CHAPTER IX.

ORDERED TO GREENSBORO', N. C.—MARCH TO THE DAN RIVER—ASSIGNED TO THE

COMMAND WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI—LEAVING WASHINGTON—FLIGHT OF GENERAL

EARLY—MAXIMILIAN—MAKING DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE UPPER RIO

GRANDE—CONFEDERATES JOIN MAXIMILIAN—THE FRENCH INVASION OF MEXICO AND

ITS RELATIONS TO THE REBELLION—ASSISTING THE LIBERALS—RESTORATION OF

THE REPUBLIC.

pb207.jpg (121K)

Full Size

The surrender at Appomattox put a stop to all military operations on

the part of General Grant's forces, and the morning of April 10 my

cavalry began its march to Petersburg, the men anticipating that they

would soon be mustered out and returned to their homes. At Nottoway

Court House I heard of the assassination of the President. The first

news came to us the night after the dastardly deed, the telegraph

operator having taken it from the wires while in transmission to

General Meade. The despatch ran that Mr. Lincoln had been, shot at 10

o'clock that morning at Willard's Hotel, but as I could conceive of

nothing to take the President there I set the story down as a canard,

and went to bed without giving it further thought. Next morning,

however, an official telegram confirmed the fact of the assassination,

though eliminating the distorted circumstances that had been

communicated the night before.

When we reached Petersburg my column was halted, and instructions given

me to march the cavalry and the Sixth Corps to Greensboro', North

Carolina, for the purpose of aiding General Sherman (the surrender of

General Johnston having not yet been effected), so I made the necessary

preparations and moved on the 24th of April, arriving at South Boston,

on the Dan River, the 28th, the Sixth Corps having reached Danville

meanwhile. At South Boston I received a despatch from General Halleck,

who immediately after Lee's surrender had been assigned to command at

Richmond, informing me that General Johnston had been brought to terms.

The necessity for going farther south being thus obviated we retraced

our steps to Petersburg, from which place I proceeded by steamer to

Washington, leaving, the cavalry to be marched thither by easy stages.

The day after my arrival in Washington an important order was sent me,

accompanied by the following letter of instructions, transferring me to

a new field of operations:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

"Washington, D. C., May 17, 1865.

"GENERAL: Under the orders relieving you from the command of the Middle

Military Division and assigning you to command west of the Mississippi,

you will proceed without delay to the West to arrange all preliminaries

for your new field of duties.

"Your duty is to restore Texas, and that part of Louisiana held by the

enemy, to the Union in the shortest practicable time, in a way most

effectual for securing permanent peace.

"To do this, you will be given all the troops that can be spared by

Major-General Canby, probably twenty-five thousand men of all arms; the

troops with Major-General J. J. Reynolds, in Arkansas, say twelve

thousand, Reynolds to command; the Fourth Army Corps, now at Nashville,

Tennessee, awaiting orders; and the Twenty-Fifth Army Corps, now at

City Point, Virginia, ready to embark.

"I do not wish to trammel you with instructions; I will state, however,

that if Smith holds out, without even an ostensible government to

receive orders from or to report to, he and his men are not entitled to

the considerations due to an acknowledged belligerent. Theirs are the

conditions of outlaws, making war against the only Government having an

existence over the territory where war is now being waged.

"You may notify the rebel commander west of the Mississippi—holding

intercourse with him in person, or through such officers of the rank of

major-general as you may select—that he will be allowed to surrender

all his forces on the same terms as were accorded to Lee and Johnston.

If he accedes, proceed to garrison the Red River as high up as

Shreveport, the seaboard at Galveston, Malagorda Bay, Corpus Christi,

and mouth of the Rio Grande.

"Place a strong force on the Rio Grande, holding it at least to a point

opposite Camargo, and above that if supplies can be procured.

"In case of an active campaign (a hostile one) I think a heavy force

should be put on the Rio Grande as a first preliminary. Troops for

this might be started at once. The Twenty-Fifth Corps is now

available, and to it should be added a force of white troops, say those

now under Major-General Steele.

