THE HOLSTON SETTLEMENTS TO THE END OF THE REVOLUTION, 1781-83.
John Sevier.
John Sevier had no sooner returned from doing his share in defeating
foes who were of his own race, than he was called on to face another set
of enemies, quite as formidable and much more cruel. These were the red
warriors, the ancient owners of the soil, who were ever ready to take
advantage of any momentary disaster that befell their hereditary and
victorious opponents, the invading settlers.
For many years Sevier was the best Indian fighter on the border. He was
far more successful than Clark, for instance, inflicting greater loss on
his foes and suffering much less himself, though he never had any thing
like Clark's number of soldiers. His mere name was a word of dread to
the Cherokees, the Chickamaugas, and the upper Creeks. His success was
due to several causes. He wielded great influence over his own
followers, whose love for and trust in "Chucky Jack" were absolutely
unbounded; for he possessed in the highest degree the virtues most
prized on the frontier. He was open-hearted and hospitable, with winning
ways towards all, and combined a cool head with a dauntless heart; he
loved a battle for its own sake, and was never so much at his ease as
when under fire; he was a first-class marksman, and as good a horseman
as was to be found on the border. In his campaigns against the Indians
he adopted the tactics of his foes, and grafted on them some important
improvements of his own. Much of his success was due to his adroit use
of scouts or spies. He always chose for these the best woodsmen of the
district, men who could endure as much, see as much, and pass through
the woods as silently, as the red men themselves. By keeping these
scouts well ahead of him, he learned accurately where the war parties
were. In the attack itself he invariably used mounted riflemen, men
skilled in forest warfare, who rode tough little horses, on which they
galloped at speed through the forest. Once in position they did the
actual fighting on foot, sheltering themselves carefully behind the
tree-trunks. He moved with extreme rapidity and attacked with
instantaneous suddenness, using ambushes and surprises wherever
practicable. His knowledge of the whereabouts and size of the hostile
parties, and the speed of his own movements, generally enabled him to
attack with the advantage of numbers greatly on his side. [Footnote: The
old Tennessee historians, headed by Haywood, base their accounts, of the
actions on statements made by the pioneers, or some of the pioneers,
forty or fifty years after the event; and they do a great deal of
bragging about the prowess of the old Indian fighters. The latter did
most certainly perform mighty deeds; but often in an entirely different
way from that generally recorded; for they faced a foe who on his own
ground was infinitely more to be dreaded than the best trained European
regulars. Thus Haywood says that after the battle of the Island Flats,
the whites were so encouraged that thenceforward they never asked
concerning their enemies, "how many are they?" but "where are they?" Of
course, this is a mere piece of barbaric boasting. If the whites had
really acted on any such theory there would have been a constant
succession of disasters like that at the Blue Licks. Sevier's latest
biographer, Mr. Kirke, in the "Rear-guard of the Revolution," goes far
beyond even the old writers. For instance, on p. 141 he speaks of
Sevier's victories being "often" gained over "twenty times his own
number" of Indians. As a matter of fact, one of the proofs of Sevier's
skill as a commander is that he almost always fought with the advantage
of numbers on his side. Not a single instance can be produced where
either he or any one else during his lifetime gained a victory over
twenty times his number of Indians, unless the sieges are counted. It is
necessary to keep in mind the limitations under which Haywood did his
work, in order to write truthfully; but a debt of gratitude will always
be due him for the history he wrote. Like Marshall's, it is the book of
one who himself knew the pioneers, and it has preserved very much of
value which would otherwise have been lost. The same holds true of
Ramsey.] He could then outflank or partially surround the Indians, while
his sudden rush demoralized them; so that, in striking contrast to most
other Indian fighters, he inflicted a far greater loss than he received.
He never fought a big pitched battle, but, by incessantly harrying and
scattering the different war bands, he struck such terror to the hearts
of the Indians that he again and again, in a succession of wars, forced
them into truces, and for the moment freed the settlements from their
ravages. He was almost the only commander on the frontier who ever
brought an Indian war, of whatever length, to an end, doing a good deal
of damage to his foes and suffering very little himself. Still, he never
struck a crushing blow, nor conquered a permanent peace. He never did
any thing to equal Clark's campaigns in the Illinois and against
Vincennes, and, of course, he cannot for a moment be compared to his
rival and successor, grim Old Hickory, the destroyer of the Creeks and
the hero of New Orleans.
Sevier's Cherokee Campaigns.
When the men of the Holston or upper Tennessee valley settlements
reached their homes after the King's Mountain expedition, they found
them menaced by the Cherokees. Congress had endeavored in vain to
persuade the chiefs of this tribe to make a treaty of peace, or at least
to remain neutral. The efforts of the British agents to embroil them
with the whites were completely successful; and in November the Otari or
Overhill warriors began making inroads along the frontier. They did not
attack in large bands. A constant succession of small parties moved
swiftly through the county, burning cabins, taking scalps, and, above
all, stealing horses. As the most effectual way of stopping such
inroads, the alarmed and angered settlers resolved to send a formidable
retaliatory expedition against the Overhill towns. [Footnote: Campbell
MSS. Letter of Gov. Thos. Jefferson, Feb. 17, 1781.] All the Holston
settlements both north and south of the Virginia line joined in sending
troops. By the first week in December, 1780, seven hundred mounted
riflemen were ready to march, under the joint leadership of Colonel
Arthur Campbell and of Sevier, the former being the senior officer. They
were to meet at an appointed place on the French Broad.
