CROSSING THE CANAL.
25th Sept., 1918. 4th Oct., 1918.
The two days following this action were spent in refitting and
re-organizing what was left of the Battalion. All available officers
from the "battle details" were ordered to join us, and Captains Petch
and Banwell resumed command of their Companies, while Lieuts. Hawley and
Corah took over "B" and "D." Major Burnett also came up and, though we
were still in trenches and holes in the ground, managed to produce hot
baths for everybody. The line was very quiet, the weather warm, we
needed a rest, and for two days we had it. The Brigade was to be
relieved by the Staffordshires on the evening of the 27th, and our first
orders were to go into various trenches and dug-outs round Grand Priel
Farm. These orders, however, were cancelled before relief, and we were
allotted instead a quarry and some trenches just North of le Verguier.
Up to the evening of the 26th all had been very quiet and there was not
the slightest sign that any active operations were intended. However on
this evening, the Transport drivers, bringing up rations, told us that
all the roads behind the lines were thick with guns, lorries and
waggons, all moving up. At the same time Colonel Griffiths returned
from a Conference, with some orders so secret that they were told to no
one. The following day we saw that during the night many new batteries
had taken up positions on the Ascension Ridge, guns had been carefully
camouflaged, men hidden away in copses, and all was still very quiet.
The same day, officers of another division came up reconnoitering--all
with considerable secrecy--though one was seen to be carrying a map with
a red line on it, somewhere four miles East of the St. Quentin Canal.
The following night more batteries silently took up their positions;
large bomb, water and ammunition dumps were made wherever a house or
copse would screen them from the enemy's aircraft, everything was being
prepared for some gigantic enterprise. As we went out to le Verguier, we
passed some of the Staffordshires going to the front line. It was a very
dark night, but we could see that they were carrying more than usual and
that their equipment looked very bulky. They were wearing life belts.
The secret could now be kept no longer, and as soon as possible orders
were made known to all. They were brief: "The 46th Division will on a
certain date, as part of a major operation, cross the St. Quentin Canal,
capture the Hindenburg Line, and advance to a position on the high
ground East of Magny la Fosse and Lehaucourt (2 miles E. of the Canal)."
The St. Quentin Canal, or Canal du Nord, as it is called further North,
runs for the most part North and South. At Bellicourt, opposite the
Americans, 1,000 yards North of our sector, it enters a tunnel and is
for a considerable distance underground. At Bellenglise, opposite the
right of our Divisional sector, it takes a sharp turn to the East, and
runs, past Lehaucourt and le Tronquoy, for 2½ miles before again
turning South. The main Hindenburg Line followed the line of the Canal,
just East of it. The Americans would attack the line above the tunnel,
and North of them British Divisions would continue the advance far to
the North. The 46th Division would attack with its right on Bellenglise,
and a gap of 1,000 yards from its left to the Americans. South of us no
attack would be necessary; for, once across the Canal, our right flank
would be defended all the way to le Tronquoy by the Canal itself and
this portion of the Hindenburg Line, which we should "roll up" from the
flank. Tanks could not cross the Canal except over the tunnel at
Bellicourt. Consequently the IXth Tank Battalion, allotted to our
Division for the attack, would advance with the Americans, and, once in
Bellicourt, turn south and join us to assist in the advance to the
village objectives and the heights. To the Staffordshire Brigade was
alloted the crossing of the Canal and the taking of the Hindenburg Line.
Then, after a pause to allow the Tanks to come round, the Sherwood
Foresters on the right and our Brigade on the left would sweep on, still
under a barrage, to the final objective. We should have to deal with
Magny village, the Right Brigade with Bellenglise and Lehaucourt. On the
final objective there would be another pause, then, if all had gone
well, the 32nd Division would come through to the "Red" Line of
exploitation--another two miles still further East. Maps were issued
with the objective of each unit shown in colour. The Staffordshires had
the "Blue," which was the Hindenburg Line, and the "Brown" further E. to
hold till we came up; the 4th Leicestershires had the "Yellow," which
included Knobkerry Ridge, the 5th Lincolnshires the "Dotted Blue"--just
beyond Magny village; we had the last of all, the "Green" line,
including a sunken cross-roads, an old mill on some very high ground,
and a small copse called Fosse Wood. It was argued that by this time
either the attack would have failed and we should not be wanted, or, if
successful, there could not be very much resistance; we were very weak
after Pontruet, and this was considered the easiest task. The day chosen
was September 29th--the time, dawn.
