MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.
1. Man's powers and means of knowledge are so limited and imperfect
that he can know _little_ concerning God. It is well that men in their
theological speculations should recollect that it is so, and should
pursue all such speculations in a modest and humble spirit.
But this humility and modesty defeat their own ends, when they lead us
to think that we can know _nothing_ concerning God: for to be modest
and humble in dealing with this subject, implies that we know _this_,
at least, that God is a proper object of modest and humble thought.
2. Some philosophers have been led, however, by an examination of man's
faculties and of the nature of being, to the conclusion that man can
know _nothing_ concerning God. But we may very reasonably doubt the
truth of this conclusion. We may ask, How can we _know_ that we _can_
know nothing? If we can know nothing, we cannot even know that.
It is much more reasonable to begin with things that we really do know,
and to examine how far such knowledge can carry us, respecting God, as
well as anything else. This is the course which we have been following,
and its results are very far from being trifling or unimportant.
In thus beginning from what we know, we start from two points, on each
of which we have, we conceive, some real and sure knowledge:--namely,
mathematical and physical knowledge of the universe without us; and a
knowledge of our own moral and personal nature within us.
3. (_From Nature we learn something of God._)--In pursuing the first
line of thought, we are led to reason thus. The universe is governed
by certain Ideas: for instance, everything which exists and happens in
the universe, exists and happens IN _Space_ and _Time_. Why is this?
It is, we conceive, because God has constituted and constitutes the
universe so that it may be so; that is, because the Ideas of Space and
of Time are Ideas according to which God has established and upholds
the universe.
But we may proceed further in this way, as we have already said.
The universe not only exists in space and time, but it has in it
substances--material substances: or taking it collectively, Material
_Substance_. Can we know anything concerning this substance? Yes:
something we can know; for we know that material substance cannot be
brought into being or annihilated by any natural process. We have then
an Idea of Substance which is a Law of the universe. How is this?--We
reply, that it is because our Idea of Substance is an Idea on which God
has established and upholds the universe.
Can we proceed further still? Can we discern any other Ideas according
to which the universe is constituted? Yes: as we have already remarked,
we can discern several, though as we go on from one to another
they become gradually fainter in their light, less cogent in their
necessity. We can see that Force as well as Material Substance is
an Idea on which the universe is constituted, and that _Force_ and
_Matter_ are a necessary and universal antithesis: we can see that
the Things which occupy the universe must be of definite _Kinds_, in
order that an intelligent mind may occupy itself about them, and thus
that the Idea of Kind is a constitutive Idea of the universe. We can
see that some kinds of things have life, and our Idea of Life is,
that every part of a living thing is a means to an End; and thus we
recognize _End_, or Final Cause, as an Idea which prevails throughout
the universe, and we recognize this Idea as an Idea according to which
God constitutes and upholds the universe.
Since we know so much concerning the universe, and since every Law of
the universe which is a necessary form of thought about the universe
must exist in the _Divine_ Mind, in order that it may find a place in
_our_ minds, how can we say that we can know nothing concerning the
Divine Mind?
4. (_Though but Little._)--But on the other hand, we easily see how
little our knowledge is, compared with what we do not know. Even the
parts of our knowledge which are the clearest are full of perplexities;
and of the Laws of the universe, including living as well as lifeless
things, how small a portion do we know at all!
Even the parts of our knowledge which are the clearest, I say, are
full of perplexities. Infinite Space and an infinite Past, an infinite
Future,--how helplessly our reason struggles with these aspects of
our Ideas! And with regard to _Substance_, how did ingenerable and
indestructible substance come into being? And with regard to _Matter_,
how can passive Matter be endued with living force? And with regard to
_Kinds_, how immeasurably beyond our power of knowing are their numbers
and their outward differences: still more their internal differences
and central essence! And with regard to the _Design_ which we see in
the organs of living things, though we can confidently say we see it,
how obscurely is it shown, and how much is our view of it disturbed by
other Laws and Analogies! And the Life of things, the end to which such
Design tends, how full of impenetrable mysteries is it! or rather how
entirely a mass of mystery into which our powers of knowledge strive in
vain to penetrate!
There is therefore no danger that by following this train of thought
we should elevate our view of man too high, or bring down God in our
thoughts to the likeness of man. Even if we were to suppose the Idea
of the Divine Mind to be of the same kind as the Ideas of the human
mind, the very few Ideas of this kind, which man possesses, compared
with the whole range of the universe, and the scanty length to which
he can follow each, make his knowledge so small and imperfect, that
he has abundant reason to be modest and humble in his contemplations
concerning the Intelligence that knows all and constitutes all. He can,
as I have already said, wade but a few steps into the margin of the
boundless and unfathomable ocean of truth.
