VON SPEE'S AIMS AND HOPES
The British Public and our gallant Allies have no doubt fully
appreciated the commercial importance of the battle of the Falkland
Islands. The relief that was thereby given to our shipping and trade
not only in South American waters, but throughout our overseas
Empire, can only be realised by those who have large interests
therein. British trade with South America was first upset by the
exploits of the _Karlsruhe_, later on prestige was still more
affected by the Coronel disaster, and, finally, most of all by the
expectation of the arrival of von Spee's squadron in the Atlantic.
The freedom since enjoyed by our merchant shipping on all the
sea-trade routes of the world was in great part due to the success of
this portion of our Navy, the blockade having been firmly established
by our powerful fleet in home waters. The toll of ships sunk and
captured in the early months of the war would have been much greater,
trade would have been seriously dislocated for the time being, and
the pinch of a shortage in food supplies would probably have been
felt had it not been for this very opportune victory.
What were von Spee's intentions after the destruction of Admiral
Cradock's squadron we shall probably never know, but it is evident
that he could not remain in the Pacific; it is fairly certain, also,
that he intended to seize the Falkland Islands if he found them
insufficiently guarded, as he had reason to infer was the case.
Obviously the most tempting course then open to him, whether he took
the Falklands or not, was to hold up our trade along the whole of the
east coast of South America. But the possibility of doing this was
diminished by his fatal delay after Coronel, before making a move.
Had he acted at once he might have been able to do this with impunity
for at least a month, by dividing up his squadron into small units.
His coal and other supplies would have been easily assured through
the armed merchant cruisers _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_ and _Kronprinz
Wilhelm_, organising the colliers and shoreships along these coasts.
The _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ had been operating for months past on the
north coast of South America in conjunction with the _Karlsruhe_, and
therefore already knew the tricks of this trade.
Had he been permitted to pursue this policy, von Spee was inevitably
bound to touch on the delicate subject of neutrality in arranging
supplies for so numerous a squadron. Now, according to the laws laid
down by Article 5 of the Hague Conference, 1907, "belligerents are
forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of operations
against their adversaries." By Article 12 it is laid down that
in default of any other special provisions in the legislation of
a neutral Power, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in
the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for
more than twenty-four hours, except in special cases covered by the
Convention. It is left to the neutral to make regulations as to the
hospitality it will afford, and those laid down by Brazil were that a
belligerent vessel was only allowed to visit one of their ports once
in three months for the purpose of obtaining supplies.
Being aware of these conditions, and that neutrality could not be
imposed upon to an unlimited extent, it follows that von Spee would
have been dependent in a great measure on supply ships which were
able to evade the scrutiny of the neutral authorities--a precarious
state of existence. Coal would be his prime necessity, and he might
have hoped to secure a supply of this from captured colliers, but he
could not depend upon it for such a large number of ships. Meanwhile,
however, very considerable damage might have been done to our
shipping, and it is generally believed the Germans were optimistic
enough to hope that England would be brought to her knees from
starvation by being cut off from both North and South American ports
during this period, although there was really no ground whatsoever
for such a surmise. Perhaps we shall in the future be careful not
to frame so many laws for the conduct of war, since the Power that
neglects these laws rides roughshod over her more conscientious
opponent.
Such a scheme may have been the natural outcome of von Spee's
success at Coronel. On the other hand, it is impossible to state
with certainty that he did not intend to go ultimately to the Cape
of Good Hope or some other part of Africa, but the pros and cons
have already been discussed, and it scarcely appears probable. Von
Spee, of course, had no notion of the prompt measure taken by our
Admiralty in dispatching two powerful battle-cruisers of high speed
to these waters without loss of time and in complete secrecy, though
he must have concluded that no time would be lost in sending out
reinforcements. Apparently his judgment was here at fault; hence the
proposed attack on our colony in the Falkland Islands, the capture
of which would have yielded him coal for his squadron's immediate
requirements.
Von Spee is said to have been over-persuaded by his staff to
undertake this latter venture. His movements here certainly led to
the conclusion that he had no fixed plan. When the _Invincible_
reached Pernambuco on her way home, there was a strong rumour that
three colliers had been waiting off the coast for the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_; this points to the capture of the Falklands not
being included in the original plan. Admiral Sturdee searched the
area for these ships but found nothing.
