CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESS
Of the three envoys, the conduct of General Marshall alone has
been entirely satisfactory. (Adams.)
In heart and sentiment, as well as by birth and interest, I am an
American. We should make no political connection with any nation
on earth. (Marshall to constituents.)
Tell Marshall I love him because he felt and acted as a Republican
and an American. (Patrick Henry.)
In the congressional campaign of 1798-99, the Federalists of the
Richmond District were without a strong candidate. The one they had put
up lacked that personal popularity which then counted for as much in
political contests as the issues involved. Upon Marshall's return from
France and his enthusiastic reception, ending with the Richmond
demonstration, the Federalist managers pressed Marshall to take the
place of the candidate then running, who, indeed, was anxious to
withdraw in his favor. But the returned envoy refused, urged the
Federalist then standing to continue his candidacy, and pledged that he
would do all in his power to secure his election.
Finally Washington asked Marshall to come to see him. "I received an
invitation from General Washington," writes Marshall in his account of
this important event, "to accompany his nephew ... on a visit to Mount
Vernon."[856]
When Bushrod Washington wrote that Marshall accepted the invitation, the
General was extremely gratified. "I learnt with much pleasure ... of
General Marshall's intention to make me a visit," he writes his nephew.
"I wish it of all things; and it is from the ardent desire I have to see
him that I have not delayed a moment to express it.... The crisis is
most important.... The temper of the people in this state ... is so
violent and outrageous that I wish to converse with General Marshall and
yourself on the elections which must soon come."[857] Washington says
that when his visitors arrive the matter of the fictitious Langhorne
letter will also be taken up "and we will let General Marshall into the
whole business and advise with him thereon."[858]
To Mount Vernon, therefore, Marshall and his companion journeyed on
horseback. For convenience in traveling, they had put their clothing in
the same pair of saddle-bags. They arrived in a heavy rain and were
"drenched to the skin." Unlocking the saddle-bags, the first article
they took out was a black bottle of whiskey. With great hilarity each
charged this to be the property of the other. Then came a thick twist of
tobacco, some corn bread, and finally the worn apparel of wagoners; at
some tavern on the way their saddle-bags had become exchanged for those
of drivers. The rough clothes were grotesque misfits; and when, clad in
these, his guests presented themselves, Washington, roaring with
laughter, expressed his sympathy for the wagoners when they, in turn,
discovered the exchange they had made with the lawyers.[859] In such
fashion began the conference that ended in John Marshall's candidacy for
Congress in the vital campaign of 1798-99.
This was the first time, so far as is known, that Marshall had visited
Washington at his Potomac home. No other guest except Washington's
nephew seems to have been present at this conference, so decisive of
Marshall's future. The time was September, 1798, and the conversations
were held on the broad piazza,[860] looking out upon the river, with the
new Capitol almost within sight. There, for "four or five days," his old
commander used all his influence to induce Marshall to become the
Federalist candidate.
"General Washington urged the importance of the crisis," writes Marshall
in describing the circumstance; "every man," insisted Washington, "who
could contribute to the success of sound opinions was required by the
most sacred duty to offer his services to the public." Marshall doubted
his "ability to do any good. I told him that I had made large pecuniary
engagements which required close attention to my profession and which
would distress me should the emoluments derived from it be abandoned."
Marshall told of his promise to the Federalist candidate who was then
making his campaign for election. Washington declared that this
candidate still would withdraw in Marshall's favor; but Marshall
remained unshaken. Finally Washington gave his own conduct as an
example. Marshall thus describes the final appeal which his old leader
made to him: "He had withdrawn from office with a declaration of his
determination never again, under any circumstances, to enter public
life. No man could be more sincere in making that declaration, nor could
any man feel stronger motives for adhering to it. No man could make a
stronger sacrifice than he did in breaking a resolution, thus publicly
made, and which he had believed to be unalterable. Yet I saw him,"
continues Marshall, "in opposition to his public declaration, in
opposition to his private feelings, consenting, under a sense of duty,
to surrender the sweets of retirement, and again to enter the most
arduous and perilous station which an individual could fill. My
resolution yielded to this representation."[861]
There is a tradition that, at one point in the conference, Marshall,
becoming offended by Washington's insistence, which, runs the story,
took the form of a peremptory and angrily expressed command, determined
to leave so early in the morning that his host would have no opportunity
to press the matter further; but, Washington noting Marshall's
irritation and anticipating his purpose, was on the piazza when his
departing guest appeared at dawn, and there made the final appeal which
won Marshall's reluctant consent.
Marshall felt that he was making a heavy personal sacrifice; it meant to
him the possible loss of the Fairfax estate. As we have seen, he had
just declined appointment to the Supreme Bench[862] for this very
reason, and this place later was given to Bushrod Washington, largely on
Marshall's advice.[863] Adams had been reluctant to give Marshall up as
one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court; "General Marshall or
Bushrod Washington will succeed Judge Wilson," wrote the President to
his Secretary of State[864] nearly three months after the first tender
of the place to Marshall in Philadelphia. Later on the President again
returned to Marshall.
"I still think that General Marshall ought to be preferred," he wrote.
"Of the three envoys, the conduct of Marshall alone has been entirely
satisfactory, and ought to be marked by the most decided approbation of
the public. He has raised the American people in their own esteem, and,
if the influence of truth and justice, reason and argument is not lost
in Europe, he has raised the consideration of the United States in that
quarter of the world.... If Mr. Marshall should decline, I should next
think of Mr. [Bushrod] Washington."[865]
Washington's appeal to Marshall's patriotism and sense of duty, however,
outbalanced the weighty financial reasons which decided him against
becoming an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Thus, against his
desire, he found himself once more in the hurly-burly of partisan
politics. But this time the fight which he was forced to lead was to be
desperate, indeed.
The moment Marshall announced his candidacy he became the center of
Republican attack in Virginia. The virulence of the campaign against him
was so great that it has become a tradition; and while scarcely any of
the personal assaults, which appeared in print, are extant, they are
known to have been ruthless, and utterly unrestrained both as to the
charges made and the language used in making them.
In his scurrilous review of Adams's Administration, which Adams properly
denounced as "a Mass of Lyes from the first page to the last,"[866] John
Wood repeats the substance of some of the attacks which, undoubtedly,
were launched against Marshall in this bitter political conflict. "John
Marshall," says Wood, "was an improper character in several respects;
his principles of aristocracy were well known. Talleyrand, when in
America, knew that this man was regarded as a royalist and not as a
republican, and that he was abhorred by most honest characters."[867]
The abuse must have been very harsh and unjust; for Marshall, who seldom
gave way to resentment, complained to Pickering with uncharacteristic
temper. "The whole malignancy of Anti-federalism," he writes, "not only
in the district, where it unfortunately is but too abundant, but
throughout the State, has become uncommonly active and considers itself
as peculiarly interested in the reëlection of the old member [Clopton].
"The Jacobin presses, which abound with us and only circulate within the
State, teem with publications of which the object is to poison still
further the public opinion and which are level'd particularly at me.
Anything written by me on the subject of French affairs wou'd be
ascrib'd to me, whether it appear'd with or without my signature and
wou'd whet and sharpen up the sting of every abusive scribbler who had
vanity enough to think himself a writer because he cou'd bestow personal
abuse and cou'd say things as malignant as they are ill founded."[868]
The publication of the American envoys' dispatches from France, which
had put new life into the Federalist Party, had also armed that decaying
organization with enough strength to enact the most imprudent measures
that its infatuated leaders ever devised. During June and July, 1798,
they had succeeded in driving through Congress the famous Alien and
Sedition Laws.[869]
The Alien Act authorized the President to order out of the country all
aliens whom he thought "dangerous" or "suspected" of any "treasonable or
secret machination against the government" on pain of imprisonment not
to exceed three years and of being forever afterwards incapacitated from
becoming citizens of the United States. But if the alien could prove to
the satisfaction of the President that he was not dangerous, a
presidential "license" might be granted, permitting the alien to remain
in the United States as long as the President saw fit and in such place
as he might designate. If any expelled alien returned without permission
he was to be imprisoned as long as the President thought "the public
safety may require."
The Sedition Act provided penalties for the crime of unlawful
combination and conspiracy against the Government;[870] a fine not
exceeding two thousand dollars and imprisonment not exceeding two years
for any person who should write, print, publish, or speak anything
"false, scandalous and malicious" against the Government, either House
of Congress, or the President "with intent to defame" the Government,
Congress, or the President, or "to bring them or either of them into
contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them or either or any of
them the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up
sedition within the United States."
When Jefferson first heard of this proposed stupid legislation, he did
not object to it, even in his intimate letters to his lieutenant
Madison.[871] Later, however, he became the most ferocious of its
assailants. Hamilton, on the other hand, saw the danger in the Sedition
Bill the moment a copy reached him: "There are provisions in this
bill ... highly exceptionable," he wrote. "I hope sincerely the thing
may not be hurried through. Let us not establish a tyranny. Energy is a
very different thing from violence."[872] When Madison got the first
inkling of the Alien Bill, he wrote to Jefferson that it "is a monster
that must forever disgrace its parents."[873]
As soon as the country learned what the Alien and Sedition Laws
contained, the reaction against the Federalist Party began. In vain did
the Federalists plead to the people, as they had urged in the debate in
Congress, that these laws were justified by events; in vain did they
point out the presence in America of large numbers of foreigners who
were active and bitter against the American Government; in vain did they
read to citizens the abuse published in newspapers against the
Administration and cite the fact that the editors of these libelous
sheets were aliens.[874]
The popular heart and instinct were against these crowning blunders of
Federalism. Although the patriotic wave started by Marshall's return and
the X. Y. Z. disclosures was still running strong, a more powerful
counter-current was rising. "Liberty of the press," "freedom of speech,"
"trial by jury" at once became the watchwords and war-cries of
Republicanism. On the hustings, in the newspapers, at the taverns, the
Alien and Sedition Laws were denounced as unconstitutional--they were
null and void--no man, much less any State, should obey or respect them.
