THE HISTORY OF CUBA (CONTINUED)
From the outset the two chief conditions that militated against the
development of Cuba and the prosperity of her people were trade
restriction and the appropriation of land.
In the early days of the colony large tracts of land were granted by the
Crown to Castilians of noble family. These never made permanent
residence on the Island, but entrusted their affairs to an agent. The
wealthy land owner often had a palace on the Cerro, and occasionally
paid a brief winter visit to the capital, and made a still briefer
excursion to his _hacienda_, where his appearance in all the dignity and
state of aristocratic wealth had an irritating effect upon his poor
neighbors. The money produced by his sugar plantation or his cattle
ranch he dissipated in the fashionable pleasures of Madrid and Paris.
This system of absentee landlordism acted like a blight upon the country
until the abolition of slavery necessitated the cutting up of large
estates, or their transfer to corporations, possessed of the means of
paying for the labor necessary to work them.
Not a few of the large properties were in the hands of Cubans, but in
these cases the tenure was not so harmful to the country, nor as odious
to the common people. The Cuban planters, most of whom were ruined
during the protracted period of insurrection, invariably made their
homes on the _haciendas_, where one generation followed another in
possession. The sons usually remained with the father, each taking some
particular share in the management of the estate. Thus several families
were often found living under one roof and generally in perfect amity,
for the Cubans are distinctly domestic people, affectionate in
disposition and clannish in habit.
There were comparatively few holdings in the hands of peasant
proprietors, or small farmers, and this absence of a home and land
owning population was an obviously weak element in the foundation of the
government.
The greater part of the productive soil was in the hands of a few
grandees, and the wealth extracted from it was withheld from general
circulation, which had, among other harmful consequences, that of
retarding the extension of agriculture and general industrial
advancement.
Judged by our present conceptions of justice and policy, the commercial
regulations imposed upon Cuba by Spain appear to have been extremely
foolish and iniquitous, but we must bear in mind that they were quite
consistent with the prevailing idea at that time that the interests of
colonies should be made subservient to those of the parent country. In
other words, the commercial and industrial restrictions which were
imposed on Cuba, while they had the effect of exploiting the Island for
the benefit of Spain, originated not so much from disregard of the
colony’s welfare as from the peculiar views of political economy
generally entertained in that age. Great Britain’s American possessions
were subjected to similar treatment. Spain’s fatal error lay in the
tenacity with which she clung to her misguided policy. A little
judicious reform at the beginning of the last century, when other powers
were granting to their colonies a measurable degree of freedom in trade
and self-government, would probably have sufficed to keep Cuba under
the flag of Spain.
The restrictions on the commerce of the Island began with the royal
decree of 1497, which granted to the port of Seville the conclusive
privilege of trade with the colonies, these being prohibited from any
commercial intercourse with any foreign countries. In 1707 this monopoly
was transferred from Seville to the port of Cadiz. While it was the
capital of the Island, Santiago was the sole port of entry, and after
Habana became the capital, all shipments passed through it. This
restricted traffic between Spain and its insular colony was jealously
guarded. Trading vessels were required to assemble in _flotas_, or
fleets, and to make the double voyage under the escort of war-ships.
This arrangement was designed hardly as much for protection as for the
prevention of illicit dealings with the intermediate countries. During
certain periods trade with foreigners was prohibited under the most
severe penalties, and it was never permissible except by special
authorization. Commercial intercourse between the colonies was even
forbidden. With the exception of a brief term, during which the English
occupied the Island, these hampering
[Illustration: THE WATER-FRONT, HABANA.]
conditions obtained until 1778, when Habana was opened to free trade.
The decree authorized traffic between several ports of Cuba. Others were
included in this privilege, from time to time, until, in 1803,
practically all the ports of the Island enjoyed it.
For two hundred years or more, such action upon the part of the
sovereign government was looked upon by all nations as good policy. In
1714 Spain and the Dutch Confederation effected a convention by the
terms of which each party was bound to refrain from every form of trade
with the American possessions of the other. A similar agreement was
reached between England and Spain about fifty years later. Towards the
close of the eighteenth century, however, these treaties were abrogated
and a royal _cedula_ set forth that no foreign ship should be allowed to
enter a Cuban port under any conditions.
The peninsular war reduced the trade of Cuba to such an extent that the
Ayuntamiento and the Consulado of Habana seriously debated the
expediency of throwing the port entirely open and admitting foreign
goods on a parity with those of the home country. In consideration of
the emergency the restraints on trade were substantially released
during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Shortly afterwards,
the Government sought to reëstablish them, but was induced to refrain by
the protestations of Captain-General Marques de Someruelos, who made a
forcible representation of the economic necessities of the colony and
the impossibility of their being met under the restricting policy.