"To be clear on this last point, I think the Rio Grande should be

strongly held, whether the forces in Texas surrender or not, and that

no time should be lost in getting troops there. If war is to be made,

they will be in the right place; if Kirby Smith surrenders, they will

be on the line which is to be strongly garrisoned.

"Should any force be necessary other than those designated, they can be

had by calling for them on Army Headquarters.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"To MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN,

"United States Army."

On receipt of these instructions I called at once on General Grant, to

see if they were to be considered so pressing as to preclude my

remaining in Washington till after the Grand Review, which was fixed

for the 23d and 24th of May, for naturally I had a strong desire to

head my command on that great occasion. But the General told me that

it was absolutely necessary to go at once to force the surrender of the

Confederates under Kirby Smith. He also told me that the States lately

in rebellion would be embraced in two or three military departments,

the commanders of which would control civil affairs until Congress took

action about restoring them to the Union, since that course would not

only be economical and simple, but would give the Southern people

confidence, and encourage them to go to work, instead of distracting

them with politics.

At this same interview he informed me that there was an additional

motive in sending me to the new command, a motive not explained by the

instructions themselves, and went on to say that, as a matter of fact,

he looked upon the invasion of Mexico by Maximilian as a part of the

rebellion itself, because of the encouragement that invasion had

received from the Confederacy, and that our success in putting down

secession would never be complete till the French and Austrian invaders

were compelled to quit the territory of our sister republic. With

regard to this matter, though, he said it would be necessary for me to

act with great circumspection, since the Secretary of State, Mr.

Seward, was much opposed to the use of our troops along the border in

any active way that would be likely to involve us in a war with

European powers.

Under the circumstances, my disappointment at not being permitted to

participate in the review had to be submitted to, and I left Washington

without an opportunity of seeing again in a body the men who, while

under my command, had gone through so many trials and unremittingly

pursued and, assailed the enemy, from the beginning of the campaign of

1864 till the white flag came into their hands at Appomattox Court

House.

I went first to St. Louis, and there took the steamboat for New

Orleans, and when near the mouth of the Red River received word from

General Canby that Kirby Smith had surrendered under terms similar to

those accorded Lee and Johnston. But the surrender was not carried out

in good faith, particularly by the Texas troops, though this I did not

learn till some little time afterward when I was informed that they had

marched off to the interior of the State in several organized bodies,

carrying with them their camp equipage, arms, ammunition, and even some

artillery, with the ultimate purpose of going to Mexico. In

consequence of this, and also because of the desire of the Government

to make a strong showing of force in Texas, I decided to traverse the

State with two columns of cavalry, directing one to San Antonio under

Merritt, the other to Houston under Custer. Both commands were to

start from the Red River—Shreveport and Alexandria—being the respective

initial points—and in organizing the columns, to the mounted force

already on the Red River were added several regiments of cavalry from

the east bank of the, Mississippi, and in a singular way one of these

fell upon the trail of my old antagonist, General Early. While

crossing the river somewhere below Vicksburg some of the men noticed a

suspicious looking party being ferried over in a rowboat, behind which

two horses were swimming in tow. Chase was given, and the horses,

being abandoned by the party, fell into the hands of our troopers, who,

however, failed to capture or identify the people in the boat. As

subsequently ascertained, the men were companions of Early, who was

already across the Mississippi, hidden in the woods, on his way with

two or three of these followers to join the Confederates in Texas, not

having heard of Kirby Smith's surrender. A week or two later I

received a letter from Early describing the affair, and the capture of

the horses, for which he claimed pay, on the ground that they were

private property, because he had taken them in battle. The letter also

said that any further pursuit of Early would be useless, as he

"expected to be on the deep blue sea" by the time his communication

reached me. The unfortunate man was fleeing from imaginary dangers,

however, for striking his trail was purely accidental, and no effort

whatever was being made to arrest him personally. Had this been

especially desired it might have been accomplished very readily just

after Lee's surrender, for it was an open secret that Early was then

not far away, pretty badly disabled with rheumatism.

