"THE SALIENT."
22nd June, 1915. 1st Oct., 1915.
On the 22nd June, 1915, after resting for five days in the Huts, where
General Ferguson, our Corps Commander, came to say good-bye, we marched
at 9.0 p.m. to Ouderdom, while our place in the line was taken by the
50th Northumbrian Territorial Division, who had been very badly
hammered, and were being sent for a rest to a quiet sector. At Ouderdom,
which we reached about midnight, we discovered that our billets
consisted of a farm house and a large field, not very cheering to those
who had expected a village, or at least huts, but better than one or two
units who had fields only, without the farm. It was our first experience
in bivouacs, but fortunately a fine night, so we soon all crawled under
waterproof sheets, and slept until daylight allowed us to arrange
something more substantial. The next day, with the aid of a few
"scrounged" top poles and some string, every man made himself some sort
of weather-proof hutch, while the combined tent-valises of the officers
were grouped together near the farm, which was used as mess and
Quartermaster's Stores. Unfortunately, we had no sooner made ourselves
really comfortable than the Staffordshires claimed the field as part of
their area, and we had to move to a similar billeting area a few
hundred yards outside Reninghelst where we stayed until the 28th. The
weather remained hot and fine, except for two very heavy showers in the
middle of one day, when most of the officers could be seen making
furious efforts to dig drains round their bivouacs from inside, while
the other ranks stood stark naked round the field and enjoyed the
pleasures of a cold shower-bath. We spent our time training and
providing working parties, one of which, consisting of 400 men under
Capt. Jeffries, for work at Zillebeke, proved an even greater fiasco
than its predecessor in May. For on this occasion, not only was the
night very short, but the guides failed to find the work, and the party
eventually returned to bivouacs, having done nothing except wander about
the salient for three hours. Two days before we left Reninghelst the
first reinforcements arrived for us, consisting of 12 returned
casualties and 80 N.C.O.'s and men from England--a very welcome addition
to our strength.
The time eventually arrived for us to go into the line, and on the 29th
the officers went up by day to take over from the Sherwood Foresters,
while the remainder of the Battalion followed as soon as it was dark.
Mud roads and broad cross-country tracks brought us over the plain to
the "Indian Transport Field," near Kruisstraat White Chateau, still
standing untouched because, it was said, its peace-time owner was a
Boche. Leaving the Chateau on our right, and passing Brigade
Headquarters Chalet on our left, we kept to the road through Kruisstraat
as far as the outskirts of Ypres, where a track to the right led us to
Bridge 14 over the Ypres-Comines Canal. Thence, by field tracks, we
crossed the Lille road a few yards north of Shrapnel Corner, and
leaving on our left the long, low, red buildings of the "Ecole de
Bienfaisance," reached Zillebeke Lake close to the white house at the
N.W. corner. The lake is triangular and entirely artificial, being
surrounded by a broad causeway, 6 feet high, with a pathway along the
top. On the western edge the ground falls away, leaving a bank some
twenty feet high, in which were built the "Lake Dug-outs,"--the home of
one of the support battalions. From the corner house to the trenches
there were two routes, one by the south side of the Lake, past Railway
Dug-outs--cut into the embankment of the Comines Railway--and Manor Farm
to Square Wood; the other, which we followed, along the North side of
the Lake, where a trench cut into the causeway gave us cover from
observation from "Hill 60." At Zillebeke we left the trench, and crossed
the main road at the double, on account of a machine gun which the Boche
kept at the "Hill 60" end of it, and kept moving until past the
Church--another unpleasant locality. Thence a screened track led to
Maple Copse, an isolated little wood with several dug-outs in it, and on
to Sanctuary Wood, which we found 400 yards further East. Here in
dug-outs lived the Supports, for whom at this time was no fighting
accommodation except one or two absurdly miniature keeps. At the corner
of the larger wood we passed the Ration Dump, and then, leaving this on
our left, turned into Armagh Wood on our right.
From the southern end of Zillebeke village two roads ran to the front
line. One, almost due South, kept close to the railway and was lost in
the ruins of Zwartelen village on "Hill 60"; the other, turning East
along a ridge, passed between Sanctuary and Armagh Woods, and crossed
our front line between the "A" and "B" trenches, the left of our new
sector. The ridge, called Observatory, on account of its numerous
O.P.'s, was sacred to the Gunners, and no one was allowed to linger
there, for fear of betraying these points of vantage. Beyond it was a
valley, and beyond that again some high ground N.E. of the hill,
afterwards known as Mountsorrel, on account of Colonel Martin's
Headquarters, which were on it. The line ran over the top of this high
ground, which was the meeting place of the old winter trenches (numbered
46 to 50) on the right, and, on the left the new trenches "A," "B,"
etc., built for our retirement during the 2nd Battle. The 5th Division
held the old trenches, we relieved the Sherwood Foresters in the new
"A1" to "A8," with three companies in the line and only one in support.
The last was near Battalion Headquarters, called Uppingham in Colonel
Jones' honour, which were in a bank about 200 yards behind the front
line. Some of the dug-outs were actually in the bank, but the most
extraordinary erection of all was the mess, a single sandbag thick
house, built entirely above ground, and standing by itself, unprotected
by any bank or fold in the ground, absolutely incapable, of course, of
protecting its occupants from even an anti-aircraft "dud."
