A NIGHT ATTACK ON A BRIDGE-HEAD
During the last few days in January we received strong reinforcements,
mostly recruits and reservists to bring up the regiments to their normal
strength, the losses of some of which had been very heavy: in fact, with
a fairly good knowledge of military history, I cannot recall that in any
previous war there have been so many instances of whole battalions,
batteries, and other units, being completely "wiped out," to use the
modern expressive phrase. In several cases it is said that entire
regiments of four battalions each (over 4,000 men at full war strength)
have disappeared. The 66th (probably Ersatz), and their 41st of the
regular line, are said to have met this fate: and many complete
battalions on both sides have been destroyed, or taken prisoners
wholesale. The first Russian unit to which I was attached, a battery of
horse artillery, was practically rendered non-existent; and other
batteries were lost on the actual field of battle, every man being shot
down, and the guns smashed, or taken by the enemy. Many Russian
batteries met such a fate as that described, as they were often
subjected to the fire of guns much heavier than their own; and, indeed,
it is useless to withhold the fact that the German artillery is
altogether superior to that of the Russians.
To return to the subject of the Muscovite losses. How terrible these
were may be guessed from the returns made by many regiments. I do not
purpose to give the names, or regimental numbers, of units, for reasons
which are more or less obvious. Taking twenty-three regiments,
contiguous in station to the position occupied by my division in the
middle of January, 1915, and having, at the commencement of the war, a
total combatant strength of 92,000 men, there were eight regiments which
could not parade 1,000 men each--that is, had lost three-fourths of
their strength. In the case of five of these regiments the bulk of the
missing men were known to be prisoners of war. One regiment could send
only 638 men to the trenches--less than two-thirds of a battalion. The
four regiments which had been most fortunate were each more than 1,000
men short of their proper complement; and to bring up the twenty-three
regiments to their original war strength 50,000 men were required! They
got 40,000 men; and at least 250,000 were sent to the Austrian area, and
to the district of East Prussia near Suvalki. Many of these recruits
came to the front without arms, and received those which had belonged to
the killed and to men in hospital. There was so great a shortage of arms
that some battalions were actually furnished with rifles and cartridges
taken from the Germans. I suspect that Russia would have much vaster
armies in the field if she could find rifles and cannon for them. It is
a very unpleasant fact, but still a fact, that Russia is outgunned by
her enemy to so great an extent that the Germans can place _five_ cannon
against her _three_; and that on any part of the front where the titanic
struggle is going on.
In one thing only is Russia the stronger of the two Powers, and that is
in her cavalry: and this force has not, to my knowledge, suffered a
disaster, even on a small scale. Not one of her mounted regiments has
been cut up, or even sustained abnormal losses; but they have certainly
destroyed more than one of Germany's cavalry regiments; and that in fair
open fight. The Russian cavalry has charged, successfully, all classes
of troops--mounted men, infantry and artillery. So much for the paper
tacticians who have asserted that the days of cavalry charges and
hand-to-hand fighting are over. They are clearly mistaken, as has been
shown East and West in this war, which I suppose all will admit is the
War of Wars.
Cavalry actions in the East have been almost purely cavalry actions. The
mounted rifleman, who played so important a part in the Boer War, was
singularly absent in all the actions I witnessed. It is true that the
cavalry was armed like the ancient dragoons, with a long fire-arm (the
"dragoon" soon gave place to the musket); but in all their charges they
relied on the lance and the sabre; and it was with these weapons that
the fights were decided. In some battles the German infantry was sabred
in hundreds; and the lances of the Cossacks accounted for thousands.
The Kaiser's men learned to dread both these instruments of death.
The receiving, and shaking into their places, of recruits occupied a
good deal of our time in January: and the Germans, on their side,
evidently received, not only a great many recruits, but entire divisions
of infantry, with immense numbers of guns, many of these being siege
pieces. Both sides had practically new armies in the field before the
end of the month; but while on the part of the Russians the men were
fine strong fellows of full military age (none of them seemed to be
under twenty years of age), hundreds of the Germans were immature lads
of very boyish appearance. We often got near enough together to see the
whites of one another's eyes--that is how I know what they were like.
These boys, however, fought like little vipers; and were, moreover,
amongst the cruellest scoundrels in a cruel army. Where boys fail in an
army is that they cannot bear prolonged physical strain.
It was reported that there was fighting on every part of our front, from
Caucasia to the Baltic; but I could not hear that any great battle had
been fought, or any important results obtained. The fighting with which
I was immediately concerned was a number of small affairs designed to
destroy the enemy's posts and advanced positions. They were pushing
forward a good many small parties, probably with an ulterior object; and
it was thought advisable to give them a check.
The first action was an artillery duel, which commenced at a longer
range than was usual. The Germans opened fire with a dozen or fourteen
guns at a distance of seven versts. The projectiles they used weighed
about 60 pounds, and annoyed us a good deal. They blew in about 30 yards
of trench, killing a score of men: and did much other damage. Our field
pieces failed to reduce their fire, and we sent to the rear for some
6-in guns, which were supposed to have been bought from a European
Power: they were certainly not of Russian make. We had also a very old
Krupp gun of about 7-inch calibre, which probably spoiled the beauty of
its old masters.