By the time the two columns were ready to set out for San Antonio and

Houston, General Frank Herron,—with one division of the Thirteenth

Corps, occupied Galveston, and another division under General Fred

Steele had gone to Brazos Santiago, to hold Brownsville and the line of

the Rio Grande, the object being to prevent, as far as possible, the

escaping Confederates from joining Maximilian. With this purpose in

view, and not forgetting Grant's conviction that the French invasion of

Mexico was linked with the rebellion, I asked for an increase of force

to send troops into Texas in fact, to concentrate at available points

in the State an army strong enough to move against the invaders of

Mexico if occasion demanded. The Fourth and Twenty-fifth army corps

being ordered to report to me, accordingly, I sent the Fourth Corps to

Victoria and San Antonio, and the bulk of the Twenty-fifth to

Brownsville. Then came the feeding and caring for all these troops—a

difficult matter—for those at Victoria and San Antonio had to be

provisioned overland from Indianola across the "hog-wallow prairie,"

while the supplies for the forces at Brownsville and along the Rio

Grande must come by way of Brazos Santiago, from which point I was

obliged to construct, with the labor of the men, a railroad to

Clarksville, a distance of about eighteen miles.

The latter part of June I repaired to Brownsville myself to impress the

Imperialists, as much as possible, with the idea that we intended

hostilities, and took along my chief of scouts—Major Young—and four of

his most trusty men, whom I had had sent from Washington. From

Brownsville I despatched all these men to important points in northern

Mexico, to glean information regarding the movements of the Imperial

forces, and also to gather intelligence about the ex-Confederates who

had crossed the Rio Grande. On information furnished by these scouts,

I caused General Steele to make demonstrations all along the lower Rio

Grande, and at the same time demanded the return of certain munitions

of war that had been turned over by ex-Confederates to the Imperial

General (Mejia) commanding at Matamoras. These demands, backed up as

they were by such a formidable show of force created much agitation and

demoralization among the Imperial troops, and measures looking to the

abandonment of northern Mexico were forthwith adopted by those in

authority—a policy that would have resulted in the speedy evacuation of

the entire country by Maximilian, had not our Government weakened;

contenting itself with a few pieces of the contraband artillery

varnished over with the Imperial apologies. A golden opportunity was

lost, for we had ample excuse for crossing the boundary, but Mr. Seward

being, as I have already stated, unalterably opposed to any act likely

to involve us in war, insisted on his course of negotiation with

Napoleon.

As the summer wore away, Maximilian, under Mr. Seward's policy, gained

in strength till finally all the accessible sections of Mexico were in

his possession, and the Republic under President Juarez almost

succumbed. Growing impatient at this, in the latter part of September

I decided to try again what virtue there might be in a hostile

demonstration, and selected the upper Rio Grande for the scene of my

attempt. Merritt's cavalry and the Fourth Corps still being at San

Antonio, I went to that place and reviewed these troops, and having

prepared them with some ostentation for a campaign, of course it was

bruited about that we were going to invade Mexico. Then, escorted by a

regiment of horse I proceeded hastily to Fort Duncan, on the Rio Grande

just opposite the Mexican town of Piedras Negras. Here I opened

communication with President Juarez, through one of his staff, taking

care not to do this in the dark, and the news, spreading like wildfire,

the greatest significance was ascribed to my action, it being reported

most positively and with many specific details that I was only awaiting

the arrival of the troops, then under marching orders at San Antonio,

to cross the Rio Grande in behalf of the Liberal cause.

Ample corroboration of the reports then circulated was found in my

inquiries regarding the quantity of forage we could depend upon getting

in Mexico, our arrangements for its purchase, and my sending a pontoon

train to Brownsville, together with which was cited the renewed

activity of the troops along the lower Rio Grande. These reports and

demonstrations resulted in alarming the Imperialists so much that they

withdrew the French and Austrian soldiers from Matamoras, and

practically abandoned the whole of northern Mexico as far down as

Monterey, with the exception of Matamoras, where General Mejia

continued to hang on with a garrison of renegade Mexicans.

