole period, with the exception of the short interval of the peace of

Amiens. In 1803, with the renewal of the war between her and France,

impressment was again practiced, though met at all times by

remonstrance, which in turn was succeeded by negotiation.

Those orders in Council seemed, at first, to preclude the possibility

of an amicable adjustment of difficulties. The country was on fire

from Portland to New Orleans. Cries of distress, in the shape of

memorials to Congress, came pouring in from every sea port in the

Union. Plundered merchants invoked the interposition of the strong arm

of power to protect their rights, and demanded indemnity for losses

that beggared their fortunes. Scorn and rage at this bold high-handed

robbery, filled every bosom, and the nation trembled on the verge of

war. Jefferson, however, sent Mr. Pinckney as envoy extraordinary to

cooperate with Mr. Monroe, our minister to England, in forming a

treaty which should recognize our maritime rights.

In the spring of the next year Jefferson received the treaty from

London. It having arrived the day before the adjournment of Congress,

and containing so much that was inadmissible, he did not submit it to

that body.

In the first place, there was no provision against the impressment of

seamen; and in the second place, a note from the British ministers

accompanied it, stating that the British government reserved to

itself the right to violate all the stipulations it contained, if we

submitted to the Berlin decree, and other infractions of our rights by

France. This reservation on the part of England was an assumption of

power that required no discussion. To declare that she would annul her

own solemn treaty, the moment she disapproved of our conduct towards

other nations, was to assume the office of dictator.

In the mean time, the death of Fox, whose character and conduct the

short time he was in power had given encouragement that a permanent

peace could be established, and the election of the dashing and fiery

Canning to his place, involved the negotiations in still greater

embarrassments. To indicate his course, and reveal at the outset the

unscrupulous and treacherous policy England was henceforth determined

to carry out, he had ready for promulgation long before it could be

ascertained what action our government would take on that treaty,

those other orders in Council, blockading the continent to us. He

declared, also, that all further negotiations on the subject were

inadmissible; thus leaving us no other alternative, but to submit or

retaliate. Thus our earnest solicitations and fervent desire to

continue on terms of amity--our readiness to yield for the sake of

peace what now of itself would provoke a war, were met by deception

and insult. England not only prepared orders violating our rights as

a neutral nation while submitting a treaty that protected them, but

plundered our vessels, impressed our seamen, and threatened the towns

along our coast with conflagration.

We could not allow our flag to be thus dishonored, our seamen

impressed, and our commerce vexed with impunity, and declared common

plunder by the two chief maritime nations of Europe. Retaliation,

therefore, was resolved upon; and in December of 1807, an embargo was

laid upon all American vessels and merchandize. In the spirit of

conciliation, however, which marked all the acts of government, the

President was authorized to suspend it soon as the conduct of European

powers would sanction him in doing so. This embargo prohibited all

American vessels from sailing from foreign ports, all foreign ships

from carrying away cargoes; while by a supplementary act, all coasting

vessels were compelled to give bonds that they would land their

cargoes in the United States.

This sudden suspension of commerce, threatening bankruptcy and ruin to

so many of our merchants, and checking at once the flow of produce

from the interior to the sea-board, was felt severely by the people,

and tried their patriotism to the utmost. Still the measure was

approved by the majority of the nation. New England denounced it, as

that section of the republic had denounced nearly every measure of

the administration from its commencement. The effect of the embargo

was to depress the products of our own country one half, and increase

those of foreign countries in the same proportion. There being no

outlet to the former, they accumulated in the market, and often would

not bring sufficient to pay the cost of mere transportation, while the

supply of the latter being cut off, the demand for them became

proportionably great. Thus it fell as heavy on the agricultural

classes as on the merchant, for while a portion of their expenses were

doubled, the produce with which they were accustomed to defray them

became worthless. But ship owners and sailors suffered still more, for

the capital of the one was profitless, and the occupation of the other

gone. It is true it helped manufacturers by increasing the demand for

domestic goods; it also saved a large amount of property, and a vast

number of American ships, which, if they had been afloat, would have

fallen into the hands of French and English cruisers.

But, while the embargo pressed so heavily on us, it inflicted severe

damage also on France and England, especially the latter. The United

States was her best customer, and the sudden stoppage of all the

channels of trade was a heavy blow to her manufactures, and would, no

doubt, have compelled a repeal of the orders in council to us, had

not she known that we were equal, if not greater sufferers. But while

the two nations thus stood with their hands on each other's throats,

determined to see which could stand choking the longest, it soon

became evident that our antagonist had greatly the advantage of us,

for the embargo shut ourselves out from the trade of the whole world,

while it only cut England off from that of the United States. Besides,

being forced to seek elsewhere for the products she had been

accustomed to take from us, other channels of trade began to be

opened, which threatened to become permanent.

A steady demand will always create a supply somewhere, and this was

soon discovered in the development of resources in the West Indies,

Spain, Spanish America, and Brazil, of which the British Government

had hitherto been ignorant.

The loud outcries from the opponents of this measure, especially from

New England, also convinced her that our government must soon repeal

the obnoxious act.

Under the tremendous pressure with which the embargo bore on the

people, New England openly threatened the government. John Quincy

Adams, who had sustained the administration in its course, finding his

conduct denounced by the Massachusetts Legislature, resigned his seat,

declaring to the President that there was a plan on foot to divide New

England from the Union, and that a secret emissary from Great Britain

was then at work with the ruling federalists to accomplish it. Whether

this was true or false, one thing was certain, an ominous cloud was

gathering in that quarter that portended evil, the extent of which no

one could calculate.

[Sidenote: 1809.]

Under these circumstances the embargo was repealed, and the

non-intercourse law, prohibiting all commercial intercourse with

France and Great Britain substituted.

While these things were transpiring an event occurred which threatened

to arrest all negotiations.

The Chesapeake, an American frigate, cruising in American waters, had

been fired into by the Leopard, a British 74, and several of her crew

killed. The commander of the latter claimed some British deserters,

whom he declared to be on board the American ship. Capt. Barron denied

his knowledge of any such being in the Chesapeake; moreover, he had

instructed, he said, his recruiting officer not to enlist any British

subjects. The captain of the Leopard then demanded permission to

search. This, of course, was refused, when a sudden broadside was

poured into the American frigate. Captain Barron not dreaming of an

encounter, had very culpably neglected to clear his vessel for action,

and at once struck his flag. An officer from the Leopard was

immediately sent on board, who demanded the muster-roll of the ship,

and selecting four of the crew, he retired. Three of these were

native Americans, the other was hung as a deserter. This daring

outrage threw the country into a tumult of excitement. Norfolk and

Portsmouth immediately forbade all communication with British ships of

war on the coast. [Sidenote: July 2.] The war spirit was aroused, and

soon after Jefferson issued a proclamation, prohibiting all vessels

bearing English commissions from entering any American harbor, or

having any intercourse with the shore.

[Sidenote: 1808.]

The act of the Leopard was repudiated by the English Government; but

the rage that had been kindled was not so easily laid, especially, as

no reparation was made. Mr. Monroe, our Minister to England, and

Canning could not adjust the matter; neither could Mr. Rose, the

English Minister, afterwards sent over for that especial purpose. The

British Government would not consent to mingle it up with the subject

of impressment generally, and refused to take any steps whatever

towards reparation, until the President's hostile proclamation was

withdrawn. Jefferson replied that if the minister would disclose the

terms of reparation, and they were satisfactory, their offer and the

repeal of the proclamation should bear the same date. This was refused

and Mr. Rose returned home.

[Sidenote: March.]

In the midst of this general distress and clamor, and strife of

political factions, Mr. Madison, who had been elected President, began

his administration.

Jefferson had struggled in vain against the unjust insane policy of

England. Embargoes, non-intercourse acts, all efforts at commercial

retaliation, remonstrances, arguments and appeals were alike

disregarded. Proud in her superior strength, and blind to her own true

interests, she continued her high-handed violation of neutral rights

and the laws of nations. In the mean time, the republic itself was

torn by factions which swelled the evils that oppressed it. It was

evident that Madison's seat would not be an easy one, and it was

equally apparent that he lacked some most important qualities in a

chief magistrate who was to conduct the ship of State through the

storms and perils that were gathering thick about her. The commanding

mind overshadowing and moulding the entire cabinet, the prompt

decision, fearless bearing and great energy were wanting. His manifest

repugnance to a belligerent attitude encouraged opposition and invited

attack. Small in stature and of delicate health, with shy, distant,

reserved manners, and passionless countenance, he was not fitted to

awaken awe or impart fear. Still he was a thorough statesman. His

official correspondence, while Jefferson's Secretary of State, his

dissertation on the rights of neutral nations and the laws that should

govern neutral trade, are regarded to this day as the most able

papers that ever issued from the American cabinet. His knowledge of

the Constitution was thorough and practical, and his adherence to it

inflexible. The exigencies of war, which always afford apologies, and

sometimes create demands for an illegal use of power, never forced him

beyond the precincts of law or provoked him to an improper use of

executive authority. His integrity was immovable, and though assailed

by envenomed tongues and pursued by slanders, his life at the last

shone out in all its purity, the only refutation he deigned to make.

But Madison possessed one quality for which his enemies did not give

him credit, and which bore him safely through the perils that

encompassed his administration--a calm tenacity--a silent endurance

such as the deeply-bedded rock presents in the midst of the waves. Men

knew him to be in his very nature repugnant to war, and when they saw

him go meekly, nay, shrinkingly into it, they expected to laugh over

his sudden and disgraceful exit. But while he was not aggressive and

decided in his conduct, he boldly took the responsibilities which the

nation placed upon his shoulders, and bore them serenely,

unshrinkingly to the last. His hesitation in approaching a point

around which dangers and responsibilities clustered prepared the

beholder for weak and irresolute conduct, but he was amazed at his

steadiness of character. This apparent contradiction arose from two

conflicting elements. Incapable of excitement and opposed to strife,

he naturally kept aloof from the place where one was demanded, and the

other to be met. Yet, at the same time, he had a knowledge of the

right, and an inflexible love for it which made him immovable when

assailed.