The least concession was wrung from the Council of the Indies with the
utmost difficulty. They remained convinced that the limitations of the
commerce of the colonies to the mother country was the best course for
the latter, at least, and secured a virtual resumption of the condition
by indirect means. By excessive duties, discriminating tariffs, and the
heavy port dues, foreign trade was placed at such a great disadvantage
that the Cubans, although ostensibly free in the matter, found
themselves again restricted for the most part to commerce with Spain.
The first tariff of Cuba, enforced in 1818, imposed a duty of
forty-three per cent. _ad valorem_ on all foreign merchandise, except
agricultural implements and machinery, which were taxed twenty-six and
one-half per cent. These rates were somewhat reduced a few years later.
Similar importations from Spain were granted a preferential reduction of
one-third from these rates. But, as Spain produced a very small
proportion of the articles that comprised Cuba’s imports, her merchants
secured them from various foreign sources, and, of course, the consumers
were compelled to pay higher prices than if they had been allowed to
deal directly with the producers under an impartial system of duties.
In 1828 an export tariff was imposed on sugar and coffee, which, by this
time, had become important products. Four-fifths of a cent per pound was
levied on the former, and two-fifths on the latter. A form of shipping
bounty added to the weight of these exactions. In case the exports were
carried in foreign bottoms the duty on sugar was doubled and that on
coffee increased to one cent a pound.
This tariff was maintained without material change until a reciprocal
commercial agreement was effected by the United States and Spain in
1891. For the first time in its history, Cuba found itself in a position
to trade on favorable terms with its nearest and best market. As a
result the trade of the Island was soon transferred, almost in its
entirety, to the United States, and its people enjoyed a term of
prosperity transcending anything in their former experience. The change
was, however, short lived. In 1894 the termination of the agreement and
the reëstablishment of the old regulations forced compulsory traffic
with Spain upon the Cubans.
But the burdens entailed upon the people by trade restrictions were by
no means all that they were called on to bear. A system of heavy and
vexatious taxation prevailed during the entire period of Spain’s
dominance over the Island. Taxes were levied on all kinds of property
and on every form of industry. Every profession and occupation was
taxed. Legal papers, petitions and business documents were required to
be stamped.
There was a “consumption tax” on the killing of cattle which, of course,
increased the price of meat to the consumer. There was an impost of
twenty ducats, called the _derecho de averia_, collected upon every
person who arrived on the Island. This was established in the earliest
years of the colony and maintained until near the close of the
eighteenth century. During the last hundred years of its enforcement,
the amount was increased from sixteen dollars to twenty-two dollars. It
is needless to say that this tax seriously impeded immigration of the
peasant class most needed by the country.
There was a lottery tax, and a “_cedula_,” or head tax. The latter
proved very burdensome to the poorest of the people who, when in arrears
of it, were debarred from the exercise of most rights and privileges
involving civil and ecclesiastical authorization. Thus, they could not
make contracts, enter into marriages, or secure baptism for their
children until the overdue tax had been paid.
Obviously such a system of taxation worked the utmost discouragement to
the acquisition of property and the pursuit of industries. Had the
design of the Peninsular Government been to ruin the Island and to
suppress all development, no more effective measures for the purpose
could have been devised. None but a country superlatively rich in
natural resources could have carried such a burden. Like the other
American colonies of Spain, Cuba received contributions, or _situados_,
from Mexico. During the forty years following 1766, these amounted to
108,150,504 pesos fuertes. The worst of it was that the large revenue
derived from these heavy impositions upon the people and the trade of
Cuba was either absorbed in the excessive cost of administering the
Island, or diverted to the royal treasury. Comparatively little of it
was spent on local public improvements, unless we should include works
of a military nature. Aside from the _calzada_, or military highway,
road-making was neglected. Harbors lacked improvements and cities were
deficient in water supply, sewers and paving. In the country districts,
public buildings and schoolhouses were far short of the necessities of
the population. Even in late years the annual appropriation for
educational purposes was no more than two hundred and fifty thousand
dollars.
