THE FUTURE OF CUBA
If the economic development of Cuba holds little promise for the people
of the country, they have even less to look for in the political
prospect. The period of self-government following freedom from the
Spanish yoke has been marked by utter failure to meet the demands and
the responsibilities of the situation. The Palma administration, ushered
in with the highest hopes and the utmost encouragement, was tainted with
corruption and cut short by revolution. The present regime can not boast
even that weak element of honesty and ability that its predecessor
possessed. To quote _La Lucha_, of Habana, which was the official organ
of the Gomez party, the present condition is characterized by
“intranquillity in the country, uneasiness in the towns and cities,
hatreds, fears, and absolute lack of confidence in the future.... Our
rulers refuse to be convinced that they are not the owners, but simply
the administrators of the public wealth.” Insurrection has been staved
off on several occasions by means of the strong arm or the greased palm.
As the year 1911 approaches its close, the rumblings of revolution are
heard in many different parts of the Island at the same time. These are
not to be taken as popular indications of resentment against bad
government,--the Cubans are used to that. They are the organized
preparations of the “outs” to unseat the “ins.” Such disturbances are
natural incidents of a situation which is controlled by professional
politicians. There are in Cuba no political parties based on principle.
Instead there are a number of cliques, each headed by a leader who holds
his followers by promises of patronage in case of success. Experience
has taught that the bullet is more effective than the ballot in Cuban
politics. A few shots fired at the moon displaced the Palma government.
To quote again from _La Lucha_: “In Cuba nothing can resist the
slightest armed movement, because the first subversive cry raised in our
fields is, and ever will be, the death knell of our political state.”
The Administration can not place dependence upon the military forces.
The keenest rivalry and the bitterest feeling exist between the rural
guard and the regular army. In case of a civil war, these bodies would
surely take opposite sides, and neither has any sentiment of loyalty to
the flag, or allegiance to the government. The chief influence to which
they would be amenable is the will of their respective commanders, who
are politicians and aim to employ the forces under them as political
instruments. The most effective defence of the President is found in
placating his enemies by substantial concessions, but this method has
naturally created fresh opponents with an appetite for sops, and the
Chief Executive finds himself well-nigh at the end of his resources.
A country may be greatly prosperous and the mass of its people be
miserable in the extreme. Mexico is an example in point. Cuba is
another.
Throughout the hardships and hazards of the war of independence the
_insurrectos_ were supported by the belief that American enlistment in
their cause, upon which they counted for success, would be followed by
an era of permanent prosperity for the masses. The man who bore the
brunt of the fighting, buoyed by these high hopes, realizes now that he
was exploited by a handful of his own countrymen and deserted by his
expected saviour. The desertion was repeated after the need for
protection had been emphasized and the exploitation continues in an
aggravated form.
On the _guajiro_ falls most heavily the burden of supporting the most
expensive and extravagant government in the world. This because that
government dare not bear too hardly with taxation upon the great
corporations and wealthy property owners. An important part of the game
of finesse which is necessary to the life of any administration in Cuba
consists in keeping in the good graces of the money interests, for it is
in the power of these to stop the fat grazing in the political pastures
by forcing American reoccupation, and even perhaps annexation.
So we have one of the most striking of the many anomalies in the Cuban
system of administration,--the customs duties. Here, in a country with
no industries to protect, the tariff exaction is at the rate of $12 per
head. In the United States it is no more than $3.50, while in other
countries it is considerably less. At first hand the importer pays this
tax, but, of course, it ultimately falls upon the consumer. And, as
[Illustration: A GUAJIRO’S SHACK.]
more than half the importations of the Island are foodstuffs or articles
of clothing, it necessarily follows that the masses discharge the great
bulk of the customs duties. At the same time large tracts of land that
are held by their wealthy owners at high figures are exempted from
taxation entirely.
Is it any wonder that the peasant groans under the load? It is true that
he works intermittently and loafs unnecessarily, but that is no good
reason why his last dollar should be squeezed out of him, and, if he
earned more, he would probably invite heavier taxation. He has no
encouragement to exert himself beyond the needs of the present hour. He
is probably occupying land that he may be required to vacate to-morrow.