On the whole, perhaps the character he possessed was better fitted to

secure the permanent good of the country than that of a more executive

man. A bold, decided chief magistrate, possessing genius, and calming

by his superior wisdom and strength, the disturbed elements about him,

and developing and employing the resources of the country at the

outset, would probably have ended the war in six months. But the

knowledge the country gained and communicated also to other

governments of its own weakness and power, was, perhaps, better than

the misplaced confidence which sudden success, obtained through a

great leader would have imparted. In the vicissitudes of the war, we

worked out a problem which needs no farther demonstration.

Madison's administration was based on those principles which had

governed that of Jefferson, and the same restrictive measures were

persevered in to compel England to adopt a system more conformable to

our rights and the laws of neutrality. In the mean time Mr. Erskine

was appointed Minister on the part of Great Britain to adjust the

difficulties between the two countries. [Sidenote: April 19, 1809.]

At first this seemed an easy task, for he declared that his government

would revoke the orders in council on condition the non-intercourse

act was repealed. The proposal was at once communicated to Congress

when it assembled in May, and accepted by it. The 10th of June was

agreed upon as the day on which commercial intercourse should

recommence between the two countries, and the President issued a

proclamation to that effect. In July, however, it was ascertained that

the British Government repudiated the agreement entered into by its

Minister, declaring that he had exceeded his instructions. A second

proclamation reestablishing non intercourse was instantly issued, and

the two countries were farther than ever from a reconciliation.

The conduct of Great Britain, at this period, presents such a strong

contrast to her loud declarations before the world, or rather stamps

them as falsehoods so emphatically, that the historian is not

surprised at the utter perversion of facts with which she endeavored

to cover up her turpitude, and quiet her conscience. Without any

provocation, she had declared war against the infant republic of

France. In order to shield herself from the infamy which should follow

such a violation of the rights of nations, and waste of treasure and

of blood, she planted herself on the grand platform of principle, and

insisted that she went to war to preserve human liberty, and the

integrity of governments. In this violent assault on a people with

whom she was at peace, she made a great sacrifice for the common

interests of states, and hence deserved the gratitude, and not the

condemnation of men. With these declarations on her lips, she turned

and deliberately annulled her agreements with the United States, and

invaded her most sacred rights. She impressed our seamen, plundered

our commerce, held fortresses on our soil, and stirred up the savages

to merciless warfare against the innocent inhabitants on our frontier.

While with one hand she professed to strike for the rights of nations,

with the other she violated them in a hardihood of spirit never

witnessed, except in a government destitute alike of honor and of

truth. So, also, while sacrificing her soldiers and her wealth, to

prevent the aggressions of Napoleon; nay, sending a fleet and troops

to Egypt, for the noble purpose of saving that barbarous state from a

reckless invader; her armies were covering the plains of India with

its innocent inhabitants, and robbing independent sheikhs of their

lawful possessions, until, at last, she tyrannized over a territory

_four times_ as large as that of all France, and six times greater

than her own island. Such unblushing falsehoods were never before

uttered by a civilized nation in the face of history. The most

unscrupulous government does not usually cover up its tyranny and

aggressions by pharisaic mummeries. There are all shades of hypocrisy,

but to do the most damning acts under pretence of religious principle,

has generally been considered the sole prerogative of the Spanish

inquisition.

The disavowal of Mr. Erskine's treaty by the English government, and

the consequent renewal of the non-intercourse act, threw the country

into the fiercest agitation. The conduct of Great Britain appeared

like mockery. Forcing us into conciliation by promises, and then

withdrawing those promises; proposing to settle all difficulties by

negotiation, and yet, in the progress of it, refusing to touch one of

them, she determined to try the patience of the American people to the

utmost. The disavowal of a treaty made by her own minister, which

buoyed up the nation with the hope of returning peace and prosperity,

well nigh exhausted that patience; and there is little doubt but that

an immediate declaration of war would have been sustained by a large

majority of the American people. In passing from town to town, the

traveller saw groups of angry men discussing and denouncing the

tyranny of England. The shout of "_Free trade and sailors' rights_,"

shook the land, while flashing eyes and clenched fists told how

aroused the national feeling had become.

Mr. Jackson was sent, in the place of Mr. Erskine, to negotiate a

treaty; but his proposals were the same as those which the

administration had already rejected, while his insulting insinuation

that the President knew when he made the arrangement with Mr. Erskine,

that the latter was acting without authority, abruptly terminated all

intercourse, and he was recalled.

[Sidenote: 1810.]

On the first of May, Congress passed an act which revoked the

restrictive system, yet excluded British and armed vessels from the

waters of the United States.[4] It provided, however, that it should

be renewed in March against the nation, which did not before that time

so revoke or modify its edicts, as to protect the neutral commerce of

the United States. This was regarded as the ultimatum, and beyond it,

war against which ever government refused our just demands, was the

only resort. Messrs. Pinckney and Armstrong, our ministers at the

courts of England and France, were urged to press the repeal of those

obnoxious orders in council and decrees, in order that such a

catastrophe might be prevented. France receded, and Mr. Armstrong was

notified that the decrees were to cease to have effect after the first

of November, provided England withdrew her orders in council; or, if

she refused, that the United States should force her to acknowledge

the rights that France had, in a spirit of kindness, conceded. This

glad intelligence was made known by the President in a proclamation,

in which he also declared, that unless the British government repealed

her orders in council, within three months from that date, the

non-intercourse law should be revived against it.

[Footnote 4: Act of Congress, passed 1st of May, 1810.]

In the mean time Mr. Pinckney urged, with all the arguments in his

power, the English Cabinet to recede from its unjustifiable position.

The latter endeavored, by prevarication and duplicity, to avoid coming

to a definite understanding, but being closely pushed, it at length

gave our minister to understand that the United States must force

France to take the first step in revoking those odious acts against

which we complained. But as England had been the aggressor, this was

plainly unjust and impossible, and all hope of a peaceful settlement

was given up, and on the 1st of March, 1811, he took a formal leave of

the Prince Regent. At the same time Congress had passed an act,

authorizing the President to arrest the non-intercourse Act at any

moment that England should revoke her orders in council. [Sidenote:

April, 1811.] On the 38th of the next month, Napoleon definitely

revoked his Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as they related to

us--the repeal to be ante-dated November 1st, 1810. This decree was

forwarded by our minister, Mr. Barlow, who had succeeded Armstrong, to

the English Government, but it still refused to repeal its orders in

council on the ground that the decree did not embrace the continental

states, and affected only the United States. It soon became apparent,

therefore, to every one, that war was inevitable. The American

Government had placed itself, where it could not recede without

disgrace, while England was evidently resolved not to change her

attitude.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

Another collision at sea between two armed vessels inflamed still more

the war spirit that was pervading the land. On the 16th of May a

British sloop of war, the Little Belt, fired into the frigate

President, thinking doubtless to repeat the outrage committed on the

Chesapeake, but found her fire returned with such heavy broadsides

that in a few minutes thirty-two of her crew were killed or wounded.

The commander of the English ship declared that the American frigate

fired first. This Rodgers denied, and his denial was sustained by all

his officers.

The election of members of Congress, which took place in 1810 and 11,

had given a majority to the administration, so that there could be

harmony of action between the Legislature and the Executive. Beset

with difficulties, treading on the brink of a war, whose issues could

not be foreseen, anxious and uncertain, the President, by

proclamation, called the Twelfth Congress together a month before the

appointed time. It met Nov. 8th, and Henry Clay was chosen speaker.

From the outset he had been a warm supporter of the Administration,

and his eloquent voice had rung over the land, rousing up its warlike

spirit, and inspiring confidence in the ability of the nation to

maintain its rights. James Fisk, of Vermont, Peter B. Porter, and

Samuel L. Mitchell, of New York, Adam Leybert, of Penn., Robert

Wright, of Md., Hugh Nelson, of Va., Nathaniel Macon, of N. C.,

Calhoun, Langdon, Cheeves, and Wm. Lowndes, of S. C., Wm. M. Bibb and

George M. Troup, of Ga., Felix Grundy, of Tenn., and Wm. P. Duval, of

Ky., rallied round the young speaker, and presented a noble phalanx to

the anxious President. On the other side were Josiah Quincy, of Mass,

and Timothy Pitkin and Benjamin Talmadge, of Conn.

In the Senate the democratic leaders were Samuel Smith, of Md., Wm. B.

Giles, of Va., Wm. H. Crawford, of Ga., George W. Campbell, of Tenn.,

and George M. Bibb, of Ky. Leading the opposition were James Lloyd, of

Mass., and James A. Bayard, of Del.[5]

[Footnote 5: Vide Madison's Administration, by John Quincy Adams.]