The Alien Law, said its opponents, merged the Judicial and the Executive
Departments, which the Constitution guaranteed should be separate and
distinct; the Sedition Act denied freedom of speech, with which the
Constitution expressly forbade Congress to interfere; both struck at the
very heart of liberty--so went the Republican argument and appeal.[875]
In addition to their solid objections, the Republicans made delirious
prophecies. The Alien and Sedition Laws were, they asserted, the
beginning of monarchy, the foundation of absolutism. The fervid
Jefferson indulged, to his heart's content, in these grotesque
predictions: "The alien & sedition laws are working hard," declared the
great Republican. Indeed, he thought them only "an experiment on the
American mind to see how far it will bear an avowed violation of the
constitution. If this goes down, we shall immediately see attempted
another act of Congress declaring that the President shall continue in
office during life, reserving to another occasion the transfer of the
succession to his heirs, and the establishment of the Senate for
life.... That these things are in contemplation, I have no doubt; nor
can I be confident of their failure, after the dupery of which our
countrymen have shewn themselves susceptible."[876]
Washington was almost as extravagant on the other side. When an opponent
of the Alien and Sedition Acts asked him for his opinion of them, he
advised his questioner to read the opposing arguments "and consider to
what lengths a certain description of men in our country have already
driven and seem resolved further to drive matters" and then decide
whether these laws are not necessary, against those "who acknowledge no
allegiance to this country, and in many instances are sent among us ...
for the express purpose of poisoning the minds of our people,--and to
sow dissensions among them, in order to alienate their affections from
the government of their choice, thereby endeavoring to dissolve the
Union."[877]
Washington thought that the ferocious Republican attack on the Alien and
Sedition Laws was but a cunning maneuver of politicians, and this,
indeed, for the moment at least, seems to have been the case. "The Alien
and Sedition Laws are now the desiderata of the Opposition.... But any
thing else would have done,--and something there will always be, for
them to torture; and to disturb the public mind with their unfounded and
ill favored forebodings" was his pessimistic judgment.[878]
He sent "to General Marshall Judge Addison's charge to the grand juries
of the county courts of the Fifth Circuit of the State of
Pennsylvania.... This charge is on the liberty of speech and of the
press and is a justification of the sedition and alien laws. But," wrote
Washington, "I do not believe that ... it ... or ... any other writing
will produce the least change in the conduct of the leaders of the
opposition to the measures of the general government. They have points
to carry from which no reasoning, no consistency of conduct, no
absurdity can divert them. If, however, such writings should produce
conviction in the mind of those who have hitherto placed faith in their
assertions, it will be a fortunate event for this country."[879]
Marshall had spoken in the same vein soon after his arrival at Richmond.
"The people ... are pretty right as it respects France," he reports to
the Secretary of State. The Republican criticisms of the X. Y. Z.
mission "make so little impression that I believe France will be given
up and the attack upon the government will be supported by the alien and
sedition laws. I am extremely sorry to observe that here they are more
successful and that these two laws, especially the sedition bill, are
viewed by a great many well meaning men, as unwarranted by the
constitution.
"I am entirely persuaded that with many the hate of Government of our
country is implacable and that if these bills did not exist the same
clamor would be made by them on some other account, but," truthfully and
judicially writes Marshall, "there are also many who are guided by very
different motives, and who tho' less noisy in their complaints are
seriously uneasy on this subject."[880]
The Republicans pressed Marshall particularly hard on the Alien and
Sedition Laws, but he found a way to answer. Within a few days after he
had become the Federalist candidate, an anonymous writer, signing
himself "Freeholder," published in the Richmond newspapers an open
letter to Marshall asking him whether he was for the Constitution;
whether the welfare of America depended on a foreign alliance; whether a
closer connection with Great Britain was desirable; whether the
Administration's conduct toward France was wise; and, above all,
whether Marshall was "an advocate of the alien and sedition bills or in
the event of your election will you use your influence to obtain a
repeal of these laws?"
In printing Marshall's answers to "Freeholder," the "Times and Virginia
Advertiser" of Alexandria remarked: "Mr. John Marshall has offered as a
candidate for a representative in the next Congress. He has already
begun his electioneering campaign. The following are answers to some
queries proposed to him. Whether the queries were propounded with a view
of discovering his real sentiments, or whether they were published by
one of his friends to serve electioneering purposes, is immaterial:--The
principles Mr. Marshall professes to possess are such as influence the
conduct of every real American."[881]
A week later Marshall published his answers. "Every citizen," says he,
"has a right to know the political sentiments of a candidate"; and
besides, the candidate wishes everybody to know his "real principles"
and not "attribute" to him "those with which active calumny has ...
aspersed" him. In this spirit Marshall answers that "in heart and
sentiment, as well as by birth and interest," he is "an American;
attached to the ... Constitution ... which will preserve us if we
support it firmly."
He is, he asserts, against any alliance, "offensive or defensive," with
Great Britain or "any closer connection with that nation than already
exists.... No man in existence is more decidedly opposed to such an
alliance or more fully convinced of the evils that would result from
it." Marshall declares that he is for American neutrality in foreign
wars; and cites his memorial to Talleyrand as stating his views on this
subject.
"The whole of my politics respecting foreign nations, are reducible to
this single position: ... Commercial intercourse with all, but political
ties with none ... buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible ... never
connect ourselves politically with any nation whatever."
He disclaims the right to speak for the Administration, but believes it
to have the same principles. If France, while at war with Great Britain,
should also make war on America, "it would be madness and folly" not to
secure the "aid of the British fleets to prevent our being invaded";
but, not even for that, would he "make such a sacrifice as ... we should
make by forming a permanent political connection with ... any nation on
earth."
Marshall says that he believes the Administration's policy as regards
France to have been correct, and necessary to the maintenance "of the
neutrality and independence of our country." Peace with France was not
possible "without sacrificing those great objects," for "the primary
object of France is ... dominion over others." The French accomplish
this purpose by "immense armies on their part and divisions among ...
those whom they wish to subdue."
Marshall declares that he is "not an advocate of the Alien and Sedition
Bills," and, had he been in Congress, "certainly would have opposed
them," although he does not "think them fraught with all those mischiefs
ascribed to them." But he thinks them "useless ... calculated to create
unnecessary discontents and jealousies"; and that, too, "at a time when
our very existence as a nation may depend on our union."
He believes that those detested laws "would never have been enacted" if
they had been opposed on these principles by a man not suspected of
intending to destroy the government or being hostile to it." The effort
to repeal them "will be made before he can become a member of Congress";
if it fails and is renewed after he takes his seat, he "will obey the
voice of his constituents." He thinks, however, it will be unwise to
revive the Alien and Sedition Acts which are, by their own terms, about
to expire; and Marshall pledges that he will "indisputably oppose their
revival."[882]
Upon Marshall as their favorite candidate for Congress, the eyes of the
Federalist leaders in other States were focused. They were particularly
anxious and uncertain as to his stand on the Alien and Sedition Laws;
for he seems to have privately expressed, while in Philadelphia on his
return from France, a mild disapproval of the wisdom and political
expediency of this absurd legislation. His answers to "Freeholder" were
therefore published everywhere. When the New England Federalists read
them in the "Columbian Centinel" of Saturday, October 20, most of them
were as hot against Marshall as were the rabid Virginia Republicans.
Ames whetted his rhetoric to razor edge and slashed without mercy. He
describes Republican dismay when Marshall's dispatches were published:
"The wretches [Republicans] looked round, like Milton's devils when
first recovering from the stunning force of their fall from Heaven, to
see what new ground they could take." They chose, says Ames, "the
alien and sedition bills, and the land tax" with which to arouse
discontent and revive their party. So "the implacable foes of the
Constitution--foes before it was made, while it was making, and
since--became full of tender fears lest it should be violated by
the alien and sedition laws."
The Federalists, complained Ames, "are forever hazarding the cause by
heedless and rash concessions. John Marshall, with all his honors in
blossom and bearing fruit, answers some newspaper queries unfavorably to
these laws.... No correct man,--no incorrect man, even,--whose
affections and feelings are wedded to the government, would give his
name to the base opposers of the law.... This he has done. Excuses may
palliate,--future zeal in the cause may partially atone,--but his
character is done for.... Like a man who in battle receives an ounce
ball in his body--it may heal, it lies too deep to be extracted....
There let it lie. False Federalists, or such as act wrong from false
fears, should be dealt hardly by, if I were Jupiter Tonans.... The
moderates [like Marshall] are the meanest of cowards, the falsest of
hypocrites."[883] Theodore Sedgwick declared that Marshall's "mysterious
& unpardonable" conduct had aided "french villainy" and that he had
"degraded himself by a mean & paltry electioneering trick."[884]
At first, the Republicans praised Marshall's stand; and this made the
New England Federalists frantic. Cabot, alone, defended Marshall in the
press, although not over his own name and only as a matter of party
tactics. He procured some one to write to the "Columbian Centinel" under
the name of "A Yankee Freeholder." This contributor tried to explain
away Marshall's offense.
"General Marshall is a citizen too eminent for his talents, his virtues
and his public services, to merit so severe a punishment as to [receive
the] applause of disorganizers [Republicans]." He should be saved from
the "admiration of the _seditious_"--that much was due to Marshall's
"spirit, firmness and eloquence" in the contest with "the Despots of
_France_." As "drowning men would catch at straws" so "the eagle-eyed
and disheartened sons of faction" had "with forlorn and desperate ...
avidity ... seized on" Marshall's answers to "Freeholder."
And no wonder; for "even _good men_ have stood appalled, at observing a
man whom they so highly venerate soliciting votes at the expense of
principles which they deem sacred and inviolable." "Yankee Freeholder"
therefore proposes "to vindicate General MARSHALL."
Marshall was the only Richmond Federalist who could be elected; he
"patriotically" had consented to run only because of "the situation and
danger of his country at this moment." Therefore "it was absolutely
necessary to take all the ordinary steps" to succeed. This "may appear
extraordinary ... to those who are only acquainted with the delicacy of
_New England_ elections where _personal_ solicitation is the
Death-warrant to success"; but it was "not only pardonable but
necessary ... in the Southern States."
"Yankee Freeholder" reminded his readers that "Calumny had assailed
General MARSHALL, in common with other men of merit." Virginia
newspapers had "slandered him"; politicians had called him
"_Aristocrat_, _Tory_, and _British Agent_. All this abuse ... would
infallibly have rendered him popular in _New-England_"--but not so in
"_Virginia_," where there were "too many ignorant, ill-informed and
inflamed minds."
Therefore, "it became necessary that General MARSHALL should explicitly
exhibit his political creed." After all, his answers to "Freeholder"
were not so bad--he did not assail the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Laws. "If Gen. MARSHALL thought them unconstitutional or
dangerous to liberty, would he" be content merely to say they were
unnecessary? "Would a man of General MARSHALL'S force of reasoning,
simply denominate _laws useless_," if he thought them unconstitutional?
