'Nor is it the fault of the Word,' adds S. Thomas, 'that all men do

not attain to the knowledge of the truth, but some remain in darkness.

It is the fault of men who do not turn to the Word and so cannot fully

receive Him. Whence there is still more or less darkness remaining

among men, in proportion to the lesser or greater degree in which they

turn to the Word and receive Him. And so John, to preclude any thought

of deficiency in the illuminating power of the Word, after saying

"that life was the light of men," adds "the light shineth in darkness,

and the darkness comprehended it not." The darkness is not because the

Word does not shine, but because some do not receive the light of the

Word; as while the light of the material sun is shining over the

world, it is only dark to those whose eyes are closed or feeble[212].'

It has been necessary to dwell upon this doctrine because it has an

important bearing upon two further questions, which the philosophy of

evolution has brought into new prominence, the relation of

Christianity to previous philosophy and other religions. It was the

fashion, not long ago, to give an undue value to the part played by

environment or surrounding circumstances in the creation of characters

and institutions and creeds, to the exclusion of all elements of

native originality. And the attempt was made accordingly, in various

ways, to represent Christianity as the natural product of the

different religions and philosophies which were current in the world

at the time of its appearing. But the further study of evolution has

qualified this whole mode of thought by the way in which, as we have

seen above, it has led us to look at things as organisms rather than

machines. A machine has no internal principle of unity. Its unity is

impressed upon it from without. And it may be granted therefore, for

the sake of argument, that we might conceive a machine or number of

machines as formed like the patterns in a caleidoscope by a happy

coincidence of atoms; and man, if he were only a machine, as strictly

the creature of circumstance. But an organism is a different thing.

Dependent as it is upon its environment in an hundred various ways, it

is yet more dependent upon its own selective and assimilative

capacity, in other words upon its own individuality, its self. And so

the notions of individuality, originality, personal identity have been

restored to their place in the world of thought. The old error lingers

on, and is sometimes crudely re-asserted, especially in its

anti-Christian bearing; but it has been discredited by science, and is

in fact a thing of the past. And in consequence of this, the attempt

can no longer be plausibly made to account for Christianity apart from

the personality of Jesus Christ. The mythical theories have had their

day. And it is recognised on all hands that mere aspiration can no

more create a religion than appetite can create food. A foundation

needs a founder.

But the attack thus diverted from our religion glances off on our

theology. The Christian religion, it is granted, was founded by Jesus

Christ; but its theological interpretation is viewed as a

misinterpretation, a malign legacy from the dying philosophies of

Greece. This objection is as old as the second century, and has been

revived at intervals in various forms, and with varying degrees of

success. Modern historical criticism has only fortified it with fresh

instances. But it has no force whatever if we believe that the Divine

Word was for ever working in the world in co-operation with human

reason; inspiring the higher minds among the Jews with their thirst

for holiness, and so making ready for the coming of the Holy One in

Jewish flesh: but inspiring the Greeks also with their intellectual

eagerness, and preparing them to recognise Him as the Eternal Reason,

the Word, the Truth; and to define and defend, and demonstrate that

Truth to the outer world. The fact that Greek philosophy had passed

its zenith and was declining did not make its influence upon

Christianity an evil one, a corruption of the living by the dead. It

was only dying to be incorporated in a larger life. The food that

supports our existence owes its power of nutrition to the fact, that

it too once lived with an inferior life of its own. And so the Greek

philosophy was capable of assimilation by the Christian organism, from

the fact that it too had once been vitally inspired by the life that

is the light of men. And the true successors of Plato and Aristotle

were the men of progress who realized this fact; not Celsus, Lucian,

Porphyry, but the Fathers of the Church.

Clement and Origen, Athanasius and Augustine, the Gregories and Basil

understood Greek philosophy as clearly as S. Paul understood Judaism,

and recognised its completion as plainly in the Incarnation of the

Word. Nor was this view of the Incarnation in the one case, any more

than in the other, assumed for a merely apologetic purpose. These men

were essentially philosophers, among the foremost of their age. They

knew and have testified what philosophy had done for their souls, and

what it could not do; how far it had led them forward; and of what

longings it had left them full. True, philosophy had as little

expected Wisdom to become incarnate, and that amongst the barbarians,

the outcast and the poor, as Judaism had expected Messiah to suffer,

and to suffer at the hand of Jews. But no sooner was the Incarnation

accomplished, than it flooded the whole past of Greece no less than

Judaea with a new light. This was what it all meant; this was what it

unwittingly aimed at; the long process of dialectic and prophecy were

here united in their goal.