While these guns were being brought up and got into position, which took
some time, six batteries of field-guns made a gallant dash forward, and
got to within about 2,500 to 3,000 yards of the Germans, and galled them
so much that they were fain to turn some of their heavy pieces upon
them; by which a great many of the gunners were killed and three of the
guns knocked over. Other batteries, however, were pushed forward; and
when our heavy guns were brought into action the Germans began to suffer
visibly. Through glasses we saw one of their big pieces knocked up so
that the muzzle pointed to the sky. It remained in this position for
some time, but ultimately fell over on its side. Three other guns were
so badly damaged that they could not be fired; while the gunners flew
right and left, and upwards, a mass of smashed bodies and dismembered
limbs. In less than an hour we had put the whole battery completely out
of action: but we on our side had suffered severely. Horses, guns and a
great many men were destroyed.
The next day we received warning by field telephone that aeroplanes were
hovering over the Russian lines. One appeared in front of us at three
o'clock in the afternoon, and was repeatedly shot at. It braved the fire
in an impudent manner, and dropped some bombs which did no damage. Our
gunners cut away a ditch-bank, so that the breech of the gun could be
lowered until the muzzle was elevated fully 60 degrees, and sent a shot
very near the aircraft. It was amusing to see how quickly it bolted when
it found itself in danger. A great many rifle-shots were fired at it;
but it was too far away, and if it were struck at all, it was not
injured.
Considering how much these machines were used in the West (according to
the old newspapers which I have looked up) it is surprising that we saw
so little of them in Poland. After this time I heard that the Russians
had many aeroplanes, including some of the largest that have been made;
and I saw one of these huge things. It seemed to me to be very unwieldy;
but that might have been owing to the awkwardness of the navigators, who
never seemed to be so skilful as those of France, England and Germany. I
never heard of, far less saw, them doing much with this species of war
engine. They never, I think, bombarded any German fortresses or towns,
nor did the Germans do more in this quarter than occasionally drop bombs
on troops, and transports. The only exception I can recollect was a
visit of a number of machines to Warsaw.
Of course the rivers and streams in Russia are bridged; but not to the
extent the waterways of more highly developed countries usually are.
Many of the rivers are shallow, and fords are common, and more relied on
than bridges. Where bridges did exist, those of wood were frequently
destroyed by both armies; but the more elaborate structures of brick and
stone were sometimes defended by "bridge-heads."
A "bridge-head" in the old days of military engineering consisted of a
lunette, or a redan with flanks, constructed on the near side of the
stream, unless some peculiar features of the ground necessitated the
holding of the far side: and this form of construction was generally
followed by the Russians, with the addition of trenches and wire
entanglements and flanking works.
There were frequent desperate fights for these field-works; and more
than one of those engagements which may be denominated "battles"
commenced in attempts to capture a bridge-head, or endeavours to
establish one. I use the word "battles" advisedly, because battles in
this war have generally been prolonged struggles for the possession of
trenches, often lasting many days, and sometimes weeks. A battle, in the
sense of two armies meeting in the open field, and deciding the action
within the limits of a day or two, is a thing almost unknown, so far, in
this war.
Most of the bridge-heads were constructed by the Russians. A few,
generally small ones, were made by the Germans; and some were captured
by them, and the defences afterwards elaborated. In this last-named
case, they proved a decided annoyance, if not danger, to the Russians:
and, about this time, we had orders to destroy, or recapture, a number
of them. Most of these were situated on the rivers Vistula, Warta,
Pilica and Bzura. The numerous tributaries of these great streams had
many fords: bridge-heads were, therefore, useless on brooks and
rivulets, as they could be easily turned. The most important works of
this class were on the two first-mentioned rivers; and detachments were
generally sent out to make simultaneous attacks on a number of them, as
this method greatly interfered with, if it did not entirely stop, the
enemy sending supporting parties to any one point of the offensive line.
On the 27th of the month a number of detachments went out at night to
destroy as many of the enemy's posts as possible. These parties, in our
district, each consisted of a battalion at reduced strength (600 or 700
men), and about fifty sappers with hand charges of explosives. We had
been moved out the previous day, and destroyed a number of temporary
bridges for infantry on a stream the name of which did not transpire. We
were directed, when retiring, to break the ice behind us: for the
streams were all frozen over, though the larger rivers were not, having
only a fringe of ice on either bank. The real objective of our
expedition was three bridge-heads on the Warta protecting three bridges
constructed for the passage of infantry, cavalry and artillery. These
bridges were known to be not much in use at the time; but they were
likely to greatly benefit the enemy later on.
Though some snow had fallen during the day the night was clear and
bright, and there was more moonlight than we wanted; but the Germans
were evidently off their guard. The plank-bridges on the brooks had not
even been watched by a few videttes; and nothing seemed to show that
they knew we had been engaged in tearing them down. There was an outpost
near the first bridge-head on the Warta, beyond the village of
Nishkinova, and half a section was sent to try and get between it and
the bridge. The enemy must have taken this party for one of their own
patrols, for they took no notice of it.
