We shall not trust ourselves to characterize such conduct. In the calm,

judicial language of the Chancellor of his own State such proceeding of

Mr. Seward will find its most fitting rebuke. "Independent, however,"

says Chancellor Walworth, "_of any legislation on this subject either by

the individual States or by Congress_, if the person whose services are

claimed is in fact a fugitive from servitude under the laws of another

State, _the constitutional provision is imperative that he shall be

delivered up to his master upon claim made_." Thus far, Mr. Seward

concurs with the chancellor in opinion; but the latter continues--"and

any state officer or private citizen, who owes allegiance to the United

States, and has taken the usual oath to support the Constitution

thereof, cannot, WITHOUT INCURRING THE MORAL GUILT OF PERJURY, do any

act to deprive the master of his right of recaption, when there is no

real doubt that the person whose services are claimed is in fact the

slave of the claimant."[210] Yet, regardless of the question whether the

fugitive is a slave or not, the life and labors of Mr. Seward are, in a

great measure, dedicated to a subversion of the constitutional clause

and right under consideration. He counsels open resistance! Yea, he

exhorts the people to protect and defend fugitive slaves _as such_, and

though they had confessed themselves to have fled from servitude! But we

doubt not that "the law of nature, written on the hearts and consciences

of freemen," will reverse this advice of his, and reaffirm the decision

of the chancellor of his own State. Nay, wherever there exists a freeman

with a real heart and conscience, there that decision already stands

affirmed.

As Mr. Seward's arguments are more fully elaborated by Mr. Sumner, of

Massachusetts, so they will pass under review when we come to examine

the speech of that Senator. In the mean time, we beg leave to lay before

the reader a few living examples of the manner in which the law of

nature, as written on the hearts and consciences of freemen, has

expressed itself in regard to the points above considered.

"I recognize, indeed," says the Hon. R. C. Winthrop, of Boston, "a power

above all human law-makers and a code above all earthly constitutions!

And whenever I perceive a clear conflict of jurisdiction and authority

between the Constitution of my country and the laws of my God, my course

is clear. I shall resign my office, whatever it may be, and renounce all

connection with public service of any sort. Never, never, sir, will I

put myself under the necessity of calling upon God to witness my promise

to support a constitution, any part of which I consider to be

inconsistent with his commands.

"But it is a libel upon the Constitution of the United States--and, what

is worse, sir, it is a libel upon the great and good men who framed,

adopted, and ratified it; it is a libel upon Washington and Franklin,

and Hamilton and Madison, upon John Adams, and John Jay, and Rufus King;

it is a libel upon them all, and upon the whole American people of 1789,

who sustained them in their noble work, and upon all who, from that time

to this, generation after generation, in any capacity,--national,

municipal, or state,--have lifted their hands to heaven in attestation

of their allegiance to the government of their country;--it is a gross

libel upon every one of them, to assert or insinuate that there is any

such inconsistency! Let us not do such dishonor to the fathers of the

Republic and the framers of the Constitution."

Mr. Ashman, of Massachusetts, after reciting the clause in the

Constitution which demands the restoration of fugitive slaves, proceeds

as follows: "This reads very plainly, and admits of no doubt but that,

so far as fugitive slaves are concerned, the Constitution fully

recognizes the right to reclaim them from within the limits of the free

States. It is the Constitution which we have all sworn to support, and

which I hope we all mean to support; and I have no mental reservation

excluding any of its clauses from the sanction of that oath. It is too

late now to complain that such a provision is there. Our fathers, who

formed that entire instrument, placed it there, and left it to us as an

inheritance; and nothing but an amendment of the Constitution, or a

violation of our oaths, can tear it out. And, however much we may abhor

slavery, there is no way for honorable, honest--nay, conscientious--men,

who desire to live under our laws and our Constitution, but to abide by

it in its spirit."

In like manner, the Hon. S. A. Douglas, of Illinois, declares: "All I

have to say on that subject is this, that the Constitution provides that

a fugitive from service in one State, escaping into another, 'shall be

delivered up.' The Constitution also provides that no man shall be a

Senator unless he takes an oath to support the Constitution. Then, I

ask, how does a man acquire a right on this floor to speak, except by

taking an oath to support and sustain the Constitution of the United

States? And when he takes that oath, I do not understand that he has a

right to have a mental reservation, or entertain any secret equivocation

that he excepts that clause which relates to the surrender of fugitives

from service. I know not how a man reconciles it to his conscience to

take that oath to support the Constitution, when he believes that

Constitution is in violation of the law of God. If a man thus believes,

and takes the oath, he commits perfidy to his God in order that he may

enjoy the temporary honors of a seat upon this floor. In this point of

view, it is simply a question of whether Senators will be true to their

oaths and true to the Constitution under which we live."

§ II. _The attack of Mr. Sumner on the Constitution of his country._

If we have not noticed the arguments of Mr. Chase, of Ohio, it is

because they are reproduced in the celebrated speech of Mr. Sumner, and

because he has so fully indorsed the history and logic of this speech as

to make it his own. Hence, in replying to the one of these Senators, we

at the same time virtually reply to the other.

We select the speech of Mr. Sumner for examination, because it is

generally considered the more powerful of the two. It is, indeed, the

most elaborate speech ever made in the Senate of the United States, or

elsewhere, on the subject of the Fugitive Slave Law. Even Mr. Weller

found it "so handsomely embellished with poetry, both Latin and English,

so full of classical allusions and rhetorical flourishes," as to make it

more palatable than he supposed an abolition speech could possibly be

made. As to the abolitionists themselves, they seem to know no bounds in

their enthusiastic admiration of this sublime effort of their champion.

We should not wonder, indeed, if many a female reformer had gone into

hysterics over an oration which has received such violent bursts of

applause from grave and dignified Senators. "By this effort," says Mr.

Hale, he has placed "himself side by side with the first orators of

antiquity, and as far ahead of any living American orator as freedom is

ahead of slavery. I believe that he has formed to-day a new era in the

history of the politics and of the eloquence of the country; and that in

future generations the young men of this nation will be stimulated to

effort by the record of what an American Senator has this day done,"

etc.

We have no doubt that young men may attempt to imitate the speech in

question; but, as they grow older, it is to be hoped that their taste

will improve. The speech in question will make a "new era" in the

tactics of abolitionism, and that is all. We shall see this when we come

to examine this wonderful oration, which so completely ravished _three

Senators_, and called forth such wild shouts of applause from the whole

empire of abolitionism.

Mr. Chase seems almost equally delighted with this marvellous effort.

"I avow my conviction, now and here," says he, "that, logically and

historically, his argument is impregnable--entirely impregnable."

. . . . . . "In my judgment," he continues, "the speech of my friend

from Massachusetts will make a NEW ERA in American history." Indeed, Mr.

Sumner himself does not seem altogether dissatisfied with this effort,

if we may judge from the manner in which it is referred to in his other

speeches. We do not blame him for this. We can see no reason why he

should be the only abolitionist in the universe who is not enraptured

with his oration. But when he so "fearlessly asserts" that his speech

"has never been answered," we beg leave to assure him that it _may_ be

refuted with the most perfect ease. For, indeed, its history is half

fiction, and its logic wholly false: the first containing just enough of

truth to deceive, and the last just enough of plansibility to convince

those who are waiting, and watching, and longing to be convinced.

The first thing which strikes the mind, on reading the speech of Mr.

Sumner, is the strange logical incoherency of its structure. Its parts

are so loosely hung together, and appear so distressingly disjointed,

that one is frequently at a loss to perceive the design of the oration.

Its avowed object is to procure a repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law of

1850; but no one would ever imagine or suspect such a thing from the

title of the speech, which is as follows: "Freedom, national; Slavery,

sectional." It is difficult, at first view, to perceive what logical

connection this title, or proposition, has with the repeal of the

Fugitive Slave Law. But if there be little or no logical connection

between these things, we shall soon see how the choice of such a title

and topic of discourse opens the way for the rhetorician to make a most

powerful appeal to the passions and to the prejudices of his readers. We

say, of his readers, because it is evident that the speech was made for

Buncombe, and not for the Senate of the United States.

Mr. Sumner deems it necessary to refute the position that slavery is a

national institution, in order to set the world right with respect to

the relations of the Federal Government to slavery. "The relations of

the Government of the United States," says he,--"I speak of the National

Government--to slavery, _though plain and obvious, are constantly

misunderstood_." Indeed, nothing in history seems more remarkable than

the amount of ignorance and stupidity which prevailed in the world

before the appearance of the abolitionists, except the wonderful

illuminations which accompanied their advent. "A popular belief at this

moment," continues Mr. Sumner, "makes slavery a national institution,

and, of course, renders its support a national duty. The extravagance of

this error can hardly be surpassed." In truth, it is so exceedingly

extravagant, that we doubt if it really exists. It is certain, that we

have no acquaintance, either historically or personally, with those who

have fallen into so wild an absurdity.

It is true, there is "a popular belief"--nay, there is a deep-rooted

national conviction--that the Government of the United States is bound

to protect the institution of slavery, in so far as this may be done by

the passage of a Fugitive Slave Law. This national conviction has spoken

out in the laws of Congress; it has been ratified and confirmed by the

judicial opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as

by the decisions of the Supreme Courts of the three great

non-slaveholding States of Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.

But no one, so far as we know, has ever deduced this obligation to

protect slavery, in this respect, from the absurd notion that "it is a

national institution." No such deduction is to be found in any of the

arguments of counsel before the courts above-mentioned, nor in the

opinions of the courts themselves. We shrewdly suspect that it is to be

found nowhere except in the fertile imagination of Mr. Sumner.

We concede that slavery is _not_ "a national institution." In combating

this position, Mr. Sumner is merely beating the air. We know that

slavery is not national; it is local, being confined to certain States,

and exclusively established by local or State laws. Hence, Mr. Sumner

may fire off as much splendid rhetoric as he pleases at his men of

straw. "Slavery national!" he indignantly exclaims: "Sir, this is all a

mistake and absurdity, fit to take a place in some new collection of

'Vulgar Errors' by some other Sir Thomas Browne, with the ancient but

exploded stories that the toad has a stone in its head and that

ostriches digest iron." These may be very fine embellishments; they

certainly have nothing to do with the point in controversy. The question

is not whether slavery is a national institution, but whether the

National Government does not recognize slavery as a local institution,

and is not pledged to protect the master's right to reclaim the fugitive

from his service. This is the question, and by its relevancy to this

question the rhetoric of Mr. Sumner must be tried.

We do not say it has no such relevancy. Mr. Sumner beats the air, it is

true, but he does not beat the air in vain. His declamation may have no

logical bearing on the point in dispute, but, if you watch it closely,

you will always find that it is most skillfully adapted to bring the

prejudices and passions of the reader to bear on that point. Though he

may not be much of a logician, yet, it must be admitted, he is "skillful

of fence." We should do him great injustice as an antagonist, at least

before the tribunal of human passion, if we should suppose that it is

merely for the abstract glory of setting up a man of straw, and then

knocking it down, that he has mustered all the powers of his logic and

unfurled all the splendors of his rhetoric. He has a design in all this,

which we shall now proceed to expose.

Here are two distinct questions. First, Is slavery a national

institution? Secondly, Has Congress the power to pass a Fugitive Slave

Law? These two questions are, we repeat, perfectly distinct; and hence,

if Mr. Sumner wished to discuss them fairly and honestly, he should have

argued each one by itself. We agree with him in regard to the first; we

dissent _toto coelo_ from him in regard to the last. But he has not

chosen to keep them separate, or to discuss each one by itself. On the

contrary, he has, as we have seen, connected them together as premiss

and conclusion, and he keeps them together through the first portion of

his speech. Most assuredly Mr. Sumner knows that one of the very best

ways in the world to cause a truth or proposition to be rejected is to

bind it up with a manifest error or absurdity. Yet the proposition for

which we contend--that Congress has the power to support slavery by the

passage of a Fugitive Slave Law--is bound up by him with the monstrous

absurdity that "slavery is a national institution;" and both are

denounced together as if both were equally absurd. One instance, out of

many, of this unfair mode of proceeding, we shall now lay before our

readers.

