There existed in Germany at that time two kinds of leagues between

the nobility, the one offensive and the other defensive; that of the

_Gauerbinate_ or _Gauerbschaften_, by virtue of which the

petty nobility formed family pacts for transmitting their fiefs by

indirect line when the direct line should fail, and for reconstructing

or repairing their castles out of a common fund; and that of the

_Teutonic Hanse_, the league of the prince-archbishops and

electors with sixty towns upon the Rhine. Rodolph of Hapsburg (Fig.

30), a monarch as resolute as he was able, put a stop to proceedings

which were full of danger to the imperial authority, compelled his

vassals to do him homage, and razed to the ground seventy fortresses

whose feudal brigandage had scattered desolation and ruin; but, after

his death, the usurpation of the suzerain lords began afresh, and the

_Bulle d’Or_, which was the basis of public right in Germany,

confirmed the downfall of the imperial suzerainty (1378).

[Illustration: Fig. 30.--Equestrian Stone Statue of Rodolph of

Hapsburg, Emperor of Germany, by Erwin de Steinbach, placed above

the Grand Portal of Strasburg Cathedral (Thirteenth Century).]

[Illustration: Fig. 31.--Maximilian of Austria, with Mary of

Burgundy, his wife, only daughter of Charles the Bold, and

their young son Philip, afterwards King of Castile.--“Abridged

Chronicles of Burgundy,” Manuscript of the Fifteenth Century, in

the Library of M. Ambroise-Firmin Didot.]

In France, on the other hand, as each convocation of the States-General

was attended with the creation or levying of some new tax, the third

estate attempted to exact all the more from royalty in proportion as

it gratified the latter’s pecuniary demands, claiming to have a voice

in the question of peace or war, to direct the financial affairs of

the kingdom, to be convoked every year, and to share, with the two

other orders, the weight of the charges the profit of which ought to be

shared by all. The feudal nobility resisted the exorbitant pretensions

of the third estate, but when they saw this class forming a secret

alliance with the clergy, and setting on foot a formidable league,

the password of which was the destruction of the castles and the

annihilation of the nobles, they hesitated, and did nothing until the

horrible excesses committed by the league in the country districts

had given the feudal reaction a character of legality. In 1383, after

the battle of Rosebecque, which inflicted a heavy blow upon the

communal cause in Flanders and in France, it seemed as if the power of

suzerainty was about to revive once more. Froissart, in his Chronicles,

rejoiced at this fact, because he believed that social order was

threatened with utter ruin (see his Chronicles, year 1383); but French

chivalry succumbed in its turn at Agincourt beneath the onslaught of

the English archers. This was the final condemnation of feudal armies,

as well as of the system which these armies represented, and which

they had failed in sustaining. French feudalism had already ceased to

be anything more than a storehouse of traditions which were still held

in respect, and of old customs which had fallen into disuse among the

ancient nobility.

In England, Scotland, and Ireland, high feudalism was rapidly in course

of decay, before Henry VIII. dealt it its death-blow; in Germany it

struggled for existence during the reign of Maximilian (Fig. 31); in

France it was crushed by Louis XI. with the help of the third estate.

Beyond the Alps, in Italy, its existence was prolonged for a short

period, partly under a clerical disguise, partly by the hired help of

the _condottieri_, and in some places by the support of the urban

democracy, that is the industrial and trading part of the population.

Everywhere, however, it disappeared with the Middle Ages, of which,

both in its acts and in its first principles, it bore the ineffaceable

imprint (Fig. 32).

[Illustration: Fig. 32.--Doorways of the Old Castle of Loches, in

Touraine, a favourite Manor of Louis XI. (Fifteenth Century).]

WAR AND ARMIES.

The Invasions of the Barbarians.--Attila.--Theodoric

seizes Italy.--Organization of Military Fiefs.--Defences

of Towns.--Totila and his Tactics.--The Military

Genius of Charlemagne.--Military Vassalage.--Communal

Militia.--Earliest Standing Armies.--Loss of Technical

Tradition.--The Condottieri.--The Gendarmerie.--The

_Lances Fournies_.--Weakening of Feudal Military

Obligations.--The French Army in the Time of Louis

XI. and his Successors.--Absence of Administrative

Arrangement.--Reforms.--Mercenary Troops.--Siege Operations and

Engines.

