The story goes that when General Sherman lived in New York City, which
was during the last five years of his life, he attended one night a
dinner party at which he and an ex-Confederate general who had fought
against him in the southwest were the chief guests; and that an
Englishman present asked in perfect innocence the question, Who burned
Columbia? Had bombshells struck the tents of these generals during the
war, they would not have caused half the commotion in their breasts that
did this question put solely with the desire of information. The
emphatic language of Sherman interlarded with the oaths he uttered
spontaneously, the bitter charges of the Confederate, the pounding of
the table, the dancing of the glasses, told the Englishman that the
bloody chasm had not been entirely filled. With a little variation and
with some figurative meaning, he might have used the words of Iago:
"Friends all but now, even now in peace; and then but now as if some
planet had outwitted men, tilting at one another's breast in opposition.
I cannot speak any beginning to this peevish odds."
But the question which disturbed the New York dinner party is a delight
to the historian. Feeling that history may be known best when there are
most documents, he may derive the greatest pleasure from a perusal of
the mass of evidence bearing on this disputed point; and if he is of
Northern birth he ought to approach the subject with absolute candor. Of
a Southerner who had himself lost property or whose parents had lost
property, through Sherman's campaign of invasion, it would be asking too
much to expect him to consider this subject in a judicial spirit. Even
Trent, a moderate and impartial Southern writer whose tone is a lesson
to us all, when referring, in his life of William Gilmore Simms, to
"the much vexed question, Who burned Columbia," used words of the
sternest condemnation.
Sherman, with his army of 60,000, left Savannah February 1, 1865, and
reached the neighborhood of Columbia February 16. The next day Columbia
was evacuated by the Confederates, occupied by troops of the fifteenth
corps of the Federal army, and by the morning of the 18th either three
fifths or two thirds of the town lay in ashes. The facts contained in
these two sentences are almost the only ones undisputed. We shall
consider this episode most curiously if we take first Sherman's account,
then Wade Hampton's, ending with what I conceive to be a true relation.
The city was surrendered by the mayor and three aldermen to Colonel
George A. Stone at the head of his brigade. Soon afterwards Sherman and
Howard, the commander of the right wing of the army, rode into the city;
they observed piles of cotton burning, and Union soldiers and citizens
working to extinguish the fire, which was partially subdued. Let Sherman
speak for himself in the first account that he wrote, which was his
report of April 4, 1865: "Before one single public building had been
fired by order, the smouldering fires [cotton] set by Hampton's order
were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around.
[Wade Hampton commanded the Confederate cavalry.] About dark they began
to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the
city. The whole of Woods' division was brought in, but it was found
impossible to check the flames, which, by midnight, had become
unmanageable, and raged until about 4 A.M., when the wind subsiding,
they were got under control.
"I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, Woods, and
others, laboring to save houses and protect families thus suddenly
deprived of shelter, and even of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim
on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary,
claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And without
hesitation I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city
of Columbia, not with a malicious intent or as the manifestation of a
silly 'Roman stoicism,' but from folly, and want of sense, in filling it
with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well
to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers
who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in
spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in
unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina."
Howard, in his report, with some modification agrees with his chief, and
the account in "The March to the Sea" of General Cox, whose experience
and training fitted him well to weigh the evidence, gives at least a
partial confirmation to Sherman's theory of the origin of the fire.
I have not, however, discovered sufficient evidence to support the
assertion of Sherman that Wade Hampton ordered the cotton in the streets
of Columbia to be burned. Nor do I believe Sherman knew a single fact on
which he might base so positive a statement.[220] It had generally been
the custom for the Confederates in their retreat to burn cotton to
prevent its falling into the hands of the invading army, and because
such was the general rule Sherman assumed that it had been applied in
this particular case. This assumption suited his interest, as he sought
a victim to whom he might charge the burning of Columbia. His statement
in his "Memoirs," published in 1875, is a delicious bit of historical
naivete. "In my official report of this conflagration," he wrote, "I
distinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did so
pointedly, to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was in my
opinion boastful and professed to be the special champion of South
Carolina."