The great accession of strength which the democratic members had

received, showed clearly the state of public feeling, especially south

and west, and the doubtful, hesitating policy of the last four years

was thrown aside. The tone of the President's Message was also

decidedly warlike, and no hope was held out of an amicable adjustment

of the difficulties with England. They were invoked as the

"Legislative guardians of the nation," to put the country "into an

armed attitude, demanded by the crisis." The halls of Congress

resounded with the cry of "to arms." The nightmare of fear and doubt

which had weighed down its councils was removed, and bold and fearless

speakers called aloud on the nation to defend its injured honor and

insulted rights. The might of England had ceased to be a bugbear--the

Rubicon of fear was passed. Mr. Madison, deprecating precipitate

measures, saw with alarm the sudden belligerent attitude which

Congress had assumed. The democratic leaders however told him the

nation was for war--that timidity would be his ruin--that those who

were resolved to make Mr. Clinton their candidate at the next

presidential election were taking advantage of his hesitation. In the

mean time bills providing for the enlistment of twenty-five thousand

men in the regular army; for repairing and equipping frigates and

building new vessels; authorizing the President to accept the services

of fifty thousand volunteers, and to require the Governors of the

several States and territories to hold their respective quotas of a

hundred thousand men in readiness to march at a moment's warning,[6]

were rapidly pushed through Congress. [Sidenote: Nov. 7, 1811.] The

brilliant victory, gained three days after Congress met by Harrison,

over the Indians at Tippecanoe, helped also to kindle into higher

excitement the martial spirit of the West and South-west, and for a

while opposition seemed to be struck powerless before the rising

energy of the nation.

[Footnote 6: Vide Madison's Administration, by John Quincy Adams.]

The bill authorizing the President to accept and organize certain

military corps to the number of 50,000, reported by Mr. Porter,

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, called forth a long and

exciting debate. Mr. Grundy, one of the committee, defended the

resolution in a bold and manly speech. Referring to the Indian

hostilities on our north-western frontier, he unhesitatingly declared

that they were urged forward by British influence, and war, therefore,

was already begun. Some of the richest blood of the country had

already been shed, and he pledged himself for the western country,

that its hardy sons only waited for permission to march and avenge

those who had fallen. He was answered by Randolph, who denied that

Great Britain had stimulated the Indians to their merciless border

warfare--stigmatized the war to which this resolution looked as a war

of conquest--declared it was another mode of flinging ourselves into

the arms of Bonaparte and becoming "the instruments of him who had

effaced the title of Atilla 'the scourge of God.'"

He ridiculed the idea which had been started of conquering Canada, as

an insane project, and useless if accomplished. "Suppose it is ours,"

he exclaimed, "are we any nearer to our point? As his minister said to

the king of Epirus, "may we not as well take our bottle of wine before

as after the exploit? Go march to Canada--leave the broad bosom of the

Chesapeake and her hundred tributary rivers--the whole line of

sea-coast from Machias to St. Mary's unprotected. You have taken

Quebec--have you _conquered England_? Will you seek for the deep

foundations of her power in the frozen depths of Labrador?

'Her march is on the mountain wave,

Her home is on the deep.'

Will you call upon her to leave your ports and harbors untouched only

just till you can return from Canada to defend them? The coast is to

be left defenceless whilst men in the interior are revelling in

conquest and spoil." He pronounced the country to be in a state wholly

unfit for war.

Mr. Clay answered him in an eloquent speech. He defended the character

of our troops, and expressed his full confidence in the loyalty and

bravery of the country. "Gentlemen," he said, "had inquired what would

be gained by the contemplated war? Sir, I ask in turn, what will you

not lose by your mongrel state of peace with Great Britain? Do you

expect to gain anything in a pecuniary view? No sir. Look at your

treasury reports. Yon now receive only $6,000,000 of revenue annually,

and this amount must be diminished in the same proportion as the

rigorous execution of the orders in council shall increase. Before

these orders existed you received _sixteen millions_." He declared

that war was inevitable unless we tamely sacrificed our own interests,

rights and honor. In answering the objection that we ought only to go

to war when we were invaded, he exclaimed in thrilling tones, while

the house gazed in breathless silence on his excited features, "_How

much better than invasion is the blocking of your very ports and

harbors, insulting your towns, plundering your merchants and scouring

your coasts? If your fields are surrounded, are they in a better

condition than if invaded? When the murderer is at your door will you

meanly skulk to your cells? or will you boldly oppose him at his

entrance?_"

Every part of his speech told with tremendous effect. Many of the

members opposed the bill, which continued the subject of debate for

several days. Mr. Williams of South Carolina, defended it in a

fearless speech. In reply to a remark made by one of the members, that

it was unjust to go to war with England, as she was fighting for her

existence, he exclaimed in a loud sonorous voice that pealed through

the chamber, "_If her existence, sir, depends upon our destruction,

then I say down let her go._ She is contending for the liberties of

the world too, it seems. I would as soon have expected to hear that

the devil had espoused the cause of Christianity. Sir, we may trace

her progress for years through blood. Did she raise the standard of

liberty in India? Was it for liberty she offered up so many human

hecatombs on the plains of Hindostan? Was it to plant the standard of

_liberty_ in this country that she immolated even infant innocence

during the war of the Revolution? Is it to extend or secure the

blessings of freedom to us that the fireside and the cradle are

exposed to savage incursions in the west at this time?" This part of

his speech created a marked sensation.

The bill finally passed by 44 to 34.[7] The winter passed in exciting

debates, both in Congress and in the State Legislatures, while every

hamlet in the land was agitated with the notes of hostile

preparations. [Sidenote: March 9.] In the midst of this excitement,

the country was startled by the transmission of documents to Congress

showing that a man by the name of Henry had been sent by the Governor

of Canada to sound the disaffected New England States and endeavor to

form some connection with the leading federalists.[8]

[Footnote 7: Vide Report of proceedings in the House of

Representatives, Dec. 1811.]

[Footnote 8: This adventurer after staying some months in Boston, in

constant communication with the Secretary of Sir James Craig, Governor

of Canada, to whom he asserted that Massachusetts, in case of war,

would separate from the Union and ally herself, probably, with

England, visited the latter country to obtain remuneration for his

services. The Home Government, however, sent him back to Sir James

Craig as better able to appreciate the value of his labors. Indignant

at this neglectful treatment, he returned to Boston and obtained a

letter of introduction from Governor Gerry to Madison, to whom he

offered to divulge the whole conspiracy, of which he had been the head

and soul, for a certain sum of money. Madison gave him $50,000, and

the swindler embarked for France. There is but little doubt that Henry

made a fool of the Governor of Canada, and completely overreached the

President. The publication of the correspondence, however, increased

the hatred both against the federalists and the English nation.

He was an Irish adventurer of commanding person and most engaging

address. At one time he was editor of a paper and afterwards wine

dealer in Philadelphia. In 1798 he was appointed captain in the army,

and stationed at Fort Adams in Newport. Thence he was transferred to

Boston where he mingled freely in the best society of the city.

Becoming tired of a military life, he bought land in Vermont, and

settled down as a farmer. Finding agricultural pursuits unsuited to

his taste, he removed to Montreal and studied law for several years.

Being an aspiring man he made strenuous efforts to obtain the office

of Attorney General. Indignant at his failure, he turned his attention

to politics, in which he was more successful, for in a few months he

acquired the snug little sum of $50,000, paid over to him out of the

public treasury. He however did not enjoy the fruits of his labors. A

Frenchman styling himself Count, and who had accompanied him in his

last voyage from England, wheedled him into the purchase of large

estates held by the former in France. Relieved of most of his money,

and well supplied with deeds, etc., Henry sailed for France. But

failing to find the locality of these large possessions of which he

had become the purchaser, he was again compelled to fall back on his

genius for the means of subsistence, and became a distinguished

correspondent of a London Journal.]

[Sidenote: Apr. 8.]

In the mean time, Jonathan Russell, of Rhode Island, who had been

appointed _charge d'affaires_ to the English Court on the return of

Mr. Pinckney, wrote home that there was no prospect that the British

government would revoke its orders in council; and the President,

therefore, on the first of April, recommended an embargo to be laid on

all vessels in port, or which should arrive, for the term of sixty

days. The message was received with closed doors, and the house felt

that this was preparatory to a declaration of war. When Mr. Porter, in

accordance with the recommendation of the message, brought in a bill

to lay this embargo, there was great sensation in the house. In reply

to the interrogation, whether this was a peace measure or preparatory

to war, Mr. Grundy, one of the committee, arose and said, "it is a

_war_ measure, and it is meant that it shall lead directly to it." Mr.

Stow, of New York, said, "if it was a precursor to war, there were

some very serious questions to be asked. What is the situation of our

fortresses? What is the situation of our country generally?" Mr. Clay

then left the chair, and, in a short speech, made it apparent that

after what had passed, to shrink from this because it was a war

measure, would cover the nation with disgrace. Randolph, in reply,

said, that he was so impressed with the importance of the subject, and

the solemnity of the occasion, that he could not keep silent. "Sir,"

said he, "we are now in conclave--the eyes of the surrounding world

are not upon us. We are shut up here from the light of Heaven, but the

eyes of God are upon us. He knows the spirit of our minds. Shall we

deliberate on this subject with the spirit of sobriety and candor, or

with that spirit which has too often characterized our discussions

upon occasions like the present? We ought to realize that we are in

the presence of that God who knows our thoughts and motives, and to

whom we must hereafter render an account for the deeds done in the

body." He spoke at some length and earnestly. Clay seeing the effect

of his solemn adjurations on some members of the house, left the

speaker's chair and replied, that the gentleman from Virginia need not

have reminded them in the manner he had, of the presence of that Being

who watches and surrounds us. He thought that consciousness should

awaken different sentiments from those which had been uttered. It

ought to inspire us to patriotism, to the display of those qualities

which ennobled man. God always was with the right, and extended his

protection to those who performed their duty fearlessly, scorning the

consequences. The discussion of the bill continued through several

days, and exhibited, in a striking manner, the different effect of an

event so momentous and fearful as war on different characters. In one,

the overwhelming responsibility and direful results of adopting a

measure leading to it, shut out all other considerations. To another,

its chances and calamities were a matter of mere calculation to be

taken and met by any nation that expected to exist; while many hailed

it with the delight of true patriotism, feeling that the country had,

at last, risen from its humiliating attitude. Mr. Bleecker addressed

the house more like a clergyman than a statesman, warning the members

to desist from the perilous course. On the other hand, Mr. Mitchell,

from New York, declared, that the country was not to "be frightened by

political screech-owls;" and, alluding to the profligate character of

the Prince Regent, said, "he did not think any one should be afraid to

face a nation, at whose head stood such a man--one who was some years

since expelled a jockey club, and who was lately turned out of doors

for his unworthy conduct to his neighbor's wife. The power with which

we are to contend is not so terrific and almighty as is imagined."

