ACTION OF DIAMOND HILL
Pretoria: June 14.
The feeble resistance which the Boers offered to our advance from
Bloemfontein favoured the hope that with the fall of Pretoria they would
sue for peace, and after the almost bloodless capture of the town there
was a very general tendency to regard the war as practically over. The
troops who had been marching for so many days with Pretoria as their
goal, not unnaturally hoped that when that goal was achieved a period of
rest and refreshment would be given them. But the imperious necessities
of war demanded fresh efforts.
The successes gained in the Free State by the redoubtable Christian De
Wet, and the cutting of the communications near Rhenoster, awoke
everyone to the fact that further exertions were required. Though the
Boers under Botha had made but a poor resistance in front of their
capital, they were encouraged by the news from the Free State to adopt a
more defiant attitude, and to make what we hope has been almost a final
effort. As to that I will not be sanguine; but it is certain that,
whereas on the 7th and 8th of June the Boer leaders in the Transvaal
were contemplating surrender, on the 9th and 10th they were making all
kinds of bold schemes to harass and even entrap the British army.
On the 7th the news ran through the camp that Mrs. Botha had come
through the lines with some mission on her husband's behalf, and General
Schoeman had himself made very decided overtures. On the 8th,
therefore, an armistice was observed by both sides, and a conference on
Zwartskop, where Lord Roberts was to meet the Republican generals, was
arranged for the 9th; but when the 9th came circumstances had changed.
The Field-Marshal had actually his foot in the stirrup ready to ride to
the meeting-place, when a messenger arrived from Botha declining, unless
Lord Roberts had some new proposal to make, to enter into any
negotiations. The consequence of this was an immediate resumption of
active operations.
The military situation was, briefly, that Lord Roberts's army was spread
around and in Pretoria in various convenient camping grounds, with the
greater part of its force displayed on the east and north-east sides of
the town; and that the Boers, under Botha and Delarey, to the number of
about 7,000, with twenty-five guns, held a strong position some fifteen
miles to the east astride the Delagoa Bay Railway. It was evident that
on any grounds, whether moral or material, it was not possible for the
conquering army to allow the capital to be perpetually threatened by the
enemy in organised force, and, indeed, to be in a state of semi-siege.
With the intention, therefore, of driving the enemy from the
neighbourhood, and in the hope of capturing guns and prisoners, a large
series of combined operations was begun. Practically all the available
troops were to be employed. But the army which had marched from
Bloemfontein had dwindled seriously from sickness, from casualties, and,
above all, from the necessity of dropping brigades and battalions behind
it to maintain the communications. We have already seen how it was
necessary to leave the Fourteenth Brigade to hold Johannesburg, and now
the Eighteenth Brigade became perforce the garrison of Pretoria, thus
leaving only the Eleventh Division, the corps troops, and Ian Hamilton's
force free for field operations.
The Eleventh Division numbered, perhaps, 6,000 bayonets with twenty
guns. Ian Hamilton's force had lost Smith-Dorrien's Brigade, which was
disposed along the line between Kroonstadt and Pretoria, and though
strengthened by the addition of Gordon's Cavalry Brigade did not number
more than 3,000 bayonets, 1,000 sabres, and 2,000 rifle-armed Cavalry,
with thirty guns. But the shrinkage had been greatest among the mounted
troops. French's command of a Cavalry Division, which should have been
some 6,000 mounted men, was scarcely, even with part of Hutton's Brigade
of Mounted Infantry, 2,000. The two Cavalry Brigades with Ian Hamilton
mustered together only 1,100 men, and Ridley's Mounted Infantry, whose
nominal strength was at least 4,000, was scarcely half that number in
actuality. Brigades, therefore, were scarcely as strong as regiments,
regiments only a little stronger than squadrons, and the pitiful--absurd
if it had not been so serious--spectacle of troops of eight and ten men
was everywhere to be seen. It must, therefore, be remembered that
though the imposing names of divisions and brigades might seem to
indicate a great and powerful force, the army at Lord Roberts's disposal
was really a very small one.
