Faith is under the pressure of this challenge: and the primary

question is, how will it behave? What is it going to say, or do, in

face of this exciting transformation which has passed over the entire

surface of our intellectual scenery? How will it deal with the

situation? Will it prove itself adequate to the crisis? To what extent

can it afford to submit to the transforming process which has already

operated upon the mind and the imagination? If it submit, can it

survive? And in what condition? with what loss, or damage, or change?

On every side these challenges reach it; they beat at its doors; they

arrive in pelting haste; they clamour for immediate solutions.

Now faith, under these rapid and stormy challenges, is apt to fall

into panic. For this, surely, is the very meaning of a panic--a fear

that feeds upon itself. Men in a panic are frightened at finding

themselves afraid. So now with faith; it is terrified at its own

alarm. How is it (it asks itself) that it should find itself baffled

and timorous? If faith were faith, would it ever lose its confidence?

To be frightened is to confess itself false: for faith is confidence

in God, Who can never fail. How can faith allow of doubt or

hesitation? Surely for faith to hesitate, to be confused, is to deny

its very nature. Thus many anxious and perplexed souls retreat before

their own perplexities. Because their faith is troubled, they distrust

and abandon their faith. The very fact that it is in distress becomes

an argument against it.

It is at this point, and because of this particular peril that we are

urgently required to consider very seriously the nature and conditions

of faith. For our panic arises from our assumption that faith is of

such a nature, that the perplexity, into which, now and again, we find

ourselves thrown, must be impossible to it, must be incompatible with

it. Now, is this so? Ought we to expect of faith that its confidence

should never fail it--that its light should be always decisive? Is

faith incriminated by the mere fact that it is in difficulties?

Let us, first, consider what has occurred. Perhaps the situation

itself, if we quietly review it, will give a reason why it is that,

just at the moment when we most need vigour and assurance, we should

find ourselves stripped of all that tends to reassure.

For the peculiarity of the disturbance which we have got to encounter

lies in this, that it has removed from us the very weapons by which we

might hope to encounter it. Faith's evidential material is all

corroborative and accumulative; it draws it from out of an external

world, which can never wholly justify, or account for the internal

reality, yet which can so group itself, that from a hundred differing

lines, it offers indirect and parenthetic and convergent witness of

that which is, itself, beyond the reach of external proof. It is this

gradual grouping of an outer life into that assorted perspective in

which it offers the most effective corroboration of the inner truth,

which faith slowly accomplishes upon the matter which human science

presents to it. When once the grouping is achieved, so that the outer

world, known under certain scientific principles, tallies harmoniously

with its inner convictions, faith feels secure. The external life

offers it pictures, analogies, metaphors--all echoing and repeating

the internal world. Faith beholds itself mirrored: and, so echoed, so

mirrored, it feels itself in possession of corroborating evidences.

But the present scientific confusion seems to have shattered the

mirror--to have broken up the perspective--to have dissolved the

well-known groupings. It is true, as some of the essays which follow

will try to show, that the convulsion of which we speak, lies,

chiefly, in a change of position, or of level; so that great masses of

the matter, now thrown into confusion, will be found to compose

themselves afresh, under the newer conditions of review, and will

appear again as part and parcel of the scientific scenery. It is a

change of perspective more than anything else. But, no doubt, such a

change is just of the character to upset us, to disturb us; for,

during the change, while shifting from the old position to the new, we

are in the very chaos of confusion; everything seems, for the moment,

to be tumbling about around us: the entire scene grows unsteady;

though, indeed, when once we have got our feet firmly placed at the

new level of vantage, much, that once was familiar, is discovered to

be back again in its place, looking much the same as of old. It is the

_first_ shock of this enforced transition which is so calculated to

terrify: as when, for instance, men see their habitual reliance on the

evidence for design in nature, which had been inherited from Paley,

yield, and vanish, under the review of the facts with which the theory

of evolution acquaints them. What they feel is, that their familiar

mode of interpreting their faith, of justifying it, of picturing it,

has abruptly been torn from them. That which once seemed to evidence

it in the outer world, has ceased to be accepted or trusted. The

habitual ways of argument, the accepted assumptions, which they had

hitherto used as their supports and their instruments--have been

withdrawn--have become obsolete. Faith is thrown back on itself, on

its own inherent, naked vitality; it is robbed for the moment of that

sense of solidity and security, which fortifies and refreshes it, when

the outer world of natural facts, and the inner world of intellect and

fancy, all corroborate its confidence in itself, by harmonious

attestations of its validity. The old world of things had been brought

into this adaptation with the principles of belief. Faith was at home

in it, and looked out over it with cheerfulness, and moved about it

with freedom. But that old world is gone; and the new still lies

untested, unsorted, unverified, unassimilated, unhandled. It looks

foreign, odd, remote. Faith finds no obvious corroborations in it:

there, where it used to feel buttressed and warm, it now feels chilly

and exposed[53].