"No--the idea is too absurd to be indulged.... Time and General
MARSHALL'S conduct will hereafter prove that I am not mistaken in my
opinion of his sentiments."[885]
Cabot's strategy had little effect on New England, which appeared to
dislike Virginia with a curious intolerance. The Essex County
politician, nevertheless, stood by his guns; and six months later thus
reassures King: "I am ready to join you as well as Ames in reprobating
the publication of Marshall's sentiments on the Sedition & Alien Acts,
but I still _adhere_ to my first opinion that Marshall ought not to be
attacked in the Newspapers, nor too severely condemned anywhere, because
Marshall has not yet learned his whole lesson, but has a mind &
disposition which can hardly fail to make him presently an accomplished
(political) Scholar & a very useful man.
"Some allowance too should be made," contends Cabot, "for the influence
of the Atmosphere of Virginia which doubtless makes every one who
breathes it visionary &, upon the subject of Free Govt., incredibly
credulous; but it is certain that Marshall at Phila. would become a most
powerful auxiliary to the cause of order & good Govt., & _therefore_ we
ought not to diminish his fame which wou'd ultimately be a loss to
ourselves."[886]
The experienced practical politician, Sedgwick, correctly judged that
"Freeholder's" questions to Marshall and Marshall's answers were an
"electioneering trick." But Pickering stoutly defended Marshall upon
this charge. "I have not met with one good federalist, who does not
regret his answers to the Freeholder; but I am sorry that it should be
imagined to be an 'electioneering trick.'... General Marshall is
incapable of doing a dishonorable act." Only Marshall's patriotism had
induced him to accept the French mission, said the Secretary of
State.[887] Nothing but "the urging of friends ... overcame his
reluctance to come to Congress.... A man of untainted honor," had
informed Pickering that "Marshall is a _Sterling fellow_."[888]
The Federalists' complaints of him continued to be so strong and
widespread, however, that they even reached our legations in Europe: "I
too have lamented that John Marshall, after such a mission particularly,
should lend himself thus against a law which the French Jacobinism in
the United States had forced government to adopt. M[arshall] _before_,
was not, that we ever heard of, one of us."[889]
Toward the end of October Marshall gives his private opinion of the
Virginia Republicans and their real motives, and foretells the Virginia
Resolutions. "The real french party of this country again begins to
show itself," he writes. "There are very many indeed in this part of
Virginia who speak of our own government as an enemy infinitely more
formidable and infinitely more to be guarded against than the French
Directory. Immense efforts are made to induce the legislature of the
state which will meet in Dec'r to take some violent measure which may be
attended with serious consequences. I am not sure that these efforts
will entirely fail. It requires to be in this part of Virginia to know
the degree of irritation which has been excited and the probable extent
of the views of those who excite it."[890]
The most decent of the attacks on Marshall were contained in a series of
open letters first published in the "Aurora"[891] and signed "Curtius."
"You have long been regarded," writes Curtius, "as the leader of that
party in this State" which has tried "by audacious efforts to erect a
monarchy or aristocracy upon the ruins of our free constitution. The
energy of your mind and the violence of your zeal have exalted you to
this bad eminence." If you had "employed your talents in defense of the
people ... your history would have been read in a nation's eyes."
"The publication of your dispatches and the happy exercise of diplomatic
skill has produced a momentary delusion and infatuation in which an
opposition to the administration is confounded with hostility to the
government and treason to the country.... The execrations and yells
against French cruelty and French ambition, are incessantly kept up by
the hirelings of Great Britain and the enemies of liberty."
But, he cries, "the vengeance of an oppressed and insulted people is
almost as terrible as the wrath of Heaven"; and, like a true partisan,
Curtius predicts that this is about to fall on Marshall. Why, he asks,
is Marshall so vague on the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition
Laws?[892] "Notwithstanding the magnitude ... of your talents, you are
ridiculously awkward in the arts of dissimulation and hypocrisy.... It
is painful to attack ... a man whose talents are splendid and whose
private character is amiable"; but "sacred duties ... to the cause of
truth and liberty require it." Alas for Marshall! "You have lost
forever," Curtius assures him, "the affection of a nation and the
applause of a world. In vain will you pursue the thorny and rugged path
that leads to fame."[893]
But while "monarchist," "aristocrat," "British agent," "enemy of free
speech," "destroyer of trial by jury" were among the more moderate
epithets that filled the air from Republican lips; and "anarchist,"
"Frenchman," "traitor," "foe of law and order," "hater of government"
were the milder of the counter-blasts from the Federalists, all this was
too general, scattered, and ineffective to suit the leader of the
Republican Party. Jefferson saw that the growing popular rage against
the Alien and Sedition Laws must be gathered into one or two
concentrated thunderbolts and thus hurled at the heads of the already
quaking Federalists.
How to do it was the question to which Jefferson searched for an answer.
It came from the bravest, most consistent, most unselfish, as well as
one of the very ablest of Republicans, John Taylor "of Caroline,"
Virginia. In a letter to Jefferson concerning the Alien and Sedition
Laws, this eminent and disinterested radical suggested that "_the right
of the State governments to expound the constitution_ might possibly be
made the basis of a movement towards its amendment. If this is
insufficient the people in state conventions are incontrovertibly the
contracting parties and, possessing the infringing rights, may proceed
by orderly steps to attain the object."[894]
So was planted in Jefferson's mind the philosophy of secession. In that
fertile and receptive soil it grew with magic rapidity and bore fatal
fruit. Within two months after he received Taylor's letter, Jefferson
wrote the historic resolutions which produced a situation that, a few
years afterward, called forth Marshall's first great constitutional
opinion, and, not many decades later, gave the battle-cry that rallied
heroic thousands to armed resistance to the National Government.[895] On
October 5, 1798, Nicholas writes Jefferson that he has delivered to "Mr.
John Breckenridge a copy of the resolutions that you sent me."[896] They
were passed by the Legislature of Kentucky on November 14, 1798; and the
tremendous conflict between Nationality and States' Rights, which for so
long had been preparing, at last was formally begun.[897] Jefferson's
"Kentucky Resolutions" declared that parts of the Alien and Sedition
Laws were "altogether void and of no effect."[898] Thus a State
asserted the "right" of any or all States to annul and overthrow a
National law.
As soon as Kentucky had acted, Jefferson thus writes Madison: "I enclose
you a copy of the draught of the Kentucky resolves. I think we should
distinctly affirm all the important principles they contain so as to
hold that ground in future, and leave the matter in such a train as that
we may not be committed absolutely to push the matter to extremities, &
yet may be free to push as far as events will render prudent."[899]
Madison accordingly drew the resolutions adopted by the Legislature of
Virginia, December 21, 1798. While declaring the Alien and Sedition Laws
unconstitutional, the Virginia Resolutions merely appealed to the other
States to "co-operate with this state in maintaining unimpaired the
authority, rights, and liberties reserved to the states respectively or
to the people."[900]
The Legislature promptly adopted them and would gladly have approved far
stronger ones. "The leaders ... were determined upon the overthrow of
the General Government; and if no other measure would effect it, that
they would risk it upon the chance of war.... Some of them talked of
'seceding from the Union,'"[901] Iredell writes his wife: "The General
Assembly of Virginia are pursuing steps which directly lead to a civil
war; but there is a respectable minority struggling in defense of the
General Government, and the Government itself is fully prepared for
anything they can do, resolved, if necessary, to meet force with
force."[902] Marshall declared that he "never saw such intemperance as
existed in the V[irginia] Assembly."[903]
Following their defiant adoption of Madison's resolutions, the
Republican majority of the Legislature issued a campaign pamphlet, also
written by Madison,[904] under the form of an address to the people. The
"guardians of State Sovereignty would be perfidious if they did not
warn" the people "of encroachments which ... may" result in "usurped
power"; the State Governments would be "precipitated into impotency and
contempt" in case they yielded to such National laws as the Alien and
Sedition Acts; if like "infractions of the Federal Compact" were
repeated "until the people arose ... in the majesty of their strength,"
it was certain that "the way for a revolution would be prepared."
The Federalist pleas "to disregard usurpation until foreign danger shall
have passed" was "an artifice which may be forever used," because those
who wished National power extended "can ever create national
embarrassments to soothe the people to sleep whilst that power is
swelling, silently, secretly and fatally."
Such was the Sedition Act which "commits the sacrilege of arresting
reason; ... punishes without trial; ... bestows on the President
despotic powers ... which was never expected by the early friends of
the Constitution." But now "Federal authority is deduced by implication"
by which "the states will be stript of every right reserved." Such
"tremendous pretensions ... inflict a death wound on the Sovereignty of
the States." Thus wrote the same Madison who had declared that nothing
short of a veto by the National Government on "any and every act of the
states" would suffice. There was, said Madison's campaign document, no
"specified power" in the National Government "embracing a right against
freedom of the press"--that was a "constitutional" prerogative of the
States.
"Calumny" could be redressed in the State courts; but "usurpation can
only be controuled by the act of society [revolution]." Here Madison
quotes _verbatim_ and in italics from Marshall's second letter to
Talleyrand in defense of the liberty of the press, without, however,
giving Marshall credit for the language or argument.[905] Madison's
argument is characteristically clear and compact, but abounds in
striking phrases that suggest Jefferson.[906]
This "Address" of the Virginia Legislature was aimed primarily at
Marshall, who was by far the most important Federalist candidate for
Congress in the entire State. It was circulated at public expense and
Marshall's friends could not possibly get his views before the people so
authoritatively or so widely. But they did their best, for it was plain
that Madison's Jeffersonized appeal, so uncharacteristic of that former
Nationalist, must be answered. Marshall wrote the reply[907] of the
minority of the Legislature, who could not "remain silent under the
unprecedented" attack of Madison. "Reluctantly," then, they "presented
the present crisis plainly before" the people.
"For ... national independence ... the people of united America" changed
a government by the British King for that of the Constitution. "The will
of the majority produced, ratified, and conducts" this constitutional
government. It was not perfect, of course; but "the best rule for
freemen ... in the opinion of our ancestors, was ... that ... of
obedience to laws enacted by a majority of" the people's
representatives.
Two other principles "promised immortality" to this fundamental idea:
power of amendment and frequency of elections. "Under a Constitution
thus formed, the prosperity of America" had become "great and
unexampled." The people "bemoaned foreign war" when it "broke out"; but
"they did not possess even a remote influence in its termination." The
true American policy, therefore, was in the "avoiding of the existing
carnage and the continuance of our existing happiness." It was for this
reason that Washington, after considering everything, had proclaimed
American Neutrality. Yet Genêt had "appealed" to the people "with
acrimony" against the Government. This was resented "for a while only"
and "the fire was rekindled as occasion afforded fuel."
