TWO DAYS WITH BRABAZON
Before Dewetsdorp: April 21.
When the incursion of the Boers into the recently pacified districts
became known, the Eighth Division (Rundle) was diverted from Kimberley,
whither it was proceeding, and concentrated at Springfontein. The Third
Division (Chermside, in supersession of Gatacre) massed at Bethany.
Still more troops were needed to guard the line and clear the country.
Sir Redvers Buller was asked whether he could co-operate by forcing Van
Reenen's Pass and bringing pressure on the enemy's line of retreat. His
position in the centre of the triangle of Natal was, however, an
inconvenient one. The strategic advantages possessed by the Boers in
this scene of the war have before been noticed. But it may be worth
while to explain them again.
The enemy possess the superiority of an enveloping frontier. If Sir
Redvers Buller moves west through Van Reenen's Pass to make the
diversion required in the Free State, down will come the Boers from the
Biggarsburg on his communications and into South Natal. If he moves
north to attack the Biggarsburg positions in order to clear Natal he
will cut the Boers on his left flank and line.
According to the best information there are three thousand Boers on the
Drakensburg Passes, and ten thousand on the Biggarsburg. Buller,
therefore, would have preferred to mask Van Reenen's with the Ladysmith
Division (Fourth, Lyttelton), which was getting well and strong again,
and move northwards with the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Divisions. He did
not consider until northern Natal should be cleared that he could safely
move westward. On the other hand, the need in the Free State was urgent,
and it was therefore arranged that the Tenth Division (Hunter) should
come by sea to East London--one brigade to replace the division diverted
from Kimberley, one brigade to Bethulie, and that the rest of the Natal
Field Army should remain strictly on the defensive until the situation
was materially altered.
Practically, therefore, five brigades of troops were available for the
operations in the right-hand bottom corner: Hart, with a brigade of
Hunter's Division at Bethulie, the Third and Eighth Divisions under
Chermside and Rundle at Springfontein and Bethany. Besides these
powerful bodies, which were quite independent of the communication
troops or the Bloemfontein Army, there were fourteen hundred Yeomanry
and Mounted Infantry under General Brabazon, and Brabant's Colonial
Brigade, about two thousand five hundred strong.
It is scarcely necessary to follow all the movements in exact detail.
Rundle formed a column at Edenburg, and, marching to Reddersburg, joined
his force to part of Chermside's Division from Bethany, thus having
under his immediate command eight battalions, four batteries, and
Brabazon's Mounted Brigade. Another brigade was collecting at Edenburg
under Campbell. Hart was moved north-east towards Rouxville, where was
also Brabant with a thousand horse. The rest of Brabant's force, some
fifteen hundred strong, were blockaded in Wepener by the enemy. Such
was the situation when I left Bloemfontein on the morning of the 17th.
I travelled prosperously; came by rail to Edenburg, trekked from there
in drenching rains, most unusual for this time of year, and greatly
increasing the difficulties of supply; and, resting for the night at
Reddersburg, caught up the marching column in its camp, about eleven
miles from Dewetsdorp, on the night of the 19th.
The position of the various troops was then as follows: Rundle, with
eight battalions, four batteries, and fifteen hundred horse at Oorlogs
Poorte, about twelve miles from Dewetsdorp; Campbell, with two
battalions and a battery near Rosendal, marching to join him; the
Grenadier Guards double marching through Reddersburg to catch up the
main force; Hart, with four battalions in Rouxville; Brabant, with one
thousand horsemen eight miles north of Rouxville; Dalgety, with a
garrison of fifteen hundred men, holding Wepener.
[Illustration: Operations in the O.F.S. April, 1900.]
So far as could be learned the enemy had about seven thousand men with
twelve guns south of the Bloemfontein-Thabanchu line under Commandants
Olivier and De Wet, and with this force, which made up in enterprise and
activity what it lacked in numbers or material, they were attempting to
blockade and attack Wepener, to bar the road of Rundle's column to
Dewetsdorp, and to check Brabant and Hart at Smithfield. Besides
proposing this ambitious programme, the Boers sent their patrols riding
about the country commandeering all pacified farmers under threats of
death.
* * * * *
We had a very pleasant ride from Reddersburg, and it was evening when we
rounded the shoulder of a grassy hill and saw the camp of the main
British column before us. It lay about the foot of a prominent knoll
rising from a broad plain, which was in striking contrast to the
mountains of Natal, and seemed to promise ample opportunity to the
regular soldier. 'Camp' is, perhaps, an inaccurate description, for
there were scarcely any tents to be seen, and the rolling ground was
littered with swarms of grazing horses and oxen, and overspread with an
immense canopy of white smoke from the hundreds of gleaming grass fires
lighted to cook the soldiers' suppers. I presented myself to Sir Leslie
Rundle, who received me courteously, and briefly explained the outlines
of the situation. We had arrived in the nick of time. The whole force
would march at dawn. The scouts had exchanged shots during the day.
The Kaffir spies reported that the enemy would fight on the morrow.
What could be better? So with much satisfaction we went to bed.
There was a biting chill in the air when the first light of dawn began
to grow in the sky, nor was I the only one who searched a modest kit for
some of those warm clothes which our friends at home have thoughtfully
been sending out. The South African winter was drawing near. But the
sun soon rose, and we shivered no longer. The Cavalry were early astir.