'Those who lived under the guidance of the Eternal Reason μετὰ λόγου

βιώσαντες as Socrates, Heraclitus, and such-like men, are Christians,'

run the well-known words of Justin Martyr, 'even though they were

reckoned to be atheists in their day.' (Ap. i. 46.) Different minds

have always differed, and will continue to differ widely as to the

degree in which Greek thought contributed to the doctrines of the

Trinity and the Incarnation. It is a difficult and delicate question

for historical criticism to decide. But the essential thing to bear in

mind is that the Christian doctrine of the Logos amply covers any

possible view which criticism may establish upon the point. For, in

the light of that doctrine, it is merely a question of the degree in

which the Eternal Word chose to reveal Himself through one agency

rather than another.

Any attack, therefore, upon our theology for its connection with Greek

thought, is powerless to disturb us; since we accept the fact but give

it another, a deeper interpretation: while we rejoice in every fresh

proof that the great thoughts of the Greek mind were guided by a

higher power, and consecrated to a nobler end than ever their authors

dreamed of; and that the true classic culture is no alien element but

a legitimate ingredient in Catholic, complete Christianity.

And the same line of thought gives us a clue to the history of

religious development, the latest field to which the philosophy of

evolution has been extended. For though a superficial comparison of

religions, with a more or less sceptical result, has often been

attempted before, as for instance in the thirteenth century with its

well-known story of the three impostors; anything like a scientific

study of them has been impossible till now. For now for the first time

we are beginning to have the facts before us; the facts consisting in

the original documents of the various historic creeds, and accumulated

observations on the religious ideas of uncivilized races. In both

these fields very much remains to be done; but still there is enough

done already to justify a few generalizations. But the subject is

intensely complex, and there has been far too great a tendency, as in

all new sciences, to rush to premature conclusions. For example, there

is the shallow scepticism which seizes upon facts, like the many

parallelisms between the moral precepts of earlier religions and the

sermon on the Mount, as a convincing proof that Christianity contains

nothing that is new. No serious student of comparative religions would

justify such an inference; but it is a very common and mischievous

fallacy in the half-culture of the day. Then there is the rash

orthodoxy, that is over eager to accept any result that tallies with

its own preconceived opinions as, for instance, the belief in a

primitive monotheism. No doubt several very competent authorities

think that the present evidence points in that direction. But a

majority of critics equally competent think otherwise. And meanwhile,

there is a mass of evidence still waiting collection and

interpretation, which may one day throw further light upon the point.

Under such circumstances, therefore, it is as impolitic as it is

unscientific to identify Christian apology with a position which may

one day prove untenable. Attention has already been called to a

similar imprudence in connection with Biogenesis, and the history of

past apology is full of warnings against such conduct. Then, again,

there is the converse view which is often as glibly stated as if it

were already a scientific truism; the view that religion was evolved

out of non-religious elements, such as the appearance of dead

ancestors in dreams. This rests, to begin with, on the supposition

that the opinions of uncivilized man, as we now find him, are the

nearest to those of man in his primitive condition; which, considering

that degradation is a recognised factor in history, and that

degradation acts more powerfully in religion than in any other region,

is a very considerable assumption. But even granting this, the

psychological possibility of the process in question, as well as the

lapse of time sufficient for its operation, are both as yet unproved.

It is an hypothetical process, happening in an hypothetical period;

but, logically considered, nothing more.

All this should make us cautious in approaching the comparative study

of religions. Still, even in its present stage, it has reached some

general results. In the first place, the universality of religion is

established as an empirical fact. Man, with a few insignificant

exceptions which may fairly be put down to degradation, within the

limits of our observation, is everywhere religious. The notion that

religion was an invention of interested priestcraft has vanished, like

many other eighteenth century fictions, before nineteenth century

science. Even in the savage races, where priestcraft is most

conspicuous, the priest has never created the religion, but always the

religion the priest. Beyond this fact it is unsafe to dogmatize. There

is abundant evidence of early nature-worship in very various forms,

but whether this was the degraded offspring of purer conceptions, or

as is more generally supposed the primitive parent from which those

conceptions sprang, is still an open question. The universality of the

fact is all that is certain.

Again, there is a progressive tendency observable in the religions of

the world; but the progress is of a particular kind, and largely

counteracted by degeneracy. Individuals elevate, masses degrade

religion. There is no progress by insensible modifications; no

improvement of a religion in committee. Councils like those of Asoka

or Chosroes can only sift and popularise and publish what it needed a

Buddha or Zarathustra to create. And so religion is handed on, from

one great teacher to another, never rising above the level of its

founder or last reformer, till another founder or reformer comes;

while in the interval it is materialized, vulgarized, degraded.

