I. Historical relations of philosophical idealism. General
bearing of this doctrine upon the religious interest, and
upon the history of religion 120
II. Objections to our doctrine of the reason as having no
value for life, and as failing to help toward solving the
problem of salvation 129
III. First answer to these objections. Reports of religious
experience that show some relations of our doctrine to
the problem in question 131
IV. Relations of knowledge and will in general. Statement
of the position of Pragmatism. Resulting objections to
our whole doctrine of the reason. Truth as tested
through "workings." Absolute truth as indefinable.
Pragmatism as taught by James has defined its own
forms and tests of religious insight. These forms and
tests of insight are asserted to be superior to our own.
Religious insight as saving, but as also empirical, in
James's sense of that term, and as never absolute 135
{xiii}
V. Answer to pragmatism. Our agreement with some of its
principal positions. Our intelligence as the counsellor of
our actions. The point where we are at issue with
pragmatism. Reason and will, their general relations.
Vindication of the position taken in the former lecture 144
VI. The problem as to the absoluteness of truth. The close
relations of knowledge and action do not throw doubt
upon, but rather emphasise this absoluteness. For all
action is expressed in individual and absolutely
irrevocable deeds. These deeds, if the practical issues
of life are sharply defined, remain irrevocably on the
"score of life" as "hits" or "misses." This irrevocable
character of our deeds insures the fact that the
"counsels" or "ideas" of the intellect, which guide our
individual deeds, are as absolutely "hits" or "misses"
as are the deeds which they counsel. Resulting definition
of absolute truth, which is something perfectly concrete,
and as accessible as life itself 151
VII. Application of this view to the definition of reality.
The real world as a life of counsels and of deeds. The
divine wisdom and the divine will as inseparable. The
eternal as, not the "timeless," but the "time-inclusive"
insight and survey of life 158
V
THE RELIGION OF LOYALTY
I. Objections to all the foregoing sources of insight as
inadequate,--if considered as separate sources,--to
furnish a basis for a vital and positive religion. Need
of a new source. Appeal to life to furnish such a source.
The new source is due to men's efforts to solve the
problem of duty, and results from the relations between
the religious and the moral motives 166
{xiv}
II. The historical conflicts between religion and morality.
The relations between faith and works, divine grace and
moral strenuousness. Review of these conflicts. Need
of some unifying motive 170
III. Analysis of the bases of morals. Individual and social
elements in the idea of duty. Resulting first statement
of the search for a moral principle. Incompleteness of
this first statement 182
IV. The contribution of the reason to the definition of a
moral principle. Practical inadequacy of the result thus
far attained 186