Outside le Verguier there runs a muddy lane with an old quarry beside
it. In this quarry, in an evil-smelling but very deep dug-out lived
Battalion Headquarters; everybody else occupied trenches in the fields
round about. On the opposite side of the lane was a battery of 9.2's,
firing almost continuously day and night, making it almost impossible to
reach the Headquarters, and quite impossible to ride down the lane.
Altogether our surroundings were unpleasant. The enemy soon made them
worse, for about an hour before dawn on the 28th he suddenly put over a
few small shells, apparently high explosive, round "B" Company's
trenches, while one or two also fell round "C" and "A" Companies.
Finally he pitched three clean into the quarry, and the sentry wake up
to the fact that they were not only high explosive, but contained a very
fair percentage of mustard gas. It was about an hour before the
discovery was made and still longer before all troops were moved away.
"C" Company wisely took no risks and were soon across the road, and "A"
and "D" were practically unaffected. "B" Company, however, were not
warned, and it was nearly two hours after the first shell had come
before they were finally moved grumbling to another area. Apparently no
one was gassed, but we knew mustard only too well and feared very much
what the enemy would bring forth. However, at 9-0 a.m. it came on to
pour with rain, and we got more hopeful.
At 11 o'clock Col. Griffiths, taking the Adjutant and Company Commanders
with him, set off to a Conference with the Tank officers at Brigade
Headquarters. The enemy were shelling le Verguier, the 9.2's were firing
vigorously, it was pouring with rain, and the horses were very nervous.
The ride was consequently exciting. Led as usual by "Sunloch," the party
galloped past the 9.2's and halted at the entrance to the village to try
and "time" the Boche shells. One came, they dashed in, turned the corner
and just got clear in time; the next shell skimmed over the last groom's
head and wounded a German prisoner.
Our conference with the Tank officers caused a slight alteration in
Colonel Griffiths' plan of attack. He had intended to advance with two
companies in front and two in support, but finding that a three company
frontage was more suitable for Tank co-operation, this was adopted--"A"
Company (Petch) to be on the right, "C" Company (Banwell) to be in the
centre, and "D" Company (Corah) on the left. "B" Company (Hawley) would
be in support. The front line Company Commanders arranged rendezvous
with their Tank Commanders, and we rode back.
By evening our worst fears had been realized, and forty-five of "B"
Company had to be sent to Hospital, too blind from the mustard gas to be
of any use. C.S.M. Wardle and about five men from each of the other
Companies had also to go, while Headquarters lost Mess Corporal J.
Buswell. As we had lost L/Cpl. Bourne a few days before, this left us
rather helpless, and, but for our energetic Padre-Mess-President, should
probably have starved. We had one consolation. Towards evening on the
28th the rain stopped, the weather brightened, and there seemed to be
every prospect of a fine Sunday. Bombs, flares and extra rations were
distributed at dusk, and we turned in for the night during which, except
for a few aeroplane bombs, the evening left us in peace.
At 5-0 a.m., Sunday, the 29th of September, the barrage started. There
was the usual thick morning mist, and even at 7-0 a.m. we were unable to
see more than a few yards in any direction. Even gun flashes could not
be seen, and the only intimation we had of the progress of the fight,
was the continuous "chug-chug-chug," of the tanks, moving along the
valley North of us, completely out of sight. As we were not due to move
until 9-0 a.m. we spent the time having breakfasts and reorganizing the
remains of "B" Company. Lieut. Hawley, with the aid of the recently
returned C.S.M. J.B. Weir, D.C.M., formed one large platoon with as many
Lewis Guns as possible. Between 7-0 and 8-0 a.m. the mist lifted once
for a few seconds only, and, looking Northwards we could see the top of
the next ridge. Along the skyline as far as the eye could see from West
to East stretched a long column of horses, guns and wagons--moving
forward. Below them, in the shadow, moved a long procession of Tanks.
Then the mist closed down and we saw no more.
As soon as breakfasts were finished, picked N.C.O.'s and men were sent
forward to get in touch with the rest of the Brigade and reconnoitre
roads forward to the Canal. At 7-45 a.m. came a message from Brigade
Headquarters, to say that, as the mist was worse further East, we had
better start moving at once. Parade was accordingly ordered for 8-30
a.m., instead of 9-0 a.m., and we tried to form up in a field near the
quarry. The mist was so thick one could not see from one end of a
Company to the other, and it was nearly nine o'clock before Capt. Jack
and his orderlies with their medical box appeared in the field, and we
were ready to move off. Even so, we had to leave the mess staff behind,
but the Padre promised to bring them along.