The enemy's position ran along a high line of steep and often
precipitous hills, which extend north and south athwart the Delagoa Bay
line about fifteen miles east from Pretoria, and stretch away
indefinitely on either side. The plan of the Field-Marshal was to turn
both flanks with Cavalry forces, and to endeavour to cut the line behind
the Boers, so that, threatened by the attack of the Infantry in front,
and their retreat compromised, they would have to fall back, probably
without being able to save some, at least, of their heavy guns.
French was directed to make a wide sweep round the enemy's right flank
north of the railway. Pole-Carew, with the Eighteenth Brigade and the
Guards, was to advance frontally along the railway; Ian Hamilton to move
parallel to him about six miles further south; and Broadwood, who, with
the rest of the mounted troops, formed part of Hamilton's force, was to
endeavour to turn the enemy's left. It was felt that, important as were
the objects to be gained, they scarcely justified a very large sacrifice
of life. But though the Field-Marshal would be content with the retreat
of the enemy, both Cavalry forces were intended to press hard inward.
On the 11th, the whole army was in motion. French on the extreme left
of the British front, which was extended from flank to flank about
sixteen miles, soon came in contact with the Boers, occupying strong
defensive positions, and he became sharply engaged. During the day he
continued to persevere, but it was not until nightfall that he was able
to make any progress. Pole-Carew, with the Eleventh Division, moved
eastward along the railway, extended in battle formation, and engaged
the enemy with his long-range guns, to which the Boers replied with
corresponding pieces, including a 6-in. gun mounted on a railway truck.
Though an intermittent bombardment continued throughout the day, the
operations in the centre were confined to a demonstration.
Meanwhile Broadwood and Ian Hamilton, advancing on the right, found that
the Boers, besides occupying the whole line of the Diamond Hill plateau,
had also extended their left flank, which was composed of the Heidelburg
commando and other South Transvaal burghers, far beyond the reach of any
turning movement, and for this reason the operations to the British
right and right centre became of a piercing rather than of an enveloping
nature. Hamilton endeavoured to hold off the enemy's unduly extended
left by detaching a battalion, two field guns, and Gordon's Cavalry
Brigade with its horse battery, in the direction of the Tigerspoorte
ridges. Ridley's Brigade of Mounted Infantry curved inwards towards the
railway, and while these two forces struck out, like the arms of a
swimmer, Broadwood's Brigade was intended to push through the gap thus
made.
A dropping musketry and artillery fire began shortly after eight o'clock
along the front of the force engaged in containing the Boers near
Tigerspoorte, and half an hour later Ridley's Brigade was engaged along
the southern slopes of Diamond Hill. Meanwhile, Broadwood was advancing
steadily to the eastward, and crossing a difficult spruit debouched into
a wide, smooth, grass plain, surrounded by hills of varying height, at
the eastern end of which was a narrow gap. Through this the line of
march to the railway lay. He became immediately engaged with the Boers
round the whole three-quarters of the circle, and a scattered action,
presenting to a distant observer no picturesque features, and yet
abounding in striking incidents, began. The Boers brought seven guns,
so far as we could observe, against him, and since the fire of these
pieces was of a converging nature, the Cavalry was soon exposed to a
heavy bombardment.
In spite of this, Broadwood continued to push on. The country was well
suited for Cavalry action, and the gap, or 'poorte,' as it is called in
this country, plainly visible among the hills to the eastward,
encouraged him to try to break through. Accordingly, at about eleven
o'clock, he brought two horse-guns, under Lieutenant Conolly,[#] into a
very forward position, with the design of clearing his road by their
fire. The Boers, however, fought with a stubbornness and dash which had
long been absent from their tactics. They were in this part of the
field largely composed of Germans and other foreigners, of colonial
rebels, and of various types of irreconcilables.
[#] A younger brother of that brilliant officer of the Scots Greys,
whose death at Nitral Nek a few weeks later was so great a loss to his
friends, his regiment, and his country.
No sooner had these two guns come into action than a very ugly attack
was made on them. The ridge from which they were firing was one of
those gentle swells of ground which, curving everywhere, nowhere allows
a very extended view; and the Boers, about 200 strong, dashed forward
with the greatest boldness in the hope of bringing a close musketry fire
to bear on the gunners and of capturing their pieces. So sudden was the
attack that their heads were seen appearing over the grass scarcely 300
yards away. In these circumstances the guns fired case shot, but though
they prevented the Boers from coming nearer, it was evident that the
position was still critical. Broadwood was compelled, therefore, to ask
the 12th Lancers to charge.
