INFLUENCE OF GERMAN SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY IN BRITAIN.
The philosophy of Kant, as I have already said, involved a definite
doctrine on the subject of the Fundamental Antithesis, and a correction
of some of the errors of Locke and his successors. It was not however
at first favourably received among British philosophers, and those who
accepted it were judged somewhat capriciously and captiously. I will
say a word on these points[307].
1. (_Stewart_)--Dugald Stewart, in his _Dissertation on the Progress
of the Moral Sciences_, repeatedly mentions Kant's speculations, and
always unfavourably. In Note I to Part I. of the Dissertation he says,
"In our own times, Kant and his followers seem to have thought that
they had thrown a strong light on the nature of _space_ and also of
_time_, when they introduced the word _form_ (_form of the intellect_)
as a common term applicable to both. Is not this to revert to the
scholastic folly of verbal generalization?" And in Part II. he gives a
long and laborious criticism of a portion of Kant's speculations; of
which the spirit may be collected from his describing them as resulting
in "the metaphysical _conundrum_, that the human mind (considered as
a _noumenon_ and not as a _phenomenon_) neither exists in space nor
time." And after mentioning Meiners and Herder along with Kant, he
adds, "I am ashamed to say that in Great Britain the only one of these
names which has been much talked of is Kant." And again in Note EE, he
translates some portion of the German philosopher, adding, that to the
expressions so employed he can attach no meaning.
Stewart, in his criticism of Kant's doctrines, remarks that, in
asserting that the human mind possesses, in its own ideas, an element
of necessary and universal truth, not derived from experience, Kant had
been anticipated by Price, by Cudworth, and even by Plato; to whose
_Theætetus_ both Price and Cudworth refer, as containing views similar
to their own. And undoubtedly this doctrine of ideas, as indispensable
sources of necessary truths, was promulgated and supported by weighty
arguments in the _Theætetus_; and has ever since been held by many
philosophers, in opposition to the contrary doctrine, also extensively
held, that all truth is derived from experience. But, in pointing out
this circumstance as diminishing the importance of Kant's speculations,
Stewart did not sufficiently consider that doctrines, fundamentally the
same, may discharge a very different office at different periods of
the history of philosophy. Plato's Dialogues did not destroy, nor even
diminish, the value of Cudworth's "Immutable Morality." Notwithstanding
Cudworth's publications, Price's doctrines came out a little afterwards
with the air and with the effect of novelties. Cudworth's assertion of
ideas did not prevent the rise of Hume's skepticism; and it was Hume's
skepticism which gave occasion to Kant's new assertion of necessary
and universal truth, and to his examination into the grounds of the
possibility and reality of such truth. To maintain such doctrine
_after_ the appearance of intermediate speculations, and with reference
to them, was very different from maintaining it before; and this is the
merit which Kant's admirers claim for him. Nor can it be denied that
his writings produced an immense effect upon the mode of treating such
questions in Germany; and have had, even in this country, an influence
far beyond what Mr. Stewart would have deemed their due.
2. (_Mr. G. H. Lewes._)--But as injustice has thus been done to Kant by
confounding his case with that of his predecessors of like opinions,
so on the other hand, injustice has also been done, both to him and
those who have followed him in the assertion of ideas, by confounding
_their_ case with his. This injustice seems to me to be committed by a
writer on the History of Philosophy, who has given an account of the
successive schools of philosophy up to our own time;--has assigned
to Kant an important and prominent place in the recent history of
metaphysics;--but has still maintained that Kant's philosophy, and
indeed every philosophy, is and must be a failure. In order to prove
this thesis, the author naturally has to examine Kant's doctrines and
the reasons assigned for them, and to point out what he conceives to be
the fallacy of these arguments. This accordingly he professes to do;
but as soon as he has entered upon the argument, he substitutes, as
his opponent, for the philosopher of Königsberg, a writer of our own
time and country, who does not profess himself a Kantian, who has been
repeatedly accused, with whatever justice, of misrepresenting what he
has borrowed from Kant, and whose main views are, in the opinion of
the writer himself, very different from Kant's. Mr. Lewes[308], in the
chapter entitled "Examination of Kant's Fundamental Principles," after
a preliminary statement of the points he intends to consider, says "Now
to the question. As Kant confessedly was led to his own system by the
speculations of Hume," and so on; and forthwith he introduces the name
of _Dr. Whewell_ as the writer whose views he has to criticize, without
stating how he connects him with Kant, and goes on arguing against
_him_ for a dozen pages to the end of the Chapter.