The art of war had attained its highest degree of perfection among

the Romans, when the successive invasions of the barbarians began to

burst like an overflowing river over the richest of the Roman colonies.

These barbarians, most of whom were natives of the Caucasian mountains,

were the Iberians, who never halted till they had reached Spain; the

Celts or Cimbrians, who installed themselves among the Gauls; and the

Sarmatians and the Scythians, who inhabited the vast forests of Germany

before the great wars of Julius Cæsar (Fig. 33). Suddenly, in the

fourth century of the Christian era, a movement which commenced in the

centre of Asia caused an irruption of a race hitherto unknown upon the

Caucasian races. These were the Huns, before whom the terrified Goths

retreated, but who at first made but a brief apparition in Europe;

for if Rome at that time was wanting in seasoned legions, she could

rely, at least in the provinces of her empire, upon many numerous and

powerful auxiliaries who were accustomed to fight under her standard

(Fig. 34), some for the sake of pay, others to defend their own hearths.

[Illustration: Fig. 33.--War Trophy and Barbarian

Prisoners.--From Sculptures on the Triumphal Arch of Orange

(Second Century).]

In 451, in the reign of the Emperor Valentinian III., who had bribed

the barbarians instead of repulsing them with the sword, Attila, the

King of the Huns, bore down upon Europe at the head of seven hundred

thousand fighting men of various races. In less than three months he

had overrun and laid waste Moravia, Bohemia, Hesse, and Wurtemburg,

crossed the Rhine below Strasburg, the Moselle at Trèves and at Metz,

the Meuse at Tongres, the Scheldt at Tournay; and after two sanguinary

raids into Burgundy and the country around Orleans, pitched his tents

in the plains of Champagne. The tactics of Attila were to avoid pitched

battles, to give a wide berth to the fortresses, contenting himself

with sacking and plundering their outskirts. He laid waste the open

country, burnt villages, put their inoffensive inhabitants to the

sword, and making it his chief object to divide and isolate the Roman

legions, finally crushed them by the weight of numbers.

[Illustration: Fig. 34.--German and Gallic Auxiliaries, one

wearing Trousers (_Braccæ_), and the other a Tunic.--From a

Roman Monument of the Second Century.]

The whole West was stirred up at the tidings of this terrible invasion.

Ætius, the Roman leader among the Gauls, had called to his aid the

confederates of Amorica, the Frank-Salians, whose leader was Merovius,

the Burgundians, the Saxons, and the southern Visigoths, whose king

was Theodoric. This numerous army, composed of excellent troops under

the orders of Ætius, marched to meet the barbarians, and encountered

them in the neighbourhood of Châlons-sur-Marne. The battle lasted three

days, and the defeat of the Huns was complete.

The ferocious Attila, who had called himself the Scourge of God, and

who had run his course like some fatal meteor, leaving in his track

nothing but conflagrations and ruins, expired in the midst of an

orgie in 455. A truceless, unceasing war was still being waged all

over Europe, a sanguinary and implacable war of race and of party.

Political chaos, a chaos that Christianity alone was destined to

regenerate, was at its height in the old world, when, towards the close

of the sixth century, Theodoric, King of the Eastern Goths, who had

protected Byzantium when threatened by the Bulgarians, and who had

remained in the pay of the Emperor Zeno, determined to find occupation

for his warlike and restless subjects by leading them against Odoacer,

the sovereign of the Herulians, who at that time united under his sway

Sicily and the Italian peninsula, but whose subjects were at best but

a ferocious and turbulent mob. The young King of the Goths (he was

only thirty-four years of age) started from the depths of Mœsia (now

Servia), with the consent of the chief of the empire, at the head

of an entire warlike population, to whom he promised the conquest

of Italy. He easily overcame the King of the Herulians; and, having

conquered Italy, he posted his soldiers in the various provinces of

the peninsula, in such a manner that their pay and their rations might

continue to be supplied to them as regularly in peace as in war.