Also, Great Britain's "unjustifiable conduct ... rekindled our ardor for
hostility and revenge." But Washington, averse to war, "made his last
effort to avert its miseries." So came the Jay Treaty by which "peace
was preserved with honor."
Marshall then reviews the outbursts against the Jay Treaty and their
subsidence. France "taught by the bickerings of ourselves ... reëchoed
American reproaches with French views and French objects"; as a result
"our commerce became a prey to French cruisers; our citizens were
captured" and British outrages were repeated by the French, our "former
friend ... thereby committing suicide on our national and individual
happiness."
Emulating Washington, Adams had twice striven for "honorable"
adjustment. This was met by "an increase of insolence and affront." Thus
America had "to choose between submission ... and ... independence. What
American," asks Marshall, "could hesitate in the option?" And, "the
choice being made, self-preservation commanded preparations for
self-defense....--the fleet, ... an army, a provision for the removal
of dangerous aliens and the punishment of seditious citizens." Yet
such measures "are charged with the atrocious design of creating a
monarchy ... and violating the constitution." Marshall argues that
military preparation is our only security.
"Upon so solemn an occasion what curses would be adequate," asks
Marshall, "to the supineness of our government, if militia were the
only resort for safety, against the invasion of a veteran army, flushed
with repeated victories, strong in the skill of its officers, and led by
distinguished officers?" He then continues with the familiar arguments
for military equipment.
Then comes his attack on the Virginia Resolutions. Had the criticisms of
the Alien and Sedition Laws "been confined to ordinary peaceable and
constitutional efforts to repeal them," no objection would have been
made to such a course; but when "general hostility to our government"
and "proceedings which may sap the foundations of our union" are
resorted to, "duty" requires this appeal to the people.
Marshall next defends the constitutionality of these acts. "Powers
necessary for the attainment of all objects which are general in their
nature, which interest all America" and "can only be obtained by the
coöperation of the whole ... would be naturally vested in the government
of the whole." It is obvious, he argues, that States must attend to
local subjects and the Nation to general affairs.
The power to protect "the nation from the intrigues and conspiracies of
dangerous aliens; ... to secure the union from their wicked
machinations, ... which is essential to the common good," belongs to the
National Government in the hands of which "is the force of the nation
and the general power of protection from hostilities of every kind."
Marshall then makes an extended argument in support of his Nationalist
theory. Occasionally he employs almost the exact language which, years
afterwards, appears in those constitutional opinions from the Supreme
Bench that have given him his lasting fame. The doctrine of implied
powers is expounded with all of his peculiar force and clearness, but
with some overabundance of verbiage. In no writing or spoken word,
before he became Chief Justice of the United States, did Marshall so
extensively state his constitutional views as in this unknown
paper.[908]
The House of Delegates, by a vote of 92 against 52,[909] refused to
publish the address of the minority along with that of the majority.
Thereupon the Federalists printed and circulated it as a campaign
document. It was so admired by the supporters of the Administration in
Philadelphia that, according to the untrustworthy Callender, ten
thousand copies were printed in the Capital and widely distributed.[910]
Marshall's authorship of this paper was not popularly known; and it
produced little effect. Its tedious length, lighted only by occasional
flashes of eloquence, invited Republican ridicule and derision. It
contained, said Callender, "such quantities of words ... that you turn
absolutely tired"; it abounded in "barren tautology"; some sentences
were nothing more than mere "assemblages of syllables"; and "the
hypocritical canting that so strongly marks it corresponds very well
with the dispatches of X. Y. and Z."[911]
Marshall's careful but over-elaborate paper was not, therefore,
generally read. But the leading Federalists throughout the country were
greatly pleased. The address was, said Sedgwick, "a masterly performance
for which we are indebted to the pen of General Marshall, who has, by
it, in some measure atoned for his pitiful electioneering epistle."[912]
When Murray, at The Hague, read the address, he concluded that Marshall
was its author: "He may have been weak enough to declare _against_ those
laws that _might_ be against the _policy_ or necessity, etc., etc.,
etc., yet sustain their constitutionality.... I _hope_ J. Marshall did
write the Address."[913]
The Republican appeal, unlike that of Marshall, was brief, simple, and
replete with glowing catchwords that warmed the popular heart and fell
easily from the lips of the multitude. And the Republican spirit was
running high. The Virginia Legislature provided for an armory in
Richmond to resist "encroachments" of the National Government.[914]
Memorials poured into the National Capital.[915] By February "the tables
of congress were loaded with petitions against" the unpopular Federalist
legislation.[916]
Marshall's opinion of the motives of the Republican leaders, of the
uncertainty of the campaign, of the real purpose of the Virginia
Resolutions, is frankly set forth in his letter to Washington
acknowledging the receipt of Judge Addison's charge: "No argument,"
wrote Marshall, "can moderate the leaders of the opposition.... However
I may regret the passage of one of the acts complained of [Sedition Law]
I am firmly persuaded that the tempest has not been raised by them. Its
cause lies much deeper and is not easily to be removed. Had they [Alien
and Sedition Laws] never been passed, other measures would have been
selected. An act operating on the press in any manner, affords to its
opposers arguments which so captivate the public ear, which so mislead
the public mind that the efforts of reason" are unavailing.
Marshall tells Washington that "the debates were long and animated" upon
the Virginia Resolutions "which were substantiated by a majority of
twenty-nine." He says that "sentiments were declared and ... views were
developed of a very serious and alarming extent.... There are men who
will hold power by any means rather than not hold it; and who would
prefer a dissolution of the union to a continuance of an administration
not of their own party. They will risk all ills ... rather than permit
that happiness which is dispensed by other hands than their own."
He is not sure, he says, of being elected; but adds, perhaps
sarcastically, that "whatever the issue ... may be I shall neither
reproach myself, nor those at whose instance I have become a candidate,
for the step I have taken. The exertions against me by" men in Virginia
"and even from other states" are more "active and malignant than
personal considerations would excite. If I fail," concludes Marshall,
"I shall regret the failure more" because it will show "a temper hostile
to our government ... than of" his own "personal mortification."[917]
The Federalists were convinced that these extreme Republican tactics
were the beginning of a serious effort to destroy the National
Government. "The late attempt of Virginia and Kentucky," wrote Hamilton,
"to unite the State Legislatures in a direct resistance to certain laws
of the Union can be considered in no other light than as an attempt to
change the government"; and he notes the "hostile declarations" of the
Virginia Legislature; its "actual preparation of the means of supporting
them by force"; its "measures to put their militia on a more efficient
footing"; its "preparing considerable arsenals and magazines"; and its
"laying new taxes on its citizens" for these purposes.[918]
To Sedgwick, Hamilton wrote of the "tendency of the doctrine advanced by
Virginia and Kentucky to destroy the Constitution of the United States,"
and urged that the whole subject be referred to a special committee of
Congress which should deal with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions
and justify the laws at which they were aimed. "No pains or expense," he
insisted, "should be spared to disseminate this report.... A little
pamphlet containing it should find its way into every house in
Virginia."[919]
Thus the congressional campaign of 1798-99 drew to a close. Marshall
neglected none of those personal and familiar campaign devices which the
American electorate of that time loved so well. His enemies declared
that he carried these to the extreme; at a rally in Hanover County he
"threw billets into the bonfires and danced around them with his
constituents";[920] he assured the voters that "his sentiments were the
same as those of Mr. Clopton [the Republican candidate]"; he "spent
several thousands of dollars upon barbecues."[921]
These charges of the besotted Callender,[922] written from his cell in
the jail at Richmond, are, of course, entirely untrue, except the story
of dancing about the bonfire. Marshall's answers to "Freeholder" dispose
of the second; his pressing need of money for the Fairfax purchase shows
that he could have afforded no money for campaign purposes; and, indeed,
this charge was so preposterous that even the reckless Callender
concludes it to be unworthy of belief.
From the desperate nature of the struggle and the temper and political
habit of the times, one might expect far harder things to have been
said. Indeed, as the violence of the contest mounted to its climax,
worse things were charged or intimated by word of mouth than were then
put into type. Again it is the political hack, John Wood, who gives us a
hint of the baseness of the slanders that were circulated; he describes
a scandal in which Marshall and Pinckney were alleged to have been
involved while in Paris, the unhappy fate of a woman, her desperate
voyage to America, her persecution and sad ending.[923]
Marshall was profoundly disgusted by the methods employed to defeat him.
Writing to his brother a short time before election day he briefly
refers to the Republican assaults in stronger language than is to be
found in any other letter ever written by him:--
"The fate of my election is extremely uncertain. The means us'd to
defeat it are despicable in the extreme and yet they succeed. Nothing I
believe more debases or pollutes the human mind than faction
[party]."[924]
[Illustration: PART OF LETTER FROM JOHN MARSHALL TO HIS BROTHER, DATED
APRIL 3, 1799 (_Facsimile_)]
The Republicans everywhere grew more confident as the day of voting drew
near. Neutrality, the Alien and Sedition Laws, the expense of the
provisional army, the popular fear and hatred of a permanent military
force, the high taxes, together with the reckless charges and slanders
against the Federalists and the perfect discipline exacted of the
Republicans by Jefferson--all were rapidly overcoming the patriotic
fervor aroused by the X. Y. Z. disclosures. "The tide is evidently
turning ... from Marshall's romance" was the Republican commander's
conclusion as the end of the campaign approached.[925]
For the first time Marshall's personal popularity was insufficient to
assure victory. But the animosity of the Republicans caused them to make
a false move which saved him at the very last. They circulated the
report that Patrick Henry, the archenemy of "aristocrats," was against
Marshall because the latter was one of this abhorred class. Marshall's
friend, Archibald Blair, Clerk of the Executive Council, wrote Henry of
this Republican campaign story.
Instantly both the fighter and the politician in Henry were roused; and
the old warrior, from his retirement at Red Hill, wrote an extraordinary
letter, full of affection for Marshall and burning with indignation at
the Republican leaders. The Virginia Resolutions meant the "dissolution"
of the Nation, wrote Henry; if that was not the purpose of the
Republicans "they have none and act _ex tempore_." As to France, "her
conduct has made it to the interest of the great family of mankind to
wish the downfall of her present government." For the French Republic
threatened to "destroy the great pillars of all government and social
life--I mean virtue, morality, and religion," which "alone ... is the
armour ... that renders us invincible." Also, said Henry, "infidelity,
in its broad sense, under the name of philosophy, is fast spreading ...
under the patronage of French manners and principles."