3. It is true, however, that I had adopted some of Kant's views, or at
least some of his arguments. The chapters[309] on the Ideas of Space
and Time in the _Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, were almost
literal translations of chapters in the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_.
Yet the author was charged by a reviewer at the time, with explaining
these doctrines "in a manner incompatible with the clear views of
Emanuel Kant." It appeared to be assumed by the English admirers of the
Kantian philosophy, that Kant's views were true and clear in Germany,
but became untenable when adopted in England.
4. (_Mr. Mansel_)--But the most important of my critics on this
ground is Mr. Mansel, who has revived the censure of my speculations
as not doing justice to the Kantian philosophy. "It is much to be
regretted," he says[310], "that Dr. Whewell, who has made good use of
Kantian principles in many parts of his _Philosophy of the Inductive
Sciences_," has not more accurately observed Kant's distinction between
the necessary laws under which all men think, and the contingent
laws under which certain men think of certain things. And further on
Mr. Mansel, after giving great praise to the general spirit of the
_Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, says, "It is to be regretted
that the accuracy of his theory has been in so many instances vitiated
by a stumble at the threshold of the Critical Philosophy." Mr. Mansel
is, indeed, by much the most zealous English Kantian whose writings I
have seen;--among those, I mean, who have brought original powers of
philosophical thought to bear upon such subjects; and have not been, as
some have been, enslaved by an admiration of German systems, just as
bigotted as the contempt of them which others feel. And as Mr. Mansel
has stated distinctly some of the points in which he conceives that I
have erred in deviating from the doctrines of Kant, I should wish to
make a few remarks on those points.
5. Kant considers that Space and Time are conditions of perception,
and hence sources of necessary and universal truth. Dr. Whewell agrees
with Kant in placing in the mind certain sources of necessary truth;
he calls these Fundamental Ideas, and reckons, besides Space and Time,
others, as Cause, Likeness, Substance, and several more. Mr. Mill,
the most recent and able expounder of the opposite doctrine, derives
all truths from Observation, and denies that there is such a separate
source of truth as Ideas. Mr. Mansel does not agree either with Mr.
Mill or Dr. Whewell; he adheres to the original Kantian thesis, that
Space and Time are sources of necessary truths, but denies the office
to the other Fundamental Ideas of Dr. Whewell. In reading what has
been said by Mr. Mill, Mr. Mansel, and other critics, on the subject
of what I have called _Fundamental Ideas_, I am led to perceive that
I have expressed myself incautiously, with regard to the identity of
character between the first two of these Fundamental Ideas, namely,
Space and Time, and the others, as Force, Composition, and the like.
And I am desirous of explaining, to those who take an interest in these
speculations, how far I claim for the other Fundamental Ideas the same
character and attributes as for Space and Time.
6. The special and characteristic property of all the Fundamental Ideas
is what I have already mentioned, that they are the mental sources of
necessary and universal scientific truths. I call them _Ideas_, as
being something not derived from sensation, but governing sensation,
and consequently giving form to our experience;--_Fundamental_, as
being the foundation of knowledge, or at least of Science. And the way
in which those Ideas become the foundations of Science is, that when
they are clearly and distinctly entertained in the mind, they give rise
to inevitable convictions or intuitions, which may be expressed as
_Axioms_; and these Axioms are the foundations of Sciences respective
of each Idea. The Idea of Space, when clearly possessed, gives rise
to geometrical Axioms, and is thus the foundation of the Science of
Geometry. The Idea of Mechanical Force, (a modification of the Idea of
Cause,) when clearly developed in the mind, gives birth to Axioms which
are the foundation of the Science of Mechanics. The Idea of Substance
gives rise to the Axiom which is universally accepted,--that we cannot,
by any process, (for instance, by chemical processes,) create or
destroy matter, but can only combine and separate elements;--and thus
gives rise to the Science of Chemistry.