"The Constitution contains no power," says he, "to make a king or to

support kingly rule. With similar reason it may be said that it contains

no power to make a slave, or to support a system of slavery. The absence

of all such power is hardly more clear in one case than in the other.

But, if there be no such power, all national legislation upholding

slavery must be unconstitutional and void."

Thus covertly, and in company with the supposed power of Congress to

make slaves or to institute slavery, Mr. Sumner denounces the power of

Congress to enact a Fugitive Slave Law! He not only denounces it, but

treats it as absurd in the extreme; just as absurd, indeed, as it would

be to assert that Congress had power "to support kingly rule!" We can

listen to the arguments of Mr. Sumner; but we cannot accept his mere

opinion as authority that the power of Congress to enact such a law is

so glaringly unconstitutional, is so monstrously absurd; for, however

passionately that opinion may be declaimed, we cannot forget that a

Fugitive Slave Law was passed by the Congress of 1793, received the

signature of George Washington, and, finally, the judicial sanction of

the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Sumner is but a man.

This advantage of mixing up with a glaring falsehood the idea he wishes

to be rejected is not the only one which Mr. Sumner derives from his man

of straw. By combating the position--"the popular belief," as he calls

it--that "slavery is a national institution," he lays open a wide field

for his peculiar powers of declamation. He calls up all the

fathers--North and South--to bear witness against slavery, in order to

show that it is not a national institution. He quotes colleges, and

churches, and patriots, against slavery. Not content with this, he pours

down furious invectives of his own, with a view to render slavery as

odious as possible. But, since the simple question is, _What saith the

Constitution_--why this fierce crusade against slavery? In deciding this

very question, namely, the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law

of 1793, a high judicial authority has said that "the abstract

proposition of the justice or injustice of slavery is wholly irrelevant

here, and, I apprehend, ought not to have the slightest influence upon

any member of this court."[211]

It ought not to have--and it did not have--the slightest influence on

the highest judicial tribunal of New York, in which the above opinion

was delivered. Much as the author of that opinion (Mr. Senator Bishop)

abhorred slavery, he did not permit such an influence to reach his

judgment. It would have contaminated his judicial integrity. But

although before a judicial tribunal, about to decide on the

constitutionality of a Fugitive Slave Law, the abstract proposition of

the justice or injustice of slavery is out of place, yet at the bar of

passion and prejudice it is well calculated, as Mr. Sumner must know, to

exert a tremendous influence. Hence, if he can only get up the horror of

his readers against slavery before he comes to the real question,

namely, the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, he knows that

his victory will be more than half gained. But we admonish him that

passion and prejudice can only give a temporary éclat to his argument.

So much for the unfairness of Mr. Sumner. If we should notice all such

instances of artful design in his speech, we should have no space for

his logic. To this we would now invite the attention of the reader, in

order to see if it be really "impregnable."

As we have already intimated, Mr. Sumner does not, like Mr. Seward,

openly denounce the Constitution of his country. On the contrary, he

professes the most profound respect for every part of that instrument,

not even excepting the clause which demands the restoration of the

fugitive from labor. But an examination of his argument, both

_historical_ and _logical_, will enable us, we trust, to estimate this

profession at its real intrinsic worth.

We shall begin with his argument from history. In the examination of

this argument, we beg to excuse ourselves from any further notice of all

that vast array of historical proofs to show that "freedom is national

and slavery sectional."[212] We shall consider those proofs alone which

relate to the real point in controversy, namely, Has Congress the power

to pass a Fugitive Slave Law?

Mr. Sumner argues, from the well-known sentiments of the framers of the

Constitution with respect to slavery, that they intended to confer no

such power on Congress. Thus, after quoting the sentiments of Gouverneur

Morris, of Elbridge Gerry, of Roger Sherman, and James Madison, he adds:

"In the face of these unequivocal statements, it is absurd to suppose

that they consented _unanimously_ to any provision by which the National

Government, the work of their own hands, could be made the most

offensive instrument of slavery." Such is the historical argument of Mr.

Sumner. Let us see what it is worth.

Elbridge Gerry had said: "We ought to be careful NOT _to give any

sanction to slavery_;"--language repeatedly quoted, and underscored as

above, by Mr. Sumner. It is absurd, he concludes, to suppose that a man

who could use such language had the least intention to confer a power on

Congress to support slavery by the passage of a Fugitive Slave Law. This

is one branch of his historical argument. It may appear perfectly

conclusive to Mr. Sumner, and "entirely impregnable" to Mr. Chase; but,

after all, it is not quite so invulnerable as they imagine. Mr. Sumner

stopped his historical researches at a most convenient point for his

argument. If he had only read a little further, he would have discovered

that this same identical Elbridge Gerry was in the Congress of 1793, and

VOTED FOR the Fugitive Slave Law then passed!

It fares no better with the historical argument to prove the opinion or

intention of Roger Sherman. He had declared, it is true, that he was

opposed to any clause in the Constitution "acknowledging men to be

property." But we should not, with Mr. Sumner, infer from this that he

never intended that Congress should possess a power to legislate in

reference to slavery. For, unfortunately for such a conclusion, however

confidently it may be drawn, or however dogmatically asserted, Roger

Sherman himself was in the Senate of 1793, and was actually on the

committee which reported the Fugitive Slave Law of that session! Thus,

although the premiss of Mr. Sumner's argument is a historical fact, yet

its conclusion comes directly into conflict with another historical

fact!

We cannot, in the same way, refute the argument from the language of

Gouverneur Morris, who said "that he never would concur in upholding

domestic slavery," because he was not in the Congress of 1793. But

Robert Morris was there, and, although he helped to frame the

Constitution in 1787, he uttered not a syllable against the

constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law. Indeed, this law passed the

Senate by resolution simply, _the yeas and nays not having been called

for_!

The words of Mr. Madison, who "thought it wrong to admit in the

Constitution the idea that there could be property in man," are four or

five times quoted in Mr. Sumner's speech. As we have already seen,[213]

there cannot be, in the strict sense of the terms, "property in man;"

for the soul is the man, and no one, except God, can own the soul. Hence

Mr. Madison acted wisely, we think, in wishing to exclude such an

expression from the Constitution, inasmuch as it would have been

misunderstood by Northern men, and only shocked their feelings without

answering any good purpose.

When we say that slaves are property, we merely mean that their masters

have a right to their service or labor. This idea is recognized in the

Constitution, and _this right is secured_. We ask no more. As Mr.

Madison, and the whole South, had the _thing_, he did not care to

wrangle about the _name_. We are told, again and again, that the word

_slave_ does not appear in the Constitution. Be it so. We care not,

since our slaves are there recognized as "persons held to service" by

those to whom "such service is due." It is repeated without end that the

"Constitution acts on slaves as _persons_, and not as property."

Granted; and if Northern men will, according to the mandate of the

Constitution, only deliver up our fugitive servants, we care not whether

they restore them as persons or as property. If we may only reclaim them

as persons, and regain their service, we are perfectly satisfied. We

utterly despise all such verbal quibbling.

Mr. Madison was above it. He acted wisely, we repeat, in refusing to

shock the mind of any one, by insisting upon a mere word, and upon a

word, too, which might not have conveyed a correct idea of his own

views. But that Mr. Madison could, as he undersood the terms, regard

slaves as property, we have the most incontestable evidence. For in the

Convention of Virginia, called to ratify the Constitution of the United

States, he said, "Another clause secures us that _property_ which we now

possess. At present, if any slave elopes to any of those States where

slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by their laws, for the laws of

the States are uncharitable to one another in this respect." He then

quotes the provision from the Constitution relative to fugitives from

labor, and adds: "This clause was expressly inserted to enable _owners_

of slaves to reclaim them." So much for Mr. Sumner's main argument from

the language of the members of the Convention of 1787.

Arguing from the sentiments of that convention with respect to slavery,

he concludes that nothing could have been further from their intentions

than to confer upon Congress the power to pass a uniform Fugitive Slave

Law. He boldly asserts, that if a proposition to confer such a power

upon Congress had "been distinctly made it would have been distinctly

denied." "But no person in the convention," he says, "_not one of the

reckless partisans of slavery, was so audacious as to make the

proposition_." Now we shall show that the above statement of his is

diametrically opposed to the truth. We shall show that the members of

the convention in question were perfectly willing to confer such a power

upon Congress.

The reason why they were so is obvious to any one who has a real

knowledge of the times about whose history Mr. Sumner so confidently

declaims. This reason is well stated in the language of the Chancellor

of New York whom we have already quoted. "The provision," says he, "as

to persons escaping from servitude in one State into another, appears by

their journal to have been adopted by a unanimous vote of the

convention. At that time the existence of involuntary servitude, or the

relation of master and servant, was known to and recognized by the laws

of every State in the Union except Massachusetts, and _the legal right

of recaption by the master existed in all_, AS A PART OF THE CUSTOMARY

OR COMMON LAW OF THE WHOLE CONFEDERACY." Hence, instead of shocking the

convention, a clause recognizing such right would have been merely

declaratory of the "customary or common law," which then universally

prevailed. The "history of the times" confirms this view, and furnishes

no evidence against it.

Mr. Sumner tries to make a different impression. He lays great stress on

the fact that it was not until late in the convention that the first

clause relative to the surrender of fugitive slaves was introduced. But

this fact agrees more perfectly with our view than with his. There was

no haste about the introduction of such a provision, because it was well

known that, whenever it should be introduced, it would pass in the

affirmative without difficulty. And, in fact, when it was introduced, it

"WAS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED." This single fact speaks volumes.

Let us now attend, for a moment, to Mr. Sumner's historical proofs. He

quotes the following passage from the Madison Papers:--"Gen. (Charles

Cotesworth) Pinckney was not satisfied with it. He seemed to wish some

provision should be included in favor of property in slaves." "But," by

way of comment, Mr. Sumner adds, "he made no proposition. Unwilling to

shock the convention, and uncertain in his own mind, he only _seemed_

to wish such a provision." Now, a bare abstract proposition to recognize

property in men is one thing, and a clause to secure the return of

fugitive slaves is quite another. The first, it is probable, would have

been rejected by the convention; the last was actually and unanimously

adopted by it.

Mr. Sumner's next proof is decidedly against him. Here it is "Mr. Butler

and Mr. Charles Pinckney, both from South Carolina, now moved openly to

require 'fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like

criminals.' . . . . . . Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, at once objected:

'This would oblige the executive of the State to do it at the public

expense.' Mr. Sherman, of Connecticut, saw no more propriety in the

public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant than a horse! Under

the pressure of these objections the offensive proposition was quietly

withdrawn."

Now mark the character of these objections. It is objected, not that it

is wrong to deliver up fugitive slaves, but only that they should not be

"delivered up like criminals;" that is, by a demand on the executive of

the State to which they may have fled. And this objection is based on

the ground that such a requisition would oblige the public to deliver

them up at its own expense. Mr. Sherman insists, not that it is wrong to

surrender fugitive slaves or fugitive horses, but only that the

executive, or public, should not be called upon to surrender them.

Surely, if these gentlemen had been so violently opposed to the

restoration of fugitive slaves, here was a fair occasion for them to

speak out; and as honest, outspoken men they would, no doubt, have made

their sentiments known. But there is, in fact, not a syllable of such a

sentiment uttered. There is not the slightest symptom of the existence

of any such feeling in their minds. If any such existed, we must insist

that Mr. Sumner has discovered it by instinct, and not by his researches

in history.

The statement that "under the pressure of these objections the offensive

propositon was _quietly withdrawn_" is not true. It was not quietly

withdrawn; on the contrary, it was withdrawn with the assurance that it

would be again introduced. "Mr. Butler withdrew his proposition," says

Mr. Madison, "_in order that some particular provision might be made_,

apart from this article."[214] Accordingly, the very next day he

introduced a provision, which, as Mr. Madison declares, "was expressly

inserted to enable owners of slaves to reclaim them."