Sevier started first, with between two and three hundred of his Watauga
and Nolichucky followers. He marched down to the French Broad, but could
hear nothing of Campbell. He was on the great war trace of the southern
Indians, and his scouts speedily brought him word that they had
exchanged shots with a Cherokee war party, on its way to the
settlements, and not far distant on the other side of the river. He
instantly crossed, and made a swift march towards the would-be
marauders, camping on Boyd's Creek. The scouts were out by sunrise next
morning--December 16th,--and speedily found the Indian encampment, which
the warriors had just left. On receipt of the news Sevier ordered the
scouts to run on, attack the Indians, and then instantly retreat, so as
to draw them into an ambuscade. Meanwhile the main body followed
cautiously after, the men spread out in a long line, with the wings
advanced; the left wing under Major Jesse Walton, the right under Major
Jonathan Tipton, while Sevier himself commanded the centre, which
advanced along the trail by which the scouts were to retreat. When the
Indians were drawn into the middle, the two wings were to close in, when
the whole party would be killed or captured.
The plan worked well. The scouts soon came up with the warriors, and,
after a moment's firing, ran back, with the Indians in hot pursuit.
Sevier's men lay hid, and, when the leading warriors were close up, they
rose and fired. Walton's wing closed in promptly; but Tipton was too
slow, and the startled Cherokees ran off through the opening he had
left, rushed into a swamp impassable for horsemen, and scattered out,
each man for himself, being soon beyond pursuit. Nevertheless, Sevier
took thirteen scalps, many weapons, and all their plunder. In some of
their bundles there were proclamations from Sir Henry Clinton and other
British commanders.
The Indians were too surprised and panic-struck to offer any serious
resistance, and not a man of Sevier's force was even wounded. [Footnote:
Campbell MSS. Copy of the official report of Col. Arthur Campbell, Jan.
15, 1781. The accounts of this battle of Boyd's Creek illustrate well
the growth of such an affair under the hands of writers who place
confidence in all kinds of tradition, especially if they care more for
picturesqueness than for accuracy. The contemporary official report is
explicit. There were three hundred whites and seventy Indians. Of the
latter, thirteen were slain. Campbell's whole report shows a jealousy of
Sevier, whom he probably knew well enough was a man of superior ability
to himself; but this jealousy appears mainly in the coloring. He does
not change any material fact, and there is no reason for questioning the
substantial truth of his statements.
Forty years afterward Haywood writes of the affair, trying to tell
simply the truth, but obliged to rely mainly on oral tradition. He
speaks of Sevier's troops as only two hundred in number; and says
twenty-eight Indians were killed. He does not speak of the number of the
Indians, but from the way he describes Sevier's troops as encircling
them, he evidently knew that the white men were more numerous than their
foes. His mistake as to the number of Indian dead is easily explicable.
The official report gives twenty-nine as the number killed in the entire
campaign, and Haywood, as in the Island Flats battle, simply puts the
total of several skirmishes into one.
Thirty years later comes Ramsey. He relies on traditions that have grown
more circumstantial and less accurate. He gives two accounts of what he
calls "one of the best-fought battles in the border war of Tennessee";
one of these accounts is mainly true; the other entirely false; he does
not try to reconcile them. He says three whites were wounded, although
the official report says that in the whole campaign but one man was
killed and two wounded. He reduces Sevier's force to one hundred and
seventy men, and calls the Indians "a large body."
Thirty-four years later comes Mr. Kirke, with the "Rear-guard of the
Revolution." Out of his inner consciousness he evolves the fact that
there were "not less than a thousand" Indians, whom Sevier, at the head
of one hundred and seventy men, vanquishes, after a heroic combat, in
which Sevier and some others perform a variety of purely imaginary
feats. By diminishing the number of the whites, and increasing that of
the Indians, he thus makes the relative force of the latter about
_twenty-five times as great as it really was_, and converts a clever
ambuscade, whereby the whites gave a smart drubbing to a body of Indians
one fourth their own number, into a Homeric victory over a host six
times as numerous as the conquerors.
This is not a solitary instance; on the contrary it is typical of almost
all that is gravely set forth as history by a number of writers on these
western border wars, whose books are filled from cover to cover with
just such matter. Almost all their statements are partly, and very many
are wholly, without foundation.]Having thus made a very pretty stroke,
Sevier returned to the French Broad, where Campbell joined him on the
22d, with four hundred troops. Among them were a large number of
Shelby's men, under the command of Major Joseph Martin. The next day the
seven hundred horsemen made a forced march to the Little Tennessee; and
on the 24th crossed it unopposed, making a feint at one ford, while the
main body passed rapidly over another. The Indians did not have the
numbers to oppose so formidable a body of good fighters, and only
ventured on a little very long range and harmless skirmishing with the
vanguard. Dividing into two bodies, the troops destroyed Chota and the
other towns up and down the stream, finding in them a welcome supply of
provisions. The next day Martin, with a detachment, fell on a party of
flying Indians, killed one, and captured seventeen horses loaded with
clothing, skins, and the scanty household furniture of the cabins; while
another detachment destroyed the part of Chilhowee that was on the
nearer side of the river. On the 26th the rest of Chilhowee was burned,
three Indians killed, and nine captured. Tipton, with one hundred and
fifty men, was sent to attack another town beyond the river; but owing
to the fault of their commander, [Footnote: His "unmilitary behavior,"
says Campbell. Ramsey makes him one of the (imaginary) wounded at Boyd's
Creek. Kirke improves on this by describing him as falling "badly
wounded" just as he was about to move his wing forward, and ascribes to
his fall the failure of the wing to advance.] this body failed to get
across. The Indian woman, Nancy Ward, who in '76 had given the settlers
timely warning of the intended attack by her tribesmen here came into
camp. She brought overtures of peace from the chiefs; but to these
Campbell and Sevier would not listen, as they wished first to demolish
the Hiawassee towns, where the warriors had been especially hostile.