Instead of Hampton giving an order to burn the cotton, I am satisfied
that he urged Beauregard, the general in command, to issue an order that
this cotton should not be burned, lest the fire might spread to the
shops and houses, which for the most part were built of wood, and I am
further satisfied that such an order was given. Unfortunately the
evidence for this is not contemporary. No such order is printed in the
"Official Records," and I am advised from the War Department that no
such order has been found. The nearest evidence to the time which I have
discovered is a letter of Wade Hampton of April 21, 1866, and one of
Beauregard of May 2, 1866. Since these dates, there is an abundance of
evidence, some of it sworn testimony, and while it is mixed up with
inaccurate statements on another point, and all of it is of the nature
of recollections, I cannot resist the conclusion that Beauregard and
Hampton gave such an order. It was unquestionably the wise thing to do.
There was absolutely no object in burning the cotton, as the Federal
troops could not carry it with them and could not ship it to any seaport
which was under Union control.
An order of Beauregard issued two days after the burning of Columbia and
printed in the "Official Records" shows that the policy of burning
cotton to keep it out of the hands of Sherman's army had been abandoned.
Sherman's charge, then, that Wade Hampton burned Columbia, falls to the
ground. The other part of his account, in which he maintained that the
fire spread to the buildings from the smoldering cotton rekindled by
the wind, which was blowing a gale, deserves more respect. His report
saying that he saw cotton afire in the streets was written April 4,
1865, and Howard's in which the same fact is stated was written April 1,
very soon after the event, when their recollection would be fresh. All
of the Southern evidence (except one statement, the most important of
all) is to the effect that no cotton was burning until after the Federal
troops entered the city. Many Southerners in their testimony before the
British and American mixed commission under examination and
cross-examination swear to this; and Wade Hampton swears that he was one
of the last Confederates to leave the city, and that, when he left, no
cotton was afire, and he knew that it was not fired by his men. But this
testimony was taken in 1872 and 1873, and may be balanced by the sworn
testimony of Sherman, Howard, and other Union officers before the same
commission in 1872.
The weight of the evidence already referred to would seem to me to show
that cotton was afire when the Federal troops entered Columbia, but a
contemporary statement of a Confederate officer puts it beyond doubt.
Major Chambliss, who was endeavoring to secure the means of
transportation for the Confederate ordnance and ordnance stores, wrote,
in a letter of February 20, that at three o'clock on the morning of
February 17, which was a number of hours before the Union soldiers
entered Columbia, "the city was illuminated with burning cotton." But it
does not follow that the burning cotton in the streets of Columbia was
the cause of the fire which destroyed the city. When we come to the
probably correct account of the incident, we shall see that the
preponderance of the evidence points to another cause.
February 27, ten days after the fire, Wade Hampton, in a letter to
Sherman, charged him with having permitted the burning of Columbia, if
he did not order it directly; and this has been iterated later by many
Southern writers. The correspondence between Halleck and Sherman is
cited to show premeditation on the part of the general. "Should you
capture Charleston," wrote Halleck, December 18, 1864, "I hope that by
some accident the place may be destroyed, and if a little salt should be
sown upon the site it may prevent the growth of future crops of
nullification and secession." Sherman thus replied six days later: "I
will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think salt will
be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will be on the right of
the Right Wing, and their position will bring them naturally into
Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps you
will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The
truth is, the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak
vengeance on South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that
she deserves all that seems in store for her.... I look upon Columbia as
quite as bad as Charleston."
The evidence from many points of view corroborating this statement of
the feeling of the army towards South Carolina is ample. The rank and
file of Sherman's army were men of some education and intelligence; they
were accustomed to discuss public matters, weigh reasons, and draw
conclusions. They thought that South Carolina had brought on the Civil
War, was responsible for the cost and bloodshed of it, and no punishment
for her could be too severe. That was likewise the sentiment of the
officers. A characteristic expression of the feeling may be found in a
home letter of Colonel Charles F. Morse, of the second Massachusetts,
who speaks of the "miserable, rebellious State of South Carolina." "Pity
for these inhabitants," he further writes, "I have none. In the first
place, they are rebels, and I am almost prepared to agree with Sherman
that a rebel has no rights, not even the right to live except by our
permission."
It is no wonder, then, that Southern writers, smarting at the loss
caused by Sherman's campaign of invasion, should believe that Sherman
connived at the destruction of Columbia. But they are wrong in that
belief. The general's actions were not so bad as his words. Before his
troops made their entrance he issued this order: "General Howard will
... occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property,
manufacturing and machine shops, but will spare libraries and asylums
and private dwellings." That Sherman was entirely sincere when he gave
this order, and that his general officers endeavored to carry it out
cannot be questioned. A statement which he made under oath in 1872
indicates that he did not connive at the destruction of Columbia. "If I
had made up my mind to burn Columbia," he declared, "I would have burnt
it with no more feeling than I would a common prairie dog village; but I
did not do it."