The system of government and administration established by Theodoric

had the advantage of distributing two hundred thousand excellent troops

in the midst of a population which, glad to find itself uncalled

upon for military service, and but little taxed, allowed the work of

the conquest to be consolidated. The _millénaires_ (soldiers of

a battalion numbering a thousand men) occupied with their families

distinct portions of territory, and were bound to hold themselves

under arms, and ready to march, whenever the defence of the country

required it (Fig. 35). Theodoric had already recognised the utility

of urban garrisons. The flower of the country’s youth, organized in

a military manner, flocked to the gymnasium of Ravenna, and the king

himself presided over their exercises. His levies, as regards their

discipline, their instruction, and their equipment, resembled the

ancient legions of Rome. The iron cap, the shield, the broadsword, and

the arrow of the Goths had been replaced by the spear, the javelin,

the helmet, and the cuirass of the Romans. The old soldiers received

from the royal treasury for their services as instructors a particular

grant, which was annually paid to them till they retired altogether

from the profession of arms. When the troops were about to take the

field, the intendants, under the orders of the counts, superintended

the commissariat and the gathering and the march of the different army

corps. The provincial officers had to distribute arms, food, and hay

on the different points of the road that the troops were expected to

follow, and the inhabitants had to provide lodgings--this was the only

military service expected of them, but none could escape it.

[Illustration: Fig. 35.--Military Costume from the Sixth to the

Tenth Centuries.--From a Miniature in the “Dialogues de Saint

Grégoire,” Manuscript of the Eleventh Century (National Library

of Paris).]

The towns were at this time almost always fortified, and entrenched

camps covered nearly the whole of Italy. The castles in the rural

districts, constructed to protect the frontiers, were usually full of

troops, whose support was part of the duty of the pretorial prefect,

and whose insubordination often necessitated severe measures of

repression. “Keep up a spirit of military discipline; it is often

difficult to enforce it under civil rule,” said Theodoric to Servatus,

one of his generals.

If it is a matter of surprise to meet with such a right moral feeling

in the sovereign of reputed barbarians, barbarians half civilised,

however, by their contact with the Latin race, it is not the less so

to find, in the wars which occurred in the years 507, 508, and 509,

other barbarian kings, namely, Alaric, Clovis, Gondebaud, and Thierry,

make use of and apply with skill the rules of Greco-Roman strategy,

either in executing long military manœuvres, or in displaying all the

strategic science that sieges then required, in attacking or defending

the fortified towns of Avignon, of Carcassonne, and of Arles.

[Illustration: Fig. 36.--St. Benedict reproaches Totila with

having deceived him, and predicts his death.--Fresco in the

Church of San Miniato, Florence, painted by Spinelli of Arezzo

(Thirteenth Century).]

[Illustration: Fig. 37.--Moorish Arms from the Eleventh to the

Fourteenth Century: Armlet.--From the Armeria Real, Madrid.]

[Illustration: Fig. 38.--Moorish Arms: Daggers.--Armeria Real,

Madrid.]

[Illustration: Fig. 39.--Moorish Arms: Trident.--Armeria Real,

Madrid.]

In proportion as the preponderance of the Goths (Fig. 36), of the

Ostrogoths, and of the Visigoths diminished in Europe, that of the

Franks and of the Lombards increased. The latter were the first to

institute in Italy the feudal system, founded on the possession of

conquered territory. The conquerors established their camp in the

midst of the vanquished country, seized half the land, reduced into

servitude a portion of the colons, and imposed heavy taxes on those

whom they had not despoiled. The king having at first distributed the

great fiefs among his principal officers, these great vassals then made

a subdivision of the land granted them by their suzerains in favour of

their own men-at-arms and satellites, and these latter, in their turn,

ceded a portion of their lands to the common soldiers. The obligation

of personal service, the hierarchic subordination of vassalage, were

the necessary consequence of feudal institutions.

[Illustration: Fig. 40.--Dagger with Moorish Blade and Flemish

Handle (Fourteenth Century).--Collection of M. Onghena, Ghent.]

In all probability the establishment of the _arrière-ban_, or

the _ban-fieffe_, dates from the sixth century. It was a call to

arms of the vassals that the suzerain alone had a right to command. A

century later, feudalism, which was beginning to establish itself in

Gaul as in Italy, as a consequence of the successful invasion of the

Franks, was nearly stamped out by the Mahometan invasion of the Spanish

Moors, who had been led by their chief, Abderamus, as far as the banks

of the Loire, where they were stopped by Charles Martel, who routed

them with great slaughter.