5. But the Ideas of the Divine Mind must necessarily be different in
kind, as well as in number and extent, from the Ideas of the human
mind, on this very account, that they are complete and perfect. The
Mind which can conceive all the parts and laws of the universe in all
their mutual bearings, fundamental reasons, and remote consequences,
must be different in kind, as well as in extent, from the mind which
can only trace a few of these parts, and see these laws in a few of
their aspects, and cannot sound the whole depth of any of them. The
Divine Mind differs from the human, in the way in which we must needs
suppose what is Divine to differ from what is human.
6. It has sometimes been said that the Divine Mind differs from the
human as the Infinite from the finite. And this has been given as a
reason why we cannot know anything concerning God; for we cannot,
it is said, know _anything_ concerning the Infinite. Our conception
of the Infinite being merely negative, (the negation of a limit,)
makes all knowledge about it impossible. But this is not truly said.
Our conception of the Infinite is _not_ merely negative. As I have
elsewhere remarked, our conception of the Infinite is positive in this
way:--that in order to form this conception, we begin to follow a given
Idea in a given direction; and then, having thus begun, we suppose that
the progress of thought goes on in that direction without limit. To
arrive at our Idea of infinite space, for example, we must determine
what kind of space we mean,--line, area or solid; and from what origin
we begin: and infinite space has different attributes as we take
different beginnings in this way.
And so with regard to the kinds of infinity (for there are many) which
belong to the Divine Mind. _We_ have a few Ideas which represent the
Laws of the universe:--as Space, Time, Substance, Force, Matter, Kind,
End; of such Ideas the Divine Mind may have an infinite number. These
Ideas in the human mind are limited in depth and clearness: in the
Divine Mind they must be infinitely clearer than the clearest human
Intuition; infinitely more profound than the profoundest human thought.
And in this way, and, as we shall see, in other ways also, the Divine
Mind infinitely transcends the human mind when most fully instructed
and unfolded.
In this way and in other ways also, I say. For we have hitherto spoken
of the human mind only as contemplating the external world;--as
discerning, to a certain small extent, the laws of the universe. We
have spoken of the world of things without: we must now speak of the
world within us;--of the world of our thoughts, our being, our moral
and personal being.
7. (_From ourselves we learn something concerning God._)--We must
speak of this: for this is, as I have said, another starting point and
another line in which we may proceed from what we know, and see how far
our knowledge carries us, and how far it teaches us anything concerning
God.
Looking at ourselves, we perceive that we have to act, as well as
to contemplate: we are practical as well as speculative beings. And
tracing the nature and conditions of our actions, in the depths of our
thought we find that there is in the aspect of actions a supreme and
inevitable distinction of right and wrong. We cannot help judging of
our actions as right and wrong. We acknowledge that there must be such
a judgment appropriate to them. We have these Ideas of _right_ and
_wrong_ as attributes of actions; and thus we are _moral_ beings.
8. And again: the actions are _our_ actions. _We_ act in this way or
that. And _we_ are not mere _things_, which move and change as they
are acted on, but which do not themselves act, as man acts. I am not a
Thing but a _Person_; and the men with whom I act, who act with me--act
in various ways towards me, well or ill--are also persons. Man is a
personal being.
The Ideas of right and wrong--the _moral_ Ideas of man--are then a part
of the scheme of the universe to which man belongs. Could they be this,
if they were not also a part of the nature of that Divine Mind which
constitutes the universe?--It would seem not: the Moral Law of the
universe must be a Law of the Divine Mind, in order that it may be a
Law felt and discerned by man.
9. (_Objection answered._)--But, it may be objected, the Moral Law
of the universe is a Law in a different sense from the Laws of the
universe of which we spoke before--the mathematical and physical laws
of the universe. Those were laws according to which things _are_, and
events _occur_: but Moral Laws are Laws according to which men _ought_
to act, and according to which actions _ought_ to be. There is a
difference, so that we cannot reason from the human to the Divine Mind
in the same manner in this case as in the other.
True: we cannot reason _in the same manner_. But we can reason still
more confidently. For the Law directing what _ought to be_ is the
_Supreme Law_, and the mind which constitutes the Supreme Law is the
_Supreme Mind_, that is, the Divine Mind.
10. That the Moral Law is not verified among men in fact, is not a
ground for doubting that it is a Law of the Divine Mind; but it is a
ground for inquiring what consequences the Divine Mind has annexed to
the violation of the Law; and in what manner the supremacy of the Law
will be established in the total course of the history of the universe,
including, it may be, the history of other worlds than that in which we
now live.