These glosses of Mr. Sumner on the history of the times will appear

important, if we view them in connection with his design. This design is

to bring into doubt the idea that slaves are embraced in the clause of

the Constitution which requires fugitives from service or labor to be

delivered up. We should not suspect this design from the hints here

thrown out, if it were not afterward more fully disclosed. "On the next

day," says Mr. Sumner, "August 29th, profiting by the suggestions

already made, Mr. Butler moved a proposition, substantially like that

now found in the Constitution, _not directly for the surrender of_

'_fugitive slaves_,' as originally proposed, but as 'fugitives from

service or labor,' which, without debate or opposition of any kind, was

unanimously adopted." Was it then unanimously adopted because it was a

clause for the surrender of "fugitives from service or labor" only, and

not for the surrender of fugitive slaves?

Such appears to be the insinuation of Mr. Sumner. Be this as it may, it

is certain that he has afterward said that it may be questioned whether

"the language employed" in this clause "can be judicially regarded as

justly applicable to fugitive slaves, _which is often and earnestly

denied_.". . . . "_Still further_," he says, in italics, "_to the courts

of each State must belong the determination of the question, to which

class of persons, according to just rules of interpretation, the phrase

'persons held to service or labor' is strictly applicable._"

Mr. Sumner doubts, then, whether this provision, after all, refers to

"fugitive slaves." Now, although he has said much in regard to "the

effrontery of the Southern members of the convention" that formed the

Constitution, we may safely defy him, or any other man, to point to any

thing in their conduct which approximates to such audacity. What! the

clause in question not designed to embrace fugitive slaves? Mr. Butler,

even before he introduced the clause, declared, as we have seen, that

such would be its design. It was so understood by every member of the

convention; for there was not a man there who possessed the capacity to

misunderstand so plain a matter; and it has been so understood by every

man, of all parties and all factions, from that day down to the present.

Not one of the hired advocates who have been employed, in different

States, to argue against the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave

Law, has ever had the unblushing effrontery to contend that the clause

in question is not applicable to fugitive slaves. Nay, more, until Mr.

Sumner appeared, the frantic zeal of no abolitionist had ever so

completely besotted his intellect as to permit him to take such ground.

By Dr. Channing, by Mr. Seward, and by Mr. Chase, such application of

the words in question is unhesitatingly admitted; and hence we dismiss

Mr. Sumner's discovery with the contempt it deserves.

But to return. "The provision," says Mr. Sumner, "which showed itself

thus tardily, and was so slightly noticed in the National Convention,

was neglected in most of the contemporaneous discussions before the

people." No wonder; for it was merely declaratory of the "customary or

common law" of that day. "In the Conventions of South Carolina, North

Carolina, and Virginia," he admits, "it was commended as securing

important rights, though on this point there was a difference of

opinion. In the Virginia Convention, an eminent character,--Mr. George

Mason,--with others, expressly declared that there was 'no security of

property coming within this section.'"

Now, we shall not stickle about the fact that Mr. Sumner has not given

the very words of Mr. Mason, since he has given them in substance. But

yet he has given them in such a way, and in such a connection, as to

make a false impression. The words of Mr. Mason, taken in their proper

connection, are as follows: "We have no security for the property of

that kind (slaves) which we already have. There is no clause in this

Constitution to secure it, _for they may lay such a tax as will amount

to manumission_." This shows his position, not as it is misrepresented

by Mr. Sumner, but as it stands in his own words. If slave property may

be rendered worthless by the taxation of Congress, how could it be

secured by a clause which enables the owner to reclaim it? It would not

be worth reclaiming. Such was the argument and true position of Mr.

George Mason.

"Massachusetts," continues Mr. Sumner, "while exhibiting peculiar

sensitiveness at any responsibility for slavery, seemed to view it with

unconcern." If Massachusetts had only believed that the clause was

intended to confer on Congress the power to pass a Fugitive Slave Law,

into what flames of indignation would her sensitiveness have burst! So

Mr. Sumner would have us to believe. But let us listen, for a moment, to

the sober voice of history.

It was only about four years after the government went into operation

that Congress actually exercised the power in question, and _passed a

Fugitive Slave Law_. Where was Massachusetts then! Did she burst into

flames of indignation? Her only voice, in reply, was as distinctly and

as emphatically pronounced in favor of that law as was the voice of

Virginia itself. With a single exception, her whole delegation in

Congress,[215] with Fisher Ames at their head, voted for the Fugitive

Slave Law of 1793! Not a whisper of disapprobation was heard from their

constituents. As Mr. Sumner himself says, the passage of that act "drew

little attention." Hence he would have us to believe that Massachusetts

would have been stirred from her depths if the convention had conferred

such a power upon Congress, and yet that she was not moved at all when

Congress proceeded, as he maintains, to _usurp_ and exercise that power!

This is not all. Every member from the free States, with the exception

of five, recorded his vote in favor of the same law.[216] In the Senate,

as we have already said, it was passed by resolution, and not by a

recorded vote. No one, in either branch of Congress, uttered a syllable

against the constitutionality of the law, though many of the most

distinguished members of the very convention which framed the

Constitution itself were there. Not to mention others, there were James

Madison, and Roger Sherman, and Elbridge Gerry, and Rufus King, and

Caleb Strong, and Robert Morris, and Oliver Elsworth; and yet from not

one of these illustrious framers of the Constitution was a syllable

uttered against the constitutionality of the law in question. Nay, the

law was supported and enacted by themselves. What, then, in the face of

these indubitable facts, becomes of all Mr. Sumner's far-fetched

arguments from "the literature of the age" and from his multitudinous

voices against slavery? It is absurd, says Mr. Sumner, to suppose that

such men intended to confer any power upon Congress to pass a Fugitive

Slave Law. It is a _fact_, we reply, that as members of Congress they

proceeded, without hesitation or doubt, to exercise that very power. It

"dishonors the memory of the fathers," says Mr. Sumner, to suppose they

intended that Congress should possess such a power. How, then, will he

vindicate the memory of the fathers against the imputation of his own

doctrine that they, as members of Congress, must have knowingly usurped

the power which, as members of the convention, they had intended not to

confer?

One more of Mr. Sumner's historical arguments, and we are done with this

branch of the subject. He deems it the most conclusive of all. It is

founded on the arrangement of certain clauses of the Constitution, and

is, we believe, perfectly original. We must refer the reader to the

speech itself if he desire to see this very curious argument, since we

cannot spare the room to give it a full and fair statement.

Nor is this at all necessary to our purpose, inasmuch as we intend to

notice only one thing about this argument, namely, the wonderful effect

it produces on the mind of its inventor. "The framers of the

Constitution," says he, "were wise and careful men, who had a reason for

what they did, and who understood the language which they employed." We

can readily believe all this. Nor can we doubt that they "had a design

in the peculiar arrangement" of the clauses adopted by them. That

design, however, we feel quite sure, is different from the one

attributed to them by Mr. Sumner. But let us suppose he is right, and

then see what would follow.

The design attributed to them by Mr. Sumner was to make every one see,

beyond the possibility of a mistake, that the Constitution confers no

power on Congress to pass a Fugitive Slave Law. "They not only decline

all addition of any such power to the compact," says he, "but, _to

render misapprehension impossible,--to make assurance doubly sure,--to

exclude any contrary conclusion_, they punctiliously arrange," etc. Now,

if such were the case, then we ask if design of so easy accomplishment

were ever followed by failure so wonderful?

They failed, in the first place, "to exclude a contrary conclusion" from

the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts, of New York, and of Pennsylvania,

all of which tribunals have decided that they _did_ confer such a power

upon Congress. In the second place, although those wise men labored to

make "misapprehension impossible," yet, according to Mr. Sumner, the

Supreme Court of the United States has entirely misapprehended them. So

far from seeing that the power in question is not granted to Congress,

this high tribunal decides that it is clearly and unquestionably

granted. This is not all. The most marvellous failure is yet to come.

For, after all their pains to make the whole world see their meaning,

these wise men did not see it themselves, but went away, many of them,

and, in the Congress of 1793, helped to pass a Fugitive Slave Law!

It is to be feared, indeed, that the failure would have been absolutely

total but for the wonderful sagacity of a few abolitionists. For the

design imputed to the framers of the Constitution, and which they took

so much pains to disclose, had remained profoundly concealed from nearly

all men, not excepting themselves, until it was detected by Messrs.

Sumner, Chase, and company. But these have, at last, discovered it, and

now see it as in a flood of light. Indeed, they see it with such

transcendent clearness, with such marvellous perspicacity of vision, as

to atone for the stupidity and blindness of the rest of mankind.

So much for Mr. Sumner's historical argument. His logical argument is,

if possible, still more illogical than his historical. In regard to

this, however, we shall be exceedingly brief, as we are sick of his

sophisms, and long to be delivered from the pursuit of them.

He encounters, at the outset, "a difficulty" in the legislation of the

Congress of 1793 and in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United

States." But "on examination," says he, "this difficulty will

disappear." Perhaps difficulty so great never vanished so suddenly from

before any other man.

The authority of the Congress of 1793, though it contained so many of

the most distinguished framers of the Constitution, is annihilated by a

few bold strokes of Mr. Sumner's pen. One short paragraph, containing

two ineffably weak arguments, does the business.

The first of these arguments is as follows: "The act of 1793 proceeded

from a Congress that had already recognized the United States Bank,

chartered by a previous Congress, which, though sanctioned by the

Supreme Court, has been since in high quarters pronounced

unconstitutional. If it erred as to the bank, it may have erred also as

to fugitives from labor." We cannot conceive why such an argument should

have been propounded, unless it were to excite a prejudice against the

Congress of 1793 in the minds of those who may be opposed to a National

Bank. For if we look at its conclusion we shall see that it merely aims

to establish a point which no one would deny. It merely aims to prove

that, as the Congress of 1793 was composed of fallible men, "so it may

have erred!" We admit the conclusion, and therefore pass by the inherent

weaknesses in the structure of the argument.

His second argument is this: "But the very act contains a capital

error[217] on this very subject, so declared by the Supreme Court, in

pretending to vest a portion of the judicial power of the nation in

state officers. _This error takes from the act all authority as an

interpretation of the Constitution_. I DISMISS IT." This passage,

considered as an argument, is simply ridiculous. How many of the best

laws ever enacted by man have, in the midst of much that is as clear as

noonday, been found to contain an error! Should all, therefore, have

been blindly rejected? As soon as the error has been detected, has any

enlightened tribunal on earth ever said, "I dismiss" the whole?

By such a process we might have made as short work with Mr. Sumner's

speech. If, after pointing out one error therein, we had dismissed the

whole speech as worthless, we should have imitated his reasoning, and in

our conclusion have come much nearer to the truth. If we should say,

indeed, that because the sun has a spot on its surface it is therefore a

great ball of darkness, our argument would be exactly like that of Mr.

Sumner. But that great luminary would not refuse to shine in obedience

to our contemptible logic. In like manner, the authority of the

illustrious Congress of 1793, in which there were so many profound

statesmen and pure patriots, will not be the less resplendent because

Mr. Charles Sumner has, with Titanic audacity and Lilliputian weakness,

assailed it with one of the most pitiful of all the pitiful sophisms

that ever were invented by man.

In regard to the decision of the Supreme Court he says: "Whatever maybe

the influence of this judgment as a rule to the judiciary, it can not

arrest our duty as legislators. And here I adopt, with entire assent,

the language of President Jackson, in his memorable veto, in 1832, of

the Bank of the United States." He then quotes this language, in which

he italicizes the following sentence: "_Each public officer, who takes

an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will support it as

he understands it, and not as it is understood by others._" With these

authoritative words of Andrew Jackson," says he, "I dismiss this topic.

The early legislation of Congress and the decisions of the Supreme Court

can not stand in our way. I advance to the argument." We shall let him

advance.

But we must say a few words in conclusion. Mr. Sumner swears to support

the Constitution as he understands it; but how is it supported by him?

Is it supported by him at all or in any way? Let us see. The clause

respecting "persons held to service or labor," says he, imposes an

obligation, not upon "the National Government, but upon the States." Is

he then in favor of the States passing any law, or doing any act, by

which fugitive slaves may be delivered up? "Never," he replies.