After the brilliant victory of Poitiers (732), where the repulse of

Arab civilisation left the field open to the defenders of the Christian

faith, and to the originators of the feudal régime, the victorious

army underwent a sudden change. The Frankish knights adopted as an

inheritance of conquest the rich Saracen armour (Figs. 37, 38, 39,

40); the feudal troopers donned a coat of mail, and, henceforward, a

full suit of armour became a necessary accessory to a warrior of high

rank. The bow, which had long been thrown aside, was once more taken

into favour, and became the special arm of the footmen. But we have

exhaustively treated of the armament and equipment of the soldiery of

the period (see the chapter on Armoury in “Art in the Middle Ages”),

and we can only here deal with military tactics and organization; in a

word, with the theoretical part of the art of war.

The reign of Charlemagne, which was one long series of expeditions and

conquests, was naturally favourable to the progress and development of

this art. The Emperor of the Franks, like a man of genius, understood

how to profit by the inventions and creations of his predecessors.

To the warlike traditions of Greece and Rome he added, step by step,

the improvements that were rendered necessary by the nature of the

enemies with whom he had to contend, namely, the Lombards, the Saxons,

&c. He kept up the feudal service of the _ban_; he established

permanent orders of militia, composed of his own serfs and vassals;

but, as soon as he undertook a distant expedition, his auxiliaries,

ten times as numerous as his vassals, rendered his army rather a

German than a French one. He caused a number of fortresses to be

constructed everywhere throughout his vast empire, but he never allowed

his subjects to build any on their own account. Yet he never seems

to have attached any importance, as a protection to his territory,

to the larger enclosed towns, in which he might have held in reserve

considerable depôts of troops. He himself usually resided in rural

residences and in open and unprotected villages, barely guarded by a

few military pickets. At the slightest signal, it is true, a whole

army of _fidèles_ and servitors would have arisen as one man to

defend him; but under no circumstances would he have consented to

await his enemy under the shelter of fortifications; he was always the

true primeval German, seeking for his field of battle the open plain

rather than the hillside, preferring cavalry to infantry, and a direct

struggle, a hand-to-hand fight, to encounters at a distance, waged

and won by the missiles of the slinger and the shafts of the bowmen.

His principal victories were gained in the open country, where he was

enabled to deploy his masses of mailed horsemen; he never willingly

sat down before a stronghold, a circumstance which shows that he was

aware of his want of skill in the conduct of a siege; and he was never

fortunate in mountain warfare, as was evidenced in the disastrous day

of Roncevaux (778), which cast a shadow over the last years of his life.

Thirty years after the death of the great emperor, the treaty of

Mersen (847) freed the great vassals from the obligation of answering

the summonses of the sovereign, and of rushing to arms at his appeal,

unless for the purpose of defending the State, and substituted the

practice of furnishing armed contingents, whose services were to

be rendered for a fixed period, settled beforehand. Infeudation--a

kind of political and pecuniary contract, in virtue of which a fief

was subdivided into several smaller ones--perpetuated the feudal

_régime_, each man becoming _the man_ of another man, bound

to place himself at his disposal in time of war, and to be ready to

start on any expedition at his command, and according to the wishes of

his immediate seignior.

[Illustration: Fig. 41.--Bishop Eudes, holding his baton of

office, encouraging the young soldiers of the Duke of Normandy

at the Battle of Hastings.--Military Costumes of the Eleventh

Century, from the Bayeux Tapestry.]

During the tenth century this régime grew stronger and stronger. The

oath of infeudation, or the act of homage, remained a sacred tie

between the seignior and the vassal. This homage involved the rendering

of numerous feudal services, such as those of the _ban_, and of

the _arrière-ban_, those rendered by the servitors of different

ranks, known as bachelors, clients, esquires, bannerets, men-at-arms,

barons, &c., names already ancient, but whose rank and place in battle

were only determined on the day when they were all grouped and posted,

each under his special banner or _gonfanon_, a distinction that

implied a separate kind of equipment for each.