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE OPERATIONS OF 11TH AND 12TH JUNE, 1900]
The continual shrapnel fire of the last few hours had, in spite of their
dispersed formation, caused a good deal of loss among the horses of the
brigade. The Earl of Airlie, who was riding with the brigadier, had had
his horse shot under him, and had gone away to find another. He
returned to place himself at the head of his regiment just as it was
moving forward to the attack, and, perhaps unacquainted with the latest
development of the action, he gave a direction to the charge which was
slightly more northerly than that which Broadwood intended; so that, in
advancing, the regiment gradually came under the fire of the enemy
holding the lower slopes of Diamond Hill, instead of falling on those
who were directly threatening the guns. But it was a fine, gallant
manoeuvre, executed with a spring and an elasticity wonderful and
admirable in any troops, still more in troops who have been engaged for
eight months in continual fighting with an elusive enemy, and who must
have regarded any action, subsequent to the capture of Pretoria, rather
in the nature of an anti-climax.
Its effect was instantaneous. Though the regiment scarcely numbered 150
men, the Boers fled before them--those who were threatening the guns
towards the south, and those immediately in the line of the charge
eastward and northward, towards Diamond Hill. Had the horses been fresh
and strong a very severe punishment would have been administered to the
enemy; but with weary and jaded animals--many of them miserable
Argentines, and all worn out with hard work and scanty food--they were
unable to overtake the mass of fugitives who continued to fly before
them. A few, however, stood boldly, and one man remained firing his
rifle until the charge was close on him, when he shot Lieutenant Wright
dead at only a few yards distance, and then, holding up his hands,
claimed quarter. This was, however, most properly refused. Altogether
ten Boers perished by the lance, and the moral effect on those who
escaped must certainly have been considerable. But now in pursuit the
regiment gradually came nearer to the enemy's main position, and drew a
heavy fire on their left flank.
Seeing this, and having obtained the object with which he had
charged--the immediate relief of the guns--Lord Airlie gave the order
'files about,' and withdrew his regiment before it became too seriously
involved. As he issued this command he was struck by a heavy bullet
through the body, and died almost immediately. So fell, while directing
his regiment in successful action, an officer of high and noble
qualities, trusted by his superiors, beloved by his friends, and
honoured by the men he led. The scanty squadrons returned in excellent
order to the positions they had won, having lost in the charge, and
mostly in the retirement, two officers, seventeen men, including a
private of the 10th Hussars, who managed to join in, and about thirty
horses.
Meanwhile the pressure on Broadwood's right had become very severe. A
large force of Boers who were already engaging the 17th Lancers and the
rest of Gordon's Brigade, but who were apparently doubtful of attacking,
seeing the advance checked, now swooped down and occupied a kraal and
some grassy ridges whence they could bring a heavy enfilading fire to
bear. Broadwood, who throughout these emergencies preserved his usual
impassive composure, and whose second horse had been shot under him,
ordered the Household Cavalry to 'Clear them out.'
The troopers began immediately to dismount with their carbines, and the
General had to send a second message to them, saying that it was no good
firing now, and that they must charge with the sword. Whereon,
delighted at this unlooked-for, unhoped-for opportunity, the Life
Guardsmen scrambled back into their saddles, thrust their hated carbines
into the buckets, and drawing their long swords, galloped straight at
the enemy. The Boers, who in this part of the field considerably
outnumbered the Cavalry, might very easily have inflicted severe loss on
them. But so formidable was the aspect of these tall horsemen, cheering
and flogging their gaunt horses with the flat of their swords, that they
did not abide, and running to their mounts fled in cowardly haste, so
that, though eighteen horses were shot, the Household Cavalry sustained
no loss in men.
These two charges, and the earnest fashion in which they were delivered,
completely restored the situation; but though Broadwood maintained all
the ground he had won, he did not feel himself strong enough, in face of
the severe opposition evidently to be encountered, to force his way
through the poorte.