We soon discovered during our first tour the difference between the
Salient and other sectors of the line, for, whereas at Kemmel we were
rarely shelled more than once a day, and then only with a few small
shells, now scarcely three hours went by without some part of the
Battalion's front being bombarded, usually with whizz-bangs. The Ypres
whizz-bang, too, was a thing one could not despise. The country round
Klein Zillebeke was very close, and the Boche was able to keep his
batteries only a few hundred yards behind his front line, with the
result that the "Bang" generally arrived before the whizz. "A6" and "A7"
suffered most, and on the 1st July Captain T.C.P. Beasley, commanding
"C" Company, and Lieut. A.P. Marsh, of "B" Company, were both wounded,
and had to be sent away to Hospital some hours later. The same night we
gave up these undesirable trenches, together with "A5" and "A8" to the
4th Battalion, and took instead "49," "50" and the Support "51" from the
Cheshires of the 5th Division. These trenches were about 200 yards from
the enemy except at the junction of "49" and "50," where a small salient
in his line brought him to within 80 yards. The sniping here was as
deadly as at Kemmel, though round the corner in "A1" we could have
danced on the parapet and attracted no attention. On the other hand "49"
and "50" were comfortably built, whereas "A1" was shallow and narrow and
half filled with tunnellers' sandbags, for it contained three long mine
shafts, two of which were already under the German lines. "A2," "3" and
"4" were the most peaceful of our sector, and the only disturbance here
during the tour was when one of a small burst of crumps blew up our bomb
store and blocked the trench for a time. This was on the 5th, and after
it we were left in peace, until, relieved by the Staffordshires, we
marched back to Ouderdom, feeling that we had escaped from our first
tour in the ill-famed salient fairly cheaply. Even so, we had lost two
officers and 24 O. Ranks wounded, and seven killed, a rate which, if
kept up, would soon very seriously deplete our ranks.
[Illustration: GENERAL MAP OF FLANDERS to illustrate Chap' II & III.]
On reaching Ouderdom, we found that some huts on the Vlamertinghe road
had now been allotted us instead of our bivouac field, and as on the
following day it rained hard, we were not sorry. Our satisfaction,
however, was short-lived, for the hut roofs were of wood only, and
leaked in so many places that many were absolutely uninhabitable and had
to be abandoned. At the same time some short lengths of shelter trench
which we had dug in case of shelling were completely filled with water,
so that anyone desiring shelter must needs have a bath as well. This wet
weather, coupled with a previous shortage of water in the trenches, and
the generally unhealthy state of the salient, brought a considerable
amount of sickness and slight dysentry, and although we did not send
many to Hospital, the health of the Battalion on the whole was bad, and
we seemed to have lost for the time our energy. Probably a fortnight in
good surroundings would have cured us completely, and even after eight
days at rest we were in a better state, but on the 13th we were once
more ordered into the line and the good work was undone, for the
sickness returned with increased vigour.
Between the Railway Cutting at "Hill 60" and the Comines Canal further
south, the lines at this time were very close together, and at one
point, called Bomb Corner, less than 50 yards separated our parapet from
the Boche's. This sector, containing trenches "35" at Bomb Corner, "36"
and "37" up to the Railway, was held by the 1st Norfolks of the 5th
Division, who were finding their own reliefs, and, with one company
resting at a time, had been more than two months in this same front
line. On the 11th July the Boche blew a mine under trench "37" doing
considerable damage to the parapet, and on the following night "36" was
similarly treated, and a length of the trench blotted out. The night
after this we came in to relieve the Norfolks, who not unnaturally were
expecting "35" to share the same fate, and had consequently evacuated
their front line for the night, while they sat in the second line and
waited for it to go up in the air. Captain Jefferies with "D" Company
took over "35," while the two damaged trenches were held by "B" Company
(Capt. J.L. Griffiths). "A" and "C" held a keep near Verbranden
Molen--an old mill about three hundred yards behind our front line--and
Battalion Headquarters lived in some dug-outs in the woods behind "35."
Behind this again, the solitary Blaupoort Farm provided R.A.P. and
ration dump with a certain amount of cover, though the number of dud
shells in the courtyard made it necessary to walk with extreme caution
on a dark night. In spite of the numerous reports of listening-posts,
who heard "rapping underground," we were not blown up during our four
days in residence, and our chief worry was not mines, but again
whizz-bangs. One battery was particularly offensive, and three times on
the 15th Capt. Griffiths had his parapet blown away by salvoes of these
very disagreeable little shells. One's parapet in this area was one's
trench, for digging was impossible, and we lived behind a sort of
glorified sandbag grouse butt, six feet thick at the base and two to
three feet at the top, sometimes, but not always, bullet-proof.
One or two amusing stories are told about the infantry opposite "33,"
who were Saxons, and inclined to be friendly with the English. On one
occasion the following message, tied to a stone, was thrown into our
trench: "We are going to send a 40 lb. bomb. We have got to do it, but
don't want to. I will come this evening, and we will whistle first to
warn you." All of this happened. A few days later they apparently
mistrusted the German official news, for they sent a further message
saying, "Send us an English newspaper that we may learn the verity."
The weather throughout the tour was bad, but on the night of 17th/18th,
when we were relieved at midnight by the Sherwood Foresters, it became
appalling. We were not yet due for a rest, having been only four days in
the line, and our orders were to spend the night in bivouacs at
Kruisstraat and return to trenches the following evening, taking over
our old sector "50" to "A7." Weakened with sickness and soaked to the
skin, we stumbled through black darkness along the track to
Kruisstraat--three miles of slippery mud and water-logged shell
holes--only to find that our bivouac field was flooded, and we must
march back to Ouderdom and spend the night in the huts, five miles
further west. We reached home as dawn was breaking, tired out and wet
through, and lay down at once to snatch what sleep we could before
moving off again at 6-30 p.m. But for many it was too much, and 150 men
reported sick and were in such a weak condition that they were left
behind at the huts, where later they were joined by some 40 more who had
tried hard to reach trenches but had had to give up and fall out on the
way. The rest of us, marching slowly and by short stages, did eventually
relieve the Sherwood Foresters, but so tired as to be absolutely unfit
for trenches. Fortunately for two days the weather was good and the
Boche very quiet, there was time for all to get a thorough rest, and by
the 20th we had very largely recovered our vigour--which was just as
well, for it proved an exciting tour.