[Sidenote: Apr. 4.]

The bill finally passed, 69 to 36. In the senate, 17 to 11.[9] About

the same time another dispatch was received from Mr. Russell, closing

with, "I no longer entertain a hope that we can honorably avoid war."

[Footnote 9: Vide Journal of Secret Session of Congress, of April,

1812.]

This was the feeling of the majority of the nation. In establishing

certain fixed limits beyond which it would not go, and erecting

certain barriers over which it would not allow England to pass, the

American Government had taken a position from which there was no

receding, with honor. While every thing was thus rapidly tending to

war, and the public was eager with expectation, waiting for the next

movement that should precipitate it, with all its horrors, on the

land, a despatch, received by the British Minister, Mr. Foster,[10]

from Castlereagh, closed at once every avenue towards a peaceful

adjustment of the existing difficulties. In it he declared "that the

decrees of Berlin and Milan must not be repealed singly and specially

in relation to the United States, but must be repealed, also, as to

all other neutral nations, and that in no less extent of a repeal of

the French decrees, had the British Government ever pledged itself to

repeal the orders in council."[11] This was saying, that unless the

United States instituted herself lawgiver between France and all other

European powers, and through her own unaided efforts obtained that

which England, with all her maritime strength could not enforce, the

latter would consider herself perfectly justified in withholding from

us our national rights. This awkward attempt to cover up under the

mask of diplomacy, duplicity and falsehood, from which an honorable

mind would have shrunk, was perfectly characteristic of the man who

carried the English and Irish Union by the most stupendous frauds and

bribery and corruption that can be found in the annals of modern

civilization.

[Footnote 10: Mr. Foster had succeeded Mr. Jackson as British Minister

at Washington, in the summer of 1811.]

[Footnote 11: Correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr.

Foster, British Minister, 1812.]

I know the quasi denial of Mr. Foster, that this construction was a

just one, yet the language used can convey no other. To place it

beyond dispute, Lord Castlereagh, as late as May 22d, 1812, declared

as British Minister, to the House of Commons, that as the Berlin and

Milan decrees "were not unconditionally repealed, as required by his

Majesty's declaration, but only repealed so far as they regarded

America, he had no objection to state it, as his own opinion, that

this French decree, so issued, made no manner of alteration in the

question of the orders in council."[12]

[Footnote 12: Vide Niles' Register, vol. ii. page 332.]

It is rare to find such unscrupulous conduct on the part of a

Ministry, protected by so miserable a subterfuge. It could not be

supposed that the American Government would be deceived for a moment

by it, but the belief that we could not be _forced_ into a war,

rendered ordinary care and cunning superfluous. Occupied with

continental affairs alone, England looked upon the American Republic

as only a means to accomplish her ends there. The administration, at

Washington, was thus _compelled_ by the arbitrary conduct of its

enemy, to declare war, or forfeit all claim to the respect of the

nations of the earth, and all right to an independent existence.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Madison no longer hesitated, but on the

1st day of June transmitted a warlike message to Congress. After

recapitulating, in a general way, the history of past negotiations and

past injuries, he says: "Whether the United States shall continue

passive under these progressive usurpations and accumulating wrongs,

or opposing force to force in defence of their natural rights shall

commit a just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of events,

avoiding all connections which might entangle it in the contests or

views of other powers, and preserving a constant readiness to concur

in an honorable reestablishment of peace and friendship, is a solemn

question, which the constitution wisely confides to the legislative

department of the Government. In recommending it to their early

deliberations, I am happy in the assurance that the decision will be

worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free

and a powerful nation." This message was referred at once to the

Committee on Foreign Relations, who reported ten days after in favor

of an immediate appeal to arms. The deliberations on this report were

conducted with closed doors.

A bill drawn up by Mr. Pinckney, and offered by Mr. Calhoun, declaring

war to exist between Great Britain and the United States, was rapidly

pushed through the House, passing by a vote of 79 to 49. In the

Senate, being met not only by the opposition of the Federalists, but

by the friends of De Witt Clinton, who voted with them, it passed by a

majority of only six.[13] Congress, after passing an act, granting

letters of marque, and regulating prizes and prize goods, authorizing

the issue of Treasury notes to the amount of $5,000,000, and placing a

hundred per cent. additional duties on imports, adjourned. [Sidenote:

July 8.] In accordance with a resolution of Congress, the President

appointed a day of public humiliation and prayer, in view of the

conflict in which the nation had entered.

[Footnote 13: 19 to 13. Mr. Clinton's friends professed not to _oppose

the war_, but the declaration of it as premature.

The members from New Hampshire, most of those from Massachusetts, then

including Maine, those of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and

Delaware, with several from New York, some from Virginia and North

Carolina, one from Pennsylvania, and three from Maryland, opposed the

war. The members from Vermont, some from New York, all but one from

Pennsylvania, most from Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, all

from South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and

Louisiana, supported it.--_Ingersoll's History of the War._]

CHAPTER II.

Different feelings with which the Declaration of War was

received -- State of the parties at the commencement --

Federalists and Democrats -- Their hostility -- Absurd

doctrines of the Federalists -- Hostility of New England --

Unprepared state of the country -- Culpable neglect of the

government -- Comparative strength of the two navies --

Empty state of the Treasury -- Inefficiency of the Cabinet.

The proud and sensitive American of to-day can scarcely comprehend

how, under the heavy and protracted provocations which I have traced

in the preceding chapter, the country could have been kept for so long

a time from open hostilities. It would seem that the most arbitrary

exercise of executive and legislative power, could not have prevented

the people from rushing spontaneously to arms, and demanding their

rights at the bayonet's point. He is still more astounded, when he

remembers that this declaration of war was received with a storm of

indignation by a large party in the Union--that all New England, with

the exception of Vermont, anathematized it. The pulpit and the press

thundered forth their maledictions, and the wrath of heaven was

invoked on the heads of its authors. The flags of the shipping in

Boston harbor were hoisted at half-mast, in token of mourning, and the

spot rendered immortal by the patriots of the revolution, became the

rallying place of the disaffected, and the hope of the enemy. A common

welfare and a common country, could not allay this hostility, which

strengthened instead of diminishing to the last, and which was so

fanatical and blind in its violence, that it exhibited itself in the

most monstrous forms. Our defeats were gloried in, and the triumphs of

our oppressors hailed as an evidence that God was on their side, while

downright insubordination, plots, and incipient rebellion, crippled

the efforts of an already weak government, and swelled the disasters

on which they fattened.

But to one who knows to what a height the spirit of faction will

reach, nothing in all this unnatural hostility will seem strange. The

country, at this time, was divided into Federalists and Democrats, who

were scarcely less vindictive in their animosities, than the Whigs and

Tories of the revolution. New England was the furnace of Federalism,

and Boston the focal point from which issued incessant and bitter

assaults on Jefferson's, and afterwards on Madison's administration.

Thus, in the most trying period of our existence since the adoption of

the constitution, the country was divided and torn by the fiercest

spirit of faction with which it has ever been cursed.

I shall not enter into a history of the feuds of these two parties.

The principle which originally divided them was plain. One was for a

consolidated government, and more power in the executive; the other

for a larger distribution of power among the separate states of the

confederacy; one was strongly conservative, and the other tending to

radicalism; one was for putting the strictest construction on the

constitution, the other for giving it the greatest possible latitude.

These two parties had grown up with the republic. Their germs were

seen in the first convention that met after the achievement of our

independence, to settle the form of government. On one point all were

agreed--that our mutual safety and welfare depended on a confederacy,

but a difference of opinion arose on the amount of power the separate

states should confer on the Federal head. The constitution which was

finally adopted was not stringent enough to suit the Federalists; but

as a compromise, it was on the whole the best that could be secured.

Besides, by standing firmly with the general government in all

conflicts with the separate states, and with the executive when

brought in collision with Congress, and by the great patronage of the

President, that power which they preferred to see directly delegated

might practically be obtained. This party numbered among its leaders,

the first statesmen of the land.

Nor should these views be considered strange, nor the patriotism of

those who held them be assailed. Some of the noblest men who offered

their lives and fortunes to the cause of liberty, looked upon the

British Government as the best in the world, and stripped of some of

its peculiarities, and purged of its corruptions, would be the best

that human ingenuity could devise. They did not originally war against

a form of government, but to be free from its oppressive acts. They

did not hate, they admired the British constitution, and took up arms

not to destroy it, but to enjoy the rights it guaranteed to its

subjects. The government, in the principles of which they had been

educated, was the most prosperous and the strongest on the globe, and

common wisdom dictated that all its good points should be retained and

incorporated into our own. Why enter on an entirely new experiment

when we had so much to build upon in the experience of the mother

country? One of the grand features of that government was the central

power lodged in the throne; so ours should be characterized by a

strong executive. The very reason, the force of which was felt by all,

and that made a confederacy indispensable, viz., that a number of

independent states, separated by only imaginary lines, would,

inevitably, lead to frequent collisions and final civil war, operated

they thought with equal force against a _loose_ confederacy. The same

results would follow. The wisdom of these fears is seen at the present

day, in the separate power demanded by some of the states, and alas

was soon exhibited by the Federalists themselves in the spirit of

disobedience they instilled into the people against the general

government.