The abandonment of so much territory in northern Mexico encouraged

General Escobedo and other Liberal leaders to such a degree that they

collected a considerable army of their followers at Comargo, Mier, and

other points. At the same time that unknown quantity, Cortinas,

suspended his free-booting for the nonce, and stoutly harassing

Matamoras, succeeded in keeping its Imperial garrison within the

fortifications. Thus countenanced and stimulated, and largely supplied

with arms and ammunition, which we left at convenient places on our

side of the river to fall into their hands, the Liberals, under General

Escobedo—a man of much force of character—were enabled in northern

Mexico to place the affairs of the Republic on a substantial basis.

But in the midst of what bade fair to cause a final withdrawal of the

foreigners, we were again checked by our Government, as a result of

representations of the French Minister at Washington. In October, he

wrote to Mr. Seward that the United States troops on the Rio Grande

were acting "in exact opposition to the repeated assurances Your

Excellency has given me concerning the desire of the Cabinet at

Washington to preserve the most strict neutrality in the events now

taking place in Mexico," and followed this statement with an emphatic

protest against our course. Without any investigation whatever by our

State Department, this letter of the French Minister was transmitted to

me, accompanied by directions to preserve a strict neutrality; so, of

course, we were again debarred from anything like active sympathy.

After this, it required the patience of Job to abide the slow and poky

methods of our State Department, and, in truth, it was often very

difficult to restrain officers and men from crossing the Rio Grande

with hostile purpose. Within the knowledge of my troops, there had

gone on formerly the transfer of organized bodies of ex-Confederates to

Mexico, in aid of the Imperialists, and at this period it was known

that there was in preparation an immigration scheme having in view the

colonizing, at Cordova and one or two other places, of all the

discontented elements of the defunct Confederacy—Generals Price,

Magruder, Maury, and other high personages being promoters of the

enterprise, which Maximilian took to readily. He saw in it the

possibilities of a staunch support to his throne, and therefore not

only sanctioned the project, but encouraged it with large grants of

land, inspirited the promoters with titles of nobility, and, in

addition, instituted a system of peonage, expecting that the silver

hook thus baited would be largely swallowed by the Southern people.

The announcement of the scheme was followed by the appointment of

commissioners in each of the Southern States to send out emigrants; but

before any were deluded into starting, I made to General Grant a report

of what was going on, with the recommendation that measures be taken,

through our State Department, looking to the suppression of the colony;

but, as usual, nothing could be effected through that channel; so, as

an alternative, I published, in April, 1866, by authority of General

Grant, an order prohibiting the embarkation from ports in Louisiana and

Texas, for ports in Mexico, of any person without a permit from my

headquarters. This dampened the ardor of everybody in the Gulf States

who had planned to go to Mexico; and although the projectors of the

Cordova Colonization Scheme—the name by which it was known—secured a

few innocents from other districts, yet this set-back led ultimately to

failure.

Among the Liberal leaders along the Rio Grande during this period there

sprang up many factional differences from various causes, some

personal, others political, and some, I regret to say, from downright

moral obliquity—as, for example, those between Cortinas and

Canales—who, though generally hostile to the Imperialists, were

freebooters enough to take a shy at each other frequently, and now and

then even to join forces against Escobedo, unless we prevented them by

coaxing or threats. A general who could unite these several factions

was therefore greatly needed, and on my return to New Orleans I so

telegraphed General Grant, and he, thinking General Caravajal (then in

Washington seeking aid for the Republic) would answer the purpose,

persuaded him to report to me in New Orleans. Caravajal promptly

appeared, but he did not impress me very favorably. He was old and

cranky, yet, as he seemed anxious to do his best, I sent him over to

Brownsville, with credentials, authorizing him to cross into Mexico,

and followed him myself by the next boat. When I arrived in

Brownsville, matters in Matamoras had already reached a crisis. General

Mejia, feeling keenly the moral support we were giving the Liberals,

and hard pressed by the harassing attacks of Cortinas and Canales, had

abandoned the place, and Caravajal, because of his credentials from our

side, was in command, much to the dissatisfaction of both those chiefs

whose differences it was intended he should reconcile.