At 9-0 a.m. we moved off in single file, Col. Griffiths leading, and the
Companies following in the order "A," "C," "D," Battalion Headquarters,
and "B." It was terribly difficult to keep touch, as, with many oaths,
we stumbled over ditches and holes until we reached the lane from le
Verguier to Grand Priel. Here we picked up the Headquarter horses, and
also were much cheered by some wounded soldiers, who told us the Boche
was running away for all he was worth. Unfortunately our column was cut
in half by some artillery coming down the line, who passed between "D"
Company and Headquarters. Alongside us, moving on the same track, were
the other Sherwood Foresters, also bound for the "Green Line"; their
"all up" was passed to the head of our column, and the Colonel, thinking
we were intact, moved on. At Ascension Farm, the Adjutant was sent in to
report to Brigade Headquarters and the Colonel struck off into the
mist, marching entirely by compass bearing. Periodically he and Captain
Petch stopped to check their direction and then moved slowly on again;
there was some barbed wire and the horses were sent back. Eventually,
after crossing the old front line and going half way down the next slope
the Colonel halted, and allowing the Companies to form up by platoons,
waited until it was time to go on. He judged that he should be somewhere
near the original starting line of the Staffordshires. "C" and "D"
Companies came up but there was no Battalion Headquarters and no "B"
Company--incidentally no Adjutant. The latter, coming out from Brigade
Headquarters, found that the Battalion had gone and tried to ride after
them. He merely succeeded in getting into a wire entanglement and having
no groom had to leave his mare. With Lieut. Ashdowne, the Intelligence
Officer, and Scout-Corporal Gilbert--the only ones left of Battalion
Headquarters--he went on, hoping to catch up the Battalion before they
reached the Canal. Fortunately at 10-45 the mist blew right away, and
the sudden daylight which followed showed him where the Battalion lay;
it also showed the Staffordshire's starting tape only 60 yards from
where the Colonel had halted.
Until 11-20 we sat in the sun and waited in the hopes that some of the
missing people might join us. We held a short Conference, and the
Colonel decided that if there was any more fog or difficulty of any
sort, Company Commanders should make their way at once to their places
in the "dotted blue" line. Scouts were sent out to reconnoitre Canal
crossings, and as soon as the barrage started for the 4th Battalion's
advance, we moved forward in rear of the 5th Lincolnshires. There was
some scattered shelling, but our formation--lines of platoons in
fours--was found very suitable. On reaching the Canal the two right
Companies crossed by the remains of an old dam, the left by Riquerval
Bridge, and all formed up in the ruins of the famous Hindenburg Line on
the far side. It had been terribly battered, and here and there the
remains of its occupants showed how deadly our barrage, and how fierce
the assault of the Staffordshires had been. As we reached the Canal a
single Tank was seen coming down from the North, another followed and
then others; "our" Battalion had crossed successfully at Bellicourt, so
the battle must be going well.
After a short pause, the advance up towards Knobkerry Ridge started. As
we crossed Springbok Valley we could see the 4th Battalion consolidating
their newly-won positions on the top, and there was little opposition
from this quarter. On our right, however, there seemed to be a stiff
fight going on in Bellenglise, and several dropping shots from machine
guns fell round us. We deployed into the "blob" formation, before
ascending the ridge, and for the next half-mile our advance was worthy
of a plate in Field Service Regulations. In front the Colonel, with his
eye on Magny village, kept the direction right. Behind him the three
Companies deployed, their "distance" and "interval" perfect, and working
so well together that if one was checked for a time, the others saw it
at once and conformed. Behind the centre a small red cross flag and the
"red, white and black" marked the position of the Regimental Aid Post
and Battalion Headquarters. The latter's flag was already becoming
famous; it was the one with which "A" Company had tried to signal from
Pontruet. A few yards short of the summit of the Ridge we halted and lay
down again while the 5th Lincolnshires did their advance. While we were
here, the Tanks came up, and so excellent had been the liaison, that
from the Tank which stopped behind "A" and "C" Companies stepped the
officer with whom they had arranged details the day before.