Accordingly, they marched thither. On their way there were a couple of
skirmishes, in which several Indians were killed and one white man. The
latter, whose name was Elliot, was buried in the Tellico town, a cabin
being burned down over his grave, that the Indians might not know where
it was. The Indians watched the army from the hills. At one point a
warrior was seen stationed on a ridge to beat a drum and give signals to
the rest; but the spies of the whites stole on him unawares, and shot
him. The Hiawassee towns and all the stores of provisions they contained
were destroyed, the work being finished on the last day of the year.
On January 1, 1781, the army broke up into detachments which went home
by different routes, some additional towns being destroyed. The Indians
never ventured to offer the invaders a pitched battle. Many of the war
parties were absent on the frontier, and, at the very time their own
country was being invaded, they committed ravages in Powell's Valley,
along the upper Holston, and on the Kentucky road, near Cumberland Gap.
The remaining warriors were cowed by Sevier's first success, and were
puzzled by the rapidity with which the troops moved; for the mounted
riflemen went at speed wherever they wished, and were not encumbered by
baggage, each man taking only his blanket and a wallet of parched corn.
All the country of the Overhill Cherokees was laid waste, a thousand
cabins were burned, and fifty thousand bushels of corn destroyed.
Twenty-nine warriors in all were killed, and seventeen women and
children captured, not including the family of Nancy Ward, who were
treated as friends, not prisoners. But one white man was killed and two
wounded. [Footnote: Campbell MSS. Arthur Campbell's official report. The
figures of the cabins and corn destroyed are probably exaggerated. All
the Tennessee historians, down to Phelan, are hopelessly in the dark
over this campaign. Haywood actually duplicates it (pp. 63 and 99)
recounting it first as occurring in '79, and then with widely changed
incidents as happening in '8l--making two expeditions. When he falls
into such a tremendous initial error, it is not to be wondered at that
the details he gives are very untrustworthy. Ramsey corrects Haywood as
far as the two separate expeditions are concerned, but he makes a number
of reckless statements apparently on no better authority than the
traditions current among the border people, sixty or seventy years after
the event. These stand on the same foundation with the baseless tale
that makes Isaac Shelby take part in the battle of Island Flats. The
Tennessee historians treat Sevier as being the chief commander; but he
was certainly under Campbell; the address they sent out to the Indians
is signed by Campbell first, Sevier second, and Martin third. Haywood,
followed by Ramsey, says that Sevier marched to the Chickamauga towns,
which he destroyed, and then marched down the Coosa to the region of the
Cypress Swamps. But Campbell's official report says that the towns "in
the neighborhood of Chickamauga and the Town of Cologn, situated on the
sources of the Mobile" were _not_ destroyed, nor visited, and he
carefully enumerates all the towns that the troops burned and the
regions they went through. They did not go near Chickamauga nor the
Coosa. Unless there is some documentary evidence in favor of the
assertions of Haywood and Ramsey they cannot for a moment be taken
against the explicit declaration of the official report.
Mr. Kirke merely follows Ramsey, and adds a few flourishes of his own,
such as that at the Chickamauga towns "the blood of the slaughtered
cattle dyed red the Tennessee" for some twenty miles, and that "the
homes of over forty thousand people were laid in ashes." This last
estimate is just about ten times too strong, for the only country
visited was that of the Overhill Cherokees, and the outside limit for
the population of the devastated territory would be some four thousand
souls, or a third of the Cherokee tribe, which all told numbered perhaps
twelve thousand people.]
In the burnt towns, and on the dead warriors, were found many letters
and proclamations from the British agents and commanders, showing that
almost every chief in the nation had been carrying on a double game; for
the letters covered the periods at which they had been treating with the
Americans and earnestly professing their friendship for the latter and
their determination to be neutral in the contest then waging. As
Campbell wrote in his report to the Virginian governor, no people had
ever acted with more foolish duplicity.
Before returning, the three commanders, Campbell, Sevier, and Martin,
issued an address to the Otari chiefs and warriors, and sent it by one
of their captured braves, who was to deliver it to the head-men.
[Footnote: Campbell MSS. Issued at Kai-a-tee, Jan. 4, 1781; the copy
sent to Governor Jefferson is dated Feb. 28th.] The address set forth
what the white troops had done, telling the Indians it was a just
punishment for their folly and perfidy in consenting to carry out the
wishes of the British agents; it warned them shortly to come in and
treat for peace, lest their country should again be visited, and not
only laid waste, but conquered and held for all time. Some chiefs came
in to talk, and were met at Chota [Footnote: The Tennessee historians
all speak of this as a treaty; and probably a meeting did take place as
described; but it led to nothing, and no actual treaty was made until
some months later.]; but though they were anxious for peace they could
not restrain the vindictive spirit of the young braves, nor prevent them
from harassing the settlements. Nor could the white commanders keep the
frontiersmen from themselves settling within the acknowledged boundaries
of the Indian territory. They were constantly pressing against the
lines, and eagerly burst through at every opening. When the army marched
back from burning the Overhill towns, they found that adventurous
settlers had followed in its wake, and had already made clearings and
built cabins near all the best springs down to the French Broad. People
of every rank showed keen desire to encroach on the Indian lands.
[Footnote: Calendar of Va. State Papers, II., letter of Col. Wm.