Aside from the riots resulting from the enforcement of the tobacco
monopoly, during the term of Captain-General Roja, there was no active
opposition to the Government previous to 1823. In that year an abortive
insurrection followed the attempt to abrogate the liberal constitution
of 1812, and reëstablish the old-time absolutism. Political agitation
and revolutionary outbreaks continued from that time, stimulated by the
secret societies, whose
[Illustration: MOUNTAIN ROAD IN THE PROVINCE OF ORIENTE.]
branches were scattered all over the country. Under these circumstances
the veiled antipathy, which had been growing between the Cubans and
Spaniards, rapidly assumed the nature of a wide breach. On the one side
were ranged the official class, the clerics, the beneficiaries of
monopolies, and persons who derived profit in various ways from
connection with the administration. On the other, were the native whites
who sought independence, or at least autonomy. The latter had the
sympathy and support of practically all the blacks, and of a large
proportion of the colored population.
In 1836 the constitution of 1812 was reëstablished in Spain, but Cuba
was deprived of the most important privileges that should have been
secured to her by the change. The deputies who were sent to the
constitutional convention at Madrid from Cuba were arbitrarily excluded.
It was announced that the Island should be governed by special laws, but
these were never published and, if definitely framed at all, must have
been communicated to the officials in a semi-confidential manner.
This totally unjust and fatally unwise action on the part of the Crown
stirred the existing discontent to boiling point and thereafter the
revolutionary movement assumed a much more menacing aspect. During the
succeeding decade a number of uprisings occurred in such widely
separated parts of the country as to clearly indicate that the entire
Island was disaffected. The lack of connection between these outbreaks
and their quick subsidence also showed an absence of organization or
concerted plan. In 1847, however, a more serious revolutionary
conspiracy, and one which was destined to have far-reaching effect, was
set on foot by Narcisco Lopez. The movement was intelligently planned
and contemplated the annexation of Cuba to the United States.
The conspiracy was betrayed to the Spanish authorities--no uncommon
occurrence in the early revolutionary period--and Lopez, with the chief
figures in the affair, fled to America. In 1850 Lopez with six hundred
men landed at Cardenas and captured the fortress. Failing, however, to
receive expected support, he immediately sailed to Key West. The
following year Lopez landed another expedition in Cuba near Bahia Honda.
This occasion was memorable on account of the fact that the force
included one hundred and fifty men under Colonel Crittenden of
Kentucky. Disaster quickly overtook this attempt. The mistake was made
of immediately dividing the force after landing. Lopez with one body of
men advanced on Las Pozas, leaving Colonel Crittenden, with the
remainder, in El Morilla. A detachment of Spanish troops overtook and
defeated Lopez, after a gallant fight. The leader was captured, carried
to Habana, and promptly garroted. Crittenden and his men attempted to
escape by sea but were surrounded and forced to surrender. All were
subsequently shot at the Castle of Atares.
This incident aroused among the people of the United States an interest
in Cuban affairs, out of which there grew a sympathy for the insurgents
that never abated.
Several futile efforts followed the Lopez affair, and then came the
revolution of 1868, which had its inception at Yara, in the Province of
Camaguey. It is generally referred to by the Cubans as the “Ten Years
War,” although no battles were fought. There were, however, many deaths
from disease, especially among the Spanish troops, and the cost of the
contest was three hundred million dollars, which amount was charged to
the Cuban debt.
In February, 1878, the treaty of Zanjon was entered into by the
representatives of Spain and those of the independent government which
the insurgents had created on paper and had affected to maintain in the
field. Under this convention the Crown agreed to substantial civil and
political concessions in favor of the people of Cuba. These
undertakings, the Cubans declare, were never fulfilled. Spanish
officials, on the other hand, maintain that the mother country actually
granted more than her obligation demanded of her. The truth will be
found in the fact that while laws were promulgated in accordance with
the promises given at Zanjon, they were not carried out. Thus although
documentary evidence might be adduced to show that the Cubans enjoyed a
liberal government after 1878, their condition, in reality, remained
virtually unchanged.
The hopes that had been inspired by the treaty of Zanjon quickly waned
and the spirit of discontent revived. This was greatly increased by the
economic troubles resulting from the depression of the sugar trade,
which began in 1884, and the total abolition of slavery in 1887.
Meanwhile Spain continued to regulate the financial affairs of the
Island with the old-time reckless mismanagement. From 1893 to 1898 the
revenues of Cuba derived from excessive taxation, heavy duties and the
Habana lottery, averaged about $25,000,000 per annum. Of this amount,
$10,500,000 was appropriated to the payment of the Cuban debt, which by
1897 had swelled to the enormous aggregate of $400,000,000, or $283.54
per capita, a ratio more than three times as great as the per capita
debt of Spain. For the support of the army, navy, administration and
church in Cuba, $12,000,000 was allotted. The remaining $2,500,000 was
allowed for public works, education and general improvements in Cuba,
independent of municipal expenditures. It may be added that when, as in
better times, the revenues had been very much larger, the demands of the
home Government were proportionally increased.