At about 1 o'clock we moved on again--our centre through Magny la Fosse
and our Flank Companies on each side of it. The fight in Bellenglise
seemed to be over, and for the moment things were very quiet. Swarms of
prisoners, waving their arms, were seen coming from various trenches and
the village; no one was looking after them, we were all much too keen on
getting forward. Here and there, when a few Boches showed signs of
getting into a trench instead of keeping to the open, some soldier would
administer a friendly jab with the bayonet to show them what was
expected of them. The Tanks came along behind us, meaning to form up in
Magny woods, and wait there till we went on. As the Lincolnshires got
their objective without trouble, we moved close up to them and once more
lay down to wait for 1-40 p.m., the time for our own barrage and
advance.
Unfortunately, though screened from the East, the corner of Magny Woods,
was visible from the South. Across the Canal on the high ground, some
German gunner must have seen the Tanks assembling, and, finding no
attack was coming his way, started to shoot at point blank range at our
right flank. The right and centre became very unpleasant, and there was
a veritable barrage round "A" Company. Through it, very hot and very
angry at being shelled, suddenly appeared Padre Buck, a heavy pack of
food on his back, and behind him the Regimental Serjeant-Major and the
missing Headquarters. He had found them near Ascension Farm and knowing
enough of the plan of attack, had "sweated" them along as hard as he
could. It is impossible to imagine what we should have done without
runners, signallers or batmen, to say nothing of the food. As we were
now only 600 yards from our final objective the Padre and Captain Jack
went off to find a Regimental Aid Post and finally settled in a small
dug-out in a sunken road just outside the village.
At 1-40 p.m. our barrage started and our advance began; our shelling was
slightly ragged in one or two places, but for the most part it was very
accurate--wonderfully so, as guns were firing at extreme range. On the
right "A" Company working along, and on both sides of an old trench,
reached their objective without difficulty except for the shelling
which, aimed at the Tanks, was falling all round the Company. Captain
Petch, after L/Cpl. Downs and others had removed some twenty-one Boches
from a hole under the road, made his Headquarters there, went round his
outposts, and sent patrols out to his right flank, where the Sherwood
Foresters, delayed in Bellenglise, had not yet reached Lehaucourt. They
soon came up, however, and our right flank was secured. In the centre
"C" Company had even more shells and did not have the satisfaction of
evicting any Boches. They reached their objective and put outposts round
the Mill and along a sunken road to connect with "A" Company. The
protective barrage was still in front of them, and through it, in the
direction of Levergies, could be seen several German batteries
limbering up. One was quite close. This was too much for C.S.M. Angrave
and Serjeant Tunks, who collected some twenty men and, regardless of the
barrage, took advantage of the cover of a sunken road running East, and
pushed forward. They could not cross the open, but, using their rifles,
drove off the gunners and killed the horses, so that the battery
remained in our hands. This very enterprising party then went on under
Serjeant Tunks and had a look at Levergies, finally returning after it
was dark.
Behind "C" Company, the Colonel and Adjutant after lying for some time
in a small hole, and wondering whether they would be rolled on by one of
our Tanks, or hit by the shells aimed at it, finally planted their flag
outside a little dug-out on the N.E. corner of Magny Woods. However, the
Colonel would not rest here, but was off again at once to see how we had
fared. He first met Captain Banwell looking for a "success rocket"; this
sounded satisfactory, and, as about the same time, Lieut. Hawley
appeared with "B" Company, and we once more had a "reserve," all looked
well. On the left--"D" Company (Corah), after chalking their names on a
battery of deserted whizz-bangs, collected a Boche officer and some 50
men from a 4.2 gun battery without any trouble; hurrying on, they found
some 20 others trying to blow up a 5.9 Howitzer in Fosse Wood,
demonstrated that this could not be allowed and took them all prisoners;
then, without further opposition, they dug in round the E. side of the
wood and continued the line Northwards to the Divisional boundary. After
visiting these, the Colonel went off to look at the left flank, and
here, except for an Australian Machine Gun Section under a Serjeant
there was no one. The Americans were not up to their objective, they had
not even taken Etricourt, and for nearly a mile back our left was "in
the air." Worse still, the Australian Serjeant had just been ordered to
withdraw; the Colonel pointed out the situation, and the Serjeant, dying
for an excuse to stay where he could see enemy to shoot at, called back
his men and said "he'd stay as long as we wanted him." It was not very
satisfactory, but we could do nothing else except pray hard for the
arrival of the 32nd Division. When the Colonel arrived back at Battalion
Headquarters we thought at first that our casualties had been very light
indeed, but it was not long before we got some bad news. On our right
flank the Tanks had suffered heavily at the hands of the German gunners
on the Le Tronquoy high ground, and one of them, disabled and on fire,
was a mark for several German batteries. Some of the crew managed to
escape, but others, too badly wounded, were left inside; one crawled to
our Aid Post. Padre Buck heard of this and at once went off to the
rescue. The shelling was very heavy, and he was hit almost at once and
wounded in many places. He was carried back to the Aid Post, but died
soon afterwards, conscious to the last, but not in great pain. The Padre
had been with us two years, and during all that time, there was never a
trench or outpost that he had not visited, no matter how dangerous or
exposed. In addition to his Chaplain's duties, he had been O.C. Games,
Recreation Room and often Mess President--a thorough sportsman and a
brave soldier, we felt his loss keenly.