Christian to Governor of Virginia, April 10, 1781.]
The success of this expedition gave much relief to the border, and was
hailed with pleasure throughout Virginia [Footnote: State Department
MSS., No. 15, Feb. 25, 1781.] and North Carolina. Nevertheless the war
continued without a break, bands of warriors from the middle towns
coming to the help of their disheartened Overhill brethren. Sevier
determined to try one of his swift, sudden strokes against these new
foes. Early in March he rode off at the head of a hundred and fifty
picked horsemen, resolute to penetrate the hitherto untrodden wilds that
shielded the far-off fastnesses where dwelt the Erati. Nothing shows his
daring, adventurous nature more clearly than his starting on such an
expedition; and only a man of strong will and much power could have
carried it to a successful conclusion. For a hundred and fifty miles he
led his horsemen through a mountainous wilderness where there was not so
much as a hunter's trail. They wound their way through the deep defiles
and among the towering peaks of the Great Smoky Mountains, descending by
passes so precipitous that it was with difficulty the men led down them
even such surefooted beasts as their hardy hill-horses. At last they
burst out of the woods and fell like a thunderbolt on the towns of the
Erati, nestling in their high gorges. The Indians were completely taken
by surprise; they had never dreamed that they could be attacked in their
innermost strongholds, cut off, as they were, from the nearest
settlements by vast trackless wastes of woodland and lofty, bald-topped
mountain chains. They had warriors enough to overwhelm Sevier's band by
sheer force of numbers, but he gave them no time to gather. Falling on
their main town, he took it by surprise and stormed it, killing thirty
warriors and capturing a large number of women and children. Of these,
however, he was able to bring in but twenty, who were especially
valuable because they could be exchanged for white captives. He burnt
two other towns and three small villages, destroying much provision and
capturing two hundred horses. He himself had but one man killed and one
wounded. Before the startled warriors could gather to attack him he
plunged once more into the wilderness, carrying his prisoners and
plunder, and driving the captured horses before him; and so swift were
his motions that he got back in safety to the settlements. [Footnote:
_Do_. Letters of Col. Wm. Christian, April 10, 1781; of Joseph Martin,
March 1st; and of Arthur Campbell, March 28th. The accounts vary
slightly; for instance, Christian gives him one hundred and eighty,
Campbell only one hundred and fifty men. One account says he killed
thirty, another twenty Indians. Martin, by the way, speaks bitterly of
the militia as men "who do duty at times as their inclination leads
them." The incident, brilliant enough anyhow, of course grows a little
under Ramsey and Haywood; and Mr. Kirke fairly surpasses himself when he
comes to it.] The length of the journey, the absolutely untravelled
nature of the country, which no white man, save perhaps an occasional
wandering hunter, had ever before traversed, the extreme difficulty of
the route over the wooded, cliff-scarred mountains, and the strength of
the Cherokee towns that were to be attacked, all combined to render the
feat most difficult. For its successful performance there was need of
courage, hardihood, woodcraft, good judgment, stealth, and great
rapidity of motion. It was one of the most brilliant exploits of the
border war.
Even after his return Sevier was kept busy pursuing and defeating small
bands of plundering savages. In the early summer he made a quick inroad
south of the French Broad. At the head of over a hundred hard riders he
fell suddenly on the camp of a war party, took a dozen scalps, and
scattered the rest of the Indians in every direction. A succession of
these blows completely humbled the Cherokees, and they sued for peace;
thanks to Sevier's tactics, they had suffered more loss than they had
inflicted, an almost unknown thing in these wars with the forest
Indians. In midsummer peace was made by a treaty at the Great Island of
the Holston.
End of the War with the British and Tories.
During the latter half of the year, when danger from the Indians had
temporarily ceased, Sevier and Shelby led down bands of mounted riflemen
to assist the American forces in the Carolinas and Georgia. They took an
honorable share under Marion in some skirmishes against the British and
Hessians but they did not render any special service, and Greene found
he could place no reliance on them for the actual stubborn campaigns
that broke the strength of the king's armies. They enlisted for very
short periods, and when their time was up promptly returned to their
mountains, for they were sure to get home-sick and uneasy about their
families; and neither the officers nor the soldiers had any proper idea
of the value of obedience. Among their own hills and forests and for
their own work, they were literally unequalled; and they were ready
enough to swoop down from their strongholds, strike some definite blow,
or do some single piece of valiant fighting in the low country, and then
fall back as quickly as they had come. But they were not particularly
suited for a pitched battle in the open, and were quite unfitted to
carry on a long campaign. [Footnote: Shelby MSS. Of course Shelby paints
these skirmishes in very strong colors. Haywood and Ramsey base their
accounts purely on his papers.]; [Footnote: Ramsey and his followers
endeavor to prove that the mountain men did excellently in these 1781
campaigns; but the endeavor is futile. They were good for some one
definite stroke, but their shortcomings were manifest the instant a long
campaign was attempted; and the comments of the South Carolina
historians upon their willingness to leave at unfortunate moments are on
the whole just. They behaved somewhat as Stark and the victors at
Bennington did when they left the American army before Saratoga;
although their conduct was on the whole better than that of Stark's men.
They were a brave, hardy, warlike band of irregulars, probably better
fighters than any similar force on this continent or elsewhere; but
occasional brilliant exceptions must not blind us to the general
inefficiency of the Revolutionary militia, and their great inferiority
to the Continentals of Washington, Greene, and Wayne. See Appendix.]