The Democrats, on the other hand, saw in all this a decided leaning

towards a monarchy, and afterwards boldly accused their adversaries of

conspiring to erect a throne in the midst of this republic. They were

taunted with sycophancy to England, and a craving after English

distinctions and aristocratic preeminence. The _principles_ on which

the two parties rested had their birth in true patriotism, and their

effect on the character of the Constitution was, doubtless, healthful.

Nor was there anything in their nature adapted to awaken such

vindictive hate. But like a strife between two individuals, the origin

of which is soon lost sight of in the passion engendered by the

conflict, so these two factions, in the heat of party rancor, forgot

in the main the theories on which they split. In the proposition of

every measure by either party for the welfare of the state, some

secret plot was supposed to be concealed.

The embarrassments in which this fierce hostile spirit placed the

administration, rendering it timid and cautious, was increased by the

form it took. The levelling and radical notions of the French

revolution, followed as they were by such atrocities, disgusted the

federalists, while the democrats, though they denounced the violence,

sympathized with the people, and saw in the commotion the working of

their own principles amid the oppressed masses of France. They not

only loved France, as their old ally, but they sympathized with her in

her efforts to hurl back the banded oppressors who sought to

reestablish a hated throne in her midst. So while the former party

stood charged with hating republics and wishing the domination of

England, the latter was accused of seeking an alliance with the

usurper Napoleon.

Many of the reasons given by the Federalists for their opposition,

furnish another exhibition of the blinding power of party spirit. As

to the simple question between England and America, it would seem that

no sane man could doubt, that sufficient provocation had been given to

justify us in a resort to arms. The impressment of six or seven

thousand seamen, most of them American citizens, the destruction of

nearly a thousand merchantmen, and the insults every where heaped upon

our flag, were wrongs which could not be justified. They therefore

endeavored to cover them up, by saying that the Democrats were

assisting Bonaparte, whom they regarded as a monster in human form,

and whose success would be the downfall of all liberty. The wrongs we

suffered were thus lost sight of, in the greater wrong of crippling

England in her desperate struggle with this modern Attila. Rather than

endanger the success of that conflict, they would suffer for a time

from the effect of her odious measures. They felt that England, in her

conduct, was not governed by hostile feelings towards this

country--that the evils she inflicted on us, were only incidental to

the war she was waging against a tyrant. Placed in imminent peril, as

the champion of freedom, she was compelled to resort to extraordinary

measures, which though they injured us, were intended only to crush a

common enemy. Hence the absurd interrogatory so incessantly urged by

wise statesmen: "Why do you not declare war against France as well as

England?"--as if the neglect to protect the interests and honor of the

country in one quarter, rendered it obligatory on the government to

neglect them in all quarters. The law which would redress one wrong,

is none the less right, because he who administers it refuses to apply

it to a second wrong. The injustice is in the person, not in the deed.

Besides, when a nation is insulted and outraged by two powers, it has

a perfect right to choose which it will first assault and chastise.

And yet the false doctrine was constantly promulgated, that we had no

right to declare war with England, without including France, because

she was equally criminal. In other words, the nation was bound to bear

quietly the evils under which it groaned, or embrace in the contest,

France, which stood ready to do us justice the moment that England

would.

It seems incredible that so absurd a dogma was soberly defended by

clear-headed statesmen. Strictly applied, it would require a nation,

for the sake of consistency, to submit to wrongs that degrade and ruin

her, or enter on a war equally ruinous, from its magnitude, when there

was a safe mode of procedure. Besides, all the circumstances pointed

out England as our antagonist. She harassed our frontiers--had taken

the first step against our commerce, and impressed our seamen. France

was guilty only of violating the laws of neutrality, while she always

stood pledged to recede from her position, if England would do the

same, and finally did recede, leaving no cause for war. The seizures

under the Rambouillet decree, were matters for negotiation before a

declaration of war could be justified.

As Jefferson was the head of the Democratic party, the Federalists

bent all their energies against his administration, and on his

retirement transferred their hostility to that of Madison.

But the Federalists were not all opposed to the war. The elder Adams,

the noblest chief of Federalism, was too clear-headed and high-minded

a statesman to let party spirit come between him and his country's

good, and he firmly advocated it, which brought down on him the

condemnation of many of his friends. Said he--"It is utterly

incomprehensible to me that a rational, social, or moral creature can

say the war is unjust; how it can be said to be unnecessary is very

mysterious. I have thought it both just and necessary for five or six

years." His son, John Quincy, deserted the party to uphold the war. On

the other hand, many friends of the administration and several members

of the cabinet were wholly opposed to it. There seemed to be an awe of

England oppressing our older statesmen that rendered them insensible

to insult, and willing to see the country the scorn and contempt of

the world, for its base submission under the unparalleled indignities

heaped upon it, rather than risk a conflict with that strong power.

Many of the merchants, also, who saw that their own ruin would

inevitably follow hostilities, were averse to it--indeed, the learning

and intelligence of the land was against it--but the people of the

South and West, between whom and their country's honor and rights

selfish interests and bitter party hate did not come, nobly sustained

it.

The gloomy prospect with which a nation always enters on an unequal

war, was in our case saddened by these divided feelings of the people,

and by the open animosity of several of the States. In order to

paralyze us still more, and render our complete humiliation certain,

provided England would strike a bold and decided blow, no preparation

had been made for the struggle. Although we had been for many years on

the verge of war, we had done comparatively nothing to meet its

exigences, but stood and stupidly gazed into its fearful abyss.

The income from the customs, in 1811, was $13,000,000. This, of

course, the Government knew would decrease in time of war, as it did,

to $9,500,000. Our debt at this period was $45,000,000. Yet a loan of

$11,000,000, five millions of Treasury Notes, and the revenue from the

imposts, which were doubled, was all the money furnished to carry on a

war, which was to cost over thirty millions a year. Congress, however,

did, as a last act of wisdom, appropriate $100,000 to the support,

expense, exchange, &c., of prisoners of war. The utter blindness which

had fallen on the Government was exhibited more fully in its neglect

of the Navy. Under the "peace establishment" of 1801, our navy had

been reduced, and from that time to 1812, "a period of eleven eventful

years, during which the nation was scarcely a day without suffering a

violation of its neutral rights, _not a single frigate_ had been added

to the navy." Gun-boats had been built for the protection of our

harbors, and the marine corps increased by seven hundred men, and

$200,000 per annum was appropriated to rebuild three frigates that had

been suffered to decay. Beyond this, nothing was done, and with but

nine frigates and a few other cruising vessels of less rate, while

seven thousand of our merchant ships were scattered over the ocean

claiming our protection, we plunged into a war with a nation that had

a hundred ships of the line in commission, and more than a thousand

vessels of war which bore her flag of defiance over the deep.

Superadded to all, the President, commander-in-chief of the army, was

utterly ignorant of war, and by nature and in principle wholly

repugnant to it. Conscious of his high and responsible position, he

resolved to press it with vigor. But he was unfortunate in his

Cabinet. Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, had seen a little military

service, but only in a subordinate capacity. Mr. Gallatin, Secretary

of the Treasury, first opposed the declaration of war, and afterwards

insisted that the only hope of the country lay in a speedy peace.

Hamilton, Secretary of the Navy, and Eustis, Secretary of War, were

both ignorant of the duties of their respective departments. Pinckney,

the Attorney-General, shook his head at our prospects, while Gideon

Granger, Postmaster-General,[14] openly declared that the war could

not but end in failure, while Madison conducted its operations. To

complete the climax, a General wholly unfit for his position, was to

open the campaign. At this critical juncture, too, we had scarcely any

representatives abroad to enlist sympathy with us in our struggle. Mr.

Adams had been sent to Russia, and Joel Barlow was our Minister to

France. The latter, however, died in Poland a few months after he

received the news of our declaration of war, leaving us with scarcely

a representative in Europe.

[Footnote 14: The Postmaster-General was not at that time a member of

the Cabinet.]

It is not a matter of surprise that such a commencement to the war was

disastrous; the wonder is, that five, instead of two years of defeat,

were not meted out to us, as a just punishment for such stupidity and

neglect. Nothing but the momentous events transpiring in Europe,

distracting the attention of England, and rendering the presence of

her armies necessary at home, prevented her from striking us a blow,

from which it would have taken years to recover. May our Government

never be left to try such an experiment again!

CHAPTER III.

Plan of the Campaign -- General Hull sent to Detroit --

British officers first receive news of the declaration of

war -- Capture of Hull's baggage, etc. -- Enters Canada and

issues a proclamation, and sends out detachments -- Colonels

McArthur and Cass advance on Malden -- Hull refuses to

sustain them -- Recrosses to Detroit -- Van Horne's defeat

-- Colonel Miller defeats the enemy, and opens Hull's

communications -- Strange conduct of Hull -- Advance of the

British -- Surrender of Detroit -- Indignation of the

officers -- Review of the Campaign -- Rising of the people

-- Harrison takes command -- Advance of the army.

In determining the course to be pursued in carrying on hostilities the

administration selected Canada as the only field of operations

promising any success. The navy was to be shut up in port, leaving our

seven thousand merchantmen to slip through the hands of British

cruisers, and reach home as they best could. It was to be a war on

land and not on the sea, and the conquest of Canada would undoubtedly

be the result of the first campaign. General Dearborn, who had served

in the revolution, was appointed commander-in-chief of the northern

forces, and soon repaired to Plattsburgh, while General Van

Rensalaer, of the New York militia, and General Smith were stationed

on the Niagara frontier.