This is the first consequence, and it is serious enough in itself to

provoke alarm. Faith cannot be at ease or confident, until the outer

world responds to its own convictions; and yet ease and confidence are

exactly what it is challenged to exhibit.

And then, when a man, under this sense of fear, deprived of external

testimonies, attempts to exhibit, to evoke, to examine, his inner

conviction, in its inherent and vital character, as it is in itself,

unsupported by adventitious aids, he is astonished at his own

difficulty in discovering or disclosing it. Where is it all fled--that

which he had called his faith? He had enjoyed it, had relied on it,

had again and again asserted it in word and deed: and now, when he

wants to look at it, when he is summoned to produce it, when he is

challenged to declare its form and fashion; he finds himself dazed,

bewildered, searching helplessly for that which ever escapes him,

grasping at a fleeting shadow, which baffles his efforts to endow it

with fixity and substance. And, so finding, he grows yet more

desperately alarmed: it seems to him that he has been self-deceived,

betrayed, abandoned. He is bitterly sensitive to the sharp contrast

between the triumphant solidity with which scientific facts bear down

upon him, certified, undeniable, substantial, and the vague, shifty,

indistinct phantom, into which his conviction vanishes as soon as he

attempts to observe it in itself, or draw it out for public

inspection.

Yet, if we consider what faith signifies, we shall see at once that

this contrast ought to carry with it no alarm. It is a contrast which

follows on the very nature of faith. If we had understood its nature,

we could never have expected it to disclose itself under the same

conditions as those which govern the observation of scientific facts.

Faith is an elemental energy of the soul, and the surprise that we are

undergoing at not being able to bring it under direct observation, is

only an echo of the familiar shock with which we learn that science

has ransacked the entire bodily fabric of man, and has nowhere come

across his soul; or has searched the heavens through and through with

its telescope, and has seen no God. We are upset for a moment when

first we hear this; and then, we recover ourselves as we recollect

that, if God be what we believe Him to be, immaterial and spiritual,

then He would cease to be Himself, if He were visible through a

telescope: and that if the spirit of man be what we believe it to be,

that is the very reason why no surgeon's knife can ever arrive at it.

And, as with the soul, so with all its inherent and essential acts.

They are what it is: they can no more be visible than it can. How can

any of the basal intuitions, on which our knowledge rests, present

themselves to our inspection in the guise of external and phenomenal

facts? That which observes can never, strictly speaking, observe

itself. It can never look on at itself from outside, or view itself as

one among the multitude of things that come under its review. How can

it? It is itself the organ of vision: and the eye cannot see its own

power of seeing. This is why natural science, which is an organised

system of observation, finds that its own observing mind is absolutely

and totally outside its ken. It can take stock of the physiological

condition of thoughts or of feelings; but they themselves, in their

actual reality, are all rigidly shut out from the entire area of

scientific research. Wherever they begin, it ends; its methods

abruptly fail. It possesses no instrument by which to make good its

advance further. For the only instrument which it knows how to use,

and by which alone it can search, and examine, is itself the object

which it desires to submit to examination. But if _it_ is to be

examined, who, and what, is to conduct the examination? The observing

mind that turns round to explore itself, carries itself round as it

turns. It can never say--'Let me look at myself, as if I were a

phenomenon, as a fact presented to my own consciousness,' for it

itself would be engaged in the act of looking: it itself is the

consciousness to which it proposes to present itself[54]. So again,

the thought itself can never hope, by rigid analysing, to arrive at

last at itself, as the final residue of the analysis, for it is

itself, all along, employed as analyst. The process of analysis is,

itself, the real disclosure of what thought is: and this disclosure is

made just as effectively even though the result of the analysis be to

declare that it can discover nothing that corresponds to thought. It

is, indeed, impossible that anything should so correspond, except the

power to analyse; but this power _is_ thought: and every act of the

analysis, which issues in the sceptical conclusion, has verified the

real existence of thought. It is the same with all profound spiritual

acts. None of them can ever be offered to public inspection: they can

never be handed across to another, for him to look at. For they are

living acts, and not external results. How can an act of will, or of

love, be submitted to observation? Its outward result is there to be

examined; but it, itself, is incapable of transportation. If anyone

were to ask 'What is it you mean by thinking, or loving, or willing?'

who could tell him? It would be obviously impossible to explain,

except to a being who could think, will, and love. You could give him

illustrations of what you mean--signs--instances--evidences; but they

can only be intelligible, as evidences, to one who already possesses

the faculties. No one can do a piece of thinking for another, and hand

it over to him in a parcel. Only by thinking, can it be known what

thought is: only by feeling can it be understood what is meant by a

feeling: only by seeing, willing, loving, can we have the least

conception of sight, or of will, or of love.