He can find no better market for his produce than the precarious one of
the adjacent village. Enterprise is an invitation to the spoilers of the
capital and the petty officials of his locality. If you should ask his
candid opinion, it would be that conditions are no better than they were
under Spain, and perhaps not quite as good. You may attempt to relieve
his depression by a reminder of his splendid independence. He will not
understand what you are talking about, although he is far from being a
dullard. He fought in the wars of independence because he was assured
that success would mean a full stomach and perchance the ownership of a
scrap of land. It resulted in neither and, unless restrained by
scepticism, he would fight again, under any banner, for the same
promise. Independence _per se_ is of no more value to him than a
cocoanut husk. He can not eat it and it will not buy calico for his
woman.
The only class of Cubans that is waxing fat and living in contentment is
that composed of the office-holders,--the professional politicians. They
toil not, but they reap with prodigious assiduity. They fill easy jobs
on extravagant salaries and try to persuade the country that they are
performing extremely difficult and important tasks. Their sole interest
and concern is to fill their pockets with as little exertion as need be.
The welfare of the people is a matter of no consideration to them. The
only fly in their ointment is the fact that they can not all be in
office at the same time, and so the “ins” are disturbed by the
uncomfortable knowledge that the “outs” are constantly scheming to oust
them.
The peasant has entirely lost whatever faith he may have had in the
politician. The man who pulled the chestnuts out of the fire is growing
impatient of supporting a lot of unnecessary office-holders. The peasant
is supine to a shameful degree, but there is a limit to his forbearance,
and it has almost been reached. He is ripe to serve the purposes of any
agitators--any one who will offer a fair prospect of changed conditions.
But, be it well understood, this unrest and dissatisfaction are the
outcome of basic causes. They can only be remedied by radical
reformation of the economic and political state of the country. And such
reformation is not to be expected from any native source. Cuba’s
salvation depends upon guidance and aid from without, or, if not that,
from the foreign element within her borders. This fact has become so
obvious that even the organs of the politicians admit it. All classes,
save the numerically smallest, are weary and disgusted with the
condition of things. They can find no remedy at the polls. If the
present administration is ejected, it is sure to be followed by another
as bad, or worse.
When it comes to a consideration of the best means to relieve Cuba’s
distress, the factors in the matter are found to be so complex, and the
opinions on the subject so diverse, that it is extremely difficult to
arrive at any definite conclusion. One point, at least, almost all
students of the situation are agreed upon, and that is that the United
States fell very short of affording the Cubans the assistance in
rehabilitating themselves that they had a right to expect, and that the
hasty manner in which they were left to their own resources is mainly
responsible for the confusion that has existed ever since.
If the Cuban has not an actual ineptitude for exercising the functions
of government, he must be disqualified by utter inexperience. The brief
period of autonomy is hardly worth considering in this respect. Before
the present century only a very small proportion of the population had
ever exercised the elementary political function of voting. Under Spain
the affairs of the country were regulated to the smallest detail by the
national authority, which extended its paternal supervision to matters
affecting the private life of the individual. For instance, regulations
for the conduct of the bull-ring and the cock-pit emanated from the
captain-general, and under his instructions the petty officers were
constituted censors of the morals of private citizens, with power to
punish offenders.
Another equally serious disqualification is to be found in the large
proportion of illiterates in Cuba. These comprise more than half the
total population. The great majority of them are _campesinos_, rustics.
Nevertheless, it is to the country districts that we must look for the
best thought and the greatest influence in future political movements.
City dwellers are prone to act and think in mass, to be led by the crowd
and to be unduly influenced by the press. The _guajiro_, who owns a
little patch of ground, but is utterly lacking in education, is a safer
and more valuable political unit than the average citizen of Habana.