In one respect the mountain men deserve great credit for their conduct
in the Carolinas. As a general thing they held aloof from the
plundering. The frightful character of the civil war between the whigs
and tories, and the excesses of the British armies, had utterly
demoralized the southern States; they were cast into a condition of
anarchic disorder, and the conflicts between the patriots and loyalists
degenerated into a bloody scramble for murder and plunder wherein the
whigs behaved as badly as ever the tories had done. [Footnote: In the
Clay MSS. there is a letter from Jesse Benton (the father of the great
Missouri Senator) to Col. Thos. Hart, of March 23d, 1783, which gives a
glimpse of the way in which the tories were treated even after the
British had been driven out; it also shows how soon maltreatment of
royalists was turned into general misrule and rioting. The letter runs,
in part, as follows:
"I cannot help mentioning to You an Evil which seems intaild upon the
upper part of this State, to wit, Mobbs and commotions amongst the
People. I shall give you the particulars of the last Work of this kind
which lately happend, & which is not yet settled; Plunder being the
first cause. The Scoundrels, under the cloak of great Whigs cannot bear
the thought of paying the unfortunate Wretches whom Fame and ill will
call Tories (though many of them perhaps honest, industrious and useful
men) for plunderd property; but on the other Hand think they together
with their Wives and Children (who are now beging for Mercy) ought to be
punished to the utmost extremity. I am sorry that Col. O Neal and his
Brother Peter, who have been useful men and whom I am in hopes are
pretty clear of plundering, should have a hand in Arbitrary measures at
this Day when the Civil Laws might take place.
"One Jacob Graves son of old John of Stinking Quarter, went off & was
taken with the British Army, escaped from the Guards, came & surrendered
himself to Gen'l Butler, about the middle of Last month & went to his
Family upon Parole. Col. O Neal being informed of this, armed himself
with Gun and sword, went to Graves's in a passion, Graves shut the Door,
O Neal broke it down, Graves I believe thinking his own Life at stake,
took his Brothers Gun which happened to be in the house & shot O Neal
through the Breast.
"O Neal has suffered much but is now recovering. This accident has
inflamed and set to work those who were afraid of suffering for their
unjust and unwarrantable Deeds, the Ignorant honest men are also willing
to take part against their Rulers & I don't know when nor where it is to
end, but I wish it was over. At the Guilford Feb'y Court Peter O Neal &
others armed with clubs in the Face of the Court then sitting and in the
Court house too, beat some men called Tories so much that their Lives
were despaired of, broke up the Court and finally have stopd the civil
Laws in that County. Your old Friend Col. Dunn got out at Window, fled
in a Fright, took cold and died immediately. Rowan County Court I am
told was also broke up.
"If O Neal should die I fear that a number of the unhappy wretches
called Tories will be Murdered, and that a man disposed to do justice
dare not interfere, indeed the times seem to imitate the commencement of
the Regulators."] Men were shot, houses burned, horses stolen, and
negroes kidnapped; even the unfortunate freedmen of color were hurried
off and sold into slavery. It was with the utmost difficulty that a few
wise and good commanders, earnest lovers of their country, like the
gallant General Pickens, were able to put a partial stop to these
outrages, and gather a few brave men to help in overcoming the foreign
foe. To the honor of the troops under Sevier and Shelby be it said that
they took little part in these misdeeds. There were doubtless some men
among them who shared in all the evil of that turbulent time; but most
of these frontier riflemen, though poor and ignorant, were sincerely
patriotic; they marched to fight the oppressor, to drive out the
stranger, not to ill-treat their own friends and countrymen.
Towards the end of these campaigns, which marked the close of the
Revolutionary struggle, Shelby was sent to the North Carolina
Legislature, where he served for a couple of terms. Then, when peace was
formally declared, he removed to Kentucky, where he lived ever
afterwards. Sevier stayed in his home on the Nolichucky, to be
thenceforth, while his life lasted, the leader in peace and war of his
beloved mountaineers.
Quarrels over the Land
Early in 1782 fresh difficulties arose with the Indians. In the war just
ended the Cherokees themselves had been chiefly to blame. The whites
were now in their turn the aggressors the trouble being, as usual, that
they encroached on lands secured to the red men by solemn treaty. The
Watauga settlements had been kept compact by the presence of the
neighboring Indians. They had grown steadily but slowly. They extended
their domain slightly after every treaty, such treaty being usually
though not always the sequel to a successful war; but they never gained
any large stretch of territory at once. Had it not been for the presence
of the hostile tribes they would have scattered far and wide over the
country, and could not have formed any government.
The preceding spring (1781) the land office had been closed, not to be
opened until after peace with Great Britain was definitely declared, the
utter demoralization of the government bringing the work to a
standstill. The rage for land speculation, however, which had continued,
even in the stormiest days of the Revolution, grew tenfold in strength
after Yorktown, when peace at no distant day was assured. The wealthy
land speculators of the seaboard counties made agreements of various
sorts with the more prominent frontier leaders in the effort to secure
large tracts of good country. The system of surveying was much better
than in Kentucky, but it was still by no means perfect, as each man
placed his plot wherever he chose, first describing the boundary marks
rather vaguely, and leaving an illiterate old hunter to run the lines.
Moreover, the intending settler frequently absented himself for several
months, or was temporarily chased away by the Indians, while the
official record books were most imperfect. In consequence, many
conflicts ensued. The frontiersmen settled on any spot of good land they
saw fit, and clung to it with defiant tenacity, whether or not it
afterwards proved to be on a tract previously granted to some land
company or rich private individual who had never been a hundred miles
from the sea-coast. Public officials went into these speculations. Thus
Major Joseph Martin, while an Indian agent, tried to speculate in
Cherokee lands. [Footnote: See Va. State Papers, III., 560.] Of course
the officer's public influence was speedily destroyed when he once
undertook such operations; he could no longer do justice to outsiders.