The excitement started about a mile away on our left, when, on the
evening of the 19th, the next Division blew up an enormous mine at
Hooge, and, with the aid of an intense artillery bombardment, attacked
and captured part of the village, including the chateau stables. The
enemy counter-attacked the following night, and, though he made no
headway and was driven out with heavy loss, he none the less bombarded
our new ground continuously and caused us many casualties. Accordingly,
to make a counter attraction, the Tunnelling Company working with us was
asked to blow up part of the enemy's lines as soon as possible; the blow
would be accompanied by an artillery "strafe" by us. There was at this
time such a network of mine galleries in front of "A1," that Lieut.
Tulloch, R.E., was afraid that the Boche would hear him loading one of
the galleries, so, to take no risks, blew a preliminary camouflet on the
evening of the 21st, destroying the enemy's nearest sap. This was
successful, and the work of loading and tamping the mines started at
once. 1500 lbs. of ammonal were packed at the end of a gallery
underneath the German redoubt opposite "A1," while at the end of another
short gallery a smaller mine was laid, in order to destroy as much as
possible of his mine workings. The date chosen was the 23rd, the time 7
p.m.
At 6-55 p.m., having vacated "A1" for the time, we blew the smaller of
the two mines--in order, it was said, to attract as many of the enemy as
possible into his redoubt. To judge by the volume of rifle fire which
came from his lines, this part of the programme was successful, but we
did not have long to think about it, for at 7 p.m. the 1500 lbs. went
off, and Boche redoubt, sandbags, and occupants went into the air,
together with some tons of the salient, much of which fell into our
trenches. A minute later our Artillery opened their bombardment, and for
the next half hour the enemy must have had a thoroughly bad time in
every way. His retaliation was insignificant, and consisted of a very
few little shells fired more or less at random--a disquieting feature to
those of us who knew the Germans' love of an instant and heavy reply to
our slightest offensive action. "Stand to," the usual time for the
evening "hate," passed off very quietly, and, as we sat down to our
evening meal, we began to wonder whether we were to have any reply at
all. Meanwhile, three new officers arrived--2nd. Lieut. R.C. Lawton, of
"A" Company, who had been prevented by sickness from coming abroad with
us, and 2nd Lieuts. E.E. Wynne and N.C. Marriott, both of whom were sent
to "B" Company, where they joined Capt. Griffiths at dinner. They were
half way through their meal when, without the slightest warning, the
ground heaved, pieces of the roof fell on the table, and they heard the
ominous whirr of falling clods, which betokens a mine at close quarters.
[Illustration: Hohenzollern Memorial.]
Before the débris had stopped falling, Capt. Griffiths was out of his
dug-out and scrambling along his half-filled trench, to find out what
had happened. Reaching the right end of "50," he found his front line
had been completely destroyed, and where his listening post had been,
was now a large crater, into which the Boche was firing trench mortars,
while heavy rifle fire came from his front line. Except for a few
wounded men, he could see nothing of Serjt. Bunn and the garrison of the
trench, most of whom he soon realized must have been buried, where the
tip of the crater had engulfed what had been the front line. For about
80 yards no front line existed, nor had he sufficient men in the left of
his trench to bring across to help the right, so, sending down a report
of his condition, he started, with any orderlies and batmen he could
collect, to rescue those of his Company who had been only partially
buried. Meanwhile, help was coming from two quarters. On the right,
Colonel Martin, of the 4th Battalion, also disturbed at dinner, was soon
up in "49" trench, where he found that his left flank had also suffered
from the explosion, but not so badly. His first thought was to form some
continuous line of defence across the gap, if possible linking up with
the crater at the same time, and, with this object in view he personally
reconnoitred the ground and discovered a small disused trench running in
front of "49" towards the crater. Quickly organizing parties of men, he
sent them along this cut, first to continue it up to the crater, then
with sandbags for the defence of the "lip." He himself superintended the
work inside the crater, where he had a miraculous escape from a trench
mortar, which wounded all standing round him. At the same time, R.S.M.
Small, finding a dazed man of "B" Company wandering near Battalion
Headquarters, heard what had happened, and without waiting for further
orders sent off every available man he could find with shovels and
sandbags to assist Capt. Griffiths. Half an hour later, Capt. Bland also
arrived with two platoons of "C" Company, sent across from the left of
our line, and by dawn with their help a trench had been cut through from
"50" to "49." This, though not organized for defence, yet enabled one
to pass through the damaged area. At the same time the miners started to
make a small tunnel into the bottom of the crater, so that it would no
longer be necessary to climb over the lip to reach the bomb post which
was built inside.
[Illustration: The Water Tower and Railway Track, Vermelles.]