Meanwhile every effort was being made to tell Brigade of our success,
and, while one aeroplane with British markings bombed us (in spite of
numerous red flares), another took down a message from the "Popham"
sheet, which Serjeant Signaller Wilbur was operating. Soon after 4.0
p.m. Captain D. Hill, the Brigade Major, appeared and told us that the
32nd Division would soon arrive, and at 5-15 p.m. their leading
Battalions came through us. However, they found it was now too late to
go forward, so put out Outposts just in front of our line. Their
appearance provoked the Boche to further shelling, and an unlucky hit
killed Serjeant Taylor, an experienced and valuable platoon Serjeant of
"C" Company. Serjeants Marshall of "C" Company and Clarke of "D"
Company, were also wounded, but our total casualties for the day were
under 25. We had reached our objective at all points and captured 8 guns
and about 100 prisoners. The Division altogether had taken 4,000
prisoners and 80 guns and had smashed the Hindenburg Line.
Though the machine-gun fire from low flying aeroplanes was somewhat
troublesome at dusk, we had a quiet night after the battle, and were
able to distribute rations and ammunition to the companies soon after
midnight. At the time, we hardly gave a thought to this last, but it was
a feat deserving of the highest praise. We had advanced some four miles
into the enemy's country across a canal, and by dusk bridges and roads
had been built sufficient to enable horse transport to carry rations and
ammunition to the most advanced units. Ours were delivered just outside
Battalion Headquarters, and the Companies fetched them from there. The
admirable organization of the Staff, and the skill and pluck of our
Transport Drivers, had enabled us to go into action carrying only our
rations for the one day--very different from the Germans in their March
offensive, when each man was loaded up with food for five days.
The following morning, the 32nd Division continued the advance, with a
small barrage, against Sequehart, Joncourt and, in the near centre,
Levergies. The enemy had found it impossible to remain in their
positions at Pontruet and South of the Canal, and hustled by the 1st and
French Divisions, had evacuated them. The French were now therefore
continuing our line Southwards from Lehaucourt. The attack started at
dawn and soon afterwards the valley past Fosse Wood was thronged with
Whippet tanks and cavalry, waiting in case of a possible
"break-through." It was the first time most of us had seen Cavalry in
action, and they made an imposing sight as they filed along the valley
in the morning mist. At the same time several batteries of Horse
Artillery trotted up and taking up positions near our "D" Company,
opened fire to assist the attack. Levergies, overlooked from two sides,
was soon taken and several prisoners were captured on the left, but
elsewhere the enemy had been strongly reinforced, and the attacks on
Sequehart, Preselles and Joncourt broke down under heavy machine gun
fire. Apparently a stand was to be made along the "Fonsomme" trench
line--running N. and S. along the next ridge. After waiting all day, the
Cavalry and "whippets" slowly withdrew again in the evening.
That night and the following day, as the 32nd Division had now
definitely taken over the outpost line, the Companies were brought into
more comfortable quarters near Magny la Fosse and Headquarters moved
into an old German Artillery dug-out on the hill. In these positions "A"
Company had the misfortune to lose Serjeant Toon, a most energetic and
cheerful Platoon Serjeant, who was wounded by a chance machine-gun
bullet, but otherwise we had a quiet time. Reorganization and refitting
once more occupied our minds, and, as "B" Company's gas casualties had
made them so weak, all "battle details" were ordered to join us. The
following day they arrived under C.S.M. Cooper, who resumed his duties
with "D" Company. 2nd Lieuts. Todd and Argyle also rejoined us from
leave, and the Stores and Transport moved up to Magny village. The same
afternoon there was a Battalion parade and General Rowley complimented
us on our work during our two battles. He had visited Pontruet since the
attack and was unable to find words to express his admiration for our
fight in the village. The arrival of the "Daily Mail," and the discovery
that at last the name "North Midland" figured in the head lines cheered
us all immensely, and the fall of St. Quentin to the French gave a
practical proof of the value of our efforts. We were all very happy and
said "Now we shall have a good rest to re-fit."