7. Now it may be observed, that in giving this account of the
foundation of Science, I lay stress on the condition that the Ideas
must be _clearly and distinctly possessed_. The Idea of Space must be
quite clear in the mind, or else the Axioms of Geometry will not be
seen to be true: there will be no _intuition_ of their truth; and for
a mind in such a state, there can be no Science of Geometry. A man may
have a confused and perplexed, or a vacant and inert state of mind, in
which it is not clearly apparent to him, that two straight lines cannot
inclose a space. But this is not a frequent case. The Idea of Space is
much more commonly clear in the minds of men than the other Ideas on
which science depends, as Force, or Substance. It is much more common
to find minds in which these latter Ideas are not so clear and distinct
as to make the Axioms of Mechanics or of Chemistry self-evident.
Indeed the examples of a state of mind in which the Ideas of Force
or of Substance are so clear as to be made the basis of science, are
comparatively few. They are the examples of minds scientifically
cultivated, at least to some extent. Hence, though the Axioms of
Mechanics or of Chemistry may be, in their own nature, as evident as
those of Geometry, they are not evident to so many persons, nor at so
early a period of intellectual or scientific culture. And this being
the case, it is not surprising that some persons should doubt whether
these Axioms are evident at all;--should think that it is an error to
assert that there exist, in such sciences as Mechanics or Chemistry,
Fundamental Ideas, fit to be classed with Space, as being, like it, the
origin of Axioms.
In speaking of all the Fundamental Ideas as being alike the source of
Axioms when clearly possessed, without dwelling sufficiently upon the
amount of mental discipline which is requisite to give the mind this
clear possession of most of them; and in not keeping before the reader
the different degrees of evidence which, in most minds, the Axioms
of different sciences naturally have, I have, as I have said, given
occasion to my readers to misunderstand me. I will point out one or two
passages which show that this misunderstanding has occurred, and will
try to remove it.
8. The character of axiomatic truths seen by intuition is, that
they are not only seen to be true, but to be necessary;--that the
contrary of them is not only false, but inconceivable. But this
inconceivableness depends entirely upon the clearness of the Ideas
which the axioms involve. So long as those Ideas are vague and
indistinct, the contrary of an Axiom may be assented to, though it
cannot be distinctly conceived. It may be assented to, not because it
is possible, but because _we_ do not see clearly what _is_ possible. To
a person who is only beginning to think geometrically, there may appear
nothing absurd in the assertion, that two straight lines may inclose
a space. And in the same manner, to a person who is only beginning
to think of mechanical truths, it may not appear to be absurd, that
in mechanical processes, Reaction should be greater or less than
Action; and so, again, to a person who has not thought steadily
about Substance, it may not appear inconceivable, that by chemical
operations, we should generate new matter, or destroy matter which
already exists.
Here then we have a difficulty:--the test of Axioms is that the
contrary of them is inconceivable; and yet persons, till they have in
some measure studied the subject, do not see this inconceivableness.
Hence our Axioms must be evident only to a small number of thinkers;
and seem not to deserve the name of self-evident or necessary truths.
This difficulty has been strongly urged by Mr. Mill, as supporting
his view, that all knowledge of truth is derived from experience. And
in order that the opposite doctrine, which I have advocated, may not
labour under any disadvantages which really do not belong to it, I must
explain, that I do not by any means assert that those truths which
I regard as necessary, are all equally evident to common thinkers,
or evident to persons in all stages of intellectual development. I
may even say, that some of those truths which I regard as necessary,
and the necessity of which I believe the human mind to be capable of
seeing, by due preparation and thought, are still such, that this
amount of preparation and thought is rare and peculiar; and I will
willingly grant, that to attain to and preserve such a clearness and
subtlety of mind as this intuition requires, is a task of no ordinary
difficulty and labour.