Massachusetts will never do any such thing by his advice or consent.

Surely, then, he will speak a kind word to the good people of

Massachusetts, and advise them to do nothing in violation of this solemn

compact of the Constitution. If he will do nothing to support the

compact, surely he will do nothing to break it down. He will not permit

us to indulge any such charitable hope. For it is his _avowed_ object,

by speech-making and by agitation, to create such a "public opinion" as

"shall blast with contempt, indignation, and abhorrence, all who, _in

whatever form_, or _under whatever name_, undertake to be agents"[218]

in reclaiming fugitive slaves. Yea, upon the very officers of the law

themselves, who, for this purpose, act under and by authority of the

supreme laws of the land, he pours down scorn and derision. Even these,

though in the discharge of an official duty, are--if it be in the power

of Mr. Sumner--to be blasted with abhorrence, indignation, and contempt!

The Constitution declares that the fugitive slave "shall be delivered

up." He shall NOT "be delivered up," says Mr. Sumner; and, in order to

make his words good, he means to create a "public opinion," which no

Southern master dare encounter. Nay, he rejoices to believe that such

public opinion is, in some localities, already created and prepared for

open resistance to the Constitution of the United States. "There are

many," says he, "who will never shrink at any cost, and, notwithstanding

all the atrocious penalties of this bill, from efforts to save a

wandering fellow-man from bondage. They will offer him the shelter of

their houses, and, IF NEED BE, WILL PROTECT HIS LIBERTY BY FORCE."[219]

Horrible words! Words tending directly to a conflict in which the

brightest hopes of humanity must perish, and the glory of the Republic

be extinguished in oceans of blood.

In the face of such things, we are imperiously constrained to doubt Mr.

Sumner's regard for the obligation of the oath which binds him to

support the Constitution of his country. It is certain that he can

rejoice in the breach of this obligation by others. A certain judge in

Vermont, who, like every other State officer, had taken an oath to

support the Constitution of the United States, just set Constitution,

laws, evidence, all at defiance, and boldly declared that the fugitive

should _not_ be delivered up, "_unless the master could show a bill of

sale from the Almighty_." This deed, which, in the language of

Chancellor Walworth, is stamped with "the moral guilt of perjury,"

appears heroic to Mr. Sumner, by whom it is related with evident

delight. It would seem, indeed, as if the moral sensibility of an

abolitionist of his stamp is all drawn to a single point of his

conscience, so that it can feel absolutely nothing except slavery. It

seems dead to the obligation of an oath, to the moral guilt of perjury.

Nay, it seems to rejoice in the very bravery of its perpetration,

provided it only enables a fugitive slave to effect his escape.

Perhaps Mr. Sumner would seek to justify himself by declaring that the

language _fugitive from services_ does not include fugitive slaves. If

so, we reply that the Vermont judge, whose infamous decision he

approves, had no such fine pretext. It is Mr. Sumner, as we have seen,

who first suggested this most excellent method of reconciling conscience

with treachery to the Constitution. Though he professes the most

profound respect for that instrument, he deliberately sets to work to

undermine one of its most clear and unequivocal mandates. He does not,

like Mr. Seward, openly smite the Constitution with his hand, or

contemptuously kick it with his foot. _He betrays it with a kiss._

Mr. Sumner admires the conduct of the Vermont judge; but he can heap the

most frantic abuse on the acts of the best men America has produced.

Though they be the deliberate public acts of a Clay, or a Calhoun, or a

Webster, or a GEORGE WASHINGTON, his language is not the less violent,

nor his raving vituperation the less malignant. In regard to the

Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, he says: "And still further, as if to do a

deed which should 'make heaven weep, all earth amazed,' this same

Congress, in disregard of all the cherished safeguards of freedom, has

passed a most cruel, unchristian, devilish act." The great difficulty

under which Mr. Sumner labors, and which all the energy of his soul

struggles to surmount, is to find language violent enough in which to

denounce this "foul enactment," this "detestable and heaven-defying

bill," this "monster act," which "sets at naught the best principles of

the Constitution and the very laws of God!"

Now, this bill, let it be remembered, is liable to no objection which

may not be urged against the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. It will not be

denied, indeed, that if the one of these laws be unconstitutional so

also is the other, and that both must stand or fall together. Let it

also be borne in mind that, as the one received the support of a Clay,

and a Calhoun, and a Webster, so the other received the sanction and the

signature of George Washington. Yet, in the face of these facts, Mr.

Sumner does not moderate his rage. They only seem to increase the

intensity and the fury of his wrath. "The soul sickens," he cries, "in

the contemplation of this legalized outrage. In the dreary annals of the

past there are many acts of shame--there are many ordinances of

monarchs, and laws which have become a byword and a hissing to the

nations. But when we consider the country and the age, I ask fearlessly,

what act of shame, what ordinance of monarch, what law, can compare in

atrocity with this enactment of an American Congress?"

Not content with pouring floods of abuse on the law itself, Mr. Sumner

proceeds to consign to infamy its authors and all who have given it

their support. For, after furnishing examples of what he deems among the

most atrocious transactions of the past, he adds: "I would not

exaggerate. I wish to keep within bounds; but _I think no person can

doubt_ that the condemnation affixed to all these transactions and to

their authors must be the lot hereafter of the Fugitive Slave Bill, and

of every one, according to the measure of his influence, who gave it his

support. Into the immortal catalogue of national crimes this law has now

passed, drawing with it, by an inexorable necessity, its authors also,

and chiefly him who, as President of the United States, set his name to

the bill, and breathed into it that final breath without which it would

have no life. Other Presidents may be forgotten, but the name signed to

the Fugitive Slave Bill can never be forgotten. There are depths of

infamy, as there are hights of fame. I regret to say what I must, but

truth compels me. Better far for him had he never been born; better for

his memory, and for the name of his children, had he never been

President!"

If neither Mr. Fillmore nor George Washington swore to support the

Constitution as Mr. Sumner understands it, we beg him to consider that

_his opinion was not known_ when they took the oath of office. Mr.

Fillmore had, at that time, no better guide to go by than the decisions

of the most enlightened judicial tribunals of his country, with the

Supreme Court of the United States at their head. He was not so far

raised above other men, nor possessed of so wonderful an insight into

the Constitution, as Mr. Sumner; for he could understand it no better

than its framers. Hence he was, no doubt, so conscious of his own

fallibility that he could hardly look upon modesty as a crime, or upon a

deference to the judicial tribunals of his country as infamous. We

trust, therefore, that his good name will survive, and that his children

will not blush to own it. It is certain that the American people will

never believe, on the bare authority of Mr. Sumner, that, in his course

regarding the Fugitive Slave Law, he planted his feet in the very

"depths of infamy," when they can so clearly see that he merely trod in

the footsteps of George Washington.

If what a man lacks in reason he could only make up in rage, then, after

all, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Sumner is a very respectable

Senator; for, surely, the violence of his denunciations is almost as

remarkable as the weakness of his logic. Fortunately, however, it can

hurt no one except himself or those whom he represents. Certainly, the

brightest names in the galaxy of American statesmen are not to be swept

away by the filthy torrent of his invectives. The Clays, the Calhouns,

the Websters, and the Washingtons of America, are, indeed, as far above

the impotent rage of this Senator as the very stars of heaven are beyond

his arm.[220]

§ III. _The right of Trial by Jury not impaired by the Fugitive Slave

Law._

It is alleged that the power to enact such a law does not reside in

Congress, because no such power has been "expressly delegated," and

because it is not "necessary and proper" to carry any expressly

delegated authority into effect. We should have replied to this

argument; but it has been urged before every tribunal in which the great

question under consideration has been tried, and everywhere refuted. By

Mr. Justice Nelson, in the Supreme Court of New York,[221] by Mr.

Senator Bishop, in the Court of Errors in the same State,[222] and by

Mr. Justice Story, in the Supreme Court of the United States, it has

been so clearly, so powerfully, and so triumphantly demolished as to

leave nothing more to be desired on the subject. And besides, it has

been our object not so much to refute arguments against the law in

question, or to establish that which has been so long established,[223]

as to show on what slender grounds, and yet with what unbounded

confidence, the greatest champions of abolitionism are accustomed to

oppose the Constitution, the laws, the judicial decisions, and the

uniform practice, of the whole government under which we live.

In pursuance of this design, there is another sophism of theirs, which

it now devolves upon us to examine. We allude to the argument that the

Fugitive Slave Law is unconstitutional, because it denies the right of

trial by jury.

Is this still an open question? In the biography of Mr. Justice Story,

published by his son, it is said: "The argument that the Act of 1793 was

unconstitutional, because it did not provide for a trial by jury

according to the requisitions of the sixth article in the amendment to

the Constitution, having been suggested to my father on his return from

Washington, he replied that this question was not argued by counsel nor

considered by the court, and that he should still consider it an open

one." Mr. Sumner adduces this "distinct statement that the necessity of

trial by jury was not before the court;" and adds, "So that, in the

estimation of the judge himself, it was still an open question."

In the case here referred to--Prigg _v._ The Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, reported in XVI. Peters--it is true that the question of

trial by jury was not argued by counsel nor considered by the court. But

if the greater includes the less, then this question was embraced in the

decision; for, in that case, Prigg had seized the fugitive slave without

process, and carried her away without any certificate from magistrate or

judge in the State of Pennsylvania. The court declared that he had a

right to do so under and by virtue of the Constitution of the United

States. Most assuredly, if he had a constitutional right to such

proceeding, then, in such cases, the Constitution dispenses with the

necessity of trial by jury.

It was urged by counsel that such summary method of reclaiming fugitive

slaves was unconstitutional; but the court decided otherwise. It was

insisted by Mr. Hambly, just as it is now insisted by Mr. Sumner and

others, that such arrest was unconstitutional, because it was made by

the mere will of the party, and not, as the Constitution requires, "by

due process of law." Thus the point was presented by the record, argued

by the counsel, and overruled by the court.

In overruling this argument the court says: "The owner must, therefore,

have the right to seize and repossess the slave which the local laws of

his own State confer upon him as property; and we all know that this

right of seizure and recaption is universally acknowledged in all the

slaveholding States. Indeed, this is no more than a mere affirmance of

the principles of the common law applicable to this very subject." Then,

after a quotation from Blackstone, the court adds: "Upon this ground, we

have not the slightest hesitation in holding that, under and in virtue

of the Constitution, the owner of a slave is clothed with entire

authority in every State in the Union to seize and recapture his slave

whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace or any illegal

violence."

In accordance with this opinion of the court--delivered by Mr. Justice

Story--Mr. Chief Justice Taney says: the master "has a right, peaceably,

to take possession of him, and carry him away, without any certificate

or warrant from a judge of the District or Circuit Court of the United

States, or from any magistrate of the State; and whosoever resists or

obstructs him is a wrong-doer; and every State law which proposes,

directly or indirectly, to authorize such resistance or obstruction, is

null and void, and affords no justification to the individual or the

officer of the State who acts under it. This right of the master being

given by the Constitution of the United States, neither Congress nor a

State Legislature can by any law or regulation impair it or restrict

it.[224]

Hence it would have been well if Mr. Sumner and the son of Judge Story

had looked into this decision again before they proclaimed the opinion

that the right of trial by jury is, in such cases, still an open

question. Mr. Justice Story himself must, on reflection, have seen that

the off-hand expression attributed to him was erroneous. His more

deliberate opinion is recorded, not only in the case of Prigg, but also

in his "Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States." "It is

obvious," says he, "that these provisions for the arrest and removal of

fugitives of both classes contemplate summary ministerial proceedings,

and not the ordinary courts of judicial investigations to ascertain

whether the complaint be well-founded or the claim of ownership be

established beyond all legal controversy. In cases of suspected crimes

the guilt or innocence of the party is to be made out at his trial, and

not upon the preliminary inquiry whether he shall be delivered up. All

that would seem in such cases to be necessary is that there should be

_primâ facie_ evidence before the executive authority to satisfy its

judgment that there is probable cause to believe the party guilty, such

as, upon an ordinary warrant, would justify his commitment for trial.

