PRICES OF BRITISH INVESTMENT BONDS.

% 1906 1905 1904 1896

British Consols 2½ 86½ 89⅛ 88½ 113⅞[1]

Met. Consols 3½ 102 104 104½ 128¾

London County 3 88½ 94½ 93 128¾

Leeds 4 108 109 111½ 130½

Liverpool 3½ 107 109 109 144¼

Manchester 4 123 128¾ 124¾ 159

New South Wales 3½ 100½ 100 96 112¼

Queensland 3½ 99½ 99 96 111½

Canada 3 98½ 100½ 97 107¼

Cape 3½ 97 98 95 120

Lon. & N. Western 3 93 96 95 124¾

Midland 2½ 76 79 78 124¾[2]

Great Western 4 123 127 123½ 164

----- ----- ----- ----- -----

Average 3.3 100.2 101.8 100.9 128.4

[1] Then 2¾%.

[2] Then 3%.

“Thus,” comments the writer, “these 13 British bonds,

supposedly the safest and least speculative of all

securities, have declined an average of over 28

points in ten years. Considering incomes and present

prices, the unfortunate investors in these bonds have

not only received less than 1% on their investments,

during the last ten years, but, should they sell

their bonds, they would find that the proceeds have

lost 30% of the purchasing power of a similar amount

ten years ago. Altogether, they have suffered a net

loss, over incomes, of more than 20%, or over 2% a

year.”

There are other economic influences affecting interest rates through

gold supply, but the one given appears to the writer the most direct

and forcible when applied to readjustment of prices to income.

In weighing the influence of increasing gold production and its effect

upon interest rates through the advancing prices of commodities, the

student is liable to fall into one grave error. He may perhaps jump

to the conclusion that gradually advancing prices of commodities

mean gradually advancing rates of interest. This is not at all the

case. A sustained ratio of advance means sustained high rates of

interest--nothing more. In order to make this clear let us go back to

the original principle.

Increasing prices for commodities mean an impairment of the purchasing

power of money. If the purchasing power of money is impaired 2% per

annum through increasing prices of commodities, and the normal rate

of interest is 4%, we can cover the deficiency by making the interest

rate 6% _and leaving it there as long as this ratio of impairment is

maintained_. In other words the man who loans $1,000 at 6% loses $20.00

per annum in the impairment of capital and receives normal interest of

$40.00 per annum and $20 extra to cover his loss in capital. Strictly

speaking the extra 2% is not interest at all, but an amortization

payment. It matters not how high prices ultimately go, he receives each

year a bonus sufficient to cover his loss in capital, and the interest

rate remains 6%.

Therefore, if prices of commodities advanced for ten years and then

ceased to advance, but were maintained at the highest figures reached,

interest rates would fall because there would be no further impairment

of capital, and what was formerly amortization, would become usury. On

the other hand, if a new ratio of increase should occur in commodity

prices and they should advance 4% per annum, interest rates would, if

fully adjusted, reach 8%-4% for normal interest, and 4% for impairment

of capital.

_2--The effect upon Common Stocks of Railroad Corporations._

Here the effect of high interest rates is, or in time may be, offset

by returns in the form of dividends, undivided profits, improvement of

property, or the fact that income is not limited. But there is another

trouble, and a serious one, for which the gold supply is responsible.

If the increasing supply of gold is responsible for higher commodity

prices it must be at once apparent that the building, equipment

and maintenance of railway properties costs more and more as all

commodities, including labor, advance in price. This would be all

right if the selling commodity, i.e.: transportation, also advanced

proportionately in price; but it is so difficult to override popular

prejudice and widespread misunderstanding on this point, that we find

continued agitation and legislation not only against advancing rates,

but with a view to reducing those which already obtain. There must,

of course, be a limit to this thing, and if the cost of production

continues to increase, the railroads must be permitted to demand

higher prices for transportation. Otherwise a point would finally

be reached where every railroad in the country would be forced into

bankruptcy. The great danger lies in a belated assimilation of

this truth by the masses, and too much demagoguery on the part of

politicians who do understand, but, being politicians, prefer to

reflect the views of a majority of constituents, rather than to enter

a campaign of proselyting. That evils have been fostered and wrongs

committed by eminent railroad financiers is certain; but there is

considerable confusion of ideas on this head. Over-capitalization,

illegal combinations, manipulation of funds for private gain, and the

swelling of dividends for stock-jobbing purposes, when the funds so

distributed should have gone into improvements or surplus, have all

played their part in arousing the wrath and indignation of the great

majority, and they are, as a class, prone to jump to the conclusion

that any and every railroad corporation is charging unduly high rates

for its services, and making exorbitant returns on invested capital.