During the next day we were fortunately not much harassed by the enemy,
and were consequently able to continue the repair work on "50." "B"
Company had had 42 casualties from the mine itself, of whom eight were
killed and seven, including Sergt. Bunn, were missing, while in the rest
of the Battalion about 30 men were wounded, mostly by trench mortars or
rifle fire when digging out "50" trench. At the time of the explosion
the enemy had thrown several bombs at "A2," and it was thought for a
time that he intended making an attack here, but rapid fire was opened
by the garrison, and nothing followed. On the evening of the 24th we
were due for relief, but, as "50" was still only partially cleared, and
we had not yet traced all our missing, we stayed in for another 24
hours, during which time we thoroughly reorganized the sector, and were
able to hand over a properly traversed fire trench to the Lincolnshires
when they came in. Before we left we found Sergt. Bunn's body; he had
been buried at his post, and was still holding in his hand the flare
pistol which he was going to fire when the mine exploded. The men of the
listening post were not found until some time later, for they had been
thrown several hundred yards by the explosion.
On relief, we marched back to Ouderdom, taking with us the officers and
men of the 17th Division, who had been attached for instruction during
the last tour, and reached a bivouac field near the windmill at 4-30
a.m. Here we stayed 24 hours, and then moved into the "E" huts--an
excellent camp, further E. along the Vlamertinghe road than that which
we had previously occupied. We were due to remain here for six days, and
accordingly started our usual training in bomb and bayonet fighting.
Meanwhile, Lieut. Moore and the Battalion Tunnellers were once more hard
at work helping the R.E. in "50" and "A1," and on the 30th July two of
them, Serjt. J. Emmerson and Pte. H.G. Starbuck, working underground,
came upon a German gallery. Without a moment's hesitation, Starbuck
broke in and found that the charge was already laid, and wires could be
seen leading back to the enemy's lines. If the Germans had heard him at
work there was no doubt that they would blow their mine at once, but
heedless of this danger, he stayed in the gallery until he had cut the
leads, and so made it possible for the Engineers to remove the half ton
of "Westphalite" which they found already in position, immediately under
"49." For their daring work, the two miners were awarded the D.C.M.,
Starbuck getting his at once, Serjt. Emmerson in the next honours list.
Two nights later the enemy suddenly opened rapid rifle fire opposite
"49," which equally suddenly died away, and we like to think that some
Boche officer had at the same time pressed the starting button to
explode his "Westphalite," only to find that nothing happened.
Towards the end of June, there appeared in the German official
communiqué a statement that the French had been using liquid fire in the
Champagne fighting, and those who had studied the Boche methods
recognized this as a warning that he intended to make use of it himself
at an early date. The prophets were right, and at dawn on the 30th July
the enemy, anxious to recapture Hooge, attacked the 14th Division who
were holding the village, preceding the attack with streams of liquid
fire, under which the garrison either succumbed or were driven out. At
the same time an intense bombardment was opened, and we, whose rest was
not due to end until the following day, were ordered to stand by ready
to move at 30 minutes' notice. As we waited we wondered whether the 3rd
Battle of Ypres had begun, there certainly seemed to be enough noise. By
mid-day, however, we had not been used, and as no news of the battle
reached us we were preparing to settle down again for another day of
peace, when at 2-30 p.m. orders came for us to go to Kruisstraat at
once. We marched by Companies, and on arrival bivouacked in a field
close to the Indian Transport Lines, where we met several Battalions of
the 3rd Division on their way up to Hooge, though they were unable to
tell us anything definite about what had happened. The wildest rumours
were heard everywhere, that the Germans had used burning oil, vitriol,
and almost every other acid ever invented, that the salient was broken,
that our Division had been surrounded. One thing was certain--that at 4
p.m. the gunfire had almost ceased, and there was no sign of any German
near Ypres.
As soon as it was dark we left Kruisstraat and marched by Bridge 14 and
Zillebeke to Maple Copse, where we were told to bivouac for the night,
still being ready to move at very short notice if required. Here we
found a Battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, from whom we were at last
able to learn the truth of the morning's battle. It appeared that at
dawn the enemy, carrying flame projectors, had crept close up to the
front line trenches in Hooge, and suddenly lighting these machines had
sent a spray of burning vaporised oil over the trench. The garrison,
14th Division, were surprised, many of them burnt, and all thrown into
confusion, during which the Boche attacked in considerable force, drove
them out and broke in as far as Zouave Wood. The left of the Sherwood
Foresters had been attacked, but stood firm, even though the Germans in
Zouave Wood were almost behind them, until General Shipley ordered the
flank to be dropped back to conform with the new line. A counter-attack
was delivered during the day by two Battalions of the Rifle Brigade,
who, relieved the night before, had marched eight miles out to rest and
eight miles back again at once, and were hopelessly tired before they
started. In spite of this, they made a gallant effort, and were wiped
out almost to a man in Zouave Wood. At the time of the morning attack
the Germans could if they liked have walked on into Ypres, for they had
broken into the salient, and there was no other organized line of
defence between them and the town. Fortunately they did not realise
this, or, as is more probable, they never imagined that their flame
attack would prove so successful. Still, they might make a further
effort at any moment, and it was to meet this that we had been moved
into Maple Copse.