Order was established and a workable form of government framed in Cuba
by the United States, but its action in leaving this machinery entirely
under the control of an inexperienced and immature people was like
placing a razor in the hands of a child. The needs of the Island were
sacrificed to the political exigencies of its protector. This is a fact
that will hardly admit of dispute. The leading Cuban papers and the most
representative citizens of the country declared unequivocally that the
people were not prepared nor qualified to assume the responsibility of
self-government. Governor Magoon, in a report which was suppressed, made
similar representations to his superiors in Washington. Nevertheless,
thirteen months after the transfer of the Island from Spain to the
United States, President Roosevelt ordered that withdrawal should take
place one year later and “under no circumstances and for no reason”
should our occupancy be extended beyond the date set, which happened to
be just before the assembling of the presidential conventions. We
committed our first injustice to the country and made our first mistake
in the treatment of it by that hasty and premature abandonment. We have
already paid a heavy price for the blunder and Cuba has suffered
severely from the effects of it. But our responsibility still exists and
the task remains to be performed. There is no possibility of avoidance.
Sooner or later we must take the work of Cuba’s regeneration in hand
seriously and carry it out thoroughly. How this shall be done is
difficult of conjecture.
A small number of men in this country, whose opinions on any subject
command respect, believe that the best course will be found in leaving
Cuba to work out her own difficulties without interference. The
advocates of this _laissez faire_ policy point to Mexico, the Argentine,
and other Latin-American republics as shining examples of peoples who
have independently worked out similar problems and have brought their
countries through long periods of misery and disturbance to peaceful
prosperity. But there are two strong objections to this policy. In the
first place, the United States is pledged to the Cubans and the world at
large to maintain order in the Island. No one who is familiar with
conditions can believe that the Cubans are capable of carrying on a
government for a period of five years without revolutionary eruptions.
Is it conceivable that the people of the United States would allow their
government to step in periodically to suppress disturbances and to step
out promptly as soon as peace should be restored? It is safe to say,
that the next occupation of Cuba by the United States, which can not be
delayed many years, will last for a considerably longer period than did
either of the preceding occupations. Then again, the situation in Cuba
contains a very important element which destroys the applicability to it
of the examples cited. During their formative stages Mexico, Argentina,
and the other Latin-American countries contemplated were undeveloped and
comparatively little foreign capital was invested in them. Cuba, on the
contrary, is the scene of an advanced economic development. Almost the
entire country belongs to aliens, who have billions of their money sunk
in it. Is it at all probable that these persons and corporations would
submit to the loss or deterioration of their property that would
assuredly be involved in an independent government of Cuba by the
Cubans? The monied interests form at present the most determined of the
classes that look for a radical change in conditions. They know that
trouble is constantly in the air and may take definite form at any
moment.
What is the prospect of the Cubans working out an orderly and efficient
government unaided? Up to the present, notwithstanding ample
opportunity, there is not even the nucleus of a stable and rational
political party in the country. The best men stand aloof, or find
themselves hopelessly excluded from participation in public affairs.
They complain, but their plaints are vague and indeterminate. All
classes of Cubans, but one, are clamoring for a
[Illustration: GENERAL VIEW OF JIGUANI.]
change, but no class has put its hopes and wishes into definite
utterance. The press is hardly more explicit in its demands and
denunciations. The following quotation from the _Unión Española_, of
Habana, affords a typical illustration:
“Political anarchy, by which the country is at present confronted, is
daily growing greater. It would seem as though all the political
elements had made an agreement to perturb, or rather to dissolve, the
nation, for the tendency on all sides is to dissolution. It is time the
true patriots sounded the alarm, and that politicians pause in their
work of destruction, curbing bits, that the Cuban people may continue
the ministering of its destinies and in the possession of
self-government. It would be shameful, worse than shameful, criminal,
that Cubans, drunk with sordid ambition and in petty strife for
self-aggrandisement, should again wreck the republic, turning over this
island to the covetous stranger to exploit it and lord over it.”
It is hardly possible to avoid the conviction that Cuba’s ultimate fate
will be annexation to the United States, or some very similar state. The
United States has on five different occasions emphatically and
distinctly declared its intention to preserve the independence of Cuba.
These formal and public announcements would make it difficult for any
administration to countenance, and much more to take the initiative in,
any movement tending to annexation. But several contingencies are
conceivable which might make it possible for the United States to take
Cuba into the federation with a good grace.
The result may be brought about by one of several causes, or by
combination of them.