Henry makes "these prefatory remarks" to "point out the kind of
character amongst our countrymen most estimable in my [his] eyes." The
ground thus prepared, Henry discharges all his guns against Marshall's
enemies. "General Marshall and his colleagues exhibited the American
character as respectable. France, in the period of her most triumphant
fortune, beheld them as unappalled. Her threats left them as she found
them....
"Can it be thought that with these sentiments I should utter anything
tending to prejudice General Marshall's election? Very far from it
indeed. Independently of the high gratification I felt from his public
ministry, he ever stood high in my esteem as a private citizen. His
temper and disposition were always pleasant, his talents and integrity
unquestioned.
"These things are sufficient to place that gentleman far above any
competitor in the district for congress. But when you add the particular
information and insight which he has gained, and is able to communicate
to our public councils, it is really astonishing, that even blindness
itself should hesitate in the choice....
"Tell Marshall I love him, because he felt and acted as a republican, as
an American. The story of the Scotch merchants and old torys voting for
him is too stale, childish, and foolish, and is a French _finesse;_ an
appeal to prejudice, not reason and good sense.... I really should give
him my vote for Congress, preferably to any citizen in the state at this
juncture, one only excepted [Washington]."[926]
Henry's letter saved Marshall. Not only was the congressional district
full of Henry's political followers, but it contained large numbers of
his close personal friends. His letter was passed from hand to hand
among these and, by election day, was almost worn out by constant
use.[927]
But the Federalist newspapers gave Henry no credit for turning the tide;
according to these partisan sheets it was the "anarchistic" action of
the Kentucky and Virginia Legislatures that elected Marshall. Quoting
from a letter of Bushrod Washington, who had no more political acumen
than a turtle, a Federalist newspaper declared: "We hear that General
Marshall's election is placed beyond all doubt. I was firmly convinced
that the violent measures of our Legislature (which were certainly
intended to influence the election) would favor the pretensions of the
Federal candidates by disclosing the views of the opposite party."[928]
Late in April the election was held. A witness of that event in Richmond
tells of the incidents of the voting which were stirring even for that
period of turbulent politics. A long, broad table or bench was placed on
the Court-House Green, and upon it the local magistrates, acting as
election judges, took their seats, their clerks before them. By the side
of the judges sat the two candidates for Congress; and when an elector
declared his preference for either, the favored one rose, bowing, and
thanked his supporter.
Nobody but freeholders could then exercise the suffrage in
Virginia.[929] Any one owning one hundred acres of land or more in any
county could vote, and this landowner could declare his choice in every
county in which he possessed the necessary real estate. The voter did
not cast a printed or written ballot, but merely stated, in the presence
of the two candidates, the election officials, and the assembled
gathering, the name of the candidate of his preference. There was no
specified form for this announcement.[930]
"I vote for John Marshall."
"Thank you, sir," said the lank, easy-mannered Federalist candidate.
"Hurrah for Marshall!" shouted the compact band of Federalists.
"And I vote for Clopton," cried another freeholder.
"May you live a thousand years, my friend," said Marshall's competitor.
"Three cheers for Clopton!" roared the crowd of Republican enthusiasts.
Both Republican and Federalist leaders had seen to it that nothing was
left undone which might bring victory to their respective candidates.
The two political parties had been carefully "drilled to move together
in a body." Each party had a business committee which attended to every
practical detail of the election. Not a voter was overlooked. "Sick men
were taken in their beds to the polls; the halt, the lame, and the blind
were hunted up and every mode of conveyance was mustered into service."
Time and again the vote was a tie. No sooner did one freeholder announce
his preference for Marshall than another gave his suffrage to Clopton.
"A barrel of whisky with the head knocked in," free for everybody, stood
beneath a tree; and "the majority took it straight," runs a narrative of
a witness of the scene. So hot became the contest that fist-fights were
frequent. During the afternoon, knock-down and drag-out affrays became
so general that the county justices had hard work to quell the raging
partisans. Throughout the day the shouting and huzzaing rose in volume
as the whiskey sank in the barrel. At times the uproar was "perfectly
deafening; men were shaking fists at each other, rolling up their
sleeves, cursing and swearing.... Some became wild with agitation." When
a tie was broken by a new voter shouting that he was for Marshall or for
Clopton, insults were hurled at his devoted head.
"You, sir, ought to have your mouth smashed," cried an enraged
Republican when Thomas Rutherford voted for Marshall; and smashing of
mouths, blacking of eyes, and breaking of heads there were in plenty.
"The crowd rolled to and fro like a surging wave."[931] Never before and
seldom, if ever, since, in the history of Virginia, was any election so
fiercely contested. When this "democratic" struggle was over, it was
found that Marshall had been elected by the slender majority of
108.[932]
Washington was overjoyed at the Federalist success. He had ridden ten
miles to vote for General Lee, who was elected;[933] but he took a
special delight in Marshall's victory. He hastened to write his
political protégé: "With infinite pleasure I received the news of your
Election. For the honor of the District I wish the majority had been
greater; but let us be content, and hope, as the tide is turning, the
current will soon run strong in your favor."[934]
Toward the end of the campaign, for the purpose of throwing into the
contest Washington's personal influence, Marshall's enthusiastic friends
had published the fact of Marshall's refusal to accept the various
offices which had been tendered him by Washington. They had drawn a long
bow, though very slightly, and stated positively that Marshall could
have been Secretary of State.[935] Marshall hastened to apologize:--
"Few of the unpleasant occurrences" of the campaign "have given me more
real chagrin than this. To make a parade of proffered offices is a
vanity which I trust I do not possess; but to boast of one never in my
power would argue a littleness of mind at which I ought to blush."
Marshall tells Washington that the person who published the report
"never received it directly or indirectly from me." If he had known
"that such a publication was designed" he "would certainly have
suppressed it." It was inspired "unquestionably ... by a wish to serve
me," says Marshall, "and by resentment at the various malignant
calumnies which have been so profusely bestowed on me."[936]
Washington quickly reassured Marshall: "I am sorry to find that the
publication you allude to should have given you a moment's disquietude.
I can assure you it made no impression on my mind, of the tendency
apprehended by you."[937]
As soon as all the election returns were in, Marshall reported to
Washington that the defeat of two of the Federalist candidates for
Congress was unexpected and "has reduced us to eight in the legislature
of the Union"; that the Republicans maintained their "majority in the
house of Delegates," which "means an antifederal senator and governor,"
and that "the baneful influence of a legislature hostile perhaps to the
Union--or if not so--to all its measures will be kept up."[938]
Marshall's campaign attracted the attention of the whole country, and
the news of his success deeply interested both Federalists and
Republicans. Pickering, after writing King of the Federalist success in
New York City, declared that "the other domestic intelligence, still
more important, is, that Genl. Marshall is elected a member of Congress
for his district."[939]
Speaker Sedgwick also informed King of Marshall's election. "General
Marshall you know is a member of the House of Representatives. His
talents, his character and the situation he has been in, will combine to
give him an influence, which will be further aided by the scene which he
immediately represents. He may and probably will give a tone to the
federal politics South of the Susquehannah. I well know the respect he
entertains for you and for your opinions."[940]
But the Federalist leaders were none too sure of their Virginia
congressional recruit. He was entirely too independent to suit the party
organization. His campaign statement on the Alien and Sedition Laws
angered and troubled them when it was made; and, now that Marshall was
elected, his opinion on this, to the Federalists, vital subject, his
admitted power of mind and character, and his weighty influence over the
Southern wing of the Federalists caused serious apprehension among the
party's Northern leaders. Sedgwick advises King to write Marshall on the
subject of party regularity.
"I have brought this subject to your mind, that you may decide on the
propriety of a communication of your sentiments to him, which you may do
in season to be useful. Should he, which, indeed, I do not expect,
conform his political conduct generally, to what seems indicated by his
public declaration relative to the alien & sedition acts, it would have
been better that his insignificant predecessor should have been
reëlected. There never has been an instance where the commencement of a
political career was so important as is that of General Marshall."[941]
Apprehension and uncertainty as to Marshall's course in the House was in
the minds of even the Federalist leaders who were out of the country.
The American Minister at The Hague was as much troubled about Marshall
as were the Federalist politicians at home: "If M[arshall]'s silly
declaration on the _inexpediency_ of the Sedition law does not entangle
him he may be very useful."[942] But Murray was uneasy: "Marshall, I
fear, comes in on middle ground, and when a man plays the amiable in a
body like that [House of Representatives] he cannot be counted [on], but
he will vote generally right. I was amiable the first session! It cannot
last."[943]
Jefferson, of course, was much depressed by the Federalist congressional
victories, which he felt "are extremely to be regretted." He was
especially irritated by Marshall's election: It "marks a taint in that
part of the State which I had not expected." He was venomous toward
Henry for having helped Marshall: "His [Henry's] apostacy, must be
unaccountable to those who do not know all the recesses of his
heart."[944]
A week later, however, Jefferson decided that the Federalist success did
not mean a permanent Republican reverse. Spoils and corruption, he
concluded, were the real cause of the Federalist gain. "The Virginia
congressional elections have astonished every one," he informs Tench
Coxe. "This result has proceeded from accidental combinations of
circumstances, & not from an unfavorable change of sentiment.... We are
not incorruptible; on the contrary, corruption is making sensible tho'
silent progress. Offices are as acceptable here as elsewhere, & whenever
a man has cast a longing on them, a rottenness begins in his
conduct."[945]
Jefferson, with settled and burning hatred, now puts his branding-iron
on Henry: "As to the effect of his name among the people, I have found
it crumble like a dried leaf the moment they become satisfied of his
apostacy."[946]
During the weeks which immediately followed his election, Marshall was
busy reporting to Washington on the best men to be appointed as officers
in the provisional army; and his letters to the Commander-in-Chief show
a wide and careful acquaintance with Virginians of military training,
and a delicate judgment of their qualities.[947]
By now the hated Sedition Law was justifying the political hydrophobia
which it had excited among the Republicans.[948] All over the country
men were being indicted and convicted for wholly justifiable political
criticisms,--some of them trivial and even amusing,--as well as for
false and slanderous attacks on public officers. President Adams himself
had begun to urge these prosecutions. He was particularly bitter against
the "Aurora," the Republican organ, which, according to Adams, contained
an "uninterrupted stream of slander on the American government."[949] He
thought that the editor ought to be expelled from the country.[950]
All this was more fuel to the Republican furnace. Wicked and outrageous
as were some of these prosecutions, they were not so extravagant as the
horrors which Republican politicians declared that the Sedition Laws
would bring to every fireside.