And faith stands with these primary intuitions. It is deeper and more

elemental than them all: and, therefore, still less than they can it

admit of translation into other conditions than its own;--can still

less submit itself to public observation. It can never be looked at

from without. It can be known only from within itself. Belief is only

intelligible by believing. Just as a man who is asked to say what love

is, apart from all its outward manifestations and results, must be

driven back on the iteration--'Love is--what love is: everyone who

loves, knows; no one who does not love, can ever know;' just as a man,

who is challenged to describe and define his feelings or his desires,

when stripped of all the outward evidences that they can possibly give

of themselves, is thrown into inarticulate bewilderment, and can give

no intelligible answer, and can fashion to himself no distinct feature

or character, and can only assert, confusedly, that he feels what he

feels, and that to desire is to desire;--so with faith. The scientific

convulsion has shaken and confused its normal modes of self-interpretation,

its usual evidences, signs, illustrations: these outer aids at

definition, by metaphor or by corroboration, are all brought under dim

eclipse for the moment: their relative values have been thrown into

uncertainty: they are undergoing temporary displacement, and no one is

quite sure which is being shifted, and which can be trusted to stand

firm. Faith, robbed of its habitual aids to expression, is summoned to

show itself on the field, in its own inner character. And this is just

what it never can or may do. It can only reiterate, in response to the

demand for definition, 'Faith is faith.' 'Believing is--just

believing.' Why, then, let ourselves be distressed, or bewildered, by

finding ourselves reduced to this impotence of explanation? Far from

it being an incrimination of our faith, to find ourselves caught in

such a difficulty of utterance, it is just what must happen if faith

be a profound and radical act of the inner soul. It is, essentially,

an active principle, a source of energy, a spring of movement: and, as

such, its verification can never take place through passive

introspection. It verifies itself only in actions: its reality can

only be made evident through experience of its living work.

II. We may, then, free ourselves from the sinister suspicions which

belong to panic. It is not the superficiality of our faith, which is

the secret of our bewilderment, but its depth. The deepest and most

radical elements of our being are, necessarily, the hardest to

unearth. They are, obviously, the most remote from the surface of our

lives: they are the rarest to show themselves in the open daylight:

they require the severest effort to disentangle their identity: they

lie below all ordinary methods of utterance and expression; they can

only be discovered through careful recognition of the secret

assumptions which are involved in the acts and words which they

habitually produce. By these acts and words their existence and their

force is suggested, but not exhausted--manifested, but not accounted

for. These form our only positive interpretation and evidence: and

such evidence must, therefore, always remain inadequate, imperfect; we

have always and inevitably to go behind it, and beyond it, in order to

reach and touch the motive-energy which is disclosed to us through it.

No wonder that we find this far from an easy matter. No wonder that,

under the pressure of a hostile challenge, we often lose ourselves in

a confused babble, as we struggle to make plain to others, or even to

ourselves, these innermost convictions of our souls.

Indeed, such things can never be made plain: no one ought to expect

that they should. For, if we think of it, the primary acts of spirit

must be the _last_ things that can ever be made plain; for the entire

life issuing from them is their only interpretation, so that only when

that life is closed, can their interpretation be complete. And here,

in faith, we are at the root of a life which, as we believe, it will

take eternity to fulfil. And, if so, only in and through eternity can

its full evidence for itself be produced, or its right interpretation

be yielded.

Surely, this truth clears us from many clamorous demands, which ask of

us an impossible verification. For if once we saw that we were

employed in verifying the nature of that which, if it be real, can,

confessedly, present us, on this side of the grave, only with the most

fragmentary evidence of its character, we should put lightly aside the

taunting challenge to produce such proof of our motive principle as

will stand comparison with the adequate and precise evidences of a

scientific fact, or which will submit to the rigid tests of a legal

examination. If faith be faith, it could not, for that very reason,

fulfil the conditions so proposed to it. These legal and scientific

conditions are laboriously and artificially limited to testing the

presence of a motive, or a force, which must be assumed to exist under

fixed, precise, complete conditions, here and now. They pre-suppose

that, for all practical purposes, its quantity cannot vary, or

fluctuate. If it be present at all, it is present in a distinct and

formal manner, open to definite measurement, expressing itself in

unalterable characteristics. The entire consideration of its activity

is strictly confined to the normal horizon of the actual world of

present existence. These assumptions are the first necessity of all

forms of science, without making which, it could not even begin. They

are the conditions of all its success. But they are also its

limitations: and as such, they most certainly exclude from their

survey, anything that professes to exist after the manner of faith.