The, day after I got to Brownsville I visited Matamoras, and had a long

interview with Caravajal. The outcome of this meeting was, on my part,

a stronger conviction than ever that he was unsuitable, and I feared

that either Canales or Cortinas would get possession of the city.

Caravajal made too many professions of what he would do—in short,

bragged too much—but as there was no help for the situation, I made the

best of it by trying to smooth down the ruffled feathers of Canales and

Cortinas. In my interview with Caravajal I recommended Major Young as

a confidential man, whom he could rely upon as a "go-between" for

communicating with our people at Brownsville, and whom he could trust

to keep him informed of the affairs of his own country as well.

A day or two afterward I recrossed the Gulf to New Orleans, and then,

being called from my headquarters to the interior of Texas, a fortnight

passed before I heard anything from Brownsville. In the meanwhile

Major Young had come to New Orleans, and organized there a band of men

to act as a body-guard for Caravajal, the old wretch having induced him

to accept the proposition by representing that it had my concurrence.

I at once condemned the whole business, but Young, having been

furnished with seven thousand dollars to recruit the men and buy their

arms, had already secured both, and was so deeply involved in the

transaction, he said, that he could not withdraw without dishonor, and

with tears in his eyes he besought me to help him. He told me he had

entered upon the adventure in the firm belief that I would countenance

it; that the men and their equipment were on his hands; that he must

make good his word at all hazards; and that while I need not approve,

yet I must go far enough to consent to the departure of the men, and to

loan him the money necessary to provision his party and hire a schooner

to carry them to Brazos. It was hard in deed to resist the appeals of

this man, who had served me so long and so well, and the result of his

pleading was that I gave him permission to sail, and also loaned him

the sum asked for; but I have never ceased to regret my consent, for

misfortune fell upon the enterprise almost from its inception.

By the time the party got across the Gulf and over to Brownsville,

Caravajal had been deposed by Canales, and the latter would not accept

their services. This left Young with about fifty men to whom he was

accountable, and as he had no money to procure them subsistence, they

were in a bad fix. The only thing left to do was to tender their

services to General Escobedo, and with this in view the party set out

to reach the General's camp, marching up the Rio Grande on the American

side, intending to cross near Ringgold Bar racks. In advance of them,

however, had spread far and wide the tidings of who they were, what

they proposed to do, and where they were going, and before they could

cross into Mexico they were attacked by a party of ex-Confederates and

renegade Mexican rancheros. Being on American soil, Young forbade his

men to return the fire, and bent all his efforts to getting them over

the river; but in this attempt they were broken up, and became

completely demoralized. A number of the men were drowned while

swimming the river, Young himself was shot and killed, a few were

captured, and those who escaped—about twenty in all—finally joined

Escobedo, but in such a plight as to be of little use. With this

distressing affair came to an end pretty much all open participation of

American sympathizers with the Liberal cause, but the moral support

afforded by the presence of our forces continued, and this was

frequently supplemented with material aid in the shape of munitions of

war, which we liberally supplied, though constrained to do so by the

most secret methods.

The term of office of Juarez as President of the Mexican Republic

expired in December, 1865, but to meet existing exigencies he had

continued himself in office by proclamation, a course rendered

necessary by the fact that no elections could be held on account of the

Imperial occupation of most of the country. The official who, by the

Mexican Constitution, is designated for the succession in such an

emergency, is the President of the Supreme Court, and the person then

eligible under this provision was General Ortega, but in the interest

of the Imperialists he had absented himself from Mexico, hence the

patriotic course of Juarez in continuing himself at the head of affairs

was a necessity of the situation. This action of the President gave

the Imperialists little concern at first, but with the revival of the

Liberal cause they availed themselves of every means to divide its

supporters, and Ortega, who had been lying low in the United States,

now came forward to claim the Presidency. Though ridiculously late for

such a step, his first act was to issue a manifesto protesting against

the assumption of the executive authority by Juarez. The protest had

little effect, however, and his next proceeding was to come to New

Orleans, get into correspondence with other disaffected Mexicans, and

thus perfect his plans. When he thought his intrigue ripe enough for

action, he sailed for Brazos, intending to cross the Rio Grande and

assert his claims with arms. While he was scheming in New Orleans,

however, I had learned what he was up to, and in advance of his

departure had sent instructions to have him arrested on American soil.