And in the cases of fugitive slaves there would seem to be the same

necessity of requiring only _primâ facie_ proofs of ownership, without

putting the party to a formal assertion of his rights by a suit at the

common law."[225]

But, since the abolitionists will discuss this point, then let it be

considered an open question, and let them produce their arguments. The

first we shall notice is from Mr. Sumner, who again reasons from the

sentiments of the fathers. "At the close of the National Convention,"

says he, "Elbridge Gerry refused to sign the Constitution, because,

among other things, it established 'a tribunal _without juries_, a Star

Chamber as to civil cases.' Many united in his opposition, and, on the

recommendation of the First Congress, this additional safeguard was

adopted as an amendment." Thus, according to Mr. Sumner, Elbridge Gerry

was the father of the clause in the Constitution which guarantees the

right of trial by jury. Yet Elbridge Gerry never dreamed of applying

this clause to the case of fugitive slaves; for, as we have already

seen, he voted for the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, in which such

application of it is denied. Nor did any other member of that Congress

propose the right of trial by jury in such cases.

No doubt there would have been opposition to the act of 1793 if any

member of Congress had supposed, for a moment, that it denied the right

of trial by jury to the fugitive slave. It does no such thing. It leaves

that right unimpaired; and if any slave in the Union, whether fugitive

or otherwise, desire such trial, it is secured to him by the

Constitution and laws of the country. But he cannot have such trial

where or in what State he chooses. If he lives in Richmond, he may have

a trial by jury there; but he cannot escape to Boston, and there demand

this as a right. The fugitive from labor, like the fugitive from

justice, has a right to a trial by jury, but neither can claim to have

this trial in any part of the world he pleases. The latter must be tried

in "the vicinage" where the offense is alleged to have been committed,

because there the witnesses are to be found. He has no right to flee

from these and require them to follow him with their testimony. As he

has a constitutional right to be tried in the vicinage of the alleged

offense, so has the commonwealth a right to insist on his trial there.

In like manner, and for a similar reason, if the colored man wishes to

assert his freedom under the law, he may appeal to a jury of the

country; but this must be done in the State under whose laws he is

claimed as a slave and where the witnesses reside. He cannot fly to a

distant State, and there demand a kind of trial which neither the

Constitution, nor the laws, nor public expediency, secures to him. If he

assert this right at all, he must assert it in conformity with the

_undoubted right of the other party_, which is to be sued in this, as in

all other personal actions, in the place where he resides.

In the face of these considerations, it is no wonder that the Congress

of 1793 were so unanimous in regard to the Fugitive Slave Law. Though

this law did not provide for a jury trial, yet its authors all knew that

such trial was not denied to the fugitive slave, if he had a mind to

claim it. Hence the law was passed by that Congress, without even an

allusion to this modern abolition objection to its constitutionality.

Among all the members of that body who had taken part in framing the

Constitution of the United States,[226] not one was found to hint at

such an objection. This objection is of more recent origin, if not of

less respectable parentage.

An amendment to the law in question, allowing a trial by jury to the

fugitive slave in a distant State, would indeed be a virtual denial of

the constitutional right of the master. Either because the jury could

not agree, or because distant testimony might be demanded, the trial

would probably be continued, and put off, until the expense, the loss of

time, and the worriment of vexatious proceedings, would be more than the

slave is worth. The language of Mr. Chief Justice Taney, in relation to

an action for damages by the master, is peculiarly applicable to such a

trial by jury. The master "_would be compelled_," says he, "_to

encounter the costs and expenses of a suit, prosecuted at a distance

from his own home, and to sacrifice perhaps the value of his property

in endeavoring_ to obtain compensation." This is not the kind of

remedy, says he, the Constitution "intended to give. The delivery of the

property itself--its PROMPT AND IMMEDIATE DELIVERY--_is plainly

required, and was intended to be secured_." Such prompt and immediate

delivery was a part of "the customary or common law" at the time the

Constitution was adopted, and its framers, no doubt, intended that this

practice should be enforced by the clause in question, as appears from

the fact that so many of them concurred in the Act of 1793.

But if such right to a prompt and immediate delivery be guaranteed by

the Constitution itself, then, with all due submission, we would ask,

what power has Congress to limit or abridge this right? If under and by

virtue of the Constitution this right to a prompt and immediate delivery

be secured, then what power has Congress to say there shall _not_ be a

prompt or immediate delivery? "This right of the master," says Mr. Chief

Justice Taney, "being given by the Constitution of the United States,

NEITHER CONGRESS NOR A STATE LEGISLATURE CAN BY ANY LAW OR REGULATION

IMPAIR IT OR RESTRICT IT." If this be sound doctrine,--and such we hold

it to be,--then Congress has no constitutional power to impair or

restrict the right in question, by giving the fugitive slave a trial by

jury in the State to which he may have fled. This would not be to give a

"prompt and immediate delivery," such as the Supreme Court declares the

master is entitled to by the Constitution itself; it would be either to

give no delivery at all, or else one attended with such delays,

vexations, and costs, as would materially impair, if not wholly

annihilate, the right in question.

It is right and proper, we think, that questions arising exclusively

under our own laws should be tried in our own States and by our own

tribunals. Hence we shall never consent, unless constrained by the

judicial decision of the Supreme Court of the Union, to have such

questions tried in States whose people and whose juries may, perhaps, be

hostile to our interests and to our domestic institutions. For we are

SOVEREIGN as well as they.

Only conceive such a trial by jury in a Northern State, with such an

advocate for the fugitive slave as Mr. Chase, or Mr. Sumner, or some

other flaming abolitionist! There sits the fugitive slave,--"one of the

heroes of the age," as Mr. Sumner calls him, and the very embodiment of

persecuted innocence. On the other hand is the master,--the vile

"slave-hunter," as Mr. Sumner delights to represent him, and whom, if

possible, he is determined "to blast with contempt, indignation, and

abhorrence." The trial begins. The advocate appeals to the prejudices

and the passions of the jury. He denounces slavery--about which neither

he nor the jury know any thing--as the epitome of all earthly wrongs, as

the sum and substance of all human woes. Now, suppose that on the jury

there is _only one man_, who, like the Vermont judge, requires "a bill

of sale from the Almighty" before he will deliver up a fugitive slave;

or who, like Mr. Seward, sets his own private opinion above the

Constitution of his country; or who, like Mr. Sumner, has merely sworn

to support the supreme law as he understands it; and who, at the same

time, possesses his capacity to understand it just exactly as he

pleases: then what chance would the master have for a verdict? Just none

at all. For that one man, however clear the master's evidence, would

hang the jury, and the cause would have to be tried over again.

But suppose the whole twelve jurors should decide according to the law

and the evidence, and give a verdict in favor of the claimant; would his

rights then be secured? Very far from it. For there is the eager crowd,

which never fails to flock to such trials, and which the inflammatory

eloquence of the advocate has now wrought into a frenzy. Cannot such

crowd, think you, furnish a mob to effect by force what every member of

the jury had refused to accomplish by falsehood? If the master--if the

abhorred "slave-hunter"--should escape from such a crowd with a sound

body only, and without his property, he ought, we think, to deem himself

exceedingly fortunate.

Mr. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, has advocated a trial by jury in such

cases. He was, no doubt, perfectly sincere in the belief expressed by

him, that under such a provision more fugitive slaves would be reclaimed

than under the law as it now stands. But it is equally certain that

neither Mr. Seward nor Mr. Chase was of this opinion when the one

proposed, and the other voted for, a trial by jury in such cases.

Neither of these Senators, we think we may confidently affirm, intended

to aid the master in reclaiming his fugitive slaves.

"At any rate, sir," says Mr. Winthrop, "I shall vote for the amendment

offered by the Senator from New Jersey, as right and just in itself,

whatever may be its effects." That is to say, whatever may be the

effect of a jury trial in such cases, he means to vote for it _as right

and just in itself_! Whether this were a burst of passion merely, or the

deliberate conviction of the author of it, we are not able to determine,

but we shall trust it was the former. For surely such an opinion, if

deliberately entertained, is creditable neither to a Senator nor to a

jurist. Neither this, nor any other mode of trial, is "right in itself;"

and when right at all, it is only so as a means to an end. It is only

right when it subserves the great end of justice; and if it fail to

answer this end it is then worse than worthless. Hence the statesman who

declares that, "_whatever may be the effects_" of a particular mode of

trial, he will nevertheless support it "as right and just in itself,"

thereby announces that he is prepared to sacrifice the end to the

means,--a sentiment which, we venture to affirm, is more worthy of a

fanatical declaimer than of the high-minded and accomplished Senator by

whom it was uttered.

The great objection urged against the Fugitive Slave Law is that under

it a freeman may be seized and reduced to slavery. This law, as well as

every other, may, no doubt, be grossly abused, and made a cover for evil

deeds. But is there no remedy for such evil deeds. Is there no

protection for the free blacks of the North, except by a denial of the

clear and unquestionable constitutional rights of the South? If not,

then we should be willing to submit; but there is a remedy against such

foul abuse of the law of Congress in question, and, as we conceive, a

most ample remedy.

The master may recapture his fugitive slave. This is his constitutional

right. But, in the language of the Supreme Court of New York, already

quoted, if a villain, under cover of a pretended right, proceeds to

carry off a freeman, he does so "_at his peril, and would be answerable

like any other trespasser or kidnapper_." He must be caught, however,

before he can be punished. Let him be caught, let the crime be proved

upon him, and we would most heartily concur in the law by which he

should himself be doomed to slavery for life in the penitentiary.

The Fugitive Slave Law is not the only one liable to abuse. The innocent

may be, and often have been, arrested for crime; but this is no reason

why the law of arrest should be abolished, or even impaired in its

operation. Nay, innocent persons have often been maliciously prosecuted;

yet no one, on this account, ever dreamed of throwing obstacles in the

way of prosecution for crime. The innocent have been made the victims

of perjury; but who imagines that all swearing in courts of justice

should therefore be abolished? Such evils and such crimes are sought to

be remedied by separate legislation, and not by undermining the laws of

which they are the abuses. In like manner, though we wish to see the

free blacks of the North protected, and would most cheerfully lend a

helping hand for that purpose, yet, at the same time, we would maintain

our own constitutional rights inviolate. The villain who, under cover of

the law made for the protection of our rights, should seek to invade the

rights of Northern freemen, is as much abhorred by us as by any

abolitionists on earth. Nor, on the other hand, have we any sympathy

with those who, under cover of a law _to be made_ for the protection of

the free blacks of the North, seek to invade the rights of the South. We

have no sympathy with either class of kidnappers.

Is it not wonderful that, while the abolitionists of the North create

and keep up so great a clamor about the danger their free blacks are in,

they do so little, and ask so little, either by legislation or

otherwise, in order to protect them, except in such manner, or by such

legislation, as shall aim a deadly blow at the rights and interests of

the South? If they really wish to protect their free blacks, and if the

laws are not already sufficient for that purpose, we are more than

willing to assist in the passage of more efficient ones. But we are not

willing to abandon the great right which the Constitution spreads, like

an impenetrable shield, over Southern property to the amount of sixteen

hundred millions of dollars.

The complaint in regard to the want of protection for the free blacks of

the North is without just foundation. In the case of Jack _v._ Martin,

decided in the Court of Errors of New York, we find the following

language, which is here exactly in point:--"It was contended on the

argument of this cause, with great zeal and earnestness, that, under the

law of the United States, a freeman might be dragged from his family and

home into captivity. This is supposing an extreme case, as I believe it

is not pretended any such ever has occurred, or that any complaint of

that character has ever been made; at all events, I cannot regard it as

a very potent argument. The same position might as well be taken in the

case of a fugitive from justice. It might be assumed that he was an

innocent man, and entitled to be tried by a jury of the State where he

was arrested, to ascertain whether he had violated the laws of the State

from which he fled; whereas the fact is, the executive of this State

would feel bound to deliver up the most exalted individual in this

State, (however well satisfied he might be of his innocence,) if a

requisition was made upon him by the executive of another State."