During the summer after his election Marshall visited his father in
Kentucky. Thomas Marshall was ill, and his son's toilsome journey was
solely for the purpose of comforting him; but Jefferson could see in it
nothing but a political mission. He writes to Wilson Cary Nicholas to
prepare an answer to the States that had opposed the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions; but, says Jefferson, "As to the preparing anything
[myself] I must decline it, to avoid suspicions (which were pretty
strong in some quarters on the last occasion) [the Kentucky
Resolutions].... The visit of the apostle Marshall[951] to Kentucky,
excite[s] anxiety. However, we doubt not that his poisons will be
effectually counter-worked."[952]
Jefferson's suspicions were groundless. Marshall did not even sound
public opinion on the subject. On his return to Richmond he writes the
Secretary of State, who was the most active politician of Adams's
Cabinet, and to whom Marshall freely opened his mind on politics, that
"a visit to an aged & rever'd Father" prevented an earlier answer to a
letter from Pickering; and, although Marshall has much to say, not one
word is written of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. He is obsessed
with the French question and of the advantage the French "party in
America" may secure by the impression that France was not really
hostile. "This will enable her [France's] party in America to attack
from very advantageous ground the government of the United States."[953]
Now came the public circumstance that made the schism in the Federalist
Party an open and remorseless feud. The President's militant
declaration, that he would "never send another minister to France
without assurances that he will [would] be received, respected, and
honored as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and
independent people,"[954] was perfectly attuned to the warlike spirit of
the hour. The country rang with approval. The Federalist politicians
were exultant.
Thereupon the resourceful Talleyrand wrote the Secretary of the French
Legation at The Hague to intimate to Murray, the American Minister, that
the French Directory would now receive a minister from the United
States.[955] Murray hastened the news to Adams.[956] It was a frail
assurance, indirect, irregular, unacknowledged to the world; and from
men who had insulted us and who would not hesitate to repudiate Murray's
statement if their purposes so required. Yet the President grasped by
the forelock this possibility for peace, and, against the emphatic
protest of his Cabinet, suddenly sent a second commission to try again
for that adjustment which Marshall and his associates had failed to
secure. It was the wisest and most unpopular act of Adams's troubled
Administration.
The leading Federalist politicians were enraged. Indeed, "the whole
[Federalist] party were prodigiously alarmed."[957] They thought it a
national humiliation. What! said they, kiss the hand that had slapped
our face! "The new embassy ... disgusts most men here," reported
Ames from New England.[958] Cabot confirmed Ames's doleful
message--"Surprise, indignation, grief, & disgust followed each other in
swift succession in the breasts of the true friends of our country," he
advised King.[959]
The Federalist leaders really wanted war with France, most of them as a
matter of patriotism; some, undoubtedly, because war would insure party
success in the approaching presidential election. Upon his return
Marshall had prophesied formal declaration of hostilities from the
Republic of France, when news of the dispatches reached Europe; and the
war Federalists were sorely disappointed at the failure of his
prediction. "Genl. Marshall unfortunately held the decided opinion that
France would DECLARE war when the Dispatches should appear; and T.
Sewell with other good men were so strongly impressed with the advantage
of such a declaration by them that they could not be persuaded to
relinquish the belief in it--I was astonished that they should have
attributed to the French such miserable policy." So wrote the able and
balanced Cabot.[960] That France refused to adopt "such miserable
policy" as Marshall had expected was sufficiently exasperating to the
war Federalists; but to meet that country three fourths of the way on
the road to peace was intolerable.
"The end [peace] being a bad one all means are unwise and indefensible"
was the ultra-Federalist belief.[961] Adams's second mission was, they
said, party surrender to the Republicans; it was "a policy that
threatens ... to revive the Jacobin faction in our bosom."[962]
Federalist members of Congress threatened to resign. "I have sacrificed
as much as most men ... to support this Govt. and root out Democracy, &
French principles, but ... I feel it to be lost and worse ... I can &
will resign if all must be given up to France," cried the enraged
Tracy.[963]
These "enemies of government" had said all along that things could be
arranged with France; that the X. Y. Z. disclosures were merely a
Federalist plot; and that the army was a wicked and needless expense.
What answer could the Federalists make to these Republican charges now?
Adams's new French mission, the Federalist chieftains declared, was "a
measure to _make_ dangers, and to nullify resources; to make the navy
without object; the army an object of popular terror."[964]
And the presidential election was coming on! To hold the situation just
as it was might mean Federalist victory. Suppose events did develop a
formal declaration of war with France? That would make Federalist
success more certain. The country would not turn out a party in charge
of the Government when cannon were roaring. Even more important, an open
and avowed conflict with the "bloody Republic" would, reasoned the
Federalist leaders, check the miasmic growth of French revolutionary
ideas among the people.
In short, a declaration of war with France would do everything which the
Federalists wished and hoped for. "Peace [with France] ... is not
desired as it should not be"[965] was their opinion of the statesmanship
demanded by the times. And now Adams, without one word to the men who
reluctantly had made him President,[966] had not only prevented a
rupture which would have accomplished every Federalist purpose, but had
delivered his party into the hands of the "Jacobins." He had robbed the
Federalists of their supreme campaign "issue." "Peace with France, they
think an evil and holding out the hope of it another, as it tends to
chill the public fervor";[967] and the "public fervor" surely needed no
further reduction of temperature, for Federalist health.
If Adams did not wish for a formal declaration of war, at least he might
have let things alone. But now! "Government will be weakened by the
friends it loses and betrayed by those it will gain. It will lose ...
the friendship of the sense, and worth, and property of the United
States, and get in exchange the prejudice, vice, and bankruptcy of the
nation,"[968] wrote Ames to Pickering. "In Resistance alone there is
safety,"[969] was Cabot's opinion. "The Jacobin influence is rising,
and has been ever since the mission to France was determined on; ... if
a Treaty be made with France their [Republican] ascendancy will be
sure";[970] and, after that, the deluge.
The Federalist leaders felt that, even without a declaration of
hostilities by Congress, they might make shift to win the approaching
election. For on the sea we already were waging war on France, while
formally at peace with her. Our newborn navy was taking French
privateers, defeating French men-of-war, and retaliating with pike,
cutlass, and broadside for the piratical French outrages upon American
commerce.[971] As things stood, it was certain that this would continue
until after the election, and with each glorious victory of a Truxton or
a Hull, National pride and popular enthusiasm would mount higher and
grow stronger. So the Federalist politicians thought that "the only
negotiation compatible with our honor or our safety is that begun by
Truxton in the capture of the L'Insurgente."[972]
Priceless campaign ammunition was this for the Federalist political
guns. Early in the year the bilious but keen-eyed watchman on the
ramparts of New England Federalism had noted the appearance of "a little
patriotism, and the capture of the _Insurgente_ cherishes it."[973] And
now Adams's second mission might spoil everything. "The Jacobins will
rise in consequence of this blunder,"[974] was the doleful prophecy.
Indeed, it was already in fulfillment even with the utterance: "Already
the Jacobins raise their disgraced heads from the mire of
contempt!"[975] The "country gentlemen" were the hands as the business
interests were the brain and heart of the Federalist Party; "the
President destroyed their influence, and ... left them prostrate before
their vindictive adversaries."[976]
The Republicans were overjoyed. Adams had reversed himself, eaten his
own words, confessed the hypocrisy of the "infamous X. Y. Z. plot."
"This renders their [Federalists'] efforts for war desperate, & silences
all further denials of the sincerity of the French government,"
gleefully wrote Jefferson.[977]
Marshall alone of the commanding Federalists, approved Adams's action.
"I presume it will afford you satisfaction to know that a measure which
excited so much agitation here, has met the approbation of so good a
judge as Mr. Marshall," Lee reported to the President.[978] Marshall's
support cheered the harried Chief Executive. "Esteeming very highly the
opinion and character of your friend General Marshall, I thank you for
inclosing his letter," responded Adams.[979]
The President had done still worse. Auctioneer John Fries, a militia
captain, had headed an armed mob in resistance to the National officers
who were levying the National direct tax on the houses and lands of the
farmers of eastern Pennsylvania. He had been finally taken prisoner,
tried, and convicted of sedition and treason, and sentenced to death.
Against the unanimous written advice of his Cabinet, formally
tendered,[980] the President pardoned the "traitor" and "his fellow
criminals."[981] And this clemency was granted at the plea of McKean,
the arch-"Jacobin" of Pennsylvania,[982] without even consulting the
judges of the courts in which they were twice tried and convicted.[983]
What was this, asked the Federalist leaders in dazed and angry
amazement! Paralyze the arm of the law! Unloose the fingers of outraged
authority from the guilty throat which Justice had clutched! What was to
become of "law and order" when the Nation's head thus sanctioned
resistance to both?[984] In his charge to the Federal Grand Jury, April
11, 1799, Justice Iredell declared that if "traitors" are not punished
"anarchy will ride triumphant and all lovers of order, decency, truth &
justice will be trampled under foot."[985]
How, now, could the Federalists repel Republican assaults on this direct
tax? How, now, could they reply to the Republican attacks upon the army
to support which the tax was provided! In pardoning Fries, Adams had
admitted everything which the hated Jefferson had said against both tax
and army.[986] If Adams was right in pardoning Fries, then Washington
was wrong in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion. The whole Federalist
system was abandoned.[987] The very roots of the Federalist philosophy
of government and administration were torn from their none too firm hold
upon the scanty soil which Federalist statesmen had laboriously gathered
for their nourishment. And why had Adams done this? Because, said the
Federalist politicians, it was popular in Pennsylvania;[988] that was
the President's motive--the same that moved him to send the new mission
to France.[989]
Bending under heavy burdens of state, harassed by the politicians, Adams
was enduring a private pain sharper than his public cares. His wife, the
incomparable Abigail, was in Massachusetts and seriously ill. The
President had left her to meet his Cabinet and dispatch the second
mission to France. That done, he hastened back to the bedside of his
sick wife. But the politicians made no allowances. Adams's absence "from
the seat of government ... is a source of much disgust," chronicles the
ardent Troup. "It ... has the air of an abdication."[990] A month later
he records that the President "still continues at Braintree,[991] and
the government, like Pope's wounded snake, drags its slow length
along."[992]
Such was the condition of the country and the state of political parties
when Marshall took his seat in Congress. For the Federalists, the House
was a very "cave of the winds," with confusion, uncertainty, suspicion,
anger, and all the disintegrating passions blowing this way and that.