9. This doctrine,--that some truths may be seen by intuition, but yet
that the intuition of them may be a rare and difficult attainment,--I
have not, it would seem, conveyed with sufficient clearness to obviate
misapprehension. Mr. Mill has noticed a passage of my _Philosophy_
on this subject, which he has understood in a sense different from
that which I intended. Speaking of the two Principles of Chemical
Science,--that combinations are definite in kind, and in quantity,--I
had tried to elevate myself to the point of view in which these
Principles are seen, not only to be true, but to be necessary. I was
aware that even the profoundest chemists had not ventured to do this;
yet it appeared to me that there were considerations which seemed to
show that any other rule would imply that the world was a world on
which the human mind could not employ itself in scientific speculation
at all. These considerations I ventured to put forwards, not as views
which could at present be generally accepted, but as views to which
chemical philosophy appeared to me to tend. Mr. Mill, not unnaturally,
I must admit, supposed me to mean that the two Principles of Chemistry
just stated, are self-evident, in the same way and in the same
degree as the Axioms of Geometry are so. I afterwards explained that
what I meant to do was, to throw out an opinion, that _if_ we could
conceive the composition of bodies _distinctly_, we might be able to
see that it is necessary that the modes of this composition should
be definite. This Mr. Mill does not object to[311]: but he calls it
a great attenuation of my former opinion; which he understood to be
that we, (that is, men in general,) already see, or may see, or ought
to see, this necessity. Such a general apprehension of the necessity
of definite chemical composition I certainly never reckoned upon;
and even in my own mind, the thought of such a necessity was rather
an anticipation of what the intuitions of philosophical chemists in
another generation would be, than an assertion of what they now are or
ought to be; much less did I expect that persons, neither chemists nor
philosophers, would already, or perhaps ever, see that a proposition,
so recently discovered to be true, is not only true, but necessary.
10. Of the bearing of this view on the question at issue between Mr.
Mill and me, I may hereafter speak; but I will now notice other persons
who have misunderstood me in the same way.
An able writer in the _Edinburgh Review_[312] has, in like manner,
said, "Dr. Whewell seems to us to have gone much too far in reducing
to necessary truths what assuredly the generality of mankind will not
feel to be so." It is a fact which I do not at all contest, that the
_generality of mankind_ will not feel the Axioms of Chemistry, or even
of Mechanics, to be necessary truths. But I had said, not that the
generality of mankind would feel this necessity, but (in a passage
just before quoted by the Reviewer) that the mind under certain
circumstances _attains a point of view_ from which it can pronounce
mechanical (and other) fundamental truths to be necessary in their
nature, though disclosed to us by experience and observation.
Both the Edinburgh Reviewer and Mr. Mansel appear to hold a distinction
between the fundamental truths of Geometry, and those of the other
subjects which I have classed with them. The latter says, that
perhaps metaphysicians may hereafter establish the existence of other
subjective conditions of intuitions (or, as I should call them,
Fundamental Ideas,) besides Space and Time, but that in asserting
such to exist in the science of Mechanics, I certainly go too far:
and he gives as an instance my Essay,--"Demonstration that all matter
is heavy." I certainly did not expect that the Principles asserted
in that Essay would be assented to as readily or as generally as the
Axioms of Geometry; but I conceive that I have there proved that
Chemical Science, using the balance as one of its implements, cannot
admit "imponderable bodies" among its elements. This impossibility
will, I think, not only be found to exist in fact, but seen to exist
necessarily, by chemists, in proportion as they advance towards general
propositions of Chemical Science in which the so-called "imponderable
fluids" enter. But even if I be right in this opinion, to how few will
this necessity be made apparent, and how slowly will the intuition
spread! I am as well aware as my critics, that the necessity will
probably never be apparent to ordinary thinkers.