In the same case, when before the Supreme Court of New York, the court

said: "In the case under review, the proceedings are before a magistrate

of our own State, presumed to possess a sympathy with his

fellow-citizens, and _where, upon the supposition that a freeman is

arrested, he may readily procure the evidence of his freedom_. If the

magistrate should finally err in granting the certificate, _the party

can still resort to the protection of the national judiciary. The

proceedings by which his rights have been invaded being under a law of

Congress, the remedy for error or injustice belongs peculiarly to that

high tribunal._ UNDER THEIR AMPLE SHIELD, THE APPREHENSION OF CAPTIVITY

AND OPPRESSION CAN NOT BE ALARMING."

It is evident that when this opinion was pronounced by the Supreme Court

of New York, it had not fathomed the depths of some men's capacity of

being alarmed by apprehensions of captivity and oppression. The

abolitionists will, whether or no, be most dreadfully alarmed. But the

danger consists, not in the want of laws and courts to punish the

kidnapper, but in the want of somebody to catch him. If he does all the

mischief ascribed to him by the abolitionists, is it not wonderful that

he is not caught by them? Rumor, with her thousand tongues, is clamorous

about his evil deeds; and fanatical credulity, with her ten thousand

ears, gives heed to the reports of rumor. But yet, somehow or other, the

abolitionists, with all their fiery, restless zeal, never succeed in

laying their hands on the offender himself. He must, indeed, be a most

adroit, a most cunning, a most wonderful rogue. He boldly goes into a

community in which so many are all eye, all ear, and all tongue, in

regard to the black man's rights; he there steals a free negro, who

himself has the power to tell when, where, and how, he became free; and

yet, in open day, and amid ten thousand flaming guardians of

freedom,[227] he escapes with perfect impunity! Is he not a most

marvelous proper rogue? But perhaps the reason the abolitionists do not

lay hands on him is that he is an imaginary being, who, though

intangible and invisible, will yet serve just as well to create an alarm

and keep up a great excitement as if he were a real personage.

§ IV. _The duty of the Citizen in regard to the Constitution of the

United States._

The Constitution, it is agreed on all sides, is "the supreme law of the

land,"--of every State in the Union. The first duty of the citizen in

regard to the Constitution is, then, to respect and obey each and every

one of its provisions. If he repudiates or sets at naught this or that

provision thereof, because it does not happen to agree with his own

views or feelings, he does not respect the Constitution at all; he makes

his own will and pleasure the supreme law. The true principle of loyalty

resides not in his bosom. We may apply to him, and to the supreme law of

the land, the language of an inspired apostle, that "whosoever shall

keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all."

He is guilty of all, because, by his willful disobedience in the one

instance, he sets at naught the authority by which the whole was

ordained and established.

In opposing the Fugitive Slave Law, it is forgotten by the abolitionists

that, if no such law existed, the master would have, under the

Constitution itself, the same right to reclaim his fugitive from labor,

and to reclaim him in the same summary manner; for, as we have seen, the

Supreme Court of the United States has decided that by virtue of the

Constitution alone the master has a right to pursue and reclaim his

fugitive slave, without even a writ or legal process. Hence, in opposing

the Fugitive Slave Law because it allows a summary proceeding in such

cases, the abolitionists really make war on the Constitution. The

battery which they open against the Constitution is merely masked behind

the Fugitive Slave Law; and thus the nature of their attack is concealed

from the eyes of their non-legal followers.

But, says Mr. Chase, of Ohio, I do not agree with the Supreme Court of

the United States. I oppose not the Constitution, but the decision of

the Supreme Court. "A decision of the Supreme Court," says he, "cannot

alter the Constitution." This is very true; but then, on the other

hand, it is equally true that neither can his opinion alter the

Constitution. But here the question arises, which is the rule of conduct

for the true and loyal citizen,--the decision of the Supreme Court of

the United States, or the opinion of Governor Chase? We decidedly prefer

the former. "Sir," says Mr. Chase, "when gentlemen from the slave States

ask us to support the Constitution, I fear they mean only their

_construction_ of the Constitution." We mean not so. We mean neither

_our_ nor _his_ construction of the Constitution, but that construction

only which has been given to it by the highest judicial tribunal in the

land, by the supreme and final arbiter in all such conflicts of opinion.

But Mr. Chase opposes argument as well as opinion to the decision of the

Supreme Court in regard to slavery. "What more natural," says he, "than

that gentlemen from the slave States, in view of the questions likely to

come before the Supreme Court, should desire that a majority of its

members might have interests like those which they would desire to

maintain! _Certain it is that some care has been taken to secure such a

constitution of the court, and not without success._" If Mr. Chase, or

any other abolitionist, should insinuate that the decision in question

is owing to such an unfair constitution of the Supreme Court, the answer

is as easy and triumphant as the accusation would be infamous and vile;

for, as is well known, the very decision which is so obnoxious to his

sentiments was delivered by the great jurist of Massachusetts, Mr.

Justice Story, and was concurred in by the other Northern members of the

Court. This is not all. How did it happen that substantially the same

decision has been rendered by the Supreme Courts of New York,

Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania? Were these high tribunals also

constituted with reference to the peculiar interests of the South?

The question is not whether the decision of the Supreme Court, or the

opinion of Mr. Chase, the more perfectly reflects the Constitution. Even

if he were infallible, as the Supreme Court certainly is not, we, the

people of the United States, have not agreed that he shall decide such

questions for us. And besides, it would be difficult, perhaps, to

persuade the people that he is, for the determination of such questions,

any more happily constituted than the Supreme Court itself, with all the

manifold imperfections of its Southern members. But, however this may

be, it is certain that until the people shall be so persuaded, and

shall agree to abide by his opinions, it is the duty of the good citizen

to follow the decisions of the great judicial tribunal provided by the

Constitution of his country.

If you, good citizen of the North, have a right to set up your opinion

in opposition to such decisions, then I have the same right, and so has

every other member of the commonwealth. Thus, as many constructions of

the Constitution would necessarily result as there are individual

opinions in the land. Law and order would be at an end; a chaos of

conflicting elements would prevail, and every man would do that which

seemed right in his own eyes. The only escape from such anarchy is a

just and loyal confidence in the judicial tribunals of the land--is a

subjection of the intense egotism of the individual to the will of the

nation, as expressed in the Constitution and expounded by the

constitutional authorities. Hence, we mean to support the Constitution,

not as _we_ understand it nor as _you_ understand it, but as it is

understood by the Supreme Court of the United States. Such, it seems to

us, is the only wise course--nay, is the imperative duty--of every

citizen who does not intend to disorganize the fundamental law and

revolutionize the government of his country.

It may be supposed, perhaps, by those who have reflected little on the

subject, that the controversy respecting the Fugitive Slave Law is

merely about the value of a few slaves. It is, in our opinion, far

otherwise; it is a great constitutional question; and hence the deep

interest which it has excited throughout the nation, as well as in the

Senate of the United States. It is a question, as it appears to us,

whether the Constitution or the abolitionists shall rule the country.

The Fugitive Slave Law is, as we have seen, surrounded by the strongest

possible evidences of its constitutionality; and hence, if this may be

swept away as unconstitutional by the passions of a mad faction, then

may every other legal defence be leveled before like storms, and all

security annihilated. Hence, as the friends of law and order, we intend

to take our stand right here, and defend this Act, which, although

despised and abhorred by a faction, has received the sanction of the

fathers, as well as of the great judicial tribunals, of the land.

We are asked to repeal this law--ay, by the most violent agitator of the

North we are asked to repeal this law--for "_the sake of tranquillity

and peace_!" But how can this bring peace? Suppose this law were

repealed; would tranquillity be restored? We have not forgotten--nor can

we be so easily made to forget--that this very agitator himself has

declared, that slavery is "a wrong so transcendent" that no truce is to

be allowed to it so long as it occupies a single foot of ground in the

United States. Is it not, then, a delusive prospect of peace which is

offered to us in exchange for the law in question?

Nor can we forget what other agitators have uttered respecting the

abolition of slavery in the Southern States. "Slavery," said Mr. Seward,

at a mass-meeting in Ohio, "can be limited to its present bounds; it can

be ameliorated. It can be--and it _must_ be--ABOLISHED, and you and I

can and _must_ do it." Does this look like peace, if the Fugitive Slave

Law were only out of the way? Mr. Seward, from his place in the Senate

of the United States, tells us how we must act among the people of the

North, if, in reclaiming our fugitive slaves, we would not disturb their

peace. But he had already exhorted the people of the North to "extend a

cordial welcome" to our fugitive slaves, and to "defend them as they

would their household gods." What, then, does he mean by peace?

This outcry, indeed, that the peace of the country is disturbed by the

Fugitive Slave Law, is as great a delusion as ever was attempted to be

palmed off on any people. If this law were repealed to-morrow, would

agitation cease? Would the abolitionists of the North cease to proclaim

that their doors are open, and their hospitality is ready, to receive

the poor benighted blacks? (the blacks of the South, we mean; for we

have never heard of their open doors, or cordial hospitality, for the

poor free blacks of their own neighborhood.) But we have heard--from Dr.

Channing himself--of "a convention at the North, of highly respected

men, preparing and publishing an address to the slaves, in which they

are exhorted to fly from bondage, and to _feel no scruple in seizing and

using horse or boat which may facilitate their escape_." Now, if the

Fugitive Slave Law were repealed, would all such proceedings cease? Or

if, under the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Courts of the

Union and of New York, and without any such law to back him, the master

should seek to reclaim his property, would he be welcomed, or hooted and

resisted, by the defenders of the fugitive from service? Let these

things be considered, and it will be evident, we think, that the repeal

of the law in question would only invite further aggressions, and from

this prostrate outpost the real enemies of the peace of the country

would march, if possible, over every other defense of the Constitution.

Hence, although we most ardently desire harmony and concord for the

States of the Union, we shall never seek it by a surrender of the

Constitution or the decisions of the Supreme Court. If it cannot be

found under these, it cannot be found at all. Mr. Chase assures us,

indeed, that just so long as the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in

the case of Prigg prevails, we must "encounter difficulties, and serious

difficulties."[228] If it must be so, then so be it. If the question be

whether the decisions of the Supreme Court, or the dictation of

demagogues, shall rule our destinies, then is our stand taken and our

purpose immovably fixed.

We have a right to peace under the decisions of that august tribunal. It

is neither right nor proper--it is contrary to every principle of

natural justice--that either party to this great controversy should

decide for itself. Hence, if the abolitionists will not submit to the

decisions of the Supreme Court, we shall most assuredly refuse

submission to their arrogant dictation. We can, from our inmost hearts,

respect the feelings of those of our Northern brethren who may choose to

remain passive in this matter, and leave us--by such aid as the law may

afford--to reclaim our own fugitives from labor. For such we have only

words of kindness and feelings of fraternal love. But as for those--and

especially for those in high places--who counsel resistance to the laws

and to the Constitution of the Republic, we hold them guilty of a high

misdemeanor, and we shall ever treat them as disturbers of the public

peace, nay, as enemies of the independence, the perpetuity, the

greatness, and the glory of the Union under which, by the blessing of

Almighty God, we have hitherto so wonderfully prospered.

FOOTNOTES:

[209] On this point, see page 176.

[210] XIV. Wendell, Jack v. Martin, p. 528

[211] XIV. Wendell's Reports, Jack _v._ Martin.

[212] In asserting that freedom is national, Mr. Sumner may perhaps mean

that it is the duty of the National Government to exclude slavery from

all its territories, and to admit no new State in which there are

slaves. If this be his meaning, we should reply, that it is as foreign

from the merits of the Fugitive Slave Law, which he proposed to discuss,

as it is from the truth. The National Government has, indeed, no more

power to exclude, than it has to ordain, slavery; for slavery or no

slavery is a question which belongs wholly and exclusively to the

sovereign people of each and every State or territory. With our whole

hearts we respond to the inspiring words of the President's Message: "If

the friends of the Constitution are to have another struggle, its

enemies could not present a more acceptable issue than that of a State,

whose Constitution clearly embraces a republican form of government,

being excluded from the Union because its domestic institutions may not,

in all respects, comport with the ideas of what is wise and expedient

entertained in some other State."