Nothing, however, appeared to be further from the intentions of the
Higher Command, and on October 2nd the other two Brigades came through
us to take over the line from the 32nd, and again attempt to break the
"Fonsomme" Line--on the 3rd. The French would attack on the right, the
32nd Division would be responsible for Sequehart, and the 46th, with
Staffordshires on the right and Sherwood Foresters on the left, would
sweep over Preselles, Ramicourt and Montbrehain, and make a break for
the cavalry and "whippets." Joncourt had already been captured and
the left flank was therefore secure. Our Brigade was in support, and
would not be wanted to move until 8-0 a.m. There was not much time for
making preparations, and the Artillery, who had particularly short
notice, spent the night before the battle getting into position near our
Headquarters.
[Illustration: SKETCH MAP OF CAMBRAI-ST. QUENTIN-AVESNES AREA
To illustrate battles of Sept Oct Nov 1918]
Once more a thick morning mist covered our attack and the first waves,
advancing with the barrage at dawn, quickly got possession of Preselles
and the Fonsomme Line, killing many Germans and taking large numbers of
prisoners. There was considerable resistance in the centre, but the
Sherwood Foresters, led by such men as Colonel Vann, disposed of it, and
by 10.0 a.m. all objectives were gained and everything ready for the
Cavalry. Meanwhile, soon after 8-0 a.m., the Battalion was ordered to
move up at once and support the Staffordshires. We were to be under the
orders of General Campbell, but would not be used for any purpose except
holding the Fonsomme Line, to which we were now to go. We had been
warned the previous evening that, if used at all, it would be on the
right flank, and reconnoitering parties had already gone forward to get
in touch with the Staffordshires; these had not yet returned, so we
started without them.
Soon after 9-0 a.m. we left Magny la Fosse and moved down the hill
towards Levergies, which we decided to leave on our right flank, as it
was full of gas. We were in lines of platoons in fours--"D" Company
(Corah) and "C" (Banwell) leading, bound for the Fonsomme Line, "A"
Company (Petch) and "B" (Hawley) following with orders to find support
positions to the other two. The Headquarters moved by the railway line
N.E. of Levergies to take up a position as near as possible to the
Support Battalion Headquarters of the Staffordshires. All went well
until the leading Companies were beginning to climb the hill E. of
Levergies, when a runner from Brigade Headquarters caught us up with a
message to say that the 32nd Division had not taken Sequehart in the
first attack, and that it was uncertain in whose hands the village now
was. Every effort was made to warn the Companies, but we could not reach
"D" and "A" in time, and we could only hope that if Sequehart was still
in the enemy's hands, they would be warned of it in time to deploy their
right platoons, which would otherwise march in fours close to the edge
of the village.
Sequehart, however, if not at this time actually in our hands, was at
all events clear of the enemy, and our right flank had no trouble. The
mist and smoke made communication between the Companies very difficult,
and so each moved, more or less independently, to its allotted station.
"C" was the first to reach the "Fonsomme Line," only to find that the
line was nowhere more than six inches deep, and, except for its concrete
machine gun posts, was only a "big work" when photographed from the air.
Captain Banwell accordingly took up his position in a sunken lane
running between Sequehart and Preselles. Meanwhile, the other leading
Company, "D," had moved too far to the left, a very fortunate
circumstance, because Colonel Griffiths was able to change their
direction and dispose them facing right, to form a defensive right flank
opposite Sequehart. "B" Company was also ordered to face right in
support to "D" Company. "A" Company, however, had not made the same
error as "D," and Captain Petch, keeping his direction, found, as "C"
Company had, that the "Fonsomme Line" gave him no cover. He, therefore,
occupied the same sunken lane, about 300 yards south of "C" Company.
Soon afterwards an intercepted message told Captain Petch of our changed
dispositions, and, to protect his right, he too moved his Company to
conform with "D." Battalion Headquarters had by this time occupied a
large bank at the bottom of the hill, where Colonel White, of the 5th
South Staffordshires, had already planted his flag.