And from the nature of this progress, as the work of great

individuals, another consequence has historically followed; viz. that

all the pre-Christian religions have been partial, have emphasized,

that is to say, unduly if not exclusively one requirement or another

of the religious consciousness, but never its complex whole. For the

individual teacher, however great, cannot proclaim with prophetic

intensity more than one aspect of a truth; and his followers

invariably tend to isolate and exaggerate this aspect, while any who

attempt to supply its complement are regarded with suspicion. Hence

the parties and sects and heresies of which religious history is full.

The simplest illustration of this is the fundamental distinction

between Theism and Pantheism, or the transcendence and immanence of

God; the one often said to be a Semitic, the other an Aryan tendency

of thought. But however this may be, both these principles must be

represented in any system which would really satisfy the whole of our

religious instincts; while, as a matter of fact, they were separated

by all the pre-Christian religions, and are separated by Mahometanism

and Buddhism, the only two religious systems which compete with

Christianity to-day.

These, then, are a few broad results of our comparative survey of

religions. That religion, however humble the mode of its first

appearing, is yet universal to man. That it progresses through the

agency of the great individual, the unique personality, the spiritual

genius; while popular influence is a counter-agent and makes for its

decay. That its various developments have all been partial, and

therefore needed completion, if the cravings of the human spirit were

ever to be set at rest.

And all this is in perfect harmony with our Christian belief in a God

Who, from the day of man's first appearance in the dim twilight of the

world, left not Himself without witness in sun and moon, and rain and

storm-cloud, and the courses of the stars, and the promptings of

conscience, and the love of kin: and Who the while was lighting every

man that cometh into the world, the primaeval hunter, the shepherd

chieftain, the poets of the Vedas and the Gathas, the Chaldaean

astronomer, the Egyptian priest, each, at least in a measure, to spell

that witness out aright; ever and anon when a heart was ready

revealing Himself with greater clearness, to one or another chosen

spirit, and by their means to other men; till at length, in the

fulness of time, when Jews were yearning for one in whom righteousness

should triumph visibly; and Greeks sighing over the divorce between

truth and power, and wondering whether the wise man ever would indeed

be king; and artists and ascetics wandering equally astray, in vain

attempt to solve the problem of the spirit and the flesh; 'the Word

was made Flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth.' The

pre-Christian religions were the age-long prayer. The Incarnation was

the answer. Nor are we tied to any particular view of the prehistoric

stages of this development. We only postulate that whenever and

however man became truly man, he was from that moment religious, or

capable of religion; and this postulate deals with the region that

lies beyond the reach of science, though all scientific observation

is, as we have seen, directly in its favour.

In short, the history of the pre-Christian religion is like that of

pre-Christian philosophy, a long preparation for the Gospel. We are

familiar enough with this thought in its Jewish application from the

teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews. But it seems to be often

forgotten that the principles laid down in that Epistle admit of no

limitation to any single race of men. They are naturally illustrated

from Hebrew history in a writing addressed to Hebrews. But their scope

is universal. They compel their own application to every religious

history, which the growth of our knowledge brings to light. And from

this point of view the many pagan adumbrations of Christian doctrine,

similarities of practice, coincidences of ritual, analogies of phrase

and symbol, fall naturally into place. The fathers and early

missionaries were often perplexed by these phenomena, and did not

scruple to attribute them to diabolic imitation. And even in the

present day they are capable of disturbing timid minds, when

unexpectedly presented before them. But all this is unphilosophical,

for in the light of evolution the occurrence of such analogies is a

thing to be expected; while to the eye of faith they do but emphasize

the claim of Christianity to be universal, by shewing that it contains

in spiritual summary the religious thoughts and practices and ways of

prayer and worship, not of one people only, but of all the races of

men.

'In the whole of our Christian faith,' says Thomassin, 'there is

nothing which does not in the highest degree harmonize with that

natural philosophy which Wisdom, who made all things, infused into

every created mind, and wrote upon the very marrow of the reason; so

that, however obscured by the foul pleasures of the senses, it never

can be wholly done away. It was this hidden and intimate love of the

human mind, however marred, for the incorruptible truth, which won the

whole world over to the gospel of Christ, when once that Gospel was

proclaimed[213].'

But when all this has been said, there is a lingering suspicion in

many minds, that even if the details of the doctrine of development

are not inconsistent with Christianity, its whole drift is

incompatible with any system of opinion which claims to possess

finality. And if Christianity were only a system of opinion, the

objection might be plausible enough. But its claim to possess finality

rests upon its further claim to be much more than a system of opinion.