Colonel Sedgwick, commanding at Brownsville, was now temporary master

of Matamoras also, by reason of having stationed some American troops

there for the protection of neutral merchants, so when Ortega appeared

at Brazos, Sedgwick quietly arrested him and held him till the city of

Matamoras was turned over to General Escobedo, the authorized

representative of Juarez; then Escobedo took charge, of Ortega, and

with ease prevented his further machinations.

During the winter and spring of 1866 we continued covertly supplying

arms and ammunition to the Liberals—sending as many as 30,000 muskets

from Baton Rouge Arsenal alone—and by mid-summer Juarez, having

organized a pretty good sized army, was in possession of the whole line

of the Rio Grande, and, in fact, of nearly the whole of Mexico down to

San Louis Potosi. Then thick and fast came rumors pointing to the

tottering condition of Maximilian's Empire-first, that Orizaba and Vera

Cruz were being fortified; then, that the French were to be withdrawn;

and later came the intelligence that the Empress Carlotta had gone home

to beg assistance from Napoleon, the author of all of her husband's

troubles. But the situation forced Napoleon to turn a deaf ear to

Carlotta's prayers. The brokenhearted woman besought him on her knees,

but his fear of losing an army made all pleadings vain. In fact, as I

ascertained by the following cablegram which came into my hands,

Napoleon's instructions for the French evacuation were in Mexico at the

very time of this pathetic scene between him and Carlotta. The

despatch was in cipher when I received it, but was translated by the

telegraph operator at my headquarters, who long before had mastered the

key of the French cipher:

"PARIS, January 10, 1867. FRENCH CONSUL, New Orleans, La.

"To GENERAL CASTELNAU, at Mexico.

"Received your despatch of the 9th December. Do not compel the Emperor

to abdicate, but do not delay the departure of the troops; bring back

all those who will not remain there. Most of the fleet has left.

"NAPOLEON."

This meant the immediate withdrawal of the French. The rest of the

story—which has necessarily been but in outline—is soon told.

Maximilian, though deserted, determined to hold out to the last, and

with the aid of disloyal Mexicans stuck to his cause till the spring.

When taken prisoner at Queretaro, he was tried and executed under

circumstances that are well known. From promptings of humanity

Secretary Seward tried hard to save the Imperial prisoner, but without

success. The Secretary's plea for mercy was sent through me at New

Orleans, and to make speed I hired a steamer to proceed with it across

the Gulf to Tampico. The document was carried by Sergeant White, one

of my scouts, who crossed the country from Tampico, and delivered it to

Escobedo at Queretaro; but Mr. Seward's representations were without

avail—refused probably because little mercy had been shown certain

Liberal leaders unfortunate enough to fall into Maximilian's hands

during the prosperous days of his Empire.

At the close of our war there was little hope for the Republic of

Mexico. Indeed, till our troops were concentrated on the Rio Grande

there was none. Our appearance in such force along the border

permitted the Liberal leaders, refugees from their homes, to establish

rendezvous whence they could promulgate their plans in safety, while

the countenance thus given the cause, when hope was well-nigh gone,

incited the Mexican people to renewed resistance. Beginning again with

very scant means, for they had lost about all, the Liberals saw their

cause, under the influence of such significant and powerful backing,

progress and steadily grow so strong that within two years Imperialism

had received its death-blow. I doubt very much whether such, results

could have been achieved without the presence of an American army on

the Rio Grande, which, be it remembered, was sent there because, in

General Grant's words, the French invasion of Mexico was so closely

related to the rebellion as to be essentially a part of it.

[Illustration]

Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, Volume 2, Part 5 · 第 5 / 7 章