This has, no doubt, been more or less true in the past in certain cases

where extremely high rates were made, and the apparent returns on

money attenuated by over-capitalization; but this evil is gradually

decreasing, and the real fight is, or should be, against these abuses.

The railroads are suffering for the sins of the past, and may suffer

still further; but the time is not far distant when, unless conditions

change radically, the railroads must be allowed more latitude in the

adjustment of rates.

The prevalent opinion, that needed reforms which strike at the root

of the evils mentioned above is a bear argument, is another popular

fallacy. Such reforms intelligently conceived, and unswervingly carried

out, are all in favor of the small shareholder. If laws can be enacted

which will prevent individual interests from plundering or misusing

the funds of corporations, and which will compel these corporations to

issue reports and statements which are not so involved and complex as

to be beyond the ordinary comprehension, the small holder or investor

will have a better show. But, having cured these evils, no laws can

possibly endure which contemplate curtailing fair returns on money, and

fair profits through natural enhancement in values.

But, however fair or cheering this view may appear, the fact remains

that it will be slow in its acceptance and slower in its operation. We

may therefore summarize the situation thus. Increasing production of

gold brings about increasing cost of operation, and so long as cost of

operation is advanced with no corresponding advance in selling price of

transportation, the ratio of profits will gradually decrease until a

vanishing point is reached.

In the last analysis, a probable tardy and reluctant recognition of the

true status of the case warrants the belief that for the near future,

the railroads have a hard time ahead of them, and that so far as this

single important influence is concerned, it is decidedly a bearish

factor.

_3--The effect upon stocks of industrial corporations._

Here we have a different proposition. Rising prices for commodities

do not interfere with the earning power of corporations which produce

and sell commodities, the prices of which are not limited by law. In

fact these corporations are, in many cases, gainers by this influence

which tends to advance prices, not only of what they buy, but of what

they sell. It may be added, parenthetically, that railroad companies

which own valuable coal lands, etc., find the bad influences already

discussed partially offset by the gain from such holdings. The railroad

company, however, may be considered as pre-eminently a seller of

transportation and has been so regarded herein.

The industrial corporations whose products are subject to regulation

by law, such as gas and electric lighting companies, are subject to

practically the same influences as those which operate against the

prices of railroad stocks. Their cost of production advances easily

and inevitably, and the selling price remains fixed, or advances with

difficulty and under protest.

_4--The effect on speculative commodities--Wheat, Corn, Oats, Cotton,

etc._

This phase of the subject will be dismissed with a few words. If the

contentions already made are accepted, it is apparent that all such

commodities will gradually seek a higher level. A brief examination

of statistics will show that this readjustment has been going on for

years. The gradually ascending pivotal point, or average price, is

particularly marked in the cheaper cereals,--corn and oats, and also in

cotton. This is probably due to the fact that wages have not advanced

as rapidly as have prices of living. It is found that in periods of

hard times consumption of cheaper foodstuffs and textile fabrics

is increased, while the consumption of higher priced commodities

and luxuries are curtailed. The wage-earner, therefore, has been

in reality living in a regime of hard times, although this fact is

easily submerged by steadier employment, by a fictitious appearance

of general prosperity, and the ability to spend a larger number of

dollars, without realizing fully the loss of purchasing power in the

dollars.

It would be out of the question to attempt to enter anything like

a comprehensive study of the question of gold production and its

effects in a single chapter, or even in a single volume; neither is it

necessary to the purposes of this work, for the student who desires

a comprehensive education in this regard will find ample means and

material ready to his hand. From the standpoint of investment and

speculation alone, it is submitted that increasing production of gold

is, to use the phraseology of the street, bearish on long time bonds

and other securities yielding a limited rate of interest or income,

temporarily bearish on railroad stocks, bullish on industrial shares,

except as noted, and bullish on speculative commodities.