The doctrine of development or evolution, we must remember, is not a

doctrine of limitless change, like the old Greek notion of perpetual

flux. Species once developed are seen to be persistent, in proportion

to their versatility, their power, i.e. of adapting themselves to the

changes of the world around them. And because man, through his mental

capacity, possesses this power to an almost unlimited extent, the

human species is virtually permanent. Now in scientific language, the

Incarnation may be said to have introduced a new species into the

world--a Divine man transcending past humanity, as humanity

transcended the rest of the animal creation, and communicating His

vital energy by a spiritual process to subsequent generations of men.

And thus viewed, there is nothing unreasonable in the claim of

Christianity to be at least as permanent as the race which it has

raised to a higher power, and endued with a novel strength.

III. But in saying this we touch new ground. As long as we confine

ourselves to speaking of the Eternal Word as operating in the

mysterious region which lies behind phenomena, we are safe it may be

said from refutation, because we are dealing with the unknown. But

when we go on to assert that He has flashed through our atmosphere,

and been seen of men, scintillating signs and wonders in His path, we

are at once open to critical attack. And this brings us to the real

point at issue between Christianity and its modern opponents. It is

not the substantive body of our knowledge, but the critical faculty

which has been sharpened in its acquisition that really comes in

conflict with our creed. Assuming Christianity to be true, there is,

as we have seen, nothing in it inconsistent with any ascertained

scientific fact. But what is called the negative criticism assumes

that it cannot be true, because the miraculous element in it

contradicts experience. Still criticism is a very different thing from

science, a subjective thing into which imagination and personal

idiosyncrasy enter largely, and which needs therefore in its turn to

be rigorously criticised. And the statement that Christianity

contradicts experience suggests two reflections, _in limine_.

In the first place the origin of all things is mysterious, the origin

of matter, the origin of energy, the origin of life, the origin of

thought. And present experience is no criterion of any of these

things. What were their birth throes, what were their accompanying

signs and wonders, when the morning stars sang together in the dawn of

their appearing, we do not and cannot know. If therefore the

Incarnation was, as Christians believe, another instance of a new

beginning, present experience will neither enable us to assert or

deny, what its attendant circumstances may or may not have been. The

logical impossibility of proving a negative is proverbial. And on a

subject, whose conditions are unknown to us, the very attempt becomes

ridiculous. And secondly, it is a mistake to suppose that as a matter

of strict evidence, the Christian Church has ever rested its claims

upon its miracles. A confirmatory factor indeed, in a complication of

converging arguments, they have been, and still are to many minds. But

to others, who in the present day are probably the larger class, it is

not so easy to believe Christianity on account of miracles, as

miracles on account of Christianity. For now, as ever, the real burden

of the proof of Christianity is to be sought in our present

experience.

There is a fact of experience as old as history, as widely spread as

is the human race, and more intensely, irresistibly, importunately

real than all the gathered experience of art and policy and

science,--the fact which philosophers call moral evil, and Christians

sin. It rests upon no questionable interpretation of an Eastern

allegory. We breathe it, we feel it, we commit it, we see its havoc

all around us. It is no dogma, but a sad, solemn, inevitable fact. The

animal creation has a law of its being, a condition of its perfection,

which it instinctively and invariably pursues. Man has a law of his

being, a condition of his perfection, which he instinctively tends to

disobey. And what he does to-day, he has been doing from the first

record of his existence.

Video meliora proboque,

Deteriora sequor.

Philosophers have from time to time attempted to explain this dark

experience away, and here and there men of happy temperament, living

among calm surroundings, have been comparatively unconscious of the

evil in the world. But the common conscience is alike unaffected by

the ingenuity of the one class, or the apathy of the other; while it

thrills to the voices of men like S. Paul or S. Augustine, Dante or

John Bunyan, Loyola or Luther; recognising in their sighs and tears

and lamentations, the echo of its own unutterable sorrow made

articulate. Nor is sin confined to one department of our being. It

poisons the very springs of life, and taints its every action. It

corrupts art; it hampers science; it paralyses the efforts of the

politician and the patriot; and diseased bodies, and broken hearts,

and mental and spiritual agony, are amongst its daily, its hourly

results. It would seem indeed superfluous to insist upon these things,

if their importance were not so often ignored in the course of

anti-Christian argument. But when we are met by an appeal to

experience, it is necessary to insist that no element of experience be

left out.

And moral evil, independently of any theory of its nature or its

origin, is a plain palpable fact, and a fact of such stupendous

magnitude as to constitute by far the most serious problem of our

life.

Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation, 10th Edition, 1890 · 第 21 / 51 段