At about noon the Field-Marshal, who was with the Eleventh Division,
observing an apparent movement of the enemy in his front, concluded that
they were about to retreat, and not wishing to sacrifice precious lives
if the strategic object were attained without, sent Ian Hamilton a
message not, unless the resistance of the enemy was severe, to weary his
men and horses by going too far. Hamilton, however, had seen how
closely Broadwood was engaged, and fearing that if he stood idle the
enemy would concentrate their whole strength on his Cavalry commander,
he felt bound to make an attack on the enemy on the lower slopes of
Diamond Hill, and so hold out a hand to Broadwood.
He therefore directed Bruce-Hamilton to advance with the Twenty-first
Brigade. This officer, bold both as a man and as a general, immediately
set his battalions in motion. The enemy occupied a long scrub-covered
rocky ridge below the main line of hills, and were in considerable
force. Both batteries of artillery and the two 5-in. guns came into
action about two o'clock. The Sussex Regiment, moving forward,
established themselves on the northern end of the ridge, which was well
prepared by shelling, and while the City Imperial Volunteers and some
parts of the Mounted Infantry, including the Corps of Gillies, held them
in front, gradually pressed them out of it by rolling up their right.
[Illustration: DIAGRAM EXPLAINING THE ACTION OF DIAMOND HILL]
There is no doubt that our Infantry have profited by the lessons of this
war. The widely-extended lines of skirmishers moving forward, almost
invisible against the brown grass of the plain, and taking advantage of
every scrap of cover, presented no target to the Boer fire. And once
they had gained the right of the ridge it was very difficult for the
enemy to remain.
Accordingly at 3.30 the Boers in twenties and thirties began to abandon
their position. Before they could reach the main hill, however, they had
to cross a patch of open ground, and in so doing they were exposed to a
heavy rifle fire at 1,200 yards from the troops who were holding the
front.
From where I lay, on the left of the Gillies' firing line, I could see
the bullets knocking up the dust all round the retreating horsemen,
while figures clinging to saddles or supported by their comrades, and
riderless horses, showed that some at least of the bullets had struck
better things than earth. So soon as they reached fresh cover, the
Dutchmen immediately reopened fire, and two of the Gillies were wounded
about this time.
The City Imperial Volunteers then occupied the whole of the wooded
ridge. One poor little boy, scarcely fourteen years old, was found shot
through the head, but still living, and his father, a very
respectable-looking man, who, in spite of his orders from the
field-cornet, had refused to leave his son, was captured; but with these
exceptions the Boers had removed their wounded and made good their
retreat to the main position. It being now nearly dark the action was
broken off, and having strongly picketed the ground they had won, the
Infantry returned to their waggons for the night.
It was now imperative to carry the matter through, and in view of the
unexpected obstinacy of the enemy, the Field-Marshal directed Pole-Carew
to support Hamilton with the brigade of Guards in his attack the next
day.
Early the next morning Hamilton's Infantry moved forward and re-occupied
the whole of the ground picketed the previous night. On the right De
Lisle's corps of Mounted Infantry prepared to attack; the Cavalry
maintained their wedge-like position, and exchanged shots all along
their front with the Boers; but no serious operations were begun during
the morning, it being thought better to await the arrival, or, at least,
the approach, of the brigade which had been promised.
During this interval the Boers shelled our batteries heavily with their
long range 30-pounder guns, and General Ian Hamilton, who was sitting on
the ground with his Staff near the 82nd Field Battery, was struck by a
shrapnel bullet on the left shoulder. Fortunately, the missile did not
penetrate, but only caused a severe bruise with numbness and pain, which
did not, however, make it necessary for him to leave the field. The
case of this shell, which struck close by, ran twirling along the ground
like a rabbit--a very peculiar sight, the like of which I have never
seen before.
At one o'clock the leading battalion of the Guards was observed to be
about four miles off, and Bruce-Hamilton's brigade was therefore
directed to attack. The Derbyshire Regiment, which had been briskly
engaged during the morning, advanced up a flat tongue of land on the
right. The City Imperial Volunteers moved forward in the centre, and
the Sussex on the British left. Though this advance was exposed to a
disagreeable enfilade fire from the Boer 'pom-pom,' the dispersed
formations minimised the losses, and lodgments were effected all along
the rim of the plateau. But once the troops had arrived here the fight
assumed a very different complexion.