Occasionally the falseness of his position made him unjust to the
Indians; more often it forced him into league with the latter, and made
him hostile to the borderers. [Footnote: This is a chief reason why the
reports of the Indian agents are so often bitterly hostile towards those
of their own color.]
Before the end of the Revolution the trouble between the actual settlers
and the land speculators became so great that a small subsidiary civil
war was threatened. The rough riflemen resolutely declined to leave
their clearings, while the titular owners appealed to the authority of
the loose land laws, and wished them to be backed up by the armed force
of the State. [Footnote: See in Durrett MSS. papers relating to Isaac
Shelby; letter of John Taylor to Isaac Shelby, June 8, 1782.]
The government of North Carolina was far too weak to turn out the
frontiersmen in favor of the speculators to whom the land had been
granted,--often by fraudulent means, or at least for a ridiculously
small sum of money. Still less could it prevent its unruly subjects from
trespassing on the Indian country, or protect them if they were
themselves threatened by the savages. It could not do justice as between
its own citizens, and it was quite incompetent to preserve the peace
between them and outsiders. [Footnote: Calendar of Va. State Papers,
III., p. 213.] The borderers were left to work out their own salvation.
Further Indian Troubles.
By the beginning of 1782 settlements were being made south of the French
Broad. This alarmed and irritated the Indians, and they sent repeated
remonstrances to Major Martin, who was Indian agent, and also to the
governor of North Carolina. The latter wrote Sevier, directing him to
drive off the intruding settlers, and pull down their cabins. Sevier did
not obey. He took purely the frontier view of the question, and he had
no intention of harassing his own staunch adherents for the sake of the
savages whom he had so often fought. Nevertheless, the Cherokees always
liked him personally, for he was as open-handed and free-hearted to them
as to every one else, and treated them to the best he had whenever they
came to his house. He had much justification for his refusal, too, in
the fact that the Indians themselves were always committing outrages.
When the Americans reconquered the southern States many tories fled to
the Cherokee towns, and incited the savages to hostility; and the
outlying settlements of the borderers were being burned and plundered by
members of the very tribes whose chiefs were at the same time writing to
the governor to complain of the white encroachments. [Footnote: _Do_.,
p. 4.]
When in April the Cherokees held a friendly talk with Evan Shelby they
admitted that the tories among them and their own evil-disposed young
men committed ravages on the whites, but asserted that most of them
greatly desired peace, for they were weak and distressed, and had shrunk
much in numbers. [Footnote: _Do_., p. 171, April 29, 1782.] The trouble
was that when they were so absolutely unable to control their own bad
characters, it was inevitable that they should become embroiled with the
whites.
The worst members of each race committed crimes against the other, and
not only did the retaliation often fall on the innocent, but,
unfortunately, even the good men were apt to make common cause with the
criminals of their own color. Thus in July the Chickamaugas sent in a
talk for peace; but at that very time a band of their young braves made
a foray into Powell's valley, killing two settlers and driving off some
stock. They were pursued, one of their number killed, and most of the
stock retaken. In the same month, on the other hand, two friendly
Indians, who had a canoe laden with peltry, were murdered on the Holston
by a couple of white ruffians, who then attempted to sell the furs. They
were discovered, and the furs taken from them; but to their disgrace be
it said, the people round about would not suffer the criminals to be
brought to justice. [Footnote: _Do_., pp. 213, 248.]
The mutual outrages continued throughout the summer, and in September
they came to a head. The great majority of the Otari of the Overhill
towns were still desirous of peace, and after a council of their
head-men the chief Old Tassel, of the town of Chota, sent on their
behalf a strong appeal to the governors of both Virginia and North
Carolina. The document is written with such dignity, and yet in a tone
of such curious pathos, that it is worth giving in full, as putting in
strongest possible form the Indian side of the case, and as a sample of
the best of these Indian "talks."
"A Talk to Colonel Joseph Martin, by the Old Tassell, in Chota, the 25th
of September, 1782, in favour of the whole nation. For His Excellency,
the Governor of North Carolina. Present, all the chiefs of the friendly
towns and a number of young men.
"Brother: I am now going to speak to you. I hope you will listen to me.
A string. I intended to come this fall and see you, but there was such
confusion in our country, I thought it best for me to stay at home and
send my Talks by our friend Colonel Martin, who promised to deliver them
safe to you. We are a poor distressed people, that is in great trouble,
and we hope our elder brother will take pity on us and do us justice.
Your people from Nolichucky are daily pushing us out of our lands. We
have no place to hunt on. Your people have built houses within one day's
walk of our towns. We don't want to quarrel with our elder brother; we,
therefore, hope our elder brother will not take our lands from us, that
the Great Man above gave us. He made you and he made us; we are all his
children, and we hope our elder brother will take pity on us, and not
take our lands from us that our father gave us, because he is stronger
than we are. We are the first people that ever lived on this land; it is
ours, and why will our elder brother take it from us? It is true, some
time past, the people over the great water persuaded some of our young
men to do some mischief to our elder brother, which our principal men
were sorry for. But you our elder brothers come to our towns and took
satisfaction, and then sent for us to come and treat with you, which we
did. Then our elder brother promised to have the line run between us
agreeable to the first treaty, and all that should be found over the
line should be moved off. But it is not done yet. We have done nothing
to offend our elder brother since the last treaty, and why should our
elder brother want to quarrel with us? We have sent to the Governor of
Virginia on the same subject. We hope that between you both, you will
take pity on your younger brother, and send Col. Sevier, who is a good
man, to have all your people moved off our land. I should say a great
deal more, but our friend, Colonel Martin, knows all our grievances, and
he can inform you. A string." [Footnote: Ramsey, 271. The "strings" of
wampum were used to mark periods and to indicate, and act as reminders
of, special points in the speech.]
