THE WILDERNESS AND SPOTTSYLVANIA
Wherever Grant had control in the West, and in all his counsels, his
distinct purpose was to mass the Union forces and not scatter them, and
to get at the enemy. With what ideas and intention he began the new task
he set forth definitely in his report made in July, 1865.
"From an early period in the rebellion, I had been impressed with the
idea that the active and continuous operations of all the troops that
could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were
necessary to a speedy termination of the war.... I therefore determined,
first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the
armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at
different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and
the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary
supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously
against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere
attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but
an equal submission with the loyal sections of our common country to the
Constitution and laws of the land."
Grant instructed General Butler, who had a large army at Fortress
Monroe, to make Richmond his objective point. He instructed General
Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, that Lee's army "would be his
objective point, and wherever Lee went he would go also." He hoped to
defeat and capture Lee, or to drive him back on Richmond, following
close and establishing a connection with Butler's army there, if Butler
had succeeded in advancing so far. Sherman was to move against
Johnston's army, and Sigel, with a strong force, was to protect West
Virginia and Pennsylvania from incursions. This, with plans for keeping
all the other armies of the Confederacy so occupied that Lee could not
draw from them, constituted the grand strategy of the campaign.
The theatre of operations of the Army of the Potomac was a region of
country lying west of a nearly north-and-south line passing through
Richmond and Washington. It was about 120 miles long, from the Potomac
on the north to the James on the south, and from 30 to 60 miles wide,
intersected by several rivers flowing into Chesapeake Bay. The
headquarters of the Union army were at Culpeper Court House, about 70
miles southwest of Washington, with which it was connected by railroad.
This was the starting point. Lee's army was about fifteen miles away,
with the Rapidan, a river difficult of passage, in front of it, the
foothills of the Blue Ridge on its left, and on its right a densely
wooded tract of scrub pines and various low growths, almost pathless,
known as "the Wilderness."
Two courses were open to Grant,--to march by the right, cross the upper
fords, and attack Lee on his left flank, or march by the left, crossing
the lower fords, and making into the Wilderness. Grant chose the latter
way, as, on the whole, most favorable to keeping open communications.
For General Grant, as commander of all the armies, was bound to avoid
being shut up or leaving Washington imperiled. And it may properly be
said here that his plan contemplated leaving General Meade free in his
tactics, giving him only general directions regarding what he desired to
have accomplished, the actual fighting to be done under Meade's orders.
The official reports to the Adjutant-General's office in Washington show
that on the 20th of April the Army of the Potomac numbered 81,864 men
present and fit for duty. Burnside's corps, which joined in the
Wilderness, added to this force 19,250 men, making a total of 101,114
men. After the Wilderness, a division numbering 7000 or 8000 men under
General Tyler joined it. When the Chickahominy was reached, a junction
with Butler's army, 25,000 strong, was made. Lee had on the 20th of
April present for duty, armed and equipped, 53,891. A few days later he
was reinforced by Longstreet's corps, which on the date given numbered
18,387, making a total of 72,278. Grant's army outnumbered Lee's, but he
was to make an offensive campaign in the enemy's country, operating on
exterior lines, and keeping long lines of communication open. Defending
Richmond and Petersburg there were other Confederate forces, under
Beauregard, Hill, and Hoke, estimated to amount to nearly 30,000 men,
and Breckenridge commanded still another army in the Shenandoah Valley.
In Grant's command, but not of the Army of the Potomac, were the
garrison of Washington and the force in West Virginia.
On the 3d of May the order to move was given, and at midnight the start
was made. The advance guard crossed the river before four in the morning
of the 4th, and on the morning of the 5th Grant's army, nearly a hundred
thousand strong, was disposed in the Wilderness. Lee had discovered the
movement promptly, and had moved his whole army to the right,
determined to fall upon Grant in that unfavorable place. As soon as the
Union army began a movement in the morning, it encountered the enemy,
who attacked with tremendous and confident vigor. The fighting continued
all day, with indecisive results. Early the next morning the battle was
renewed, and continued with varying fortunes, at one time one army, and
at another time the opposing army, having the advantage. There was, in
fact, a series of desperate battles between different portions of the
two armies which did not end until the night was far advanced. The
advantage, on the whole, was with the Union army. It had not been forced
back over the Rapidan. It stood fast. But it had inflicted no such
defeat on the enemy as Grant had hoped to do in the first encounter. The
losses of both sides had been very large, those of the Union Army being
3288 killed, 19,278 wounded, 6784 missing.
The next morning it was discovered that the Confederates had retired to
their intrenchments, and were not seeking battle. Then Grant gave the
order that was decisive, and revealed to the Army of the Potomac that it
had a new spirit over it. The order was, "Forward to Spottsylvania!" No
more turning back, no more resting on a doubtful result. "Forward!" to
the finish. But Lee, controlling shorter lines, was at Spottsylvania
beforehand, and had seized the roads and fortified himself. Here again
was bloody fighting of a most determined character, lasting several
days. Here Hancock, by a daring assault, captured an angle of the
enemy's works, with a large number of guns and prisoners; and it was
held, despite the repeated endeavors of the enemy to recapture it. Here
General Sedgwick was killed. Here Upton made a famous assault on the
enemy's line and broke through it, want of timely and vigorous support
preventing this exploit from making an end of Lee's army then and there.
But the Union losses at Spottsylvania, while not so large as in the
Wilderness, were very heavy, and made a painful impression upon the
people of the North.
Undoubtedly Grant was disappointed by the failure to vanquish his
opponent. Undoubtedly Lee was disappointed by his failure to repulse the
Union army in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania as he had done
formerly at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, when it had come into
the same territory. Each had underestimated the other's quality. From
Spottsylvania, on the 11th of May, after six days of continuous
fighting, with an advance of scarcely a dozen miles, and an experience
of checks and losses that would have disheartened any one but the hero
of Vicksburg, he sent this bulletin to the War Department: "We have now
ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. The result to this time is
much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of
the enemy. We have lost to this time 11 general officers killed,
wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000 men.... I am now sending back
to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and
ammunition, and propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all
summer."
The indomitable spirit of the last sentence electrified the country. It
did take all summer, and all winter, too,--eleven full months from the
date of this dispatch, and more, before General Lee, driven into
Richmond, forced to evacuate the doomed city, his escape into the South
cut off, his soldiers exhausted, ragged, starving, reinforcements out of
the question, surrendered at Appomattox the Army of Northern Virginia,
the reliance of the Confederacy, to the general whom he expected to
defeat by his furious assault in the Wilderness.