Other words of his exhibit without disguise his feelings in regard to
the occurrence which the South has regarded as a piece of wanton
mischief. "The ulterior and strategic advantages of the occupation of
Columbia are seen now clearly by the result," said Sherman under oath.
"The burning of the private dwellings, though never designed by me, was
a trifling matter compared with the manifold results that soon followed.
Though I never ordered it and never wished it, I have never shed many
tears over the event, because I believe it hastened what we all fought
for, the end of the war." It is true that he feared previous to their
entry the burning of Columbia by his soldiers, owing to their
"deep-seated feeling of hostility" to the town, but no general of such
an army during such a campaign of invasion would have refused them the
permission to occupy the capital city of South Carolina. "I could have
had them stay in the ranks," he declared, "but I would not have done it
under the circumstances to save Columbia."
Historical and legal canons for weighing evidence are not the same. It
is a satisfaction, however, when after the investigation of any case
they lead to the same decision. The members of the British and American
mixed commission (an Englishman, an American, and the Italian Minister
at Washington), having to adjudicate upon claims for "property alleged
to have been destroyed by the burning of Columbia, on the allegation
that that city was wantonly fired by the army of General Sherman, either
under his orders or with his consent and permission," disallowed all the
claims, "all the commissioners agreeing." While they were not called
upon to deliver a formal opinion in the case, the American agent was
advised "that the commissioners were unanimous in the conclusion that
the conflagration which destroyed Columbia was not to be ascribed to
either the intention or default of either the Federal or Confederate
officers."
To recapitulate, then, what I think I have established: Sherman's
account and that of the Union writers who follow him cannot be accepted
as history. Neither is the version of Wade Hampton and the Southern
writers worthy of credence. Let me now give what I am convinced is the
true relation. My authorities are the contemporary accounts of six
Federal officers, whose names will appear when the evidence is presented
in detail; the report of Major Chambliss of the Confederate army; "The
Sack and Destruction of Columbia," a series of articles in the _Columbia
Phoenix_, written by William Gilmore Simms and printed a little over a
month after the event; and a letter written from Charlotte, February 22,
to the _Richmond Whig_, by F. G. de F., who remained in Columbia until
the day before the entrance of the Union troops.
Two days before the entrance of the Federal troops, Columbia was placed
under martial law, but this did not prevent some riotous conduct after
nightfall and a number of highway robberies; stores were also broken
into and robbed. There was great disorder and confusion in the
preparations of the inhabitants for flight; it was a frantic attempt to
get themselves and their portable belongings away before the enemy
should enter the city. "A party of Wheeler's Cavalry," wrote F. G. de F.
to the _Richmond Whig_, "accompanied by their officers dashed into town
[February 16], tied their horses, and as systematically as if they had
been bred to the business, proceeded to break into the stores along Main
Street and rob them of their contents." Early in the morning of the
17th, the South Carolina railroad depot took fire through the reckless
operations of a band of greedy plunderers, who while engaged in robbing
"the stores of merchants and planters, trunks of treasure, wares and
goods of fugitives," sent there awaiting shipment, fired, by the
careless use of their lights, a train leading to a number of kegs of
powder; the explosion which followed killed many of the thieves and set
fire to the building. Major Chambliss, who was endeavoring to secure the
means of transportation for the Confederate ordnance and ordnance
stores, wrote: "The straggling cavalry and rabble were stripping the
warehouses and railroad depots. The city was in the wildest terror."
When the Union soldiers of Colonel Stone's brigade entered the city,
they were at once supplied by citizens and negroes with large
quantities of intoxicating liquor, brought to them in cups, bottles,
demijohns, and buckets. Many had been without supper, and all of them
without sleep the night before, and none had eaten breakfast that
morning. They were soon drunk, excited, and unmanageable. The stragglers
and "bummers," who had increased during the march through South
Carolina, were now attracted by the opportunity for plunder and swelled
the crowd. Union prisoners of war had escaped from their places of
confinement in the city and suburbs, and joining their comrades were
eager to avenge their real or fancied injuries. Convicts in the jail had
in some manner been released. The pillage of shops and houses and the
robbing of men in the streets began soon after the entrance of the army.