[213] Chap. ii § x.

[214] Madison Papers, p. 1448.

[215] One member seems to have been absent from the House.

[216] Annals of Congress; 2d Congress, 1791-1793, p. 861.

[217] This error was by no means a capital one.

[218] Speech in the Senate, in 1855.

[219] Speech in Boston, October 3d, 1850.

[220] Mr. Sumner has a great deal to say, in his speech, about "the

memory of the fathers." When their sentiments agree with his own, or

only seem to him to do so, then they are "the demi-gods of history." But

only let these demi-gods cross his path or come into contact with his

fanatical notions, and instantly they sink into sordid knaves. The

framers of the Constitution of the United States, says he, made "a

compromise, which _cannot be mentioned without shame_. It was that

_hateful bargain_ by which Congress was restrained until 1808 from the

prohibition of the foreign slave trade, thus securing, down to that

period, _toleration for crime_." . . . . "The effrontery of slaveholders

was matched by _the sordidness of the Eastern members_." . . . . "The

bargain was struck, and at this price the Southern States gained the

detestable indulgence. At a subsequent day, Congress branded the slave

trade as piracy, and thus, by solemn legislative act, adjudged this

compromise to be _felonious and wicked_."

But for this compromise, as every one who has read the history of the

times perfectly well knows, no union could have been formed, and the

slave trade might have been carried on to the present day. By this

compromise, then, the Convention did not tolerate crime nor the slave

trade; they merely formed the Union, and, in forming it, _gained the

power to abolish the slave trade in twenty years_. The gain of this

power, which Congress had not before possessed, was considered by them

as a great gain to the cause of humanity. If the Eastern members, from a

blind and frantic hatred of slavery, had blasted all prospects of a

union, and at the same time put the slave trade beyond their power

forever, they would have imitated the wisdom of the abolitionists, who

always promote the cause they seek to demolish.

If any one will read the history of the times, he will see that "the

fathers," the framers of the Constitution, were, in making this very

compromise, governed by the purest, the most patriotic, and the most

humane, of motives. He who accuses them of corruption shows himself

corrupt; especially if, like Mr. Sumner, he can laud them on one page as

demi-gods, and on the very next denounce them as sordid knaves, who, for

the sake of filthy lucre, could enter into a "felonious and wicked"

bargain. Yet the very man who accuses them of having made so infamous

and corrupt a bargain in regard to the slave trade can and does most

eloquently declaim against the monstrous injustice of supposing them

capable of the least act in favor of slavery!

[221] XII. Wendell, p. 314.

[222] XIV. Wendell, p. 530; XVI. Peters, p. 608.

[223] Indeed, if we had produced all the arguments in favor of the

constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, it would have carried us

far beyond our limits, and swelled this single chapter into a volume.

[224] This decision of the Supreme Court, which authorizes the master to

seize his fugitive slave _without process_, (see his speech, Appendix to

Congressional Globe, vol. xxii., part 2, p. 1587,) is exceedingly

offensive to Mr. Chase of Ohio; and no wonder, since the Legislature of

his own State has passed a law, making it a penitentiary offense in the

master who should thus prosecute his constitutional right as declared by

this decision. But, in regard to this point, the Supreme Court of the

United States does not stand alone. The Supreme Court of New York, in

the case of Jack _v._ Martin, had previously said: "Whether the owner or

agent might have made the arrest in the first instance without any

process, we will not stop to examine; authorities of deserved

respectability and weight have held the affirmative. 2 Pick. 11, 5 Serg.

& Rawle, 62, and the case of Glen _v._ Hodges, in this court, before

referred to, (in 9 Johnson,) seem to countenance the same conclusion. It

would indeed appear to follow as a necessary consequence, from _the

undoubted position, that under this clause of the Constitution the right

and title of the owner to the service of the slave is as entire and

perfect within the jurisdiction of the State to which he has fled as it

was in the one from which he escaped. Such seizure would be at the peril

of the party_; AND IF A FREEMAN WAS TAKEN, HE WOULD BE ANSWERABLE LIKE

ANY OTHER TRESPASSER OR KIDNAPPER."

[225] Story on Constitution, vol. iii. book iii., chap. xl.

[226] The framers of the Constitution in that Congress were:--"John

Langdon and Nicholas Gilmer, of New Hampshire; Caleb Strong and Elbridge

Gerry, of Massachusetts; Roger Sherman and Oliver Elsworth, of

Connecticut; Rufus King, of New York; Robert Morris and Thomas

Fitzsimmons, of Pennsylvania; George Reid and Richard Basset, of

Delaware; Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey; Pierce Butler, of South

Carolina; Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina; William Few and Abraham

Baldwin, of Georgia; and last, but not least, James Madison, of

Virginia." Yet from not one of these framers of the Constitution--from

not one of these illustrious guardians of freedom--was a syllable heard

in regard to the right of trial by jury in connection with the Fugitive

Slave Law then passed. The more pity it is, no doubt, the abolitionist

will think, that neither Mr. Chase, nor Mr. Sumner, nor Mr. Seward, was

there to enlighten them on the subject of trial by jury and to save the

country from the infamy of such an Act. Alas! for the poor, blind

fathers!

[227] This crime of kidnapping, says Mr. Chase, of Ohio, is "not

unfrequent" in his section of country; that is, about Cincinnati.

[228] Appendix to Congressional Globe, vol. xxii., part ii., p. 1587.

THE

BIBLE ARGUMENT:

OR,

SLAVERY IN THE LIGHT OF DIVINE REVELATION.

BY

THORNTON STRINGFELLOW, D. D.,

OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA.

THE BIBLE ARGUMENT:

OR,

SLAVERY IN THE LIGHT OF DIVINE REVELATION.

CIRCUMSTANCES exist among the inhabitants of these United States, which

make it proper that the Scriptures should be carefully examined by

Christians in reference to the institution of slavery, which exists in

several of the States, with the approbation of those who profess

unlimited subjection to God's revealed will.

It is branded by one portion of people, who take their rule of moral

rectitude from the Scriptures, as a great sin; nay, the greatest of sins

that exist in the nation. And they hold the obligation to exterminate

it, to be paramount to all others.

If slavery be thus sinful, it behooves all Christians who are involved

in the sin, to repent in dust and ashes, and wash their hands of it,

without consulting with flesh and blood. Sin in the sight of God is

something which God in his word makes known to be wrong, either by

preceptive prohibition, by principles of moral fitness, or examples of

inspired men, contained in the sacred volume. When these furnish no law

to condemn human conduct, there is no transgression. Christians should

produce a "thus saith the Lord," both for what they condemn as sinful,

and for what they approve as lawful, in the sight of heaven.

It is to be hoped, that on a question of such vital importance as this

to the peace and safety of our common country, as well as to the welfare

of the church, we shall be seen cleaving to the Bible, and taking all

our decisions about this matter, from its inspired pages. With men from

the North, I have observed for many years a palpable ignorance of the

Divine will, in reference to the institution of slavery. I have seen but

a few who made the Bible their study, that had obtained a knowledge of

what it did revea on this subject. Of late their denunciation of

slavery as a sin, is loud and long.

I propose, therefore, to examine the sacred volume briefly, and if I am

not greatly mistaken, I shall be able to make it appear that the

institution of slavery has received, in the first place,

1st. The sanction of the Almighty in the Patriarchal age.

2d. That it was incorporated into the only National Constitution which

ever emanated from God.

3d. That its legality was recognized, and its relative duties regulated,

by Jesus Christ in his kingdom; and

4th. That it is full of mercy.

Before I proceed further, it is necessary that the terms used to

designate the thing, be defined. It is not a name, but a thing, that is

denounced as sinful; because it is supposed to be contrary to, and

prohibited by the Scriptures.

Our translators have used the term servant, to designate a state in

which persons were serving, leaving us to gather the _relation_ between

the party served, and the party rendering the service, from other terms.

The term slave, signifies with us, a definite state, condition, or

relation, which state, condition, or relation, is precisely that one

which is denounced as sinful. This state, condition, or relation, is

that in which one human being is held without his consent, by another,

as property;[229] to be bought, sold, and transferred, together with

increase, as property forever. Now, this precise thing, is denounced by

a portion of the people of these United States, as the greatest

individual and national sin that is among us, and is thought to be so

hateful in the sight of God, as to subject the nation to ruinous

judgments, if it be not removed. Now, I propose to show from the

Scriptures, that this state, condition, or relation, did exist in the

_patriarchal age_, and that the persons most extensively involved in the

sin, if it be a sin, are the very persons who have been singled out by

the Almighty, as the objects of his special regard--whose character and

conduct he has caused to be held up as _models_ for future generations.

Before we conclude slavery to be a thing hateful to God, and a great sin

in his sight, it is proper that we should search the records he has

given us, with care, to see in what light he has looked upon it, and

find the warrant for concluding, that we shall honor him by efforts to

abolish it; which efforts, in their consequences, may involve the

indiscriminate slaughter of the innocent and the guilty, the master and

the servant. We all believe him to be a Being who is the same yesterday,

to-day, and forever.

The first recorded language which was ever uttered in relation to

slavery, is the inspired language of Noah. In God's stead he says,

"Cursed be Canaan;" "a servant of servants shall he be to his brethren."

"Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant." "God

shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and

Canaan shall be his servant."--Gen. ix: 25, 26, 27. Here, language is

used, showing the _favor_ which God would exercise to the posterity of

Shem and Japheth, while they were holding the posterity of Ham in a

state of _abject bondage_. May it not be said in truth, that God decreed

this institution before it existed; and has he not connected its

_existence_ with prophetic tokens of special favor, to those who should

be slave owners or masters? He is the same God now, that he was when he

gave these views of his moral character to the world; and unless the

posterity of Shem and Japheth, from whom have sprung the Jews, and all

the nations of Europe and America, and a great part of Asia, (the

African race that is in them excepted,)--I say, unless they are all

dead, as well as the Canaanites or Africans, who descended from Ham,

then it is quite possible that his favor may now be found with one class

of men who are holding another class in bondage. Be this as it may, God

_decreed slavery_--and shows in that decree, tokens of good-will to the

master. The sacred records occupy but a short space from this inspired

ray on this subject, until they bring to our notice, a man that is held

up as a model, in all that adorns human nature, and as one that God

delighted to honor. This man is Abraham, honored in the sacred records,

with the appellation, "Father" of the "faithful." Abraham was a native

of Ur, of the Chaldees. From thence the Lord called him to go to a

country which he would show him; and he obeyed, not knowing whither he

went. He stopped for a time at Haran, where his father died. From thence

he "took Sarai his wife, and Lot his brother's son, and all their

substance that they had gathered, and the souls they had gotten in

Haran, and they went forth to go into the land of Canaan."--Gen. xii: 5.

All the ancient Jewish writers of note, and Christian commentators

agree, that by the "souls they had gotten in Haran," as our translators

render it, are meant their slaves, or those persons they had bought with

their money in Haran. In a few years after their arrival in Canaan, Lot

with all he had was taken captive. So soon as Abraham heard it, he armed

three hundred and eighteen slaves that were born in his house, and

retook him. How great must have been the entire slave family, to produce

at this period of Abraham's life, such a number of young slaves able to

bear arms.--Gen. xiv: 14.

Abraham is constantly held up in the sacred story, as the subject of

great distinction among the princes and sovereigns of the countries in

which he sojourned. This distinction was on account of his great wealth.

When he proposed to buy a burying-ground at Sarah's death, of the

children of Heth, he stood up and spoke with great humility of himself

as "a stranger and sojourner among them," (Gen. xxiii: 4,) desirous to

obtain a burying-ground. But in what light do they look upon him? "Hear

us, my Lord, thou art a mighty prince among us."--Gen. xxiii: 6. Such is

the light in which they viewed him. What gave a man such distinction

among such a people? Not moral qualities, but great wealth, and its

inseparable concomitant, power. When the famine drove Abraham to Egypt,

he received the highest honors of the reigning sovereign. This honor at

Pharaoh's court, was called forth by the visible tokens of immense

wealth. In Genesis xii: 15, 16, we have the honor that was shown to him,

mentioned, _with a list of his property_, which is given in these words,

in the 16th verse: "He had sheep, and oxen, and he-asses, and

men-servants, and maid-servants, and she-asses, and camels." The

_amount_ of his flocks may be inferred from the _number of slaves_

employed in tending them. They were those he brought from Ur of the

Chaldees, of whom the three hundred and eighteen were born; those gotten

in Haran, where he dwelt for a short time, and those which he inherited

from his father, who died in Haran. When Abraham _went up_ from Egypt,

it is stated in Genesis xiii: 2, that he was "_very rich_," not only in

_flocks_ and _slaves_, but in "_silver_ and _gold_" also.