All through the night and the following day there were continual short
artillery bombardments by both sides, and on four occasions the Copse
was shelled with salvoes of shrapnel in rapid succession. As not more
than half of us had any sort of dug-outs, and the remainder had to rely
mainly on tree trunks for protection, our casualties were fairly heavy,
and in a short time we had lost 23 wounded, including H. West, the mess
cook, L.-Corpl. J.H. Cramp, and several other notabilities. We might,
during the day, have built ourselves some sort of cover, but every
available man had to be sent carrying bombs, ammunition, and trench
mortars for the Sherwood Foresters, whose left flank was constantly in
touch with the enemy. One of these carrying parties found by "D" Company
had the misfortune to be led by a guide, who lost his way, into the
corner of Zouave Wood, and in a few minutes six of them were wounded by
a machine gun which opened fire on them at twenty yards' range; they
were carried out by the rest of the party, who escaped under cover of
the brushwood, but one, Carroll, died a few days later. By the evening
of the 31st the situation was more satisfactory, and a new front line
trench had been organized west of the wood, linking up with the Sherwood
Foresters, who now no longer required carrying parties. Meanwhile, it
was discovered that from his newly captured position, the Boche
completely overlooked the track from Zillebeke to Maple Copse, and
accordingly we were ordered to start at once to dig a communication
trench alongside the track. All that night, the next day, Bank Holiday,
and the following night, we worked till we could hardly hold our
shovels, and by the time we stopped, at dawn on the 3rd, there was a
trench the whole way--not very deep in places and not perhaps very
scientifically dug, but still enough to give cover. As soon as work was
over we returned to the copse and slept, for at dusk that night we were
to go once more to the line and relieve the Lincolnshires in "50" to
"A7." Maple Copse had cost us altogether 35 killed and wounded.
We found the trenches very much as we had left them except that "A1" had
been battered into an almost unrecognizable condition by the enemy's
latest trench weapon, the heavy Minenwerfer. Unlike the "Rum Jar" or
"Cannister," which was a home-made article consisting of any old tin
filled with explosive, this new bomb was shaped like a shell, fitted
with a copper driving band and fired from a rifled mortar. It weighed
over 200 lbs., was either two feet two inches or three feet six inches
long and nine inches in diameter, and produced on exploding a crater as
big as a small mine. It could fortunately be seen in the air, and the
position of the mortar was roughly known, so we posted a sentry whose
duty was to listen for the report of discharge, sight the bomb, and cry
at the top of his voice "Sausage left" or "Sausage right." Our Artillery
had tried hard to destroy the mortar, but it apparently had a small
railway to itself, and moved away as soon as we opened fire. For
retaliation we had nothing except rifle grenades, which were like
flea-bites to an elephant, or the Howitzers, who had to be called on the
telephone, all of which took time.
The rest of the line was fairly quiet except for a few small "sausages"
on trench "50," and our chief concern was now the shortage of men. In
those days a trench was not considered adequately garrisoned unless
there were at least three men in every fire bay, so that although we had
many more men to the yard than we have many times had since, we
imagined, when we found it necessary to have one or two empty fire bays,
that we were impossibly weak. So much was this the case, that, on the
night of the 4th August, C.Q.M. Serjeants Gorse and Gilding were ordered
to bring all available men from the stores at Poperinghe to help hold
the line--a most unpleasant journey because the Boche, always fond of
celebrating anniversaries, commemorated the declaration of war with a
"strafe" of special magnitude. As most of this came between Ypres and
Zillebeke, the two Quartermaster Serjeants had a harassing time, and did
not reach their bivouacs in Poperinghe until 5-15 the following morning.
All through the tour the pounding of "A1" continued, while our only
effort at retaliation was a 60 lb. mortar which the Royal Garrison
Artillery placed in rear of "50" trench. This one day fired six rounds,
the last of which fell in the German front line, and for nearly
twenty-four hours we were left in peace, while a "switch" line was built
across the back of "A1" salient. All hope of ever recovering the old
"A1" was given up.
Meanwhile, the Division on our left was not being idle. For the past
week our Artillery in the salient had fired a half-hour bombardment
every morning at 2-45, and on the 9th this was repeated as usual. The
Boche had become used to it, and retired to his dug-outs, where he was
found a few minutes later by the 6th Division, who had relieved the
14th, and were now trying to recapture all the lost ground. The surprise
was perfect, and the enemy, never for a moment expecting an attack at
that hour, were killed in large numbers before they could even
"stand-to." During the battle 200 of the 4th Lincolnshires occupied our
support trenches, in case of any trouble on our front, and in the
evening the rest of the Battalion arrived and took over the line, while
we replaced them in Brigade Support--Battalion Headquarters, "B" and "C"
Companies in the "Lake" dug-outs, "A" and "D" Companies in the Barracks
of Ypres.
During the next six days we were worked harder than we had been worked
before, digging, carrying, and trench revetting. Fortunately both halves
of the Battalion had fairly comfortable quarters to which to return
after work was over, though those in Ypres lived a somewhat noisy life.
The barracks were close to the centre of the town, and each day the
Boche fired his 17 in. Howitzer from dawn to dusk, mostly at the
Cathedral and Cloth Hall, with occasional pauses to shoot at the Ecole
de Bienfaisance, just outside the Menin gate. The shell, arriving with
great regularity every 15 minutes, was generally known as the "Ypres
express," for it arrived with the most terrifying roar, buried itself
deep in the ground before exploding, and then made an enormous crater.
As it burst, not only did every house shake, but the whole street seemed
to lift a few feet in the air and settle down again. In the barracks we
had bricks and falling débris from the Cloth Hall, but nothing more, and
these slight disadvantages were easily outweighed by the comfort in
which we lived. Every man had a bed, and, as the barracks' water supply
was still in working order, we all had baths. A piano was borrowed from
the Artillery, and provided us with an excellent concert, which was held
in one of the larger rooms, and helped us to forget the war for a time,
in spite of a 40-foot crater in the Barrack Square, and the ever-present
possibility that another would arrive. Incidentally, the piano became
later a cause of much trouble to us, for the police refused to allow us
to move it through the streets without a permit from the Town Major; the
Town Major would have nothing to do with the matter, having only just
arrived in place of his predecessor, who had given us permission to
have the piano, and had then been wounded (Town Majors never lasted
long in Ypres); and the Gendarmerie would not accept responsibility, so
in the end we had to leave it in the barracks. The other two companies,
though not so comfortably housed, none the less had an enjoyable time by
the lake side, chasing the wild fowl, and watching the shelling of
Ypres.