At the close of the eighties, the price of sugar rose to an abnormal
height and Cuba entered upon a brief period of prosperity. Political
agitation abated and the Island sank into a more peaceful condition than
it had known for many years. It was, however, but the lull before the
storm. The repeal of the Blaine reciprocity agreement dealt a deadly
blow to the Cuban sugar industry. At once conditions changed.
Quiescence gave place to agitation. The revolutionary spirit awoke with
greater determination than ever, fanned by the thought that Cuba,
independent or annexed to the United States could always rely upon a
favorable market for her principal product.
Plot and conspiracy soon became rife and received the support of a
number of influential men, who had hitherto held aloof, but who now
despaired of permanent prosperity for the Island under Spanish rule. Men
who had taken part in the Ten Years War began to organize in secret, and
several of their former leaders, Gomez, Garcia, Maceo, and others,
returned to Cuba from their voluntary exile.
In 1895 was launched the insurrection which culminated in the freedom of
Cuba. The leaders of the movement entered upon it with the deliberate
design of involving the United States and their success in doing so
brought about a result which they could not have attained otherwise.
A friendly feeling for Cuba not unmixed with interest considerations,
had existed in the United States for many years. Annexation had been
discussed during the presidency of John Quincy Adams, and President Polk
made a proposition to the Spanish Government for the purchase of the
Island. In 1854, the search of several American merchant ships by
Spanish cruisers led to the issuance of the “Ostend Manifesto,” a
protest on the part of the United States. In this document it was
declared that “the possession of Cuba by a foreign power was a menace to
the peace of the United States, and that Spain be offered the
alternative of accepting $200,000,000 for her sovereignty over the
Island, or having it taken from her by force.” During the Ten Years War
President Grant expressed to the Spanish Government his belief that only
independence and emancipation could settle the Cuban question, and that
intervention might be necessary to end the war. He repeatedly proffered
the good offices of the United States in reëstablishing peace. Meanwhile
the capture of the _Virginius_, in 1873, and the summary execution of
fifty-three of her passengers and crew, by order of the Spanish
authorities, came very near to involving the countries in war.
From the outbreak of the rebellion of 1895, the people of the United
States evinced a strong sympathy for the Cubans. This was reflected by
the action of Congress in directing President Cleveland to proffer the
good offices of the United States to Spain with a view to ending the war
and securing the independence of the Island. In 1896 both Republican and
Democratic national conventions passed resolutions of sympathy for the
Cubans and demanded that the Government should take action.
At the close of the same year, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
reported a resolution recognizing the republic of Cuba, but it was never
taken from the calendar. Meanwhile reports of outrages and indignities
to American citizens in Cuba led to official protest and the appointment
of Judge William R. Day to investigate conditions. Popular indignation
in the United States was further aroused by the press reports of the
dreadful effects of General Weyler’s plan of reconcentration.
In May, 1897, Congress voted $50,000 for the purchase of supplies to
relieve the needs of the _reconcentrados_, on the ground that many of
them were reported to be American citizens. Shortly afterwards, the
United States requested the Spanish Government to put an end to the
reconcentration system and to recall Captain General Weyler. Spain
received the requests with professed favor, but, after months had
elapsed, without any action being taken, the battleship _Maine_ was sent
to Habana for the protection of American citizens.
On the night of February 15th, the _Maine_ was blown up and two hundred
and sixty-six of her complement lost their lives. President McKinley
appointed a board of naval officers to investigate the circumstances.
The resultant report, which was submitted to Congress, declared that the
ship had been destroyed by an external explosion.
The condition of affairs aroused serious apprehensions on the part of
the Spanish Government and at the same time exhilarated the insurgent
leaders. Both parties realized that the intervention of the United
States was imminent. The former proposed a suspension of hostilities,
pending an agreement upon terms of peace, and offered to appropriate
$600,000 for the benefit of the _reconcentrados_. These overtures were
promptly rejected by the insurgent leaders.
Early in April, the President sent a message to Congress requesting
authority to end the war and to secure in Cuba the establishment of a
stable government, capable of fulfilling its international obligations
and maintaining peace. This was, in effect, a request to enter upon war
with Spain.
A few days later, Congress passed joint resolutions demanding the
withdrawal of Spain from Cuba and empowering the President to use the
naval and military forces of the United States to carry the resolutions
into effect. This was virtually a declaration of war.