For what is faith? It is no steady force, existing under certified and

unvarying conditions which receive their final determination in the

world about us. Faith is, while it is here on earth, only a tentative

probation: it is a struggling and fluctuating effort in man to win for

himself a valid hold upon things that exist under the conditions of

eternity. In faith, we watch the early and rude beginnings, amid an

environment that but faintly and doubtfully responds to it, of a power

still in the womb--still unborn into its true sphere--still enveloped

in dark wrappings which encumber and impede. We see here but its

blind, uncertain pushings, its hesitating moves, now forward, now

back, now strangely vigorous and assertive, and then again, as

strangely weak and retreating. Its significance, its interpretation,

its future possibilities, its secret of development--all these lie

elsewhere, beyond death, beyond vision: we can but dimly guess, from

its action here, what powers feed it, on what resources it can rely,

what capacity of growth is open to it, what final issue determines the

measure and value of its efforts and achievements here. Such a force

as this is bound to upset all our ablest calculations. We can never

lay down rules to govern and predict its capabilities. It will

disappoint every conceivable test that we can devise for fixing its

conditions. It will laugh at our attempts to circumscribe its action.

Where we look for it to be weak, it will suddenly show itself strong:

when we are convinced that we may expect a vigorous display of its

capacities, it will mysteriously lapse. All this may terribly

disconcert us. It may tempt us into angry declarations that such an

incalculable existence is unworthy of scientific attention--is

fanciful, is unreal. But the only lesson which we ought to learn is

that methods adapted for one state of things are bound to prove

themselves futile when applied to another. If we are employed in

observing a life, which has its ground and its end in a world beyond

the present, then all methods framed for the express and definite

purpose of examining life as it exists here and now, will necessarily

prove themselves ludicrously inapt. The futility, the barrenness, the

ineptitude of our researches, lies, not with the faith against which

we level our irritable complaints, but with the methods which, by

their very terms of definition, proclaim themselves to be misplaced.

Where, then, must we dig to unearth the roots of faith? What are the

conditions of its rise and exercise? Wherein lie its grounds, and the

justification of its claim?

Faith grounds itself, solely and wholly, on an inner and vital

relation of the soul to its source. This source is most certainly

elsewhere; it is not within the compass of the soul's own activity. In

some mode, inconceivable and mysterious, our life issues out of an

impenetrable background: and as our life includes spiritual elements,

that background has spiritual factors: and as our life is personal,

within that background exists personality. This supply of life in

which we begin, from out of which our being opens, can never cease, so

long as we exist, to sustain us by one continuous act. Ever its

resources flow in: ever its vital support is unwithdrawn. In some

fashion or other, we all know that this must be so: and the Christian

Creed only lifts into clear daylight, and endows with perfect

expression, this elementary and universal verity, when it asserts that

at the very core of each man's being lies, and lives, and moves, and

works, the creative energy of the Divine Will--'the Will of our Father

Which is in Heaven.'

We stand, by the necessities of our existence, in the relationship of

sons to a Father, Who has poured out into us, and still pours, the

vigour of His own life. This is the one basis of all faith. Unless

this relationship actually exists, there could be no faith: if it

exists, then faith is its essential corollary: it is bound to appear.

Our faith is simply the witness to this inner bond of being. That

bond, which is the secret of our entire existence, accounting for all

that we are, or do, or feel, or think, or say, must become capable of

recognition by a being that is, in any sense, free, intelligent,

conscious: and this recognition by us of the source from whence we

derive, is what we mean by faith. Faith is the sense in us that we are

Another's creature, Another's making. Even as we not only feel, but

feel that we feel; not only think, but know that we think; not only

choose, but determine to choose: so, below and within all our willing,

and thinking, and feeling, we are conscious of Another, whose mind and

will alone make possible both the feeling that we feel, and also the

capacity to feel it; both the thought that we think, and also the

capacity to know it; both the will that we put forth, as well as the

power to determine it. Every act, every desire, every motive of ours,

is dependant on the source out of sight: we hang on Another's will; we

are alive in Another's life. All our life is a discovery, a

disclosure, of this secret. We find it out only by living. As we put

out powers that seem to be our own, still even in and by the very act

of putting them out, we reveal them to be not our own; we discover

that we are always drawing on unseen resources. We are sons: that is

the root-law of our entire self. And faith is the active instinct of

that inner sonship: it is the point at which that essential sonship

emerges into consciousness; it is the disclosure to the self of its

own vital secret; it is the thrill of our inherent childhood, as it

makes itself felt within the central recesses of the life; it is the

flame that shoots into consciousness at the recognition of the touch

of our divine fatherhood; it is the immediate response of the sonship

in us to its discovered origin.

Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation, 10th Edition, 1890 · 第 4 / 51 段