Just at this time several changes took place in the personnel of the
Brigade and the Battalion. First, Brig.-Gen. G.C. Kemp, R.E., late
C.R.E., 6th Division, was appointed our Brigade Commander in place of
General Clifford, who left us to take up an appointment in England,
having been exactly six months in command. Capt. Bromfield, our
Adjutant, whose health had been bad for the past month, was finally
compelled to go to Hospital, whence he was shortly afterwards
transferred to England. As his assistant, Lieut. Vincent was also away
sick, Lieut. Langdale was appointed Adjutant, while 2nd Lieut. C.H.F.
Wollaston took the place of Lieut. A.T. Sharpe as machine gun officer,
the latter having left sick to Hospital at the end of July. Lieut. Moore
sprained his ankle, and 2nd Lieut. R.C.L. Mould went down with fever,
both being sent home, and with them went 2nd Lieut. L.H. Pearson, who
had severe concussion, as the result of being knocked down by a
Minenwerfer bomb. Capt. Bland became 2nd in command with the rank of
Major, and Captain R. Hastings and Lieut. R.D. Farmer were now
commanding "A" and "C" Companies. Capt. M. Barton, our original medical
officer, had come out in June and relieved Lieut. Manfield, who had been
temporarily taking his place. We had also one reinforcement--2nd Lieut.
G.B. Williams, posted to "D" Company, who the following tour lost 2nd
Lieut. C.R. Knighton who sprained his knee. At the same time Serjt. A.
Garratt, of "A" Company, became C.S.M. of "D" in place of C.S.M. J.
Cooper, who was sent home with fever.
On the 16th August we went once more to the line for a six-day tour,
which proved to be the first in which our artillery began to show a
distinct superiority to the enemy's, not only in accuracy but in weight
of shell. Several 8" and 9.2" Howitzers appeared in the Salient and, on
the evening of the 18th, we carried out an organized bombardment of the
lines opposite "50" trench, paying special attention to the
neighbourhood of the Minenwerfer. The accuracy of these large Howitzers
was surprising, and they obtained several direct hits on the Boche front
line, the resulting display of flying sandbags and trench timbers being
watched with the utmost pleasure by almost every man in the Battalion.
The enemy retaliated with salvoes of whizz-bangs on "50," and a few on
"A6" and "A7," but did not carry out any extensive bombardment, though,
when relieved by the Lincolnshires on the 22nd, we had had upwards of 45
casualties. Among the killed was L/Cpl. Biddles of "A" Company, who had
risked death many times on patrol, only to be hit when sitting quietly
in a trench eating his breakfast. This N.C.O., old enough to have his
son serving in the company with him, was never happier than when
wandering about in No Man's Land, either by day or night, and from the
first to the last day of every tour he spent his time either patrolling,
or preparing for his next patrol. Early in the morning of the 23rd we
reached once more the huts at Ouderdom, having at last had the sense to
have the limbers to meet us at Kruisstraat to carry packs, which at
this time we always took into the line with us. We had been away from
even hut civilisation for twenty-four days--quite long enough when those
days have to be spent in the mud, noise and discomfort of the Salient.
Our rest, while fortunately comparatively free of working parties,
contained two features of interest, an inspection by our new Brigadier,
and an officers' cricket match against the 16th Lancers. For the first
we were able, with the aid of a recently-arrived draft of 100 men, to
parade moderately strong, and Gen. Kemp was well satisfied with our
"turn-out." It was, however, to be regretted that the only soldier to
whom he spoke happened to be a blacksmith, for which trade we had the
previous day sent to Brigade Headquarters a "nil" return. The cricket
match was a great success, and thanks to some excellent batting by
Lieut. Langdale, we came away victorious. The light training which we
carried out each day now included a very considerable amount of bomb
throwing, and it seemed as though the bomb was to be made the chief
weapon of the infantry soldier, instead of the rifle and bayonet, which
always has been, and always will be, a far better weapon than any bomb.
However, the new act had to be learnt, and a Battalion bomb squad was
soon formed under 2nd Lieut. R. Ward Jackson, whose chief assistants
were L/Cpl. R.H. Goodman, Ptes. W.H. Hallam, P. Bowler, E.M. Hewson, A.
Archer, F. Whitbread, J.W. Percival and others, many of whom afterwards
became N.C.O.'s. Every officer and man had to throw a live grenade, and,
as there were eight or nine different kinds, he also had to have some
mechanical knowledge, while the instructor had to know considerably more
about explosives than a sapper.
The excitement of our next tour started before we reached Kruisstraat.
All day long (the 28th August) a single 9.2" Howitzer had been firing
behind a farm house on the track to the Indian Transport Field, and, as
we marched past the position by platoons, all of us interested in
watching the loading process, it suddenly blew up, sending breach-block,
sheets of cast iron and enormous fragments of base plate and carriage
several hundred yards through the air. We ran at once to the nearest
cover, but three men were hit by falling fragments, and we were lucky
not to lose more, for several of us, including 2nd Lieut. J.W. Tomson,
had narrow escapes. We eventually reached the line, and relieved the
Lincolnshires in Trenches "49" to "A3." The 3rd Division had now taken
"A4" to "A7." Three days later 2nd Lieuts. H. Moss, N.C. Stoneham and
C.B. Clay joined us, and were posted to "A," "D" and "B" Companies
respectively. At the same time 2nd Lieut. J.D. Hills was appointed
Brigade Intelligence Officer, a new post just introduced by General
Kemp.