From our new positions we had an extensive view to the East. Mannequin
Ridge was on the right flank with Doon Hill at the end of it, held by
the enemy, though we could see the Staffordshires holding the ridge. In
the foreground was a valley, and on our left another ridge stretching
from Preselles to Ramicourt. The Staffordshires did not appear very
numerous for their large frontage, and it was clear that unless the
Cavalry appeared soon, there was danger that they would be
counter-attacked. But at 10-0 a.m. the leading Cavalry were only just
beginning to appear over the Magny heights. The enemy was fairly quiet,
except for one field gun, 2,000 yards away on our extreme right, beyond
Sequehart. C.S.M. Angrave kept sniping at the gunners, who replied to
each of his shots with a whizz-bang.
It soon became obvious that so long as the enemy remained on Doon Hill,
the Cavalry could not advance, and shortly after midday we received
orders to place two Companies at the disposal of the 137th Brigade, to
assist in an attack on the Hill. Colonel Griffiths decided to use "A"
and "D" Companies, and Captain Fetch and Lieut. Corah were at once
summoned to Headquarters, when we were told the attack was to be made by
the North Staffordshires, Colonel Evans, and that our Companies would be
in support. Accordingly Colonel Griffiths and the Company Commanders set
off for Colonel Evans' headquarters while the two Companies moved over
the open to "C" Company's sunken lane, where they formed up for the
attack. A few of "A" Company under 2nd Lieut. Whetton crossed the lane
and reached the Staffordshires' front line. There was no fixed time for
the assault, but the hill was to be shelled by our Artillery until 2.30
p.m. This shelling ceased as our Companies reached the lane, nearly a
mile from the objective, and Colonel Evans tried in vain to have it
renewed.
Meanwhile the enemy had been assembling out of sight behind Mannequin
Ridge, and now suddenly attacked the Staffordshires heavily, driving
them from their positions on the crest. At the same time the valley was
swept from end to end by bursts of machine gun fire, and it was obvious
that an advance across the open could only be made with very heavy loss.
Colonel Griffiths wished to stop the attack at least until Mannequin
Ridge was retaken, but, before anything could be done, the enemy opened
a heavy artillery barrage on the lane, and the Colonel was badly
wounded. Some of "A" Company had pushed forward a little, and Captain
Petch and 2nd Lieut. Dennis managed to find some cover for No. 4 Platoon
about 200 yards East of the Lane. It was now about 3-0 p.m. and Colonel
Evans, probably intending to alter his plans, sent for the Company
Commanders. As they arrived a shell fell on the party, killing the
Colonel, Lieut. Corah and 2nd Lieut. Christy, wounding Captain Petch. A
few minutes later 2nd Lieut. Mace was hit in the leg with a bullet, and
both he and Captain Petch were sent down. "D" Company was officerless,
"A" had three isolated groups, two forward and unapproachable, the third
under 2nd Lieut. Edwardes in the Sunken Lane. There were no orders and
no one knew what to do, so C.S.M. Cooper collected "D" and 2nd Lieut.
Edwardes and C.S.M. Smith collected all they could find of "A," and both
prolonged "C" Company's line to the left. The lane here was less sunken
than on the right, and the cover was very poor, affording little
protection against the enemy's shells, which came from front and flank.
We were now very short of officers. The Adjutant, Captain J.D. Hills,
was in command, with Lieut. Ashdowne as Adjutant; 2nd Lieut. Argyle was
acting Liaison Officer with the Staffordshires, so there was no one else
except the M.O. at Headquarters. Captain Jack, it is true, was a host in
himself, for, when not tying up the wounded, he was always ready with
some merry remark to cheer us up; we needed it, for our railway line was
as heavily shelled as the sunken lane. In addition to the killed and
wounded the Companies had also lost two new subaltern officers who had
joined the previous day and gone away slightly gassed, while 2nd Lieut.
Griffiths, who had gone forward with the reconnoitering parties, had not
been seen since. Captain Banwell was therefore alone with "C" Company.
Lieut. Steel was at once sent to command "D," and, on arrival at the
sunken lane, at once received a shell splinter in the leg; fortunately,
however, this was not serious, and he and C.S.M. Cooper were soon hard
at work straightening out the Company. This Warrant Officer and C.S.M.
Smith of "A" Company were admirable; it was largely due to them that
both Companies, badly shaken after their gruelling, were within a few
hours once more fit for anything. Our shortage of officers was likely to
continue, for our only "battle detail," Major Burnett, had just gone to
England, to the Senior Officers' School at Aldershot. Our casualties
during the afternoon included one who could ill be spared. A direct hit
with a shell on "C" Company Headquarters wounded C.S.M. Angrave in the
back. He died a few days later. One of the original Territorials, he had
served with us the whole time, and even four years of France had failed
to lessen his devotion to "C" Company.