The officers tried to preserve discipline. Colonel Stone ordered all the
liquor to be destroyed, and furnished guards for the private property of
citizens and for the public buildings; but the extent of the disorder
and plundering during the day was probably not appreciated by Sherman
and those high in command. Stone was hampered in his efforts to preserve
order by the smallness of his force for patrol duty and by the
drunkenness of his men. In fact, the condition of his men was such that
at eight o'clock in the evening they were relieved from provost duty,
and a brigade of the same division, who had been encamped outside of the
city during the day, took their place. But the mob of convicts, escaped
Union prisoners, stragglers and "bummers," drunken soldiers and negroes,
Union soldiers who were eager to take vengeance on South Carolina, could
not be controlled. The sack of the city went on, and when darkness came,
the torch was applied to many houses; the high wind carried the flames
from building to building, until the best part of Columbia--a city of
eight thousand inhabitants--was destroyed.
Colonel Stone wrote, two days afterwards: "About eight o'clock the city
was fired in a number of places by some of our escaped prisoners and
citizens." "I am satisfied," said General W. B. Woods, commander of the
brigade that relieved Stone, in his report of March 26, "by statements
made to me by respectable citizens of the town, that the fire was first
set by the negro inhabitants." General C. R. Woods, commander of the
first division, fifteenth corps, wrote, February 21: "The town was fired
in several different places by the villains that had that day been
improperly freed from their confinement in the town prison. The town
itself was full of drunken negroes and the vilest vagabond soldiers, the
veriest scum of the entire army being collected in the streets." The
very night of the conflagration he spoke of the efforts "to arrest the
countless villains of every command that were roaming over the streets."
General Logan, commander of the fifteenth corps, said, in his report of
March 31: "The citizens had so crazed our men with liquor that it was
almost impossible to control them. The scenes in Columbia that night
were terrible. Some fiend first applied the torch, and the wild flames
leaped from house to house and street to street, until the lower and
business part of the city was wrapped in flames. Frightened citizens
rushed in every direction, and the reeling incendiaries dashed, torch in
hand, from street to street, spreading dismay wherever they went."
"Some escaped prisoners," wrote General Howard, commander of the right
wing, April 1, "convicts from the penitentiary just broken open, army
followers, and drunken soldiers ran through house after house, and were
doubtless guilty of all manner of villainies, and it is these men that I
presume set new fires farther and farther to the windward in the
northern part of the city. Old men, women, and children, with everything
they could get, were herded together in the streets. At some places we
found officers and kind-hearted soldiers protecting families from the
insults and roughness of the careless. Meanwhile the flames made fearful
ravages, and magnificent residences and churches were consumed in a very
few minutes." All these quotations are from Federal officers who were
witnesses of the scene and who wrote their accounts shortly after the
event, without collusion or dictation. They wrote too before they knew
that the question, Who burned Columbia? would be an irritating one in
after years. These accounts are therefore the best of evidence. Nor does
the acceptance of any one of them imply the exclusion of the others. All
may be believed, leading us to the conclusion that all the classes named
had a hand in the sack and destruction of Columbia.
When the fire was well under way, Sherman appeared on the scene, but
gave no orders. Nor was it necessary, for Generals Howard, Logan, Woods,
and others were laboring earnestly to prevent the spread of the
conflagration. By their efforts and by the change and subsidence of
wind, the fire in the early morning of February 18 was stayed. Columbia,
wrote General Howard, was little "except a blackened surface peopled
with numerous chimneys and an occasional house that had been spared as
if by a miracle." Science, history, and art might mourn at the loss they
sustained in the destruction of the house of Dr. Gibbes, an antiquary
and naturalist, a scientific acquaintance, if not a friend, of Agassiz.
His large library, portfolios of fine engravings, two hundred paintings,
a remarkable cabinet of Southern fossils, a collection of sharks' teeth,
"pronounced by Agassiz to be the finest in the world," relics of our
aborigines and others from Mexico, "his collection of historical
documents, original correspondence of the Revolution, especially that
of South Carolina," were all burned.
The story of quelling the disorder is told by General Oliver: "February
18, at 4 A.M., the Third Brigade was called out to suppress riot; did
so, killing 2 men, wounding 30 and arresting 370." It is worthy of note
that, despite the reign of lawlessness during the night, very few, if
any, outrages were committed on women.
[220] In a letter presented to the Senate of the United States (some
while before April 21, 1866) Sherman said, "I saw in your
Columbia newspaper the printed order of General Wade Hampton
that on the approach of the Yankee army all the cotton should be
burned" (_South. Hist. Soc. Papers_, VII, 156).