We suffered the usual scattered shelling and trench mortaring during the
first half of the tour, to which our Artillery could only reply lightly
because they were saving ammunition for an organised bombardment further
North. However, no serious damage was done, so this did not matter. The
bombardment took place at dawn on the 1st September, and in reply the
Germans, instead of shelling the left as was expected, concentrated all
their efforts on the "50," "A1" corner, starting with salvoes of
whizz-bangs, and finishing with a heavy shoot, 8", 5.9" and shrapnel,
from 10.45 to mid-day. Our Artillery replied at once, but nothing would
stop the Boche, who had the most extraordinary good fortune in hitting
our dug-outs, causing many casualties. 2nd Lieut. Clay, not yet 24 hours
in trenches, was among the first to be wounded, and soon afterwards
Serjt. B. Smith, of "B" Company, received a bad wound, to which he
succumbed a few hours later. In "A" Company, except for C.S.M. Gorse's
and the Signallers', every dug-out was hit, and C.E. Scott and F.W.
Pringle, the two officers' batmen, were killed, while A.H. Cassell was
badly wounded. The officers themselves had two miraculous escapes.
First, 2nd Lieuts. Tomson and Moss were sitting in their dug-out, when a
5.9" dud passed straight through the roof and on into the ground almost
grazing 2nd Lieut. Tomson's side. These two then went round to wake
Capt. Hastings, who was resting in another dug-out, and the three had
only just left, when this too was blown in, burying Capt. Hastings' Sam
Browne belt and all his papers. Many brave deeds were done during the
shelling, two of which stand out. T. Whitbread, of "A" Company, hearing
of the burying of the two officers' servants, rushed to the spot, and,
regardless of the shells which were falling all round, started to dig
them out, scraping the earth away with his hands, until joined by
Sergeants Gore and Baxter, who came up with shovels. The other, whose
work cannot be passed over, was our M.O., Captain Barton. Always calm
and collected, yet always first on the spot if any were wounded, he
seemed to be in his element during a bombardment, and this day was no
exception. He was everywhere, tying up wounds, helping the Stretcher
Bearers, encouraging everyone he met, and many a soldier owed his life
to the ever-present "Doc."
On the 2nd September we were relieved by the Lincolnshires again, and
once more became Brigade reserve for six days--six of the most
unpleasant days we spent in the Salient. First the Railway dug-outs, to
which Battalion Headquarters and half the Battalion should have gone,
had been so badly shelled while the Lincolnshires were there that only
one company was allowed to go, while the remainder were sent to bivouac
at Kruisstraat. The fine weather came to an end the same day, and it
rained hard all the time, which would have been bad enough in bivouacs,
and was worse for us who had to spend most of our day on some
working-party, either dug-outs, or trying to drain some hopelessly
water-logged communication trench, such as the one from Manor Farm to
Square Wood. Altogether we had a poor time, and were quite glad on the
8th to return to trenches, where we were joined two days later by
Lieut.-Col. C.H. Jones, who had returned from England and took over
command. He had had the greatest difficulty in returning to France, and
it was only when he had applied to the War Office for command of a
Brigade in Gallipoli that the authorities at last took notice of him and
sent him back to us. On his arrival Major Toller resumed his duties of
2nd in command; Major Bland was at the time in England sick.
The arrival of an officer reinforcement was always the signal for a
Boche strafe, and the return of the Colonel they celebrated with a two
days' "hate" instead of one. "A1" and "50" and their supports suffered
most, and much damage to trenches was done by heavy Minenwerfer, 8" and
5.9" shells. Towards evening the situation became quieter, but just
before 10 o'clock the Boche exploded a camouflet against one of our "A1"
mine galleries, and killed three Tunnellers, whose bodies we could not
rescue owing to the gasses in the mine, which remained there for more
than twenty-four hours. The next day the bombardment of "50" and "50S"
continued, and amongst other casualties, which were heavy, Capt. J.L.
Griffiths and 2nd Lieut. R.B. Farrer of "B" Company were both hit and
had to be evacuated, the one with 13, the other 35 small fragments of
shell in him. The enemy had now become so persistent that we asked for
help from our heavy artillery, and the following day--our last in the
line--we carried out several organized bombardments of important enemy
centres, such as "Hill 60," to which he replied with a few more large
"crumps" on "50" support and was then silent. In the evening the
Lincolnshires took our place, and, having lost 11 killed and 39 wounded
in 6 days, we marched back to rest at Dickebusch huts.
For some considerable time there had been many rumours about a coming
autumn offensive on our part, and on the 22nd September, having returned
to trenches two days previously, we received our first orders about it.
We were told nothing very definite except that the 3rd and 14th
Divisions would attack at Hooge, while we made a vigorous demonstration
to draw retaliation from their front to ourselves, and that there would
also be attacks on other parts of the British front. We were to make a
feint gas attack by throwing smoke-bombs and lighting straw in front of
our parapet, to frighten the Boche into expecting an attack along the
"Hill 60"--Sanctuary Wood front. Capt. Burnett and his transport were,
therefore, ordered to bring up wagon-loads of straw, much to their
annoyance, for they already had a bad journey every night with the
rations, and extra horses meant extra anxiety. It was seldom that the
transport reached Armagh Wood without being shelled on an ordinary
night, and whenever there was fighting in any part of the Salient, the
area round Maple Copse became so hot that they had to watch for an
opportunity and gallop through. In spite of this they never failed us,
and rations always arrived, even in the worst of times.