Thus the vassals were in the power of the seignior, who, having the

right to dispose of their military services, enjoyed the right of

_reize_--a right that gave him the power of assembling and leading

to battle a certain number of feudal groups. “Obey my summons, or I

will burn you!”[2] were the words of the seignior in the _ban_

published by the crier, and, at the second summons, the sound of the

trumpet rang out in the cross roads, in the streets, and in the country

places, calling the men to arms. To fail to answer the call of the

_ban_ was to commit a crime of the worst character.

[Illustration: Fig. 42.--After the Battle of Hastings (14th

October, 1066), the relatives of the vanquished came to carry

away their dead. The body of the Saxon King, Harold, is taken

to Waltham by the monks of that monastery. In the background

is seen Battle Abbey, founded by Duke William on the site of

the battle.--Fac-simile of a Miniature in the “Chroniques

de Normandie.” Manuscript of the Fifteenth Century, in the

possession of M. Ambroise Firmin-Didot.]

In the great expedition of William, Duke of Normandy, against the

Anglo-Saxons (1066), he had no other auxiliaries than his Norman

vassals and subjects. He conquered Harold and took possession of

England with a numerous and trained army, furnished with terrible

warlike machines and engines (Figs. 41 and 42). The Norman Conquest

was, to a certain extent, a prelude to the Crusades, for those

raids across the seas, repeated from time to time for more than two

centuries, bore no resemblance to the barbarian invasions, either

Saracen or Norman, which had been previously recorded in history.

New measures, inspired by the circumstances of the times, were the

consequence of the general crumbling to pieces of all the Eastern

nations; among these may be mentioned the establishment of the communal

militia, which set out for a campaign accompanied by its spiritual

pastors, and received the last offices of religion at their hands

on the field of battle; the regular pay allowed to those who were

destitute of private resources (a knight received at first ten sous a

day--equivalent to ten francs of modern money--and a squire received

five); the chartering of ships intended for the transport of troops;

the system of commissariat for armies in the field; and the supply of

military equipments, arms, &c.

This communal militia, sprung from the freeing of the communes, and

detachments of _soudoyers_, or paid troops, soon grew into a standing

army, which was formally incorporated for the first time by Louis le

Jeune about 1140, and increased by Philip Augustus, who added to it

the affiliated knights. Under the latter sovereign, an army in the

field presented three ranks of combatants--_bannerets_, _knights_,

and _squires_, to whom were added the _men-at-arms_. A motley crew of

_varlets_ on foot, without officers or discipline, followed the troops,

and hovered about them during an engagement, picking up the spoil of

the conquered, and killing the wounded with clubs or battle-axes,

called _glaives de mercy_.

The disasters of the Crusaders in the East, after two centuries of

useless heroism and tremendous efforts, were principally due to the

defects in their military administration, which foresaw nothing, and

was incapable of adjusting itself to the difficulties inherent to a

war in a distant and almost unknown land whither the enthusiastic

crowds who wore the cross bent their adventurous steps. Famine, plague,

leprosy, and fever destroyed the Christian armies on their journey to

Palestine, and during their stay there; and these evils would have

been greater still had it not been for the creation of the different

military orders which sprang into existence under the pressure of these

almost inevitable calamities, and which supplied hospital attendants,

chaplains, and soldiers. The continuation of the feudal wars (Fig. 43)

in Europe gave the last blow to the disorganization of the armies of

Christ.

[Illustration: Fig. 43.--Richard Cœur-de-Lion, King of England

and Duke of Normandy, mortally wounded by an arrow shot by

Bertrand de Gourdon, at the Siege of the Castle of Chalus, in

Limousin (1199).--“Chroniques de Normandie,” Manuscript of the

Fifteenth Century (Library of M. Ambroise Firmin-Didot).]

[Illustration: Fig. 44.--Soldier of the Time of Philippe le

Bel.--Miniature in a Manuscript of the Period (National Library

of Paris).]

[Illustration: Fig. 45.--Man-at-arms with a _pot de fer_

with nose-piece, a coat of mail over his leather tunic, and armed

with a short broadsword.--From a Miniature in the “Dialogues de

Saint Grégoire,” a Manuscript of the Eleventh Century, in the

National Library of Paris.]

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