The top of the Diamond Hill plateau was swept by fire from a long rocky
kopje about 1,800 yards distant from the edge, and was, moreover,
partially enfiladed from the enemy's position on the right. The
musketry immediately became loud and the fighting severe. The City
Imperial Volunteers in the centre began to suffer loss, and had not the
surface of the ground been strewn with stones, which afforded good
cover, many would have been killed and wounded. Though it was not
humanly possible to know from below what the ground on top of the hill
was like--we were now being drawn into a regular rat-trap. It was quite
evident that to press the attack to an assault at this point would
involve very heavy loss of life, and, as the reader will see by looking
at the rough plan I have made, the troops would become more and more
exposed to enfilade and cross fire in proportion as they advanced.
After what I had seen in Natal the idea of bringing guns up on to the
plateau to support the Infantry attack when at so close a range from the
enemy's position seemed a very unpleasant one. But General
Bruce-Hamilton did not hesitate, and at half-past three the 82nd Field
Battery, having been dragged to the summit, came into action against the
Boers on the rocky ridge at a distance of only 1,700 yards.
This thrusting forward of the guns undoubtedly settled the action. The
result of their fire was immediately apparent. The bullets, which had
hitherto been whistling through the air at the rate of perhaps fifteen
or twenty to the minute, and which had compelled us all to lie close
behind protecting stones, now greatly diminished, and it was possible to
walk about with comparative immunity. But the battery which had reduced
the fire, by keeping the enemy's heads down, drew most of what was left
on themselves. Ten horses were shot in the moment of unlimbering, and
during the two hours they remained in action, in spite of the protection
afforded by the guns and waggons, a quarter of the gunners were hit.
Nevertheless, the remainder continued to serve their pieces with
machine-like precision, and displayed a composure and devotion which won
them the unstinted admiration of all who saw the action.
About four o'clock General Ian Hamilton came himself to the top of the
plateau, and orders were then given for the Coldstream Guards to prolong
the line to the left, and for the Scots Guards to come into action in
support of the right. Two more batteries were also brought forward, and
the British musketry and artillery being now in great volume, the Boer
fire was brought under control. Ian Hamilton did not choose to make the
great sacrifices which would accompany an assault, however, nor did his
brigadier suggest that one should be delivered, and the combatants
therefore remained facing each other at the distance of about a mile,
both sides firing heavily with musketry and artillery, until the sun
sank and darkness set in.
General Pole-Carew, who with the Eighteenth Brigade was still
responsible for containing the Boer centre across the railway, now rode
over to Hamilton's force, and plans were made for the next day. It must
have been a strange experience for these two young commanders, who,
fifteen years ago, had served together as aides-de-camp on Lord
Roberts's staff, to find themselves now under the same chief designing a
great action as lieutenant-generals. It was decided that Hamilton's
force should move further to the right and attack on the front, which,
on the 12th, had been occupied by De Lisle's corps of Mounted Infantry,
that the brigade of Guards should take over the ground which the
Twenty-first Brigade had won and were picketing, and that the Eighteenth
Brigade, which was now to be brought up, should prolong the line to the
left. But these expectations of a general action on the morrow were
fortunately disappointed. Worsted in the fire fight, with three parts
of their position already captured, and with the lodgment effected by
Colonel De Lisle's corps on the left threatening their line of retreat,
the Boers shrank from renewing the conflict.
During the night they retreated in good order from the whole length of
the position which they occupied, and marched eastward along the railway
in four long columns. When morning broke and the silence proclaimed the
British the victors, Hamilton, in order to carry out his original
orders, marched northward and struck the railway at Elandsfontein
station, where he halted. The Mounted Infantry and Cavalry were hurried
on in pursuit, but so exhausted were their horses that they did not
overtake the enemy.
Such were the operations of the 11th, 12th, and 13th of June, by which,
at a cost of about 200 officers and men, the country round Pretoria for
forty miles was cleared of the Boers, and a heavy blow dealt to the most
powerful force that still keeps the field in the Transvaal.
