Tariff controversy continued--Mr. Hayne--Mr.
Carter--Mr. Govan--Mr. Martindale--Mr.
Buchanan--Sugar Planters invoked to aid Free
Trade--The West also invoked--Its pecuniary
embarrassments for want of markets--Henry
Baldwin--Remarks on the views of the
parties--State of the world--Dread of the
Protective policy by the Planters--Their schemes
to avert its consequences, and promote Free Trade.
TO understand the sentiments of the South, on the Protective Policy, as
expressed by its statesmen, we must again quote from the Congressional
Debates of 1824:
Mr. Hayne, of South Carolina, said: "But how, I would seriously ask, is
it possible for the home market to supply the place of the foreign
market, for our cotton? We supply Great Britain with the raw material,
out of which she furnishes the Continent of Europe, nay, the whole
world, with cotton goods. Now, suppose our manufactories could make
every yard of cloth we consume, that would furnish a home market for no
more than 20,000,000 lbs. out of the 180,000,000 lbs. of cotton now
shipped to Great Britain; leaving on our hands 160,000,000 lbs., equal
to two-thirds of our whole produce. . . . . Considering this scheme of
promoting certain employments, at the expense of others, as unequal,
oppressive, and unjust--viewing prohibition as the _means_, and the
destruction of all foreign commerce as the _end_ of this policy--I take
this occasion to declare, that we shall feel ourselves, justified in
embracing the very first opportunity of repealing all such laws as may
be passed for the promotion of these objects."
Mr. Carter, of South Carolina, said: "Another danger to which the
present measure would expose this country, and one in which the
Southern States have a deep and vital interest, would be the risk we
incur, by this system of exclusion, of driving Great Britain to
countervailing measures, and inducing all other countries, with whom the
United States have any considerable trading connections, to resort to
measures of retaliation. There are countries possessing vast capacities
for the production of rice, of cotton, and of tobacco, to which England
might resort to supply herself. She might apply herself to Brazil,
Bengal, and Egypt, for her cotton; to South America, as well as to her
colonies, for her tobacco; and to China and Turkey for her rice."
Mr. Govan, of South Carolina, said: "The effect of this measure on the
cotton, rice, and tobacco-growing States, will be pernicious in the
extreme:--it will exclude them from those markets where they depended
almost entirely for a sale of those articles, and force Great Britain to
encourage the cottons, (Brazil, Rio Janeiro, and Buenos Ayres,) which,
in a short time, can be brought in competition with us. Nothing but the
consumption of British goods in this country, received in exchange, can
support a command of the cotton market to the Southern planter. It is
one thing very certain, she will not come here with her gold and silver
to trade with us. And should Great Britain, pursuing the principles of
her reciprocal duty act, of last June, lay three or four cents on our
cotton, where would, I ask, be our surplus of cotton? It is well known
that the United States can not manufacture one-fourth of the cotton that
is in it; and should we, by our imprudent legislative enactments, in
pursuing to such an extent this restrictive system, force Great Britain
to shut her ports against us, it will paralyze the whole trade of the
Southern country. This export trade, which composes five-sixths of the
export trade of the United States, will be swept entirely from the
ocean, and leave but a melancholy wreck behind."
It is necessary, also, to add a few additional extracts, from the
speeches of Northern statesmen, during this discussion.
Mr. Martindale, of New York, said: "Does not the agriculture of the
country languish, and the laborer stand still, because, beyond the
supply of food for his own family, his produce perishes on his hands, or
his fields lie waste and fallow; and this because his accustomed market
is closed against him? It does, sir. . . . . A twenty years' war in Europe,
which drew into its vortex all its various nations, made our merchants
the carriers of a large portion of the world, and our farmers the
feeders of immense belligerent armies. An unexampled activity and
increase in our commerce followed--our agriculture extended itself, grew
and nourished. An unprecedented demand gave the farmer an extraordinary
price for his produce. . . . . Imports kept pace with exports, and
consumption with both. . . . . Peace came into Europe, and shut out our
exports, and found us in war with England, which almost cut off our
imports. . . . . Now we felt how _comfortable_ it was to have plenty of
food, but no clothing. . . . . Now we felt the imperfect organization of
our system. Now we saw the imperfect distribution and classification of
labor. . . . . Here is the explanation of our opposite views. It is
employment, after all, that we are all in search of. It is a market for
our labor and our produce, which we all want, and all contend for. 'Buy
foreign goods, that we may import,' say the merchants: it will make a
market for importations, and find employment for our ships. Buy English
manufactures, say the cotton planters; England will take our cotton in
exchange. Thus the merchant and the cotton planter fully appreciate the
value of a market when they find their own encroached upon. The farmer
and manufacturer claim to participate in the benefits of a market for
their labor and produce; and hence this protracted debate and struggle
of contending interests. It is a contest for a market between the
_cotton-grower and the merchant_ on the one side, and the _farmer and
the manufacturer_ on the other. That the manufacturer would furnish this
market to the farmer, admits no doubt. The farmer should reciprocate the
favor; and government is now called upon to render this market
accessible to foreign fabrics for the mutual benefit of both. . . . .