11. Though Mr. Mansel does not acknowledge any subjective conditions
of intuition besides Space and Time, he does recognize other _kinds
of necessity_, which I should equally refer to Fundamental Ideas;
because they are, no less than Space and Time, the foundations of
universal and necessary truths in science. Such are[313] the Principle
of Substance;--All Qualities exist in some subject: and the Principle
of Causality;-- Every Event has its Cause. To these Principles he
ascribes a "metaphysical necessity," the nature and grounds of which
he analyses with great acuteness. But what I have to observe is, that
whatever _differences_ may be pointed out between the _grounds_ of
the necessity, in this case of _metaphysical_ necessity, and in that
which Mr. Mansel calls _mathematical_ necessity which belongs to the
Conditions or Ideas of Space and of Time; still, it is not the less
true that the Ideas of Substance and of Cause, _do_ afford a foundation
for necessary truths, and that on these truths are built Sciences. That
every Change must have a Cause, with the corresponding Axioms,--that
the Cause is known by the Effect, and Measured by it,--is the basis
of the Science of Mechanics. That there is a Substance to which
qualities belong, with the corresponding Axiom,--that we cannot create
or destroy Substance, though we may alter Qualities by combining and
separating Substances,--is the basis of the Science of Chemistry. And
that this doctrine of the Indestructibility of Substance is a primary
axiomatic truth, is certain; both because it has been universally taken
for granted by men seeking for general truths; and because it is not
and cannot be proved by experience[314]. So that I have here, even
according to Mr. Mansel's own statement, other grounds besides Space
and Time, for necessary truths in Science.
12. Besides mathematical and metaphysical necessity, Mr. Mansel
recognizes also a _logical necessity_. I will not pretend to say
that this kind of necessity is exactly represented by any of those
Fundamental Ideas which are the basis of Science; but yet I think it
will be found that this logical necessity mainly operates through
the attribution of Names to things; and that a large portion of its
cogency arises from these maxims,--that names must be so imposed that
General Propositions shall be possible,--and so that Reasoning shall be
possible. Now these maxims are really the basis of Natural History,
and are so stated in the _Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_. The
former maxim is the principle of all Classification; and though we have
no syllogisms in Natural History, the apparatus of _genus_, _species_,
_differentia_, and the like, which was introduced in the analysis of
syllogistic reasoning, is really more constantly applied in Natural
History than in any other science.
13. Besides the different kinds of necessity which Mr. Mansel thus
acknowledges, I do not see why he should not, on his own principles,
recognize others; as indeed he appears to me to do. He acknowledges,
I think, the distinction of Primary and Secondary qualities; and
this must involve him in the doctrine that Secondary Qualities are
necessarily perceived by means of a _Medium_. Again: he would, I
think, acknowledge that in organized bodies, the parts exist for a
_Purpose_; and Purpose is an Idea which cannot be inferred by reasoning
from facts, without being possessed and applied as an Idea. So that
there would, I conceive, exist, in his philosophy, all the grounds of
necessary truth which I have termed Fundamental Ideas; only that he
would further subdivide, classify, and analyse, the kinds and grounds
of this necessity.
In this he would do well; and some of his distinctions and analyses
of this kind are, in my judgment, very instructive. But I do not see
what objection there can be to my putting together all these kinds of
necessity, when my purpose requires it; and, inasmuch as they all are
the bases of Science, I may call them by a general name; for instance,
Grounds of Scientific Necessity; and these are precisely what I mean by
_Fundamental Ideas_.
That some steady thought, and even some progress in the construction
of Science, is needed in order to see the necessity of the Axioms thus
introduced, is true, and is repeatedly asserted and illustrated in the
History of the Sciences. The necessity of such Axioms is seen, but it
is not seen at first. It becomes clearer and clearer to each person,
and clear to one person after another, as the human mind dwells more
and more steadily on the several subjects of speculation. _There are
scientific truths which are seen by intuition, but this intuition
is progressive._ This is the remark which I wish to make in answer
to those of my critics who have objected that truths which I have
propounded as Axioms, are not evident to all.
14. That the Axioms of Science are not evident _to all_, is true
enough, and too true. Take the Axiom of Substance:--that we may change
the condition of a substance in various ways, but cannot destroy it.
This has been assumed as evident by philosophers in all ages; but if
we ask an ordinary person whether a body can be destroyed by fire, or
diminished, will he unhesitatingly reply, that it cannot? It requires
some thought to say[315], as the philosopher said, that the weight of
the smoke is to be found by subtracting the weight of the ashes from
that of the fuel; nay, even when this is said, it appears, at first,
rather an epigram than a scientific truth. Yet it is by thinking only,
not by an experiment, that, from a happy guess it becomes a scientific
truth. And the thought is the basis, not the result, of experimental
truths; for which reason I ascribe it to a Fundamental Idea. And so,
such truths are the genuine growth of the human mind; not innate,
as if they needed not to grow; still less, dead twigs plucked from
experience and stuck in from without; not universal, as if they grew
up everywhere; but not the less, under favourable circumstances, the
genuine growth of the scientific intellect.