In anticipation of the war, General Hull, Governor of Michigan, had

been ordered to occupy his territory with an army of two thousand men,

for the purpose of defending the north-western frontier from the

Indians, and in case of war to obtain the command of Lake Erie, and

thus be able to cooperate with Dearborn and Van Rensalaer in the

invasion of Canada. The command naturally descended on him as Governor

of Michigan. Having, also, been an officer of merit under Washington,

the appointment was considered a very judicious one.

With part of the first regiments of United States infantry, and three

companies of the first regiment of artillery, the balance made up of

Ohio volunteers and Michigan militia, and one company of rangers, he

left Dayton, in Ohio, the first of June, just eighteen days before the

declaration of war. On the tenth, he was joined at Urbana by Colonel

Miller, with the fourth regiment of infantry, composed of three

hundred men. Here the little army entered the untrodden wilderness,

and slowly cut its way through the primeval forest, two hundred miles

in extent, to Detroit. It reached Maumee the latter part of June,

where, on the second of July, Hull received the news of the

declaration of war. The letter of the Secretary of War had been

_fourteen days_ reaching him. The British officer, at Maiden, had

been officially notified of it _two days before_. "On this occasion,

the British were better served. Prevost received notice of it, on the

24th of June, at Quebec. Brock on the 26th, at Newark. St. George on

the 30th, at Malden; and Roberts on the 8th of July, at St. Joseph's.

But, a fact still more extraordinary than the celerity of these

transmissions, is, that the information thus rapidly forwarded to the

British commanders, at Malden and St. Joseph, was received under

envelopes, franked by the Secretary of the American Treasury."[15]

But, if the Secretary of the Treasury had been the victim of a shrewd

trick, the Secretary of War had commenced his career by a most

egregious blunder. On the day of the declaration of war, he wrote two

letters to General Hull, one announcing the fact, and the other making

no mention of it. The latter despatched by a special messenger,

reached the General on the 24th of June. The former being intrusted to

the public mail as far as Cleveland, thence to be forwarded as it best

could, did not arrive at head quarters till the 2nd of July, or two

days after the news which it contained had been received by the

British officer at Malden.[16] By this unpardonable carelessness of

the Secretary of War, General Hull not only lost all the advantage to

be derived from having the knowledge of the declaration of hostilities

six days before the enemy, but he had to suffer from the preparations

which this previous information gave the latter time to make.

[Footnote 15: Vide Armstrong's Notices of the War of 1812.]

[Footnote 16: Vide Hull's Memoirs, and Armstrong's Notices of the

War.]

The first disaster that resulted from this culpability of the

Secretary of War, was the loss of General Hull's baggage, "hospital

stores, intrenching tools, and sixty men," together with the

instructions of the government, and the returns of the army. Having

received a letter from the Secretary of War, dated as late as the 18th

of June, in which he was urged to march with all possible despatch to

Detroit, and containing no announcement of a rupture, he naturally

supposed that the two governments were still at peace, and so to carry

out the instructions of the secretary, and expedite matters, he

shipped his baggage, stores, &c., to go by water to Detroit, while he

took his army by land. But the day previous the British commander, at

Malden, had received official notice of the declaration of war, and

when the packet containing the stores, &c., attempted to pass the

fort, it was stopped by a boat containing a British officer and six

men, and its cargo seized.

This first advantage gained over him so unexpectedly, by the enemy,

had a most depressing effect on the General. Instead of rousing him to

greater exertion, it filled him with doubt and uncertainty. He had a

dozen subordinates, either of whom, with that army, would in a few

days have seized Malden, and recovered all he had lost, and inflicted

a heavy blow on the enemy.

At length, however, he seemed to awake to the propriety of doing

something to carry out the objects of the campaign, and on the 12th

crossed the Detroit River and marched to Sandwich, only eighteen miles

from Malden. But here, with an unobstructed road leading to the enemy

before him, he paused and issued a proclamation to the Canadians, and

sent out detachments which penetrated sixty miles into the province.

The friendly disposition of the inhabitants was apparent, while the

Indians were overawed into a neutral position.

Four days after crossing the river, General Hull sent Colonels Cass

and Miller, with a detachment of two hundred and eighty men, towards

Malden. These gallant officers pushed to the river Canards, within

four miles of the fort, and driving the British pickets who held the

bridge from their position, took possession of it, and immediately

dispatched a messenger to General Hull, announcing their success. They

described the occupation of the post as of the utmost importance in

carrying out the plan of the campaign, and begged that if the army

could not be moved there, that they might be allowed to hold it

themselves--the General sending reinforcements as occasion demanded.

Instead of being gratified at this advantage gained over the enemy,

General Hull seemed irritated, condemned the attack as a breach of

orders, and directed the immediate return of the detachment. These

brave officers persisting in their request, he gave them permission to

retain the position, provided they were willing to do so on their own

responsibility, and without any aid from him.

This he knew they would not do. Such a proposition, from the

commanding officer, indicated a weakness of judgment, and a

willingness to resort to the most transparent trickery to escape

responsibility, that no apology can excuse. From the statements of the

British afterwards, it appeared that the approach of this detachment

filled the garrison with alarm; the shipping was brought up to the

wharves, and the loading of baggage commenced, preparatory to flight.

On two sides the fort was in a dilapidated state, while seven hundred

men, of whom only one hundred were regular troops, constituted the

entire garrison. From the panic which the approach of Cass and Miller

created, there is no doubt that the appearance of the whole army, of

two thousand men before the place, would have been followed by an

immediate surrender. One thing is certain, if General Hull supposed

that a garrison of seven hundred men behind such works, could make a

successful defence against nearly three times their number, he had no

right to regard his strong position at Detroit, when assailed by only

an equal force, untenable. Either Malden could have been taken, or

Detroit was impregnable. The troops felt certain of success, and were

impatient to be led to the attack, but he pronounced it unsafe to

advance without heavy artillery; besides, he wished to wait the effect

of his proclamation on the enemy. The Indians and Canadian militia, he

said, had begun to desert, and in a short time the force at Malden

might be "materially weakened." Two thousand men sat quietly down to

wait for this miserable garrison of seven hundred, six hundred of whom

were Canadian militia and Indians, to dwindle to less force, before

they dared even to approach within shot. The army was kept here three

weeks, till two twenty-four pounders and three howitzers could be

mounted on wheels strong enough to carry them, and yet a few weeks

after, behind better works than those of Malden, and with a force

fully equal to that of his adversary, he felt authorized to surrender,

though the largest guns brought forward to break down his defences,

were six pounders.

The cannon at length, being mounted, were with the ammunition placed

on floating batteries, ready to move on Malden, when the order to

march was countermanded, and the army, instead of advancing against

the enemy, recrossed the river to Detroit, over which it had passed a

few weeks before to the conquest of Canada. General Hull had issued a

proclamation, sent out two detachments, mounted two heavy cannon and

three howitzers, and then marched back again. Such were the

astonishing results accomplished by the first grand army of invasion.

The gathering of the Indian clans, and reinforcements pouring into the

British garrison, had alarmed him. The news seemed to take him by

surprise, as though it for the first time occurred to him that during

these three or four weeks in which he remained idle, the enemy might

possibly be active.

The surrender, at this time, of Fort Mackinaw, situated on the island

of the same name in the straits between Lakes Huron and Michigan, was

a severe blow to him, for it opened the flood-gates to all the

Indians, Canadians and British in the north-west. This fort was the

key to that section of the country, and the grand depot of the fur

companies. By its position it shielded General Hull from all attack in

that direction. Lieutenant Hanks commanded it, with a garrison of

sixty men. As soon as the British commander of St. Joseph's, just

above it, received news of the declaration of war, he took with him

some two hundred Canadians and British, and four hundred Indians, and

suddenly appearing before the fort demanded its surrender. This was

the first intimation to Lieutenant Hanks of the commencement of

hostilities. He capitulated without offering any resistance, and the

Indians at once rallied around the British standard. Here was another

blunder, a double one. In the first place, private enterprise had

outstripped the action of Government. The British officer at St.

Joseph's, though more remote than Mackinaw, received the declaration

of war _nine_ days before it reached the American commander at the

latter place, or rather, Lieutenant Hanks did not receive it at all,

either from the Government or General Hull. Colonel Roberts, of St.

Joseph's, with his band of Canadians and Indians, was kind enough to

convey the information.

It is surprising that General Hull, after his experience, did not at

once provide that a post so vital to him, should not become the victim

of the same criminal negligence which had paralyzed his efforts.

_Fifteen days_ intervened between his receiving the notification of

war, and the taking of Fort Mackinaw, and yet no messenger from him,

the Governor of the Territory, and commander-in-chief of the forces in

that section, reached the garrison. Were it not for the calamitous

results which followed, the whole campaign might be called a "comedy

of errors."

Three days previous, however, to the retreat of Hull from Canada, he

committed another error which increased his embarrassments. Proctor,

who had arrived at Malden with reinforcements, threw a small

detachment across the river to Brownstown, to intercept any provisions

that might be advancing from Ohio to the army. Captain Brush, who was

on the way with the mail, flour and cattle, was thus stopped at the

River Raisin. To open the communication and bring up the provisions,

Major Van Horne was dispatched with two hundred volunteers and

militia. But the detachment, marching without sufficient caution, was

led into ambush, and utterly defeated. Only about one-half returned to

the army. Both Gen. Hull and Major Van Horne were to blame in this

affair--the former for not sending a larger detachment, when he knew

the enemy must be on the march, while at the same time he was ignorant

of his force. This error is the more culpable, because he did not

expect an immediate attack; for, after the detachment was despatched,

he remained quietly in Canada, and then crossed at his leisure to

Detroit. He therefore could, without danger, have spared a larger

force, and should have done so, especially when the want of provisions

was one of the evils he would be called upon to encounter. On the

other hand, Major Van Horne should have heeded the information he

received, that the enemy were in advance, in position, and not allowed

his little army to rush into an ambuscade.