But the Republicans were a compact, disciplined, determined body full of
spirit and purpose.
FOOTNOTES:
[856] Marshall to Paulding, April 4, 1835; _Lippincott's Magazine_
(1868), ii, 624-25.
[857] Washington to Bushrod Washington, Aug. 27, 1798; _Writings_: Ford,
xiv, 75.
[858] _Ib._ In September, 1797, when Marshall was absent on the X. Y. Z.
mission, Washington received a letter from one "John Langhorne" of
Albemarle County. Worded with skillful cunning, it was designed to draw
from the retired President imprudent expressions that could be used
against him and the Federalists. It praised him, denounced his
detractors, and begged him to disregard their assaults. (Langhorne to
Washington, Sept. 25, 1797; _Writings_: Sparks, xi, 501.) Washington
answered vaguely. (Washington to Langhorne, Oct. 15, 1797; _Writings_:
Ford, xiii, 428-30.) John Nicholas discovered that the Langhorne letter
had been posted at Charlottesville; that no person of that name lived in
the vicinity; and that Washington's answer was called for at the
Charlottesville post-office (where Jefferson posted and received
letters) by a person closely connected with the master of Monticello. It
was suspected, therefore, that Jefferson was the author of the
fictitious letter. The mystery caused Washington much worry and has
never been cleared up. (See Washington to Nicholas, Nov. 30, 1797;
_ib._, footnote to 429-30; to Bushrod Washington, March 8, 1798; _ib._,
448; to Nicholas, March 8, 1798; _ib._, 449-50.) It is not known what
advice Marshall gave Washington when the latter asked for his opinion;
but from his lifelong conduct in such matters and his strong repugnance
to personal disputes, it is probable that Marshall advised that the
matter be dropped.
[859] Paulding: _Washington_, ii, 191-92.
[860] Marshall to Paulding, _supra._
[861] Marshall to Paulding, _supra._ This letter was in answer to one
from Paulding asking Marshall for the facts as to Washington's part in
inducing Marshall to run for Congress.
[862] Pickering to Marshall, Sept. 20, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc.
[863] _Ib._
[864] Adams to Pickering, Sept. 14, 1798; _Works_: Adams, viii, 595.
[865] Adams to Pickering, Sept. 26, 1798; _Works_: Adams, viii, 597.
[866] Adams to Rush, June 25, 1807; _Old Family Letters_, 152.
[867] Wood, 260. Wood's book was "suppressed" by Aaron Burr, who bought
the plates and printer's rights. It consists of dull attacks on
prominent Federalists. Jefferson's friends charged that Burr suppressed
it because of his friendship for the Federalist leaders. (See Cheetham's
letters to Jefferson, Dec. 29, 1801, Jan. 30, 1802, _Proceedings_, Mass.
Hist. Soc. (April and May, 1907) 51-58.) Soon afterward Jefferson began
his warfare on Burr.
[868] Marshall to Pickering, Oct. 15, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc. This campaign was unusually acrimonious everywhere. "This
Electioneering is worse than the Devil." (Smith to Bayard, Aug. 2, 1798;
_Bayard Papers_: Donnan, 69.)
[869] See Statutes at Large, 566, 570, 577, for Alien Acts of June 18,
June 25, and July 6, and _ib._, 196, for Sedition Law of July 14, 1798.
[870] This section was not made a campaign issue by the Republicans.
[871] Jefferson to Madison, May 10, 1798; _Works_: Ford, viii, 417; and
to Monroe, May 21, 1798; _ib._, 423. Jefferson's first harsh word was to
Madison, June 7, 1798; _ib._, 434.
[872] Hamilton to Wolcott, June 29, 1798; _Works_: Lodge, x, 295.
[873] Madison to Jefferson, May 20, 1798; _Writings_: Hunt, vi, 320.
[874] For the Federalists' justification of the Alien and Sedition Laws
see Gibbs, ii, 78 _et seq._
[875] As a matter of fact, the anger of Republican leaders was chiefly
caused by their belief that the Alien and Sedition Laws were aimed at
the Republican Party as such, and this, indeed, was true.
[876] Jefferson to S. T. Mason, Oct. 11, 1798; _Works_: Ford, viii, 450.
[877] Washington to Spotswood, Nov. 22, 1798; _Writings_: Ford, xiv,
121-22.
[878] Washington to Murray, Dec. 26, 1798; _Writings_: Ford, xiv, 132.
[879] Washington to Bushrod Washington, Dec. 31, 1798; _ib._, 135-36.
Judge Addison's charge was an able if intemperate interpretation of the
Sedition Law. The Republican newspapers assailed and ridiculed this very
effectively in the presidential campaign of 1800. "Alexander Addison has
published in a volume a number of his _charges_ to juries--and
_precious_ charges they are--brimstone and saltpetre, assifoetida and
train oil." (_Aurora_, Dec. 6, 1800. See Chief Justice Ellsworth's
comments upon Judge Addison's charge in Flanders, ii, 193.)
[880] Marshall to Pickering, Aug. 11, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc.
[881] Oct. 11, 1798. The questions of "Freeholder" were, undoubtedly,
written with Marshall's knowledge. Indeed a careful study of them leads
one to suspect that he wrote or suggested them himself.
[882] The _Times and Virginia Advertiser_, Alexandria, Virginia, October
11, 1798. This paper, however, does not give "Freeholder's" questions.
The _Columbian Centinel_, Boston, October 20, 1798, prints both
questions and answers, but makes several errors in the latter. The
correct version is given in Appendix III, _infra_, where "Freeholder's"
questions and Marshall's answers appear in full.
[883] Ames to Gore, Dec. 18, 1798; _Works_: Ames, i, 245-47.
[884] Sedgwick to Pickering, Oct. 23, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc.
[885] _Columbian Centinel_ (Boston), Oct. 24, 1798.
[886] Cabot to King, April 26, 1799; King, iii, 9.
[887] This was not true. The Fairfax embarrassment, alone, caused
Marshall to go to France in 1797.
[888] Pickering to Sedgwick, Nov. 6, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc.
[889] Murray to J. Q. Adams, March 22, 1799; _Letters_: Ford, 530.
Murray had been a member of Congress and a minor Federalist politician.
By "us" he means the extreme Federalist politicians.
[890] Marshall to Pickering, Oct. 22, 1798; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc.
[891] Adams: _Gallatin_, 212.
[892] "Freeholder" had not asked Marshall what he thought of the
constitutionality of these laws.
[893] Thompson: _The Letters of Curtius._ John Thompson of Petersburg
was one of the most brilliant young men that even Virginia ever
produced. See Adams: _Gallatin_, 212, 227. There is an interesting
resemblance between the uncommon talents and fate of young John Thompson
and those of Francis Walker Gilmer. Both were remarkably intellectual
and learned; the characters of both were clean, fine, and high. Both
were uncommonly handsome men. Neither of them had a strong physical
constitution; and both died at a very early age. Had John Thompson and
Francis Walker Gilmer lived, their names would have been added to that
wonderful list of men that the Virginia of that period gave to the
country.
The intellectual brilliancy and power, and the lofty character of
Thompson and Gilmer, their feeble physical basis and their early passing
seem like the last effort of that epochal human impulse which produced
Henry, Madison, Mason, Jefferson, Marshall, and Washington.
[894] Taylor to Jefferson, June 25, 1798; as quoted in _Branch
Historical Papers_, ii, 225. See entire letter, _ib._, 271-76.
[895] For an excellent treatment of the Kentucky and Virginia
Resolutions see Von Holst: _Constitutional History of the United
States_, i, chap. iv.
[896] Nicholas to Jefferson, Oct. 5, 1798; quoted by Channing in
"Kentucky Resolutions of 1798"; _Amer. Hist. Rev._, xx, no. 2, Jan.,
1915, 333-36.
[897] Writing nearly a quarter of a century later, Jefferson states that
Nicholas, Breckenridge, and he conferred on the matter; that his draft
of the "Kentucky Resolutions" was the result of this conference; and
that he "strictly required" their "solemn assurance" that no one else
should know that he was their author. (Jefferson to Breckenridge, Dec.
11, 1821; _Works_: Ford, viii, 459-60.)
Although this letter of Jefferson is positive and, in its particulars,
detailed and specific, Professor Channing has demonstrated that
Jefferson's memory was at fault; that no such conference took place; and
that Jefferson sent the resolutions to Nicholas, who placed them in the
hands of Breckenridge for introduction in the Kentucky Legislature; and
that Breckenridge and Nicholas both thought that the former should not
even see Jefferson, lest the real authorship of the resolutions be
detected. (See "The Kentucky Resolutions": Channing, in _Amer. Hist.
Rev._, xx, no. 2, Jan., 1915, 333-36.)
[898] See Jefferson's "Rough Draught" and "Fair Copy" of the Kentucky
Resolutions; and the resolutions as the Kentucky Legislature passed them
on Nov. 10, 1798; _Works_: Ford, viii, 458-79. See examination of
Marshall's opinion in Marbury _vs._ Madison, vol. III of this work.
[899] Jefferson to Madison, Nov. 17, 1798; _Works_: Ford, viii, 457.
[900] _Writings_: Hunt, vi, 326-31.
[901] Davie to Iredell, June 17, 1799; quoting from a Virginia
informant--very probably Marshall; McRee, ii, 577.
[902] Iredell to Mrs. Iredell; Jan. 24, 1799; McRee, ii, 543.
[903] Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 1, 1799; quoting Marshall to Sykes,
Dec. 18, 1798; _Letters_: Ford, 534.
[904] _Writings_: Hunt, vi, 332-40.
[905] For Marshall's defense of the liberty of the press, quoted by
Madison, see _supra_, chap. VIII.
[906] Address of the General Assembly to the People of the Commonwealth
of Virginia, Journal, H.D. (Dec., 1798), 88-90.
[907] Sedgwick to Hamilton, Feb. 7, 1799; _Works_: Hamilton, vi, 392-93;
and to King, March 20, 1799; King, ii, 581. And Murray to J. Q. Adams,
April 5, 1799; _Letters_: Ford, 536.
[908] Address of the Minority: Journal, H.D. (Dec., 1798), 88-90. Also
printed as a pamphlet. Richmond, 1798.