On the 23rd there were two preliminary bombardments, one short but very
heavy at Hooge, the other lasting most of the morning on "Hill 60"--a
bluff. During the night it rained and the arrival of our straw was
consequently postponed until the following night, which proved to be
little better. The wagons were late and there was not much time to
complete our task; however, all worked their utmost, and by 1.0 a.m. on
the 25th a line of damp straw had been spread along our wire in front of
"50." Unfortunately, the Battalion on our right were unable to put their
straw in position in time, but as the Brigade beyond them had theirs, we
thought this would not make any difference to the operation. Just before
daylight a general order from G.H.Q. arrived, starting with the words,
"At Dawn, on the 25th September, the British Armies will take the
offensive on the Western Front." We felt that the time had now come when
the war was going to be won and the Boche driven out of France, and some
of us were a little sorry that our part was to consist of nothing more
than setting fire to some damp straw.
At 3.50 a.m. Hooge battle started with an intense artillery bombardment
from every gun in the salient, and it was an inspiring sight to stand on
the ridge behind "50" trench and watch, through the half-light, the line
of flashes to the west, an occasional glare showing us the towers of
Ypres over the trees. The Germans replied at once on "A1" trench, but
finding that we remained quiet, their batteries soon ceased fire and
opened instead on Sanctuary Wood and Hooge. This was expected, for it
was not in the initial attack, but during the consolidation that the 3rd
Division wanted to draw the enemy's fire. At a few minutes before six
our time had come, smoke bombs were thrown, and, though the wind was
against us, Col. Jones, feeling that we must make the biggest possible
display, ordered the straw to be lit. This promptly drew fire, and in
five minutes there was not one single gun on our side of the Salient
still firing at Hooge, they had all turned on us. At first sight of the
smoke several machine guns had opened fire opposite "50" and "49," but
these died away almost at once as the Boche, thoroughly frightened at
the prospect of gas, evacuated his trenches. Half-an-hour later he
actually bombarded his own lines on the Northern slopes of "Hill 60"
with 11" shells, presumably imagining that we had occupied them. The
bluff was complete.
But such a success cannot be purchased without loss, and our losses had
been heavy. The Staffordshires had not lit their straw because of the
wind, so that the enemy's retaliation, which should have been spread
along the whole front from "A1" to "Hill 60" was concentrated entirely
on our three trenches "40," "50" and "A1." "C" Company (Lt. R.D. Farmer)
in "50" suffered most. Choked and blinded by the smoke from the straw,
which blew back and filled the trench, their parapet blown away by salvo
after salvo of small shells, their supports battered with 8" and heavy
mortars, with no cover against the unceasing rain of shells from front
and left, they had to bear it all in silence, unable to hit back.
Serjts. J.G. Burnham and J. Birkin were killed, and with them 10 others
of the battalion, while 30 more were wounded. Once more the "Doc." and
his stretcher-bearers were everywhere, and many who might otherwise have
bled to death, owed their lives to this marvellous man, who wandered
round and dressed their wounds wherever the shelling was hottest. At the
first opening of the battle our telephone lines to the Artillery were
broken, and for some time we could get no support, but the Derby
Howitzers and one of the Lincolnshire batteries fired a number of rounds
for us, and later, thanks to the efforts of Lieut. C. Morgan, R.F.A.,
the F.O.O., we were able to call on Major Meynell's Staffordshire
battery as well. By 7.15 a.m. all was once more quiet, and we spent the
rest of the day evacuating our casualties, and trying to clear away some
of the litter of straw from our trenches.
The following day passed quietly, and in the evening, relieved by the
Lincolnshires, we marched out of trenches. Ten minutes later the enemy
blew up trench "47" and opened heavy rifle fire on all sides of the
salient. The Battalion was marching by companies, and "A" and "D" had
just reached Manor Farm when the noise began, and bullets fell all round
them. Capt. Jefferies, who was leading, was hit almost at once and fell
mortally wounded, never again recovering consciousness, and several
others became casualties before the party could reach cover on the far
side of the Farm. "B" and "C" were still in Armagh Wood, so Colonel
Jones at once decided to man the new breastwork between it and Square
Wood, and there they remained until the situation became once more
quiet. Finally, at midnight, we moved into our Brigade Support
positions, Headquarters and "B" Company in Railway Dug-outs, "C" Company
in Deeping Dug-outs near the Lake, and the others in Kruisstraat
bivouacs. Even now we were not allowed to live in peace, for the
following morning, at 11.0 a.m., the enemy bombarded Railway Dug-outs
for two hours, firing 90 8" shells, and (so says the War Diary) "plenty
of shrapnel." No one was hit, though Col. Jones' dug-out and the Orderly
Room were destroyed, and the bomb store, which was hit and set on fire,
was only saved from destruction by the efforts of C.S.M. Lovett, who
with Pte. Love and one or two others, fetched water from the pond and
put out the fire. From 6.30 to 7.30 p.m. the dug-outs were again
bombarded and a few more destroyed, so that we were not sorry when, on
the 1st October the Wiltshire Regiment came to relieve us, and we
marched back to bivouacs at Ouderdom.
On the 2nd, after a farewell address to the officers by the Corps
Commander, the Battalion marched during the morning to Abeele, where at
3.30 p.m. we entrained for the South and said good-bye to the "Salient"
for ever. We were not sorry to go, even though there were rumours of a
coming battle, and our future destination was unknown.