General Hull's position had now become sufficiently embarrassing.

"The whole northern hive was in motion." Reinforcements were hastening

to the support of Malden; his communications on the lake were cut off

by British vessels, while the defeat of Van Horne announced that his

communications by land were also closed. The latter he knew must be

opened at all hazards, and Colonel Miller was dispatched on the route

which Van Horne had taken with four hundred men to clear the road to

the river Raisin. Leaving Detroit on the 8th of August, he next day in

the afternoon, as he was approaching Brownstown, came upon the enemy

covered with a breast work of logs and branches of trees, and

protected on one side by the Detroit river, and on the other by swamps

and thickets. The British and Canadians were commanded by Muir, and

the Indians by Tecumseh. Captain Snelling leading the advance guard

approached to within half musket shot, before he discovered the enemy.

A fierce and deadly fire was suddenly opened on him, which he

sustained without flinching, till Colonel Miller converting his order

of march into order of battle, advanced to his support. Seeing,

however, how destructive the fire of the enemy was, while the bullets

of his own men buried themselves for the most part in the logs of the

breastwork; perceiving, also, some symptoms of wavering, Miller

determined to carry the works by the bayonet. The order to charge was

received with loud cheers; and the next moment the troops poured

fiercely over the breastwork, and routing the British and Canadians

pressed swiftly on their retiring footsteps. Tecumseh, however,

maintained his post, and Van Horne, who commanded the right flank of

the American line, supposing from his stubborn resistance that it

would require more force than he possessed to dislodge him, sent to

Colonel Miller for reinforcements. The latter immediately ordered a

halt, and with a reluctant heart turned from the fugitives now almost

within his grasp, and hastened to the relief of his subordinate. On

arriving at the breastwork, he found the Indian chief in full flight.

He then started again in pursuit, but arrived in view of the enemy

only to see him on the water floating away beyond his grasp.

He, however, had established the communication between the army and

the river Raisin, and dispatched Captain Snelling to Detroit with the

account of the victory, and a request for boats to remove the wounded,

and bring provisions for the living, and reinforcements to supply the

place of the dead and disabled. General Hull immediately sent Colonel

McArthur with a hundred men and boats, but with provisions sufficient

only for a single meal.[17]

[Footnote 17: Miller's testimony on the trial of Hull.]

Colonel Miller was some twenty miles from the supplies, but not

deeming it prudent with the slender reinforcements he had received,

and the still scantier provisions, to proceed, remained on the battle

field, and sent another messenger declaring that the communication was

open, and it required only a few more men and a supply of provisions,

to keep it so. The next evening, the messenger returned, bringing

instead of provisions a peremptory order to return to Detroit. It is

doubtful whether Colonel Miller ought not to have advanced without

waiting for further reinforcements, and formed a junction with Captain

Brush, who had an abundance of provisions, and a detachment of a

hundred and fifty men. But, after the communications were established,

he did not probably see so much necessity for dispatch as for

security. But General Hull seemed to be laboring under a species of

insanity. After sending forth two detachments to open his

communications, and finally succeeding, he deliberately closed them

again, and shut from his army all those provisions, the want of which

he a few days after gave as a reason for surrendering. The rapid

concentration of the enemy's forces, in front of him, might have been

given as a sufficient cause for suddenly calling in all his troops to

defend Detroit, had he not two days after sent Colonel McArthur,

accompanied by Cass, with a detachment of four hundred men, to obtain

by a back, circuitous and almost wholly unknown route through the

woods that which Colonel Miller had secured, and then been compelled

to relinquish.

[Sidenote: Aug. 7.]

When General Hull recrossed the river to Detroit, he left some hundred

and fifty, convalescents and all, "to hold possession of that part of

Canada," which he had so gallantly won, "to defend the post to the

last extremity against musketry, but if overpowered by artillery to

retreat."[18] In the mean time, General Brock, the commander of the

British forces, approached, and began to erect a battery opposite

Detroit to protect his army, and cover it in crossing the river. Not a

shot was fired to interrupt his proceedings, no attempt made to

destroy his shipping which had arrived. Daliba offered "to clear the

enemy from the opposite shores from the lower batteries," to which

General Hull replied, "I will make an agreement with the enemy, that

if they will not fire on me I will not fire on them." Major Jessup

asked permission to cross the river and spike the guns, but this was

considered a too desperate undertaking. In short, every project that

was proposed was rejected, and the twenty-four pounders and the

howitzers slept dumb on their carriages, in the midst of these hostile

preparations of the enemy.

[Footnote 18: McAfee's History.]

At length, on the morning of the 15th, a messenger arrived from

General Brock demanding an immediate surrender of the town and fort.

To this summons Hull replied in a decided and spirited manner; but

this did not seem to daunt the British commander. He immediately

opened his fire from a newly erected battery, which, after knocking

down some chimneys, and disabling a few soldiers, finally ceased at

ten o'clock in the evening. The next morning it re-commenced, and

under cover of its harmless thunder the British, in broad daylight,

commenced crossing a river more than three thousand feet wide. This

presumptuous attempt succeeded without the loss of a man. The troops

then formed in column twelve deep, and marching along the shore, soon

emerged into view, about five hundred yards from the fort. The

opposing forces were nearly equal, but the position of the Americans

gave them vastly the advantage. The fort proper was of great strength,

surrounded by a deep, wide ditch, and strongly palisaded with an

exterior battery of two twenty-four pounders. It was occupied by four

hundred men, while four hundred more lay behind a high picket fence,

which flanked the approach to it. Three hundred more held the town.

Against this formidable array, General Brock, preceded by five light

pieces of artillery, boldly advanced. He did not even have a vanguard,

and rode alone in front of his column. To the most common observer,

they were marching on certain and swift destruction. The militia who

had never been under fire, were eager for the conflict, so confident

were they of victory. On swept the apparently doomed column upon which

every eye was sternly bent, while every heart beat with intense

anxiety to hear the command to fire. In this moment of thrilling

excitement, a white flag was lifted above the works, and an order came

for all the troops to withdraw from the outer posts and stack their

arms. Such a cry of indignation as followed, probably never before

assailed the ears of a commander. Lieutenant Anderson in a paroxysm of

rage, broke his sword over one of his guns and burst into tears. The

shameful deed was done, and so anxious was General Hull that all

should receive the benefit of this capitulation, that he included in

it Colonels McArthur and Cass, and their detachment whom he had sent

to the river Raisin, together with that entrusted with the supplies.

To enhance the regret and shame of this sudden surrender, it was soon

discovered that McArthur and Cass, having heard the cannonading

twenty-four hours before, had returned, and at the moment the white

flag was raised were only a mile and a half from the fort, and

advancing so as to take the enemy in rear. The result of a defence

would have been the entire destruction of the British army. Ah! what a

different scene was occurring on this same day, in another hemisphere.

On this very morning Napoleon crossed the Dnieper, on his way to

Moscow, and Murat and Ney, at the head of eighteen thousand splendid

cavalry, fell on the Russian rear guard, only six thousand strong. Yet

this comparatively small band, composed like most of the troops under

Hull, of new levies, never thought of surrendering. First in two

squares, and then in one solid square they continued their retreat all

day--sometimes broken, yet always re-forming and presenting the same

fringe of glittering steel, and the same adamantine front. Forty times

were the apparently resistless squadrons hurled upon them, yet they

still maintained their firm formation, and at night effected a

junction with the main army, though with the loss of more than

one-sixth of their number. It was to be left to Scott and Brown and

Miller and Jessup and Jackson, to show that Russian serfs were not

braver troops than American freemen.

It sometimes happens that events widely different in their character,

and presenting still wider contrast in the magnitude and grandeur of

the circumstances that attend them, are in their remote results alike,

both in character and in their effect on the destiny of the world.

Thus, six days after our declaration of war, Napoleon crossed the

Niemen, on his march to Moscow. This first step on Russian territory

was the signal for a long train of events to arise, which in the end

should dash to earth the colossal power of Napoleon, while our

movement was to break the spell which made Great Britain mistress of

the seas; and two nations, one an unmixed despotism and the other a

pure republic, from that moment began to assume a prominence they

never before held, and from that time on, have been the only powers

which have rapidly increased in resources and strength, till each

threatens, in time, to swallow up its own hemisphere.

Much has been written of this campaign of Hull, and in the

controversy, statistics differ as widely as opinions. He was tried by

Court Martial, of which Martin Van Buren was Judge Advocate, acquitted

of treason, but found guilty of cowardice and sentenced to be shot.

Being pardoned by the President, his life was saved, but he went forth

a blighted and ruined man.

On many points there is room for a diversity of judgment, but one

thing is certain, General Hull was unfit for the station to which he

was assigned. He had been a gallant subordinate officer in the

revolution, but a man may be a good major, or even colonel, but a bad

commander-in-chief. There are many officers who are fit only to act

under orders, whom personal danger never agitates, but who are

unnerved by responsibility. Let the latter rest on some other person

and they will cheerfully encounter the peril. Hull may have been one

of these, at least it seems more rational to attribute a portion of

his conduct to some mental defect rather than to cowardice. It is

hard to affix such a stain on a man who moved beside Washington in the

perilous march on Trenton--stood firmly amid the hottest fire at

Princeton--gallantly led his men to the charge at Bemis' Heights, and

faced without flinching the fiery sleet that swept the column pressing

up the rugged heights of Stony Point. Gray hairs do not make a coward

of such a man, though they should render him imbecile.