Considering how dimly and imperfectly we see what consequences the
Divine Governor has annexed to the violation of the Moral Law, He who
sees all these consequences and has provided for the establishment of
His Law in the whole history of the human race, must be supposed to be
infinitely elevated above man in wisdom;--more even in virtue of this
aspect of His nature, than in virtue of that which is derived from the
contemplation of the universe.
11. Man is a person; and his personality is his _highest_ attribute,
or at least, that which makes all his highest attributes possible.
And the highest attribute which belongs to the finite minds which
exist in the universe must exist also in the Infinite Mind which
constitutes the universe as it is. The Divine Mind must reside in a
_Divine Person_. And as man, by his personality, acts in obedience to
or in transgression of a moral law, so God, by His Personality, acts in
establishing the Law and in securing its supremacy in the whole history
of the world.
12. (_Creation._)--Acknowledging a Divine Mind which is the foundation
and support of the world as it is, constituting and upholding its laws,
it may be asked, Does this view point to a beginning of the world?
Was there a time when the Divine Mind called into being the world,
before non-existent? Was there a Creation of the world?
I do not think that an answer to this question, given either way,
affects the argument which I have been urging. The Laws of the
Universe discoverable by the human mind, are the Laws of the Divine
Mind, whether or not there was a time when these Laws first came into
operation, or first produced the world which we see. The argument
respecting the nature of the Divine Mind is the same, whether or not we
suppose a Creation.
But, in point of fact, every part of our knowledge of the Universe does
seem to point to a beginning. Every part of the world has been, so far
as we can see, formed by natural causes out of something different
from what it now is. The Earth, with its lands and seas, teeming with
innumerable forms of living things, has been produced from an earth
formed of other lands and seas, occupied with quite different forms of
life: and if we go far enough back, from an earth in which there was
no life. The stars which we call _fixed_ move and change; the nebulæ
in their shape show that they too are moving and changing. The Earth
was, some at least hold, produced by the condensation of a nebula.
The history of man, as well as of others of its inhabitants, points
to a beginning. Languages, Arts, Governments, Histories, all seem to
have begun from a starting-point, however remote. Indeed not only a
beginning, but a beginning at no remote period, appears to be indicated
by most of the sciences which carry us backwards in the world's history.
But we must allow, on the other hand, that though all such lines of
research point _towards_ a beginning, none of them can be followed _up
to_ a beginning. All the lines converge, but all melt away before they
reach the point of convergence. As I have elsewhere said[320], in no
science has man been able to arrive at a beginning which is homogeneous
with the known course of events, though we can often go very far
back, and limit the hypotheses respecting the origin. We have, in the
impossibility of thus coming to any conclusion by natural reason on the
subject of creation, another evidence of the infinitely limited nature
of the human mind, when compared with the Creative or Constitutive
Divine Mind.
13. (_End of the World._)--But if our natural reason, aided by all
that science can teach, can tell us nothing respecting the origin
and beginning of this world, still less can reason tell us anything
with regard to the _End_ of this world. On this subject, the natural
sciences are even more barren of instruction than on the subject of
Creation. Yet we may say that as the Constitution of the Universe, and
its conformity to a Collection of eternal and immutable Ideas as its
elements, are not inconsistent with the supposition of a Beginning of
the present course of the world, so neither are they inconsistent with
the supposition of an End. Indeed it would not be at all impossible
that physical inquiries should present the prospect of an End, even
more clearly than they afford the retrospect of a Beginning. If, for
instance, it should be found that the planets move in a resisting
medium which constantly retards their velocity, and must finally
make them fall in upon the central sun, there would be an end of the
earth as to its present state. We cannot therefore, on the grounds of
Science, deny either a Beginning or an End of the present world.
14. But here another order of considerations comes into play, namely,
those derived from moral and theological views of the world. On these
we must, in conclusion, say a few words.
It is very plain that these considerations may lead us to believe in
a view of the Beginning, Middle, and End of the history of the world,
very different from anything which the mere physical and natural
sciences can disclose to us. And these expressions to which I have
been led, the _Beginning_, the _Middle_, and the _End_ of the world's
history according to theological views, are full of suggestions of the
highest interest. But the interest which belongs to these suggestions
is of a solemn and peculiar kind; and the considerations to which
such suggestions point are better, I think, kept apart from such
speculations as those with which I have been concerned in the present
volume.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 320: _Hist. Ind. Sc._ b. xviii. c. vi. sect. 5]