15. Not only do I hold that the Axioms, on which the truths of science
rest, grow from guesses into Axioms in various ways, and often
gradually, and at different periods in different minds, and partially,
even in the end; but I conceive that this may be shown by the history
of science, as having really happened, with regard to all the most
conspicuous of such principles. The scientific insight which enabled
discoverers to achieve their exploits, implied that they were among
the first to acquire an intuitive conviction of the Axioms of their
Science: the controversies which form so large a portion of the history
of science, arise from the struggles between the clear-sighted and
the dimsighted, between those who were forwards and those who were
backwards in the progress of ideas; and these controversies have very
often ended in diffusing generally a clearness of thought, on the
controverted subject, which at first, the few only, or perhaps not
even they, possessed. The History of Science consists of the History
of Ideas, as well as of the History of Experience and Observation.
The latter portion of the subject formed the principal matter of my
_History_ of the Inductive Sciences; the former occupied a large
portion of the _Philosophy_ of the Inductive Sciences[316]; which, I
may perhaps be allowed to explain, is, for the most part, a Historical
Work no less than the other; and was written in a great measure, at the
same time, and from the same survey of the works of scientific writers.
16. I am aware that the explanation which I have given, may naturally
provoke the opponents of the doctrine of scientific necessity to
repeat their ordinary fundamental objections, in a form adapted to
the expressions which I have used. They may say, the fact that these
so-called Axioms thus become evident only during the progress of
experience, proves that they are derived from experience: they may,
in reply to our image, say, that truths are stuck into the mind by
experience, as seeds are stuck into the ground; and that to maintain
that they can grow under any other conditions, is to hold the
doctrine of spontaneous generation, which is equally untenable in the
intellectual and in the physical world. I shall not however here resume
the general discussion; but shall only say briefly in reply, that
Axioms,--for instance, this Axiom, that _material substances cannot be
created or annihilated by any process which we can apply_,--though it
becomes evident in the progress of experience, cannot be derived from
experience; for it is a proposition which never has nor can be proved
by experience; but which, nevertheless, has been always assumed by men,
seeking for general truths, as necessarily true, and as controlling
and correcting all possible experience. And with regard to the image
of vegetable development, I may say, that as such development implies
both inherent forms in the living seed, and nutritive powers in earth
and air; so the development of our scientific ideas implies both a
formative power, and materials acted on; and that, though the analogy
must be very defective, we conceive that we best follow it by placing
the formative power in the living mind, and in the external world the
materials acted on: while the doctrine that all truth is derived from
experience only, appears to reject altogether one of these elements, or
to assert the two to be one.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 307: The remarks contained in this chapter have for the most
part been already printed and circulated in a _Letter to the Author of
Prolegomena Logica_, 1852.]
[Footnote 308: _Biographical History of Philosophy_, 1846. In a more
recent edition the author of this work has modified his expressions,
but still employs himself in arguing against Dr. Whewell, in order to
overthrow Kant. So far as his arguments affect my philosophy, they are,
as I conceive, answered in the various expositions which I have given
of that philosophy.]
[Footnote 309: B. ii. The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences. Chap.
ii. Of the Idea of Space. Chap. iii. Of some peculiarities of the
Idea of Space. Chap. vii. Of the Idea of Time. Chap. viii. Of some
peculiarities of the Idea of Time.]
[Footnote 310: _Prolegomena Logica_, by H. L. Mansel, M.A. 1851.]
[Footnote 311: _Logic_, i. p. 273, 3rd edit.]
[Footnote 312: No. 193, p. 29.]
[Footnote 313: _Prol. Log._ p. 123.]
[Footnote 314: See _Phil. Ind. Sc._ b. vi. c. iii.]
[Footnote 315: Kant.]
[Footnote 316: Republished as _The History of Scientific Ideas_.]