It is not easy at this remote period to appreciate the difficulties of

the position in which Hull eventually found himself. At first he

refused to take command of the expedition, but being urged by the

government, accepted, though with the express understanding that in

case of hostilities, he was to be sustained both by a fleet on Lake

Erie, and an army operating on the northern and western frontier of

New York. He knew that the conquest of Canadian territory would be of

slight importance, if the lake and river communication was controlled

by the enemy, for they could pass their troops from one point to

another with great rapidity, cut off his supplies and reinforcements,

and hem him in till a force sufficient to overwhelm him was

concentrated.

On arriving near Malden, he was astounded to hear that the enemy had

received notice of the war before him, and hence had time to make more

or less preparations. The second blow was the loss of hospital

stores, intrenching tools, army baggage, private papers, &c. The third

came in the fall of Mackinaw, thus removing the only barrier that kept

back the northern hordes. He knew the enemy had possession of the

water communication, and were therefore able to threaten his retreat.

Dearborn, who ought to have been pressing the British on the Niagara

frontier, and thus attracted their forces from Malden, had entered

into an armistice with the Governor of Canada, leaving the latter at

full liberty to reinforce the troops opposed to Hull, a privilege of

which he was not slow to avail himself. There was not a gleam of

sunshine in the whole gloomy prospect that spread out before the

American commander. His own army diminishing, while that of his

adversary was rapidly increasing--behind him a wilderness two hundred

miles in extent, his situation was disheartening enough to make a

strong man sad. The difficulties in which he found himself environed

must always produce one of two effects on every man--either rouse him

to tenfold diligence and effort and daring, or sink him in

corresponding inactivity and despondency. There can be no middle

state. That the latter was the effect produced on General Hull, there

can be no doubt. He proved plainly that he was not one of those whom

great emergencies develope into an extraordinary character worthy to

command and worthy to be obeyed. The very first misfortune unmanned

him, and from that hour to the sad close of the campaign, when he

acted at all he did nothing but heap blunder on blunder. His mind

having once got into a morbid state, his position and his prospects

appeared to his diseased imagination ten times more desperate than

they really were.

With the failure of General Dearborn to invade Canada from the New

York frontier, and more especially with the lakes entirely under the

control of the enemy, his campaign, according to all human

calculations, must prove a failure. Detroit must fall, and Michigan be

given up to the enemy. The only chance by which this catastrophe could

have been prevented, was offered by General Brock when he crossed the

river to storm Detroit. If Hull had possessed a spark of genius or

military knowledge, he would have seen in this rash movement of his

enemy, the avenue opened for his release, and the sure precursor of

his fortunes. With that broad river cutting off its retreat, the

British army would have been overthrown; provisions and arms obtained,

and the enemy received a check which in all probability would have

enabled Hull to sustain himself till reinforcements arrived. But he

had made up his mind to surrender, and thus save Detroit from the

cruelties of the savage, and the enemy could not commit a blunder of

sufficient magnitude to arouse his hopes and spur him into

resistance; and having scarcely heard the report of his guns from

first to last, he veiled the banner of his country in the dust.

This explanation of his conduct would correspond more with his former

life, than to admit the charge of either treason or cowardice, and be

perfectly satisfactory, but for the _mode_ of his surrender. There is

a mystery here, that neither General Hull nor his friends have ever

cleared up. After having shown the imbecility of government, by which

failure became inevitable, they stop as though their task was done.

But the criminality of government being conceded, and the fall of

Detroit acknowledged to be an inevitable consequence, it does not

follow that the surrender of the army was necessary. Why, after

Colonel Miller opened the communications with supplies and

reinforcements, did not General Hull retreat at once? The enemy would

not have attempted a pursuit through that wilderness. With a rear

guard left to man the works, he could have gained two days' march,

while Detroit was able to make as good terms without him as with him.

He could have had no reason for staying, except the determination to

hold his position and defend Detroit to the last. If he had not fully

resolved to do so, the way of retreat was open, and he was bound to

occupy it; if he _had_, why did he not keep to that determination? No

new elements had entered into the struggle--no unforeseen events

occurred to affect the conclusions he had adopted. The enemy was not

in greater force than he imagined, but on the contrary, in less. He

understood the strength of his own position; his troops were never in

greater spirits; why then did he so suddenly and totally change his

purpose? It is impossible to reconcile this grievous inconsistency in

his conduct. Nor is this all that is dark and mysterious; supposing

new conditions had occurred to alter his determination, and affect the

relative position of the armies--an entirely new order of things had

taken place, requiring another mode of procedure than the one adopted

by himself and the army; why did he not call a council of war, and

submit those new features to its consideration? When his troops wished

to attack Malden, he considered the question so momentous as to

require a council of his officers. When a simple repulse was the only

misfortune that could happen, he regarded it his duty to take advice

from his subordinates; but when it came to an absolute surrender of

his whole army, no such obligation was felt. This man, who was so

afraid to compromise his force, lest it should meet with a repulse,

did not in the end hesitate to surrender it entire, and cover it with

dishonor on his own responsibility. Military history rarely records

such an event as this, and never unless either treason or cowardice

was apparent as noonday. Not a faltering word--not a doubtful

movement--not a sign of flinching, till the white flag was seen

flaunting its cowardly folds before the banner of his country. No

general has a right to assume such a responsibility, at least, until

the question has been submitted to his officers. He may peril his

troops in an unsuccessful attack, but never _dishonor_ them without

consulting their wishes. The act was that of a timorous commander, or

of a bold and unscrupulous man, like Gorgey. The rash and unmilitary

advance of Brock, which notwithstanding its success, met the

disapproval of his superior, seems wholly unaccountable, except some

one, in the confidence of Hull, had whispered in his ears, that the

latter intended no defence.

The _manner_ of surrender, conflicts with the explanation of the act

itself, and involves the conduct of Hull in a mystery. To tell us he

was neither a traitor nor a coward, and yet leave those violations of

military rules and contradictions of character unexplained and

unreconciled, is to leave the same painful doubt on the mind as though

no defence had been attempted. A morbid state of mind equivalent to

insanity, thus changing for a time the whole character of the man, is

the only charitable construction.

The blame, however, was not distributed impartially. The Secretary of

War should have been immediately removed from office, Dearborn

withdrawn as commander-in-chief, and the whole administration

thoroughly overhauled, and its policy changed. As it was, the swelling

curses of the land smote the single head of General Hull. The news of

his surrender fell on the country like a thunderbolt at noonday. The

march of his army had been watched with intense interest, but with

scarcely any misgivings. So large a force appearing with the

declaration of war in their hands on the weak and unprepared posts of

the north-western frontier was expected to sweep everything before it.

Its defeat was considered impossible, its entire, shameful surrender,

therefore, could hardly be credited. The nation was stunned, but with

surprise, not fear, at least that portion west of the Alleghanies.

Indignation and a spirit of fierce retaliation swelled every bosom.

But eastward, where party spirit and divided feelings and views, had

rendered the war party cautious and timid, the effect was for a time

paralyzing. If defeated at the outset, while England could bring into

the field scarcely any but her colonial force, what would be our

prospects of success when her veterans drilled in the wars of the

continent should appear? The government, however, awoke to the

vastness of the undertaking, but still remained ignorant of the means

by which it was to be accomplished.

To save the north-western frontier, now laid open to the incursions

of savages, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Virginia, sent forth

crowds of volunteers, eager to redeem the tarnished reputation of the

country. Several members of Congress from Kentucky enlisted as private

soldiers--the young and ardent Clay was seen at the musters, thrilling

the young men who surrounded him, as though he wielded the fiery cross

in his hands. Ten thousand men were raised in an incredible short

space of time, and placed under General Harrison, the hero of

Tippecanoe. To these were added portions of the 17th and 19th

regiments of regular infantry and two regiments from Kentucky and

Ohio, for government was apparently determined to make up for the

insufficient, niggardly expenditures of the first campaign by its

useless prodigality in preparing for the second.

Four thousand men raised by order of Gov. Shelby, of Kentucky, all

mounted on horseback, were put under Major General Hopkins, of the

militia, who, jointly with three regiments already sent to Vincennes

by Harrison, were to defend the frontiers of Indiana and Illinois.

[Sidenote: Oct. 10.]

Reaching Fort Harrison, which Captain, afterwards General Taylor, with

scarcely thirty efficient men, had gallantly defended against the

attacks of four or five hundred Indians, this motley crowd of horsemen

started on the 14th for the Indian villages which lay along the

Illinois and Wabash rivers. But the long and tedious march and the

uncomfortable bivouacs by night, obscured the visions of glory that

had dazzled them, and the fourth day, the enthusiasm which from the

first had been rapidly subsiding, reached zero, and open mutiny seized

the entire body of the troops. A major rode up to General Hopkins and

peremptorily ordered him to wheel about. The General refusing to obey,

he was compelled next day to constitute the rear guard of this

splendid corps of cavalry, whose horses' tails were towards the enemy

and their heads towards Fort Harrison.

[Sidenote: Sept. 12.]

In the mean time, Harrison, with about 2,500 men reached Fort Deposit,

and relieved the garrison composed of seventy men who had gallantly

withstood the attacks of hordes of Indians. Here he paused till the

arrival of other troops, and occupied the time in sending out various

detachments against the Indian villages, all of which were successful.