This, then, is the remedy we propose, sir, for the evils which we suffer.
Place the mechanic by the side of the farmer, that the manufacturer who
makes our cloth, should make it from _our_ farmers' wool, flax, hemp,
etc., and be fed by our farmers' provisions. Draw forth our iron from
our own mountains, and we shall not drain our country in the purchase of
the foreign. . . . . We propose, sir, to supply our own wants from our own
resources, by the means which God and Nature have placed in our
hands. . . . . But here is a question of sectional interest, which elicits
unfriendly feelings and determined hostility to the bill. . . . . The
cotton, rice, tobacco, and indigo-growers of the Southern States, claim
to be deeply affected and injured by this system. . . . . Let us
inquire if the Southern planter does not demand what, in fact, he denies
to others. And now, what does he request? That the North and West should
buy--what? Not their cotton, tobacco, etc., for that we do already, to
the utmost of our ability to consume, or pay, or vend to others; and
that is to an immense amount, greatly exceeding what they purchase of
us. But they insist that we should buy English wool, wrought into cloth,
that they may pay for it with their cotton; that we should buy Russia
iron, that they may sell their cotton; that we should buy Holland gin
and linen, that they may sell their tobacco. In fine, that we should not
grow wool, and dig and smelt the iron of the country; for, if we did,
they could not sell their cotton." (On another occasion, he said:)
"Gentlemen say they _will_ oppose every part of the bill. They will,
therefore, move to strike out every part of it. And, on every such
motion, we shall hear repeated, as we have done already, the same
objections: that it will ruin trade and commerce; that it will destroy
the revenue, and prostrate the navy; that it will enhance the prices of
articles of the first necessity, and thus be taxing the poor; and that
it will destroy the cotton market, _and stop the future growth of
cotton_."
Mr. Buchanan, of Pennsylvania, said: "No nation can be perfectly
independent which depends upon foreign countries for its supply of iron.
It is an article equally necessary in peace and in war. Without a
plentiful supply of it, we cannot provide for the common defense. Can we
so soon have forgotten the lesson which experience taught us during the
late war with Great Britain? Our foreign supply was then cut off, and we
could not manufacture in sufficient quantities for the increased
domestic demand. The price of the article became extravagant, and both
the Government and the agriculturist were compelled to pay double the
sum for which they might have purchased it, had its manufacture, before
that period, been encouraged by proper protecting duties."
Sugar cane, at that period, had become an article of culture in
Louisiana, and efforts were made to persuade her planters into the
adoption of the Free Trade system. It was urged that they could more
effectually resist foreign competition, and extend their business, by a
cheap supply of food, than by protective duties. But the Louisianians
were too wise not to know, that though they would certainly obtain
cheap provisions by the destruction of Northern manufactures, still,
this would not enable them to compete with the cheaper labor supplied by
the slave trade to the Cubans.
The West, for many years, gave its undivided support to the
manufacturing interests, thereby obtaining a heavy duty on hemp, wool,
and foreign distilled spirits: thus securing encouragement to its hemp
and wool-growers, and the monopoly of the home market for its whisky.
The distiller and the manufacturer, under this system, were equally
ranked as public benefactors, as each increased the consumption of the
surplus products of the farmer. The grain of the West could find no
remunerative market, except as fed to domestic animals for droving East
and South, or distilled into whisky which would bear transportation.