At the risk of indulging in undue reiteration, attention will again be

called to the fallacy of considering such subjects as the one of gold

production too remote in concrete effects, or too sluggish in operation

to be of importance to the speculator. A thorough understanding of

cause and effect bears upon the operations of today, in that it

anticipates the results of tomorrow. Through knowledge of influences of

this character, serious error may be avoided. For example, one of the

profound axioms of the speculative world is that bonds advance first

and stocks afterwards. If we understand _why_ bonds have been, and are

at present, declining we may be justified in modifying this view and

considering the axiom more or less obsolete. He who operates an engine

without a clear understanding of its motive power is likely to get into

trouble, or perhaps be blown up.

It may be pointed out also, that a too literal acceptance of the

suggested effects of this or any other great price influence is highly

dangerous. Even while gold production continues to increase rapidly,

prices, not only of shares, but of all things, will overleap themselves

and will also swing backwards to the other extreme. The cycles are

not completed, until both zenith and nadir have been touched. Changes

in gold production will not prevent declines in prices; they will,

however, interfere with the regularity of the cycles.

This chapter may be fittingly closed with the following list of

conclusions reached by Mr. Holt, in the work already mentioned. These

conclusions cover all the points herein presented, and others which are

of interest and value:

“1--That both the output and supply of gold are

likely to increase rapidly for many years.

“2--That, therefore, the value of gold will

depreciate as the quantity increases.

“3--That this depreciation will be measured by the

rise in the average price level.

“4--That a rising price level, if long continued, is

accompanied by rising or high interest rates.

“5--That high interest rates mean lower prices for

bonds and all other long-time obligations drawing

fixed rates of interest, dividends, or income.

“6--Rising prices increase the cost of materials and

of operation and tend to decrease the net profits

of all concerns, the prices of whose products or

services either cannot be advanced at all, or are not

free to advance rapidly.

“7--Rising prices tend to increase the net profits of

all concerns that own their own sources of materials

and supplies.

“8--Rising prices of commodities tend to cause

the prices of all tangible property to rise. This

includes lands, mines, forests, buildings and

improvements.

“9--Rising prices of commodities and property tend to

increase the value of the securities of corporations

holding commodities or property.

“10--Rising prices and cost of living necessitate

higher money wages, though the rise of wages will

follow, at some distance, behind the rise of prices.

“11--As rising prices do not mean increased profits

to all concerns, many employers will not concede

higher wages without strikes.

“12--Rising prices and wages, therefore, mean

dwindling profits and troublous times in many

industries, with complete ruin as the final goal.

“13--Because wages will not rise as fast or as much

as prices and the cost of living, there will be

dissatisfaction and unrest among wage and salary

earners.

“14--Rising prices of commodities and property

encourage speculation in commodities, stocks and real

estate and discourage honest industry.

“15--Thus, rising prices, by diminishing the

incomes of ‘safe’ investments in ‘gilt-edged’

bonds and stocks and by increasing the profits of

speculators encourage extravagance, recklessness and

thriftlessness.

“16--As rising prices decrease the purchasing power

of debts, and thus aid debtors at the expense of

creditors, they discourage saving and thrift.

“17--Rising prices, then, by promoting speculation

and extravagance, increase consumption, especially of

luxuries, and, therefore, stimulate production.

“18--Rising prices, then, result in what is real

prosperity for many industries; but what is for a

nation as a whole, artificial or sham prosperity--the

result of marking up prices rather than of increasing

production.

“19--With prices, wages, rates and industries always

imperfectly adjusted to the ever depreciating value

of gold, and with instability and uncertainty

throughout the financial world, there cannot but be

a great shifting around of values and of titles to

property.

“20--As this shifting is to the advantage of the

debtors--the rich--and to the disadvantage of the

creditors--the great middle class--it results in

rapidly concentrating wealth in the hands of a

comparatively few.

“21--For all of these reasons a prolonged period of

rapidly rising prices is reasonably certain to

become a period of unrest, discontent, agitation,

strikes, riots, rebellions and wars.

“22--A rapidly depreciating standard of value then,

if long continued, not only produces most important

results in the financial, industrial and commercial

world, but is likely to result in changes of great

consequence in the political, social, and religious

world.

“In view of all the facts, results and possible

consequences connected with the increasing output

and supply of gold, The Wall Street Journal was

right when, on December 4, 1906, it said that ‘No

other economic force is at present in operation in

the world of more stupendous power than that of gold

production.’”

The cycles of speculation · 第 9 / 34 题