After the action of Diamond Hill the whole army returned to Pretoria,
leaving only a Mounted Infantry corps to hold the positions they had won
to the eastward. French and Pole-Carew, whose troops had marched far and
fought often, were given a much-needed rest. Ian Hamilton, whose force
had marched further and fought more than either, was soon sent off on
his travels again. The military exigencies forbade all relaxation, and
only three days' breathing space was given to the lean infantry and the
exhausted horses. By the unbroken success of his strategy Lord Roberts
had laid the Boer Republics low. We had taken possession of the Rand,
the bowels whence the hostile Government drew nourishment in gold and
munitions of war. We had seized the heart at Bloemfontein, the brain at
Pretoria. The greater part of the railways, the veins and nerves, that
is to say, was in our hands. Yet, though mortally injured, the trunk
still quivered convulsively, particularly the left leg, which, being
heavily booted, had already struck us several painful and unexpected
blows.
To make an end two operations were necessary: first, to secure the
dangerous limb, and, secondly, to place a strangling grip on the
windpipe somewhere near Komati Poorte. The second will, perhaps, be the
business of Sir Redvers Buller and the glorious Army of Natal. The
first set Hamilton's Brigades in motion as part of an intricate and
comprehensive scheme, which arranged for the permanent garrisoning of
Frankfort, Heilbron, Lindley, and Senekal, and directed a simultaneous
movement against Christian De Wet by four strong flying columns.
I had determined to return to England; but it was with mixed feelings
that I watched the departure of the gallant column in whose good company
I had marched so many miles and seen such successful fights. Their road
led them past Lord Roberts's headquarters, and the old Field-Marshal
came out himself to see them off. First the two Cavalry Brigades
marched past. They were brigades no longer; the Household Cavalry
Regiment was scarcely fifty strong; in all there were not a thousand
sabres. Then Ridley's 1,400 Mounted Infantry, the remnants of what on
paper was a brigade of nearly 5,000; thirty guns dragged by skinny
horses; the two trusty 5-inch 'cow-guns' behind their teams of toiling
oxen; Bruce-Hamilton's Infantry Brigade, with the City Imperial
Volunteers, striding along--weary of war, but cheered by the hopes of
peace, and quite determined to see the matter out; lastly, miles of
transport: all streamed by, grew faint in the choking red dust, and
vanished through the gap in the southern line of hills. May they all
come safely home.
APPENDIX
_COMPOSITION OF LIEUT.-GENERAL IAN HAMILTON'S FORCE_
DIVISIONAL STAFF
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL IAN HAMILTON.
C.B., D.S.O.
_A.D.C.s_--Captain de Heriez Smith.
Captain Balfour, late 11th Hussars.
Captain Maddocks, R.A.
Captain Duke of Marlborough, I.Y.
_A.A.G._--Lieut.-Colonel Le Gallais, 8th Hussars.
_D.A.A.G.s_--Captain Vallentin, Somerset L.I.
Captain Gamble, Lincoln Regiment.
Captain Atcherley, A.S.C.
Captain Kirkpatrick, R.E.
_Provost Marshal_--Captain Sloman, East Surrey Regiment.
_Div. Signalling Officer_--Captain Ross, Norfolk Regiment.
_P.M.O._--Colonel Williams, N. S. Wales A.M.C.
_Divisional Troops_--Rimington's Guides under Major Rimington,
Inniskilling Dragoons.
2ND MOUNTED INFANTRY BRIGADE
BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. RIDLEY
_A.D.C._--Captain Hood, Coldstream Guards.
_Brigade Major_--Lieut-Colonel Mitford, East Surrey Regiment.
_Staff Officers_--Captain Sir T. MacMahon, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
Captain Eustace Crawley, 12th Lancers.
2ND MOUNTED INFANTRY CORPS
Lieut.-Colonel de Lisle, Commanding Durham Light Infantry.
_Staff Officer_--Captain Fanshawe, Oxford L.I.
_6th M.I. Battalion_--Captain Pennefather, Welsh Regiment.
_New South Wales Mounted Rifles_.
_West Australians_.
1 Pom-pom.
5TH MOUNTED INFANTRY CORPS
Lieut.-Colonel Dawson, I.S.C.
_Staff Officer_--Captain Ballard, Norfolk Regiment.
_5th M.I. Battalion_--Major Lean, Warwick Regiment.
_Roberts' Horse_--Captain Baumgartner, East Lancashire Regiment.