The speech is interesting because it shows that the Indians both liked
and respected Sevier, their most redoubtable foe; and because it
acknowledges that in the previous war the Cherokees themselves had been
the wrongdoers. Even Old Tassel had been implicated in the treacherous
conduct of the chiefs at that period; but he generally acted very well,
and belonged with the large number of his tribesmen who, for no fault of
their own, were shamefully misused by the whites.
The white intruders were not removed. No immediate collision followed on
this account; but when Old Tassel's talk was forwarded to the governor,
small parties of Chickamaugas, assisted by young braves from among the
Creeks and Erati, had already begun to commit ravages on the outlying
settlements. Two weeks before Old Tassel spoke, on the 11th of
September, a family of whites was butchered on Moccasin Creek. The
neighbors gathered, pursued the Indians, and recaptured the survivors.
[Footnote: Calendar of Va. State Papers, III., p. 317.] Other outrages
followed, throughout the month. Sevier as usual came to the rescue of
the angered settlers. He gathered a couple of hundred mounted riflemen,
and made one of his swift retaliatory inroads. His men were simply
volunteers, for there was no money in the country treasury with which to
pay them or provide them with food and provisions; it was their own
quarrel, and they furnished their own services free, each bringing his
horse, rifle, ammunition, blanket, and wallet of parched corn. Naturally
such troops made war purely according to their own ideas, and cared
nothing whatever for the commands of those governmental bodies who were
theoretically their superiors. They were poor men, staunch patriots, who
had suffered much and done all they could during the Revolution
[Footnote: _Do_.]; now, when threatened by the savages they were left to
protect themselves, and they did it in their own way. Sevier led his
force down through the Overhill towns, doing their people no injury and
holding a peace talk with them. They gave him a half breed, John Watts,
afterwards one of their chiefs, as guide; and he marched quickly against
some of the Chickamauga towns, where he destroyed the cabins and
provision hoards. Afterwards he penetrated to the Coosa, where he burned
one or two Creek villages. The inhabitants fled from the towns before he
could reach them; and his own motions were so rapid that they could
never gather in force strong enough to assail him. [Footnote: The
authority for this expedition is Haywood (p. 106); Ramsey simply alters
one or two unimportant details. Haywood commits so many blunders
concerning the early Indian wars that it is only safe to regard his
accounts as true in outline; and even for this outline it is to be
wished we had additional authority. Mr. Kirke, in the "Rear-guard," p.
313, puts in an account of a battle on Lookout Mountain, wherein Sevier
and his two hundred men defeat "five hundred tories and savages." He
does not even hint at his authority for this, unless in a sentence of
the preface where he says, "a large part of my material I have derived
from what may be termed 'original sources'--old settlers." Of course the
statement of an old settler is worthless when it relates to an alleged
important event which took place a hundred and five years before, and
yet escaped the notice of all contemporary and subsequent historians. In
plain truth unless Mr. Kirke can produce something like contemporary--or
approximately contemporary--documentary evidence for this mythical
battle, it must be set down as pure invention. It is with real
reluctance that I speak thus of Mr. Kirke's books. He has done good
service in popularizing the study of early western history, and
especially in calling attention to the wonderful careers of Sevier and
Robertson. Had he laid no claim to historic accuracy I should have been
tempted to let his books pass unnoticed; but in the preface to his "John
Sevier" he especially asserts that his writings "may be safely accepted
as authentic history." On first reading his book I was surprised and
pleased at the information it contained; when I came to study the
subject I was still more surprised and much less pleased at discovering
such wholesale inaccuracy--to be perfectly just I should be obliged to
use a stronger term. Even a popular history ought to pay at least some
little regard to truth.] Very few Indians were killed, and apparently
none of Sevier's people; a tory, an ex-British sergeant, then living
with an Indian squaw, was among the slain.
This foray brought but a short relief to the settlements. On Christmas
day three men were killed on the Clinch; and it was so unusual a season
for the war parties to be abroad that the attack caused widespread
alarm. [Footnote: Calendar of Va. State Papers, III., p. 424.] Early in
the spring of 1783 the ravages began again. [Footnote: _Do_., p. 479.]
Some time before General Wayne had addressed the Creeks and Choctaws,
reproaching them with the aid they had given the British, and
threatening them with a bloody chastisement if they would not keep the
peace. [Footnote: State Department MSS. Letters of Washington, No. 152,
Vol. XI., Feb. I, 1782.] A threat from Mad Anthony meant something, and
the Indians paid at least momentary heed. Georgia enjoyed a short
respite, which, as usual, the more reckless borderers strove to bring to
an end by encroaching on the Indian lands, while the State authorities,
on the other hand, did their best to stop not only such encroachments,
but also all travelling and hunting in the Indian country, and
especially the marking of trees. This last operation, as Governor Lyman
Hall remarked in his proclamation, gave "Great Offence to the Indians,"
[Footnote: Gazette of the State of Georgia, July 10. 1783.] who
thoroughly understood that the surveys indicated the approaching
confiscation of their territory.