[Illustration: Company Headquarters, Loisne, 1918.]
[Illustration: The Bathing Pool, Gorre Brewery, 1918.]
Soon after 3-0 p.m. General Campbell himself rode up to Battalion
Headquarters and after explaining the situation, pointed out the
importance of holding a little group of trenches on some high ground
three-quarters of a mile E. of Preselles. Accordingly "B" Company
(Hawley), now only 25 strong, were sent there with two Lewis Guns; at
the same time some of the Monmouthshires were sent to help him.
Meanwhile, all the afternoon and evening, the enemy kept making small
attacks on Mannequin Ridge and towards Sequehart; several of these were
broken up by Artillery fire, and after his first efforts he had no
further successes. Our Cavalry, having arrived too late in the morning
to pass through when the enemy was really disorganized, waited all day
in the valley behind Preselles, and after losing several men and
horses in the shelling, had once more to withdraw at dusk. Their horses
were sent back, but as many men as could be spared were sent up
dismounted, with rifles and bayonets, to help hold the "Fonsomme Line"
in case of strong enemy counter attacks. They did not move up until dark
and, of course, could not find the "Fonsomme Line," any more than we
could in the morning, so started to dig where they could. Fortunately
the Commanding Officer, going round the line, found them, and, sending
one party up to help "B" Company, who were now alone, he and Captain
Banwell guided the rest across the valley, where they could find some
cover on the hill side. Had they been allowed to remain where they had
started to dig, they would probably have suffered very heavily in the
morning from the Ridge opposite, whence the enemy would have had a
beautiful view of them.
Rations arrived soon after dark. During the afternoon 2nd Lieut. Todd
had reconnoitred a route for his limbers, and, after a narrow escape
from some heavy shells, had managed to find a passable road. With the
limbers came also 2nd Lieut. Griffiths, who had been wandering all over
the countryside in his efforts to find us. By midnight the companies had
their rations and their mail, and, even in the sunken lane, a smile
could be seen here and there. The night was quiet, and we were able to
collect all scattered parties and see what our casualties had been.
Fortunately the loss of other ranks was not in the same proportion as of
officers, but we had started so weak that we could ill afford to lose
the seven killed and 30 wounded which were our total casualties for the
day. "A" and "D" Companies had been hardest hit and Lance-Corporal
Meakin was amongst the killed; Serjeant Ward had been wounded, Serjeant
Peach of "B" Company had also been killed, while "C" Company, in
addition to their C.S.M., lost Serjt. Bond gassed and Cpl. Foulds
wounded.
[Illustration: Pontruet.]
At dawn on the 4th, as there was no sign of any attempted counter-attack
on the part of the enemy, most of the dismounted cavalry were withdrawn,
and we remained in our positions of the previous day. The morning was
slightly misty and Battalion Headquarters had one bad scare. The
Commanding Officer and Adjutant were out looking for new quarters, when
they suddenly saw coming over the hill W. of Sequehart--behind their
right flank--a number of Germans in open order. A battery of 60 pounders
in Levergies saw them at the same time and opened fire at point blank
range. It was fully five minutes before a few leisurely French soldiers
appearing over the same crest, showed that the Germans were merely a
large batch of prisoners collected by the French at dawn. Throughout the
day the enemy shelled various parts of the back area, and in this
respect Headquarters came off worst, being more bombarded than even the
sunken road. The bank under which they sat did not give them much cover,
and the Boche managed to drop his shells with great accuracy on the
Railway line and even hit the R.A.P. By the afternoon they were so tired
of being chased backwards and forwards along the bank that they followed
the example of the M.O., who with a wonderful display of calmness, which
he did not in the least feel, sat reading a book of poems and refused to
move. He admitted afterwards that he had not read a line, but it looked
very well, and as usual he kept us all cheerful.
Late in the afternoon the long expected orders for relief came and we
learnt that we were to come out that night with the Staffordshires. "B"
Company on the left were actually relieved, but the other Companies had
merely to wait until the front line Battalions were clear and then march
out. The Boche shelled Headquarters once more just as they were going
and fired a considerable amount of gas shells all over the countrywide,
but no one was hurt, and eventually, some by Magny, some by Joncourt,
all arrived at the little village of Etricourt. Some of us rolled into
dug-outs, some into ruined houses, some in the road; all of us murmured
"Now we shall have our real rest at last," and went to sleep--tired
out.