It is highly probable that abuse of political power, or revolution, will
make American intervention again necessary before long. If the next
occupation is not permanent, the one succeeding it is likely to be so.
The people of America will tire of the trouble and expense of periodical
correction of conditions in Cuba.
The property owning class in Cuba, native as well as foreign, is almost
unanimously in favor of the annexation of the Island to the United
States, and a majority of the resident Spaniards entertain the same
sentiment. If this class should unite in action it would be
irresistible. Should it form a political party, with annexation as its
chief platform, it could overcome the professional politicians and
control Congress. A majority of the peasantry would undoubtedly support
such a party. The Island might thus pass in a legal manner by vote of
the people.
The same result might be brought about by the monied interests deciding
to buy the Congressional vote without going to the trouble and expense
of creating a genuine majority in the Legislature.
If none of the suggested contingencies should come about, it is highly
probable that Cuba will eventually come into the Union by a process
somewhat similar to that which brought Hawaii under the flag. American
interests and American citizens are constantly increasing in the Island.
It is not difficult to imagine a _coup d’état_, resulting in a
government in the hands of Americans.
If the desire of a majority of the Cubans were all that was necessary to
bring about annexation, the matter might be accomplished without serious
difficulty. There are, however, many obstacles in the way when the
question is viewed from the standpoint of the other party to the
transaction. The United States would derive important advantages from
the possession of Cuba, but in several respects the American people
would suffer by the arrangement.
At the outset a difficulty would arise as to the terms of admission. The
most enthusiastic advocates of annexation among intelligent Cubans would
not be willing to come under the American flag with anything less than
the status and rights of a state. This attitude is easy to appreciate.
Cuba’s population, wealth, resources, commerce, industries, and
strategic position would fully justify her aspirations to the highest
rank among America’s possessions. She would not be content with a
territorial position, and the proposition, which has been advanced, that
she should accept the indefinite status of Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, is not worth a moment’s consideration.
Despite official figures to the contrary, it is the conviction of many
who have had the best possible opportunities for judging, that a large
majority of the native population of Cuba have negro blood in their
veins. Practically one hundred per cent. of the people profess the Roman
Catholic faith and Spanish is the mother tongue of the same proportion.
Would the American nation agree to the construction of a sister state
out of such material?
The admission to the United States of Cuba’s products free of duty would
constitute a serious menace to Louisiana’s chief industry and to the
growing beet sugar industry of our northwestern territory. The fruit
growers of California and Florida would suffer from competition with
products raised by cheaper labor, and to a less extent the tobacco
growers of Virginia and Kentucky would feel the same pressure.
As to the advantages that Cuba would enjoy from annexation, there can be
no question. The most obvious and pronounced would be the assurance of
good government, perpetual peace within her borders, an incalculably
better administration than the present at one-third of its cost, free
trade with the United States, and a market there for all her products
and purchases.
Perhaps Cuba might approximate closely to the enjoyment of these
benefits under an arrangement which could be effected with much less
difficulty than annexation. A permanent protectorate, if introduced with
the usual methods of soothing and placating the protected, would
probably solve Cuba’s difficulties more effectually than any other plan
at present practicable. Out of such a state, Cuba might at some future
date become a member of the Union by a gradual process of evolution.
There is, of course, the objection to such an arrangement that it would
impair the independence which we have promised to maintain, but when
both parties to an agreement are willing to waive its terms there should
be no obstruction to cancelling it. Furthermore, if such a protectorate
should be established it will no doubt grow out of a presumptively
temporary occupation. The process would be something like that which has
resulted in England’s established control over Egypt. When the British
occupation of that country occurred the administration under Gladstone
declared positively that Great Britain would retire as soon as her work
should be done. She has now, however, no thought of ever doing so. Her
control of the country is undoubtedly a great benefit to the people, and
the world at large would regret her relinquishment of it. Our Government
is acting in a similar manner in its treatment of the Filipinos. No
statesman in the country now contemplates the independence of those
people as within the bounds of probability.
Under a protectorate it would be possible for the United States to
insure to the Cubans a considerable measure of the benefits that would
accrue to them from annexation, without entailing upon this country the
disadvantages which would follow the latter measure.