Towards the end of 1783 a definite peace was concluded with the
Chickasaws, who ever afterwards remained friendly [Footnote: Va. State
Papers, III., p. 548.]; but the Creeks, while amusing the Georgians by
pretending to treat, let their parties of young braves find an outlet
for their energies by assailing the Holston and Cumberland settlements.
[Footnote: _Do_., p. 532.] The North Carolina Legislature, becoming
impatient, passed a law summarily appropriating certain lands that were
claimed by the unfortunate Cherokees. The troubled peace was continually
threatened by the actions either of ungovernable frontiersmen or of
bloodthirsty and vindictive Indians. [Footnote: _Do_., p. 560.] Small
parties of scouts were incessantly employed in patrolling the southern
border.
Growth of the Settlements.
Nevertheless, all pressing danger from the Indians was over. The Holston
settlements throve lustily. Wagon roads were made, leading into both
Virginia and North Carolina. Settlers thronged into the country, the
roads were well travelled, and the clearings became very numerous. The
villages began to feel safe without stockades, save those on the extreme
border, which were still built in the usual frontier style. The
scattering log school-houses and meeting-houses increased steadily in
numbers, and in 1783, Methodism, destined to become the leading and
typical creed of the west, first gained a foothold along the Holston,
with a congregation of seventy-six members. [Footnote: "History of
Methodism in Tennessee," John B. M'Ferrin (Nashville, 1873), I., 26.]
These people of the upper Tennessee valleys long continued one in
interest as in blood. Whether they lived north or south of the Virginia
or North Carolina boundary, they were more closely united to one another
than they were to the seaboard governments of which they formed part.
Their history is not generally studied as a whole, because one portion
of their territory continued part of Virginia, while the remainder was
cut off from North Carolina as the nucleus of a separate State. But in
the time of their importance, in the first formative period of the young
west, all these Holston settlements must be treated together, or else
their real place in our history will be totally misunderstood.
[Footnote: Nothing gives a more fragmentary and twisted view of our
history than to treat it purely by States; this is the reason that a
State history is generally of so little importance when taken by itself.
On the other hand it is of course true that the fundamental features in
our history can only be shown by giving proper prominence to the
individual state life.]
Frontier Towns.
The two towns of Abingdon and Jonesboro, respectively north and south of
the line, were the centres of activity. In Jonesboro the log
court-house, with its clapboard roof, was abandoned, and in its place a
twenty-four-foot-square building of hewn logs was put up; it had a
shingled roof and plank floors, and contained a justice's bench, a
lawyers' and clerk's bar, and a sheriff's box to sit in. The county of
Washington was now further subdivided, its southwest portion being
erected into the county of Greene, so that there were three counties of
North Carolina west of the mountains. The court of the new county
consisted of several justices, who appointed their own clerk, sheriff,
attorney for the State, entry-taker, surveyer, and registrar. They
appropriated money to pay for the use of the log-house where they held
sessions, laid a tax of a shilling specie on every hundred pounds for
the purpose of erecting public buildings, laid out roads, issued
licenses to build mills, and bench warrants to take suspected persons.
[Footnote: Ramsey, 277. The North Carolina Legislature, in 1783, passed
an act giving Henderson two hundred thousand acres, and appointed Joseph
Martin Indian agent, arranged for a treaty with the Cherokees, and
provided that any good men should be allowed to trade with the Indians.]
Abingdon was a typical little frontier town of the class that
immediately succeeded the stockaded hamlets. A public square had been
laid out, round which, and down the straggling main street, the few
buildings were scattered; all were of logs, from the court house and
small jail down. There were three or four taverns. The two best were
respectively houses of entertainment for those who were fond of their
brandy, and for the temperate. There were a blacksmith shop and a couple
of stores. [Footnote: One was "kept by two Irishmen named Daniel and
Manasses Freil" (_sic_; the names look very much more German than
Irish).] The traders brought their goods from Alexandria, Baltimore, or
even Philadelphia, and made a handsome profit. The lower taverns were
scenes of drunken frolic, often ending in free fights. There was no
constable, and the sheriff, when called to quell a disturbance, summoned
as a posse those of the bystanders whom he deemed friendly to the cause
of law and order. There were many strangers passing through; and the
better class of these were welcome at the rambling log-houses of the
neighboring backwoods gentry, who often themselves rode into the taverns
to learn from the travellers what was happening in the great world
beyond the mountains. Court-day was a great occasion; all the
neighborhood flocked in to gossip, lounge, race horses, and fight. Of
course in such gatherings there were always certain privileged
characters. At Abingdon these were to be found in the persons of a
hunter named Edward Callahan, and his wife Sukey. As regularly as
court-day came round they appeared, Sukey driving a cart laden with
pies, cakes, and drinkables, while Edward, whose rolls of furs and deer
hides were also in the cart, stalked at its tail on foot, in full
hunter's dress, with rifle, powder-horn, and bullet-bag, while his fine,
well-taught hunting-dog followed at his heels. Sukey would halt in the
middle of the street, make an awning for herself and begin business,
while Edward strolled off to see about selling his peltries. Sukey never
would take out a license, and so was often in trouble for selling
liquor. The judges were strict in proceeding against offenders--and even
stricter against the unfortunate tories--but they had a humorous liking
for Sukey, which was shared by the various grand juries. By means of
some excuse or other she was always let off, and in return showed great
gratitude to such of her benefactors as came near her mountain cabin.
[Footnote: Campbell MSS.; an account of the "Town of Abingdon," by David
Campbell, who "first saw it in 1782."]
Court-day was apt to close with much hard drinking; for the backwoodsmen
of every degree dearly loved whiskey.