[909] Journal, H.D. (1799), 90.
[910] Callender: _Prospect Before Us_, 91.
[911] _Ib._, 112 _et seq._
[912] Sedgwick to King, March 20, 1799; King, ii, 581.
[913] Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 5, 1799; _Letters_: Ford, 536.
[914] Mordecai, 202; also Sedgwick to King, Nov. 15, 1799; King, iii,
147-48.
[915] Jefferson to Pendleton, Feb. 14, 1799; _Works_: Ford, ix, 46; and
to Madison, Jan. 30, 1799; _ib._, 31.
[916] Jefferson to Bishop James Madison, Feb. 27, 1799; _ib._, 62.
[917] Marshall to Washington, Jan. 8, 1799; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[918] Hamilton to Dayton, 1799; _Works_: Lodge, x, 330. The day of the
month is not given, but it certainly was early in January. Mr. Lodge
places it before a letter to Lafayette, dated Jan. 6, 1799.
[919] Hamilton to Sedgwick, Feb. 2, 1799; _Works_: Lodge, x, 340-42.
[920] This was probably true; it is thoroughly characteristic and fits
in perfectly with his well-authenticated conduct after he became Chief
Justice. (See vol. III of this work.)
[921] Callender: _Prospect Before Us_, 90 _et seq._
[922] See Hildreth, v, 104, 210, 214, 340, 453-55.
[923] Wood, 261-62. This canard is an example of the methods employed in
political contests when American democracy was in its infancy.
[924] Marshall to his brother James M., April 3, 1799; MS. Marshall uses
the word "faction" in the sense in which it was then employed. "Faction"
and "party" were at that time used interchangeably; and both words were
terms of reproach. (See _supra_, chap. II.) If stated in the vernacular
of the present day, this doleful opinion of Marshall would read:
"Nothing, I believe, more debases or pollutes the human mind than
partisan politics."
[925] Jefferson to Pendleton, April 22, 1799; _Works_: Ford, ix, 64-65.
[926] Henry to Blair, Jan. 8, 1799; Henry, ii, 591-94.
[927] Henry to Blair, Jan. 8, 1799; Henry, ii, 595.
[928] _Virginia Herald_ (Fredericksburg), March 5, 1799.
[929] This was true in most of the States at that period.
[930] This method of electing public officials was continued until the
Civil War. (See John S. Wise's description of a congressional election
in Virginia in 1855; Wise: _The End of An Era_, 55-56. And see Professor
Schouler's treatment of this subject in his "Evolution of the American
Voter"; _Amer. Hist. Rev._, ii, 665-74.)
[931] This account of election day in the Marshall-Clopton contest is
from Munford, 208-10. For another fairly accurate but mild description
of a congressional election in Virginia at this period, see Mary
Johnston's novel, _Lewis Rand_, chap. iv.
[932] Henry, ii, 598.
[933] Randall, ii, 495.
[934] Washington to Marshall, May 5, 1799; _Writings_: Ford, xiv, 180.
[935] As a matter of fact, they were not far wrong. Marshall almost
certainly would have been made Secretary of State if Washington had
believed that he would accept the portfolio. (See _supra_, 147.) The
assertion that the place actually had been offered to Marshall seems to
have been the only error in this campaign story.
[936] Marshall to Washington, May 1, 1799; _Writings_: Ford, xiv,
footnote to 180-81; also Flanders, ii, 389.
[937] Washington to Marshall, May 5, 1799; _Writings_: Ford, xiv, 180.
[938] Marshall to Washington, May 16, 1799; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[939] Pickering to King, May 4, 1799; King, iii, 13.
[940] Sedgwick to King, July 26, 1799; King, iii, 69.
[941] Sedgwick to King, July 26, 1799; King, iii, 69.
[942] Murray to J. Q. Adams, June 25, 1799; _Letters_: Ford, 566.
[943] Murray to J. Q. Adams, July 1, 1799; _ib._, 568.
[944] Jefferson to Stuart, May 14, 1799; _Works_: Ford, ix, 67.
[945] Jefferson to Coxe, May 21, 1799; _Works_: Ford, ix, 69-70.
[946] _Ib._, 70.
[947] For instances of these military letters, see Marshall to
Washington, June 12, 1799; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong.
[948] See Morison, i, 156-57; also Hudson: _Journalism in the United
States_, 160. Party newspapers and speakers to-day make statements, as a
matter of course, in every political campaign much more violent than
those for which editors and citizens were fined and imprisoned in
1799-1800. (See _ib._, 315; and see summary from the Republican point of
view of these prosecutions in Randall, ii, 416-20.)
[949] Adams to Pickering, July 24, 1799; _Works_: Adams, ix, 3.
[950] Adams to Pickering, Aug. 1, 1799; _ib._, 5; and same to same. Aug.
3, 1799; _ib._, 7.
[951] Professor Washington, in his edition of Jefferson's _Writings_,
leaves a blank after "apostle." Mr. Ford correctly prints Marshall's
name as it is written in Jefferson's original manuscript copy of the
letter.
[952] Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas, Sept. 5, 1799; _Works_: Ford,
ix, 79-81.
[953] Marshall to Pickering, Aug. 25, 1799; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist.
Soc. Marshall had not yet grasped the deadly significance of Jefferson's
States' Rights and Nullification maneuver.
[954] _Supra._
[955] Talleyrand to Pichon, Aug. 28, and Sept. 28; _Am. St. Prs._, ii,
241-42; Murray to Adams, Appendix of _Works_: Adams, viii. For familiar
account of Pichon's conferences with Murray, see Murray's letters to J.
Q. Adams, then U.S. Minister to Berlin, in _Letters_: Ford, 445, 473,
475-76; and to Pickering, _ib._, 464.
[956] "Murray, I guess, wanted to make himself a greater man than he is
by going to France," was Gallatin's shrewd opinion. Gallatin to his
wife, March 1, 1799; Adams: _Gallatin_, 227-28.
[957] _Ib._
[958] Ames to Dwight, Feb. 27, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 252.
[959] Cabot to King, March 10, 1799; King, ii, 551.
[960] Cabot to King, Feb. 16, 1799; _ib._, 543.
[961] Ames to Pickering, March 12, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 253.
[962] Ames to Pickering, Oct. 19, 1799; _ib._, 257.
[963] Uriah Tracy to McHenry, Sept. 2, 1799; Steiner, 417.
[964] Ames to Pickering, Nov. 5, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 260-61.
[965] Ames to Pickering, March 12, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 254.
[966] "Men of principal influence in the Federal party ... began to
entertain serious doubts about his [Adams's] fitness for the station,
yet ... they thought it better to indulge their hopes than to listen to
their fears, [and] ... determined to support Mr. Adams for the Chief
Magistracy." ("Public Conduct, etc., John Adams"; Hamilton: _Works_:
Lodge, vii, 318.)
[967] Ames to Dwight, Feb. 27, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 252.
[968] Ames to Pickering, Nov. 5, 1799; _ib._, 260.
[969] Cabot to King, March 10, 1799; King, ii, 552.
[970] Higginson to Pickering, April 16, 1800; Pickering MSS., Mass.
Hist. Soc., printed in _An. Rept._, Amer. Hist. Assn., 1896, i, 836.
[971] For an excellent summary of this important episode in our history
see Allen: _Our Naval War with France_.
[972] Pickering to King, March 6, 1799; King, ii, 548-49.
[973] Ames to Pickering, March 12, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 254.
[974] Ames to Dwight, Oct. 20, 1799; _ib._, 259.
[975] Ames to Pickering, Oct. 19, 1799; _ib._, 257.
[976] Wolcott to Ames, Aug. 10, 1800; Gibbs, ii, 403.
[977] Jefferson to Pendleton, Feb. 19, 1799; _Works_: Ford, ix, 54.
[978] Lee to Adams, March 14, 1799; _Works_: Adams, viii, 628.
[979] Adams to Lee, March 29, 1799; _ib._, 629.
[980] Cabinet to President, Sept. 7, 1799; _Works_: Adams, ix, 21-23;
and same to same, May 20, 1799; _ib._, 59-60.
[981] Adams to Lee, May 21, 1800; _ib._, 60. For account of Fries's
Rebellion see McMaster, ii, 435-39. Also Hildreth, v, 313.
[982] Pickering to Cabot, June 15, 1800; Lodge: _Cabot_, 275.
[983] "Public Conduct, etc., John Adams"; Hamilton: _Works_: Lodge, vii,
351-55; and see Gibbs, ii, 360-62.
[984] See Hamilton's arraignment of the Fries pardon in "Public Conduct,
etc., John Adams"; _Works_: Lodge, vii, 351-55.
[985] McRee, ii, 551.
[986] "The Aurora, in analyzing the reasons upon which Fries, Hainy, and
Getman have been pardoned brings the President forward as, by this act,
condemning: 1. The tax law which gave rise to the insurrection; 2. The
conduct of the officers appointed to collect the tax; 3. The marshal; 4.
The witnesses on the part of the United States; 5. The juries who tried
the prisoners; 6. The court, both in their personal conduct and in their
judicial decisions. In short, every individual who has had any part in
passing the law--in endeavoring to execute it, or in bringing to just
punishment those who have treasonably violated it." (_Gazette of the
United States_, reviewing bitterly the comment of the Republican organ
on Adams's pardon of Fries.)
[987] Many Federalists regretted that Fries was not executed by
court-martial. "I suppose military execution was impracticable, but if
some executions are not had, of the most notorious offenders--I shall
regret the events of lenity in '94 & '99--as giving a fatal stroke to
Government.... Undue mercy to villains, is cruelty to all the good &
virtuous. Our people in this State are perfectly astonished, that cost
must continually be incurred for insurrections in Pennsylvania for which
they say they are taxed & yet no punishment is inflicted on the
offenders. I am fatigued & mortified that our Govt. which is weak at
best, would withhold any of its strength when all its energies should be
doubled." (Uriah Tracy to McHenry, on Fries, May 6, 1799; Steiner, 436.)
And "I am in fear that something will occur to release that fellow from
merited Death." (Same to same, May 20, 1790; _ib._)
[988] "Public Conduct, etc., John Adams"; Hamilton: _Works_: Lodge, vii,
351-55.
[989] Ames to Pickering, Nov. 23, 1799; _Works_: Ames, i, 270.
[990] Troup to King, May 6, 1799; King, iii, 14.
[991] Adams's home, now Quincy, Massachusetts.
[992] Troup to King, June 5, 1799; King, iii, 34.