The half-section found two sentinels on the bridge who were completely
surprised. One fellow dropped his rifle and held up his hands: the other
began to cry out, but was promptly stopped by a bayonet-thrust, and his
body put in the shadow under the parapet. The first man begged his life,
and was told that it would be granted him if he shut his mouth,
otherwise---- He took the hint: and we listened to hear if an alarm had
been given. Apparently it had not been, for we could hear men singing a
rousing chorus: and the white sheet of snow between us and the outwork
was unbroken by any perceptible object. To the right we could just
perceive the second division of the bridge-head: the third section was
further up the stream.
There had been no previous reconnoitring by any member of our
detachment, at any rate--and we had no knowledge of the numbers or
disposition of the enemy. Judging by appearances there would be at least
400 men in each work; and there might be 4,000 in reserve, somewhere
behind. I could see that we were taking a good deal on trust; and how we
were to pass the wire entanglements without great loss puzzled me. We
had no artillery to pave the way.
It had been arranged that the firing of a rocket should be the signal
for the simultaneous attack on the bridge-head, or three sections of the
head: for they were connected by an entrenched line. The bridge on the
left, the one we first reached, was an old stone structure; the other
two were made of planks supported by boats in place of pontoons. A
battalion, and a section of engineers, was detailed to attack each
bridge; but the arrival of the three divisions was not well timed, and
we had a long and anxious wait, being, I must admit, more fortunate than
skilful.
We observed that the German patrol we had evaded walked right up to the
main body of our battalion, and were quietly made prisoners of. They
evidently mistook our men for some of their own body.
It was not until two o'clock a.m. that we saw the rocket shoot upward
and heard the dull explosion of its head; and immediately we rushed
towards the earthwork in front of us, the apex of which was only about
200 yards from the foot of the bridge.
The surprise of the enemy must have been complete: for although we
heard rapid firing to the right of us, where the other two sections were
operating, we were suffered to rush right up to the wire entanglement
before a shot was fired at us, and we passed the obstruction and entered
the trench before a man of us dropped.
There were not many men in the trench, and these were all bayoneted in
less than a minute: but even in this short time the enemy in the
earthwork behind the trench recovered themselves, and opened fire on us
with both rifles and ordnance. Fortunately we were well spread out, and
our losses were not great; the chief, and most regrettable of them being
Colonel Krastnovitz, whose head was blown off. He was a very brave man,
and excellent officer; and his death was a great personal loss to us
all--to none more than to myself. I did not see him fall; but I soon
became aware that he was down. The Major was not with us, having been
previously wounded, and the command of the battalion devolved on a
Captain, quite a young man, but energetic and brave, and well acquainted
with his work.
The bridge-head, considering its strength, and the numerous supporting
works, fell into our hands with astonishing ease. Its capture did not
cost us more than 100 men. We killed 200, captured eighty, and about
1,000 ran away. The pontoon on the extreme right was also captured, but
with some difficulty and loss; while the defenders of the centre bridge
drove back its assaulters with the loss of nearly half their strength:
and it becoming certain that there was a strong supporting body in the
German rear which was fast coming up, we received orders to destroy all
we could, and retire.
There was not much time for destruction. We perceived at least four
battalions of the enemy close upon us; and their artillery began to fire
into the gorge of the work. So we destroyed the breach-blocks of some of
the guns we had captured, and ran for it, taking our prisoners with us,
though most of them afterwards escaped.
Our engineers had discovered that the bridge was mined; and they blew it
up so quickly after we had passed, that I am not sure one or two of our
men did not go up with it. I know that I had an unpleasantly narrow
escape myself, besides being half suffocated with dust and smoke. I
afterwards learned that one of the wooden pontoons was destroyed; but on
the whole the expedition was not as successful as it should have been.
It had been undertaken with too weak a force; and should have been
accompanied by artillery. We got away with a total loss to the three
columns of about 800 men, or more than a third of their number.
It was a night of curious adventures, and singular mistakes on the part
of the enemy. For we had not retreated more than four versts when a
squad of thirty Prussian hussars rode up to us, mistaking us for a
battalion of their own countrymen. When they discovered their mistake
they tried to escape by spreading out, and galloping away full tilt.
Twenty of them and a dozen horses went down before our fire: the rest
got away.
I understood that the Russian commander was not well pleased with the
results of this expedition; but nobody was so much to blame as himself
for not sending a stronger detachment, and for not adequately supporting
what he did send. The whole force was a flying detachment, and as such
ought to have been differently constituted. For instance we ought to
have had a strong body of Cossacks with us; and that very useful corps
ought to have linked us up with headquarters.
As it was we had to make a forced march well into the next day, bivouac
in the snow on short commons, and continue our march before we were half
rested. We passed through several towns and villages, in which we saw
groups of starving people. Many of them followed us, in dread of the
Germans whom they believed were closely pursuing us; but I think those
acute gentlemen were far behind, probably suspecting a trap; and I have
firmly believed that it was only the daring presumption and impudence of
our proceedings that saved us. Had the Germans known how weak we were,
and at so great a distance from our base, it is probable that we should
have tasted the delights of a German military prison.