Indeed their mounted squadrons in silhouette against the morning sky was
my first waking impression, and by half-past five all were in motion. I
started a little later, but it was not long before I overtook them.
Though the command was not a large one it presented several interesting
features.
For the first time I saw the Imperial Yeomanry in the field. Trotting
across the beautiful green pasture land in a most extended formation, to
which they seemed readily to adapt themselves, were seven hundred
Yeomen, all good men and true, who had volunteered to fight because they
understood the main causes of the quarrel, and from personal conviction
earnestly desired to be of some assistance to the State, and who were,
moreover, excellently mounted on smart, short-docked cobs, which they
sat and rode like the sportsmen they mostly were.
We were moving along in a wide formation, which secured us against all
possibilities of surprise, when suddenly I noticed that the scouts far
in front were halted.
'Tit-tat, tit-tat': two shots from a high plateau to the right. Shots
fired towards you, I must explain, make a double, and those fired away
from you a single, report.
We had flushed one of the enemy's outposts. Riding nearer, I could see
their figures--seven in all--exposed on the skyline. This showed they
were only an outpost, and wished to make us believe they were more.
When the Boer is in force he is usually invisible. Still, the position
was a strong one, and it is always a possibility worth considering with
the Boer that he may foresee your line of thought, and just go one step
further, out of contrariness. General Brabazon therefore halted his
centre squadrons and detached a turning force of three companies of
Yeomanry to the right.
We waited, watching the scouts exchange shots with the Boer picket, and
watching--for it was a very pretty sight--the Yeomanry spread out and
gallop away to the flank like a pack of hounds in full cry, each
independent, yet the whole simultaneous. In a quarter of an hour they
were scrambling up the steep sides of the plateau almost in rear of the
obstructive picket, which hurriedly departed while time remained. Then
the centre swung forward, and the whole Cavalry force advanced again,
the greater part of it moving on to the plateau, where a running fight
with the Dutch outposts now commenced at long range.
Several times we thought that we had unmasked their main position, and
that the Cavalry work for the day was over; but each time Brabazon's
turning movement on the right, the execution of which was entrusted to
Colonel Sitwell, a very dashing officer of Egyptian note, compelled them
to fall back. After an hour of this sort of thing we were in possession
of practically the whole of the plateau, which turned out to be of large
extent.
Beyond it, commanding it, essential to it, yet not of it, was a steep
rocky kopje. The swift advance and the necessity of pressing the enemy
had left the Infantry a long way behind. The General felt, however,
that this point must be secured. McNeill made a dash for it with the
scouts. The Yeomanry galloped off to the right again, as if about to
surround it, and the Boers allowed themselves to be bounced out of this
strong and important position, and scampered away to a smooth green hill
a mile in rear. Brabazon made haste to occupy the captured kopje in
force, and did so just in time, for as soon as the turning force--two
companies (I am going to call them squadrons in future) of yeomanry and
a company of Mounted Infantry--approached the green hill, the musketry
suddenly grew from an occasional drip into a regular patter, and there
was the loud boom of a field gun. We had found the main Boer position,
and the Cavalry came to a standstill. The enemy now directed a very
sharp fire on the captured kopje, which, it seems, they originally
intended to hold had they not been hustled out of it as has been
described. They also shelled the Yeomanry--who were continuing the flank
movement--rather heavily as they retired, inflicting some loss.
We had now to wait for the Infantry, and they lagged on the road. The
Boer fire began to take effect. Several soldiers were carried wounded
off the top of the hill--one poor fellow shot through both cheekbones.
Others had to lie where they were struck because it was not possible to
move them while the fire was so accurate.
On the reverse slope, however, there was good cover for man and horse.
Some of the men were engaged for the first time, and though their
behaviour was excellent, the General thought it necessary to walk along
the firing line and speak a few words here and there.
The Infantry still lagged on the road, but at about two o'clock Sir
Leslie Rundle himself arrived. The firing about the kopje had been
loud, and a rumour--who starts these tales?--ran back along the marching
columns that the Cavalry were hard pressed, were running short of
ammunition, and that the Boers were turning both flanks. At any rate, I
found anxious faces in the divisional staff.
Rundle considered that the retention of the kopje was of first
importance, and Sir Herbert Chermside, his second in command, fully
agreed with him. But the Infantry of the advanced guard were alone near
enough. It was decided to push them on. At this moment a reassuring
message arrived from Brabazon engaging that he could hold his own, and
hoping the Infantry would not be hurried so as to lose their breath.
Everyone was very cheerful after this, and when at last the leading
battalion--the Worcester Regiment--marched to the kopje all were able to
admire the fine cool way in which they crossed the dangerous ground
behind it; and I myself saw three pom-pom shells strike all around a
young officer, who waved his rifle thereat in high delight, and shouted
out loudly, 'By the left!' an order the purport of which I am as
uncertain as the reader, but which, doubtless, was encouraging in
spirit. When the Infantry had relieved the mounted men the latter
withdrew to safer positions, and as the evening was drawing on the
action came to an end--by mutual consent and by the effective
intervention of the British Artillery.
The events of the next day, though according to the scale of the war
unimportant, were nevertheless instructive from the military point of
view, and, so far as they concerned me, sufficiently exciting to
require, if not to deserve, a letter to themselves.