_Marshall's Horse_--Captain Corbett.
_Ceylon M.I._--Major Rutherford,
1 Pom-pom.
6TH MOUNTED INFANTRY CORPS
Lieut.-Colonel Legge, 20th Hussars.
_Staff Officer_--Captain Hart, East Surrey Regiment.
_2nd M.I. Battalion_--Major Dobell.
_Kitchener's Horse_--Major Cookson, I.S.C.
_Lovat's Scouts_--Major A. Murray.
1 Pom-pom.
7TH MOUNTED INFANTRY CORPS
Lieut.-Colonel Bainbridge, Buffs.
_Staff Officer_--Captain Hamilton, Oxford L.I.
_7th M.I. Battalion_--Major Welch.
_Burmah M.I._--Captain Copeman.
1 Pom-pom.
P BATTERY
_Ammunition Column_--Major Mercer, R.H.A.
_Bearer Company and Field Hospital_--New South Wales Army Medical Corps.
2ND CAVALRY BRIGADE
BRIGADIER-GENERAL BROADWOOD
_A.D.C._--Captain Aldridge, R.H.A.
_Brigade-Major_--Captain Hon. T. Brand, 10th Hussars.
_Signalling Officer_--Captain Sloane Stanley, 12th Lancers.
_Household Cavalry_--Lieut.-Colonel Galley.
_10th Lancers_--Lieut-Colonel Fisher.
_12th Lancers_--Lieut.-Colonel Earl of Airlie.
_Q Battery, R.A._
_Ammunition Column_--Captain Kincaid, R.A.
_Bearer Company._
_Field Hospital._
19TH BRIGADE
MAJOR-GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN
_A.D.C.s_--Captain Hood, R.M.L.I.
Lieut. Dorrien Smith, Shropshire L.I.
_Brigade Major_--Major Inglefield, East Yorkshire Regiment.
_74th Battery_--Major MacLeod.
_2nd Duke of Cornwall L.I._--Lieut.-Colonel Ashby.
_Shropshire L.I._--Lieut.-Colonel Spens.
_Gordon Highlanders_--Lieut.-Colonel MacBean.
_Royal Canadians_--Lieut.-Colonel Otter.
_Bearer Company and Field Hospital._
21ST BRIGADE
MAJOR-GENERAL BRUCE-HAMILTON
_A.D.C._--Lieut. Frazer, Cameron Highlanders.
_Brigade Major_--Major Shaw, Derbyshire Regiment.
_76th Battery_--Major Campbell.
_1st Royal Sussex_--Lieut.-Colonel Donne.
_1st Derby_--Major Gossett.
_1st Cameron_--Lieut.-Colonel Kennedy.
_City Imperial Volunteers_--Brigadier-Colonel MacKinnon; Colonel The
Earl of Albemarle.
_Bearer Company._
_Field Hospital._
DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
LIEUT.-COLONEL WALDRON, R.F.A.
_8lst Battery._
_82nd Battery_--Major Conolly.
_1 Section of Five-inch guns_--Captain Massey.
_Ammunition Column_--Captain Hardman.
EFFECTIVE FIGHTING STRENGTH
11,000 Men.
4,600 Horses.
8,000 Mules.
36 Field guns.
2 Five-inch guns
23 Machine guns.
6 Pom-poms.
The force left Bloemfontein, April 22.
Arrived at Pretoria on June 5.
Distance traversed, 401 miles in a straight line.
Time on the march, 45 days.
Halts, 10 days.
General actions on nine days:
Israel's Poorte, April 25.
Houtnek, April 30 and May 1.
Welkom, May 4.
Sand River, May 10.
Affair of Lindley, May 20.
Doornkop (Florida), May 29.
Six Mile Spruit (Pretoria), June 4.
Diamond Hill, June 11 and 12.
Eighteen days' skirmishes.
Towns captured:
Thabanchu.
Winburg.
Ventersburg.
Kroonstadt.
Lindley.
Heilbron.
Johannesburg.
Pretoria.
[Illustration: MAP OF MARCH FROM BLOEMFONTEIN TO PRETORIA (small
version)]
[Illustration: MAP OF MARCH FROM BLOEMFONTEIN TO PRETORIA (large
version)]