Take a fact in proof of this assertion. Hon. Henry Baldwin, of
Pittsburgh, at a public dinner given him by the friends of General
Jackson, in Cincinnati, May, 1828, in referring to the want of markets,
for the farmers of the West, said, "He was certain, the aggregate of
their agricultural produce, finding a market in Europe, would not pay
for the pins and needles they imported."
The markets in the Southwest, now so important, were then quite limited.
As the protective system, coupled with the contemplated internal
improvements, if successfully accomplished, would inevitably tend to
enhance the price of agricultural products; while the free trade and
anti-internal improvement policy, would as certainly reduce their value;
the two systems were long considered so antagonistic, that the success
of the one must sound the knell of the other. Indeed, so fully was Ohio
impressed with the necessity of promoting manufactures, that all capital
thus employed, was for many years entirely exempt from taxation.
It was in vain that the friends of protection appealed to the fact, that
the duties levied on foreign goods did not necessarily enhance their
cost to the consumer; that the competition among home manufacturers, and
between them and foreigners, had greatly reduced the price of nearly
every article properly protected; that foreign manufacturers always had,
and always would advance their prices according to our dependence upon
them; that domestic competition was the only safety the country had
against foreign imposition; that it was necessary we should become our
own manufacturers, in a fair degree, to render ourselves independent of
other nations in times of war, as well as to guard against the
vacillations in foreign legislation; that the South would be vastly the
gainer by having the market for its products at its own doors, to avoid
the cost of their transit across the Atlantic; that, in the event of the
repression or want of proper extension of our manufactures, by the
adoption of the free trade system, the imports of foreign goods, to meet
the public wants, would soon exceed the ability of the people to pay,
and, inevitably, involve the country in bankruptcy.
Southern politicians remained inflexible, and refused to accept any
policy except free trade, to the utter abandonment of the principle of
protection. Whether they were jealous of the greater prosperity of the
North, and desirous to cripple its energies, or whether they were truly
fearful of bankrupting the South, we shall not wait to inquire. Justice
demands, however, that we should state that the South was suffering from
the stagnation in the cotton trade existing throughout Europe. The
planters had been unused to the low prices, for that staple, they were
compelled to accept. They had no prospect of an adequate home market for
many years to come, and there were indications that they might lose the
one they already possessed. The West Indies was still slave territory,
and attempting to recover its early position in the English market. This
it had to do, or be forced into emancipation. The powerful Viceroy of
Egypt, Mehemet Ali, was endeavoring to compel his subjects to grow
cotton on an enlarged scale. The newly organized South American
republics were assuming an aspect of commercial consequence, and might
commence its cultivation. The East Indies and Brazil were supplying to
Great Britain from one-third to one-half of the cotton she was annually
manufacturing. The other half, or two-thirds, she might obtain from
other sources, and repudiate all traffic with our planters. Southern
men, therefore, could not conceive of any thing but ruin to themselves,
by any considerable advance in duties on foreign imports. They
understood the protective policy as contemplating the supply of our
country with home manufactured articles to the exclusion of those of
foreign countries. This would confine the planters, in the sale of their
cotton, to the American market mainly, and leave them in the power of
moneyed corporations; which, possessing the ability, might control the
prices of their staple, to the irreparable injury of the South. With
slave labor they could not become manufacturers, and must, therefore,
remain at the mercy of the North, both as to food and clothing, unless
the European markets should be retained. Out of this conviction grew the
war upon Corporations; the hostility to the employment of foreign
capital in developing the mineral, agricultural, and manufacturing
resources of the country; the efforts to destroy the banks and the
credit system; the attempts to reduce the currency to gold and silver;
the system of collecting the public revenues in coin; the withdrawal of
the public moneys from all the banks as a basis of paper circulation;
and the sleepless vigilance of the South in resisting all systems of
internal improvements by the General Government. Its statesmen foresaw
that a paper currency would keep up the price of Northern products one
or two hundred per cent. above the specie standard; that combinations of
capitalists, whether engaged in manufacturing wool, cotton, or iron,
would draw off labor from the cultivation of the soil, and cause large
bodies of the producers to become consumers; and that roads and canals,
connecting the West with the East, were effectual means of bringing the
agricultural and manufacturing classes into closer proximity, to the
serious limitation of the foreign commerce of the country, the checking
of the growth of the navy, and the manifest, injury of the planters.