After the destruction of Sodom, we see him sojourning in the kingdom of

Gerar. Here he received from the sovereign of the country, the honors of

equality; and Abimelech, the king, (as Pharoah had done before him,)

seeks Sarah for a wife, under the idea that she was Abraham's sister.

When his mistake was discovered, he made Abraham a large present. Reason

will tell us, that in selecting the items of this present, Abimelech was

governed by the visible indications of Abraham's preference in the

articles of wealth--and that above all, he would present him with

nothing which Abraham's sense of moral obligation would not allow him to

own. Abimelech's present is thus described in Genesis xx: 14, 16, "And

Abimelech took sheep, and oxen, and men-servants, and women-servants,

and a thousand pieces of silver, and gave them unto Abraham." This

present discloses to us what constituted the most highly prized items of

wealth, among these eastern sovereigns in Abraham's day.

God had promised Abraham's seed the land of Canaan, and that in his seed

all the nations of the earth should be blessed. He reached the age of

eighty-five, and his wife the age of seventy-five, while as yet, they

had no child. At this period, Sarah's anxiety for the promised seed, in

connection with her age, induced her to propose a female slave of the

Egyptian stock, as a secondary wife, from which to obtain the promised

seed. This alliance soon puffed the slave with pride, and she became

insolent to her mistress--the mistress complained to Abraham, the

master. Abraham ordered Sarah to exercise her authority. Sarah did so,

and pushed it to severity, and the slave absconded. The divine oracles

inform us, that the angel of God found this run-away bond-woman in the

wilderness; and if God had commissioned this angel to improve this

opportunity of teaching the world how much he abhorred slavery, he took

a bad plan to acomplish it. For, instead of repeating a homily upon

doing to others as we "would they should do unto us," and heaping

reproach upon Sarah, as a hypocrite, and Abraham as a tyrant, and

giving Hagar direction how she might get into Egypt, from whence

(according to abolitionism) she had been unrighteously sold into

bondage, the angel addressed her as "Hagar, Sarah's maid," Gen. xvi: 1,

9; (thereby recognizing the relation of master and slave,) and asks her,

"whither wilt thou go?" and she said "I flee from the face of my

mistress." Quite a wonder she honored Sarah so much as to call her

mistress; but she knew nothing of abolition, and God by his angel did

not become her teacher.

We have now arrived at what may be called an _abuse_ of the institution,

in which one person is the property of another, and under their control,

and subject to their authority without their consent; and if the Bible

be the book, which proposes to furnish the case which leaves it without

doubt that God abhors the institution, here we are to look for it. What,

therefore, is the doctrine in relation to slavery, in a case in which a

rigid exercise of its arbitrary authority is called forth upon a

helpless female; who might use a strong plea for protection, upon the

ground of being the master's wife. In the face of this case, which is

hedged around with aggravations as if God designed by it to awaken all

the sympathy and all the abhorrence of that portion of mankind, who

claim to have more mercy than God himself--but I say, in view of this

strong case, what is the doctrine taught? Is it that God abhors the

institution of slavery; that it is a reproach to good men; that the

evils of the institution can no longer be winked at among saints; that

Abraham's character must not be transmitted to posterity, with this

stain upon it; that Sarah must no longer be allowed to live a stranger

to the abhorrence God has for such conduct as she has been guilty of to

this poor helpless female? I say, what is the doctrine taught? Is it so

plain that it can be easily understood? and does God teach that she is a

bond-woman or slave, and that she is to recognize Sarah as her mistress,

and not her equal--that she must return and submit herself unreservedly

to Sarah's authority? Judge for yourself, reader, by the angel's answer:

"And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Return unto thy mistress, and

submit thyself under her hands."--Gen. xvi: 9.

But, says the spirit of abolition, with which the Bible has to contend,

you are building your house upon the sand, for these were nothing but

hired servants; and their servitude designates no such state,

condition, or relation, as that, in which one person is made the

property of another, to be bought, sold, or transferred forever. To

this, we have two answers in reference to the subject, _before giving

the law_. In the first place, the term servant, in the schedules of

property among the patriarchs, _does designate_ the state, condition, or

relation in which one person is the legal property of another, as in

Gen. xxiv: 35, 36. Here Abraham's servant, who had been sent by his

master to get a wife for his son Isaac, in order to prevail with the

woman and her family, states, that the man for whom he sought a bride,

was the son of a man whom God had greatly blessed with riches; which he

goes on to enumerate thus, in the 35th verse: "He hath given him flocks,

and herds, and silver, and gold, and men-servants, and maid-servants,

and camels, and asses;" then in verse 36th, he states the disposition

his master had made of his estate: "My master's wife bare a son to my

master when she was old, and unto him he hath given all that he hath."

Here, servants are enumerated with silver and gold as part of the

patrimony. And, reader, bear it in mind; as if to rebuke the doctrine of

abolition, servants are not only inventoried as property, but as

property which _God had given to Abraham_. After the death of Abraham,

we have a view of Isaac at Gerar, when he had come into the possession

of this estate; and this is the description given of him: "And the man

waxed great, and went forward, and grew until he became very great; for

he had possession of flocks, and possession of herds, and _great store

of servants_."--Gen. xxvi: 13, 14. This state in which servants are made

chattels, he received as an inheritance from his father, and passed to

his son Jacob.

Again, in Genesis xvii, we are informed of a covenant God entered into

with Abraham; in which he stipulates to be a God to him and his _seed_,

(not his servants,) and to give to his _seed_ the land of Canaan for an

everlasting possession. He expressly stipulates, that Abraham shall put

the token of this covenant upon every servant born in his house, and

upon every servant _bought with his money of any stranger_.--Gen. xvii:

12, 13. Here again servants are property. Again, more than four hundred

years afterward, we find the _seed_ of Abraham, on leaving Egypt,

directed to celebrate the rite, that was ordained as a memorial of their

deliverance, viz: the Passover, at which time the same institution which

makes _property_ of _men_ and _women_, is recognized, and the _servant

bought with money_, is given the privilege of partaking, upon the ground

of his being circumcised _by his master_, while the hired servant, over

whom the master had no such control, is excluded until he _voluntarily_

submits to circumcision; showing clearly that the institution of

involuntary slavery then carried with it a right, on the part of the

master, _to choose_ a religion _for the servant_ who was his money, as

Abraham did, by God's direction, when he imposed circumcision on those

he had bought with his money,--when he was circumcised himself, with

Ishmael his son, who was the only individual beside himself, on whom he

had a right to impose it, except the bond-servants bought of the

stranger with his money, and their children born in his house. The next

notice we have of servants as property, is from God himself, when

clothed with all the visible tokens of his presence and glory, on the

top of Sinai, when he proclaimed his law to the millions that surrounded

its base: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not

covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant,

nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's."--Ex. xx:

17. Here is a patriarchal catalogue of property, having God for its

author, the wife among the rest, who was then purchased, as Jacob

purchased his two, by fourteen years' service. Here the term servant, as

used by the Almighty, under the circumstances of the case could not be

understood by these millions, as meaning any thing but property, because

the night they left Egypt, a few weeks before, Moses, by Divine

authority, recognized their servants as property, which they had bought

with their money.

2d. In addition to the evidence from the context of these, and various

other places, to prove the term servant to be identical in the import of

its essential particulars with the term slave among us, there is

unquestionable evidence, that _in the patriarchal age_, there are two

distinct states of servitude alluded to, and which are indicated by two

distinct terms, or by the same term, and an adjective to explain.

These two terms are first, servant or bond-servant; second, hireling or

hired servant; the first indicating involuntary servitude; the second,

voluntary servitude for stipulated wages, and a specified time. Although

this admits of the clearest proof _under the law_, yet it admits of

proof before the law was given. On the night the Israelites left Egypt,

which was before the law was given, Moses, in designating the

qualifications necessary for the Passover, uses this language,--Exod.

xii: 44, 45: "Every man's servant that is bought for money, when thou

hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof. A foreigner and an

hired servant shall not eat thereof." This language carries to the human

mind, with irresistible force, the idea of _two distinct states_--one a

state of _freedom_, the other a state of _bondage_: in one of which, a

person is serving with his consent for wages; in the other of which a

person is serving without his _consent_, according to his master's

pleasure.

Again, in Job iii, Job expresses the strong desire he had been made by

his afflictions to feel, that he had died in his infancy. "For now,"

says he, "should I have lain still and been quiet, I should have slept:

then had I been at rest. There (meaning the grave) the wicked cease from

troubling, and there the weary be at rest. There the prisoners rest

together; they hear not the voice of the oppressor. The small and the

great are there, and the servant is free from his master."--Job iii: 11,

13, 17, 18, 19. Now, I ask any common-sense man to account for the

expression in this connection, "there the servant is free from his

master." Afflictions are referred to, arising out of _states_ or

_conditions_, from which _ordinarily_ nothing but _death_ brings relief.

_Death_ puts an end to afflictions of body that are incurable, as he

took his own to be, and therefore he desired it.

The troubles brought on good men by a wicked persecuting world, last for

life; but in _death_ the wicked cease from troubling,--_death_ ends that

_relation_ or _state_ out of which such troubles grow. The prisoners of

the oppressors, in that age, stood in a _relation_ to their _oppressor_,

which led the oppressed to expect they would hear the voice of the

_oppressor_ until _death_. But _death_ broke the _relation_, and was

desired, because in the grave they would hear his voice no more.

All the distresses growing out of inequalities in human condition; as

wealth and power on one side, and poverty and weakness on the other,

were terminated by death; the grave brought both to a level: the small

and the great are there, and there, (that is, in the grave,) he adds,

the servant is free from his master; made so, evidently, by _death_. The

_relation_, or _state_ out of which his oppression had arisen, being

destroyed by _death_, he would be freed from them, because he would, by

_death_, be freed from his master who inflicted them. This view of the

case, and this only, will account for the use of such language. But upon

a supposition that a _state_ or _relation_ among men is referred to,

that is _voluntary_, such as that between a _hired servant_ and his

_employer_, that can be _dissolved_ at the pleasure of the _servant_,

the language is without meaning, and perfectly unwarranted; while such a

_relation_ as that of _involuntary_ and _hereditary_ servitude, where

the master had _unlimited power_ over his servant, and in an age when

cruelty was common, there is the greatest propriety in making the

servant or slave, a _companion with himself, in affliction_, as well as

the oppressed and afflicted, in every class where _death alone_

dissolved the _state_ or _condition_, out of which their afflictions

grew. Beyond all doubt, this language refers to a state of _hereditary

bondage_, from the afflictions of which, _ordinarily_, nothing in that

day brought relief but _death_.

Again, in chapter 7th, he goes on to defend himself in his eager desire

for death, in an address to God. He says, it is natural for a servant to

desire the shadow, and a hireling his wages: "As the servant earnestly

desireth the shadow, and as the hireling looketh for the reward of his

work," so it is with me, should be supplied.--Job vii: 2. Now, with the

previous light shed upon the use and meaning of these terms in the

_patriarchal Scriptures_, can any man of candor bring himself to believe

that two states or conditions are not here referred to, in one of which,

the highest reward after toil is mere rest; in the other of which, the

reward was wages? And how appropriate is the language in reference to

these two states.

The _slave_ is represented as earnestly desiring the _shadow_, because

his condition allowed him no prospect of any thing more desirable; but

the _hireling_ as looking for the _reward of his work_, because _that_

will be an equivalent for his fatigue.