Both the British and German squadrons refrained from using wireless,
and so had no knowledge of their proximity during the first week in
December. Had the German ships passed our squadron whilst coaling at
the Falklands, they would in all likelihood have separated, and would
then have had a free hand--for some time, at any rate--along the east
coast, whilst our ships would have gone round the Horn and searched
for them in vain in the Pacific. The first intimation of their having
eluded our squadron would have been that much of our shipping would
be reported overdue in England from South American ports (for von
Spee would most assuredly have avoided approaching within sight of
land). This would very probably have been put down in the first few
instances to the depredations of the _Karlsruhe_, whose fate was at
this time quite unknown. The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were
sufficiently powerful to cope with anything which von Spee thought
was likely to be in these seas. As a matter of fact, however, the
battle-cruiser _Princess Royal_ was in North American waters at this
time, having left England in secrecy soon after the _Invincible_ and
_Inflexible_ were dispatched south.
In further support of this theory of what was the German Admiral's
plan of campaign, it may be mentioned that a fully laden German
collier was forced to intern at a South American port south of the
Plate in order to avoid capture by the _Carnarvon_ and _Cornwall_,
who were searching the coast there just after the battle of the
Falklands took place. Another collier, the _Mera_, put back into
Montevideo very hurriedly and interned herself, and lastly, the
tender _Patagonia_ ended her career in like manner. The presence of
all these ships in this locality is evidence of the organisation
arranged for the supply of the German squadron along this coast, and
precludes the idea of its going to Africa.
There is evidence to show that von Spee picked up naval reservists
for his squadron at Valparaiso, but there is none to confirm the
rumour that he proposed to occupy the Falkland Islands, retaining
a garrison there after they had been captured. He could never have
hoped to occupy or to hold them for any length of time. Baron von
Maltzhan, the manager of a large sheep farm in Chile, was selected to
take command of an expedition consisting of an armed force of some
500 men, whose function was to assist in the capture of the Falkland
Islands, but not necessarily to remain on as a permanent garrison.
The damage that can be done to merchant shipping and trade by a
single hostile ship has been demonstrated on more than one occasion
during this war. If, therefore, it is presumed that the revised
German programme was to capture the Falkland Islands, thus aiming a
blow at British prestige, and then to scatter in the manner suggested
so as to hamper or cripple our trade with the New World as long as
possible, it will then be seen how opportune a victory this was for
the British nation.
Had von Spee escaped being brought to action, it seems probable that
he would have endeavoured to work his way home in preference to the
alternative of internment.
In brief, then, this is a rough outline of events that "might"--one
could almost use the word "would"--have taken place, had not such
prompt steps been taken by the Admiralty to meet him wherever he
went by superior forces. Von Spee knew he was being cornered, and is
reported to have said so at Valparaiso.
If additional proof of the decision of the Germans to bring about
this war, whatever the cost, were required, it is to be found in
the testimony of a captured German reservist, who has already been
mentioned in this book. He was German interpreter to the Law Courts
at Sydney. This man told a naval surgeon who was examining him after
he had been rescued, when he was still in a very shaken condition
and could have had no object in lying, that he had been called up by
the German Admiralty on _June 26th_. In company with several other
reservists, therefore, he took passage in a sailing ship bound for
Valparaiso, where he ultimately joined the _Leipzig_. This tale is
corroborated by the fact that von Spee put into Valparaiso to pick up
naval reservists in accordance with instructions from Germany, which
perhaps may have been the cause of his delay in coming round the Horn
after defeating Admiral Cradock. Other prisoners informed us that
they had been cruising up and down the Chilean coast in order to meet
a storeship from Valparaiso with these reservists on board, so as to
avoid being reported. The latter, however, never turned up, so the
Germans were obliged to put in there a second time.
The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria and of his
wife, the alleged cause of this war, took place at Serajevo, the
capital of Bosnia, two days after this man was called up by German
Admiralty orders, namely, on Sunday, June 28th, 1914.
A German newspaper, in speaking of the success of Admiral von Spee
at Coronel, also admirably sums up the issue of the battle of the
Falkland Islands: "The superiority of our fleet in no way detracts
from the glory of our victory, for the very essence of the business
of a strategist is the marshalling of a superior fleet at the right
place and at the right moment."
"Not unto us,"
Cried Drake, "not unto us--but unto Him
Who made the sea, belongs our England now!
Pray God that heart and mind and soul we prove
Worthy among the nations of this hour
And this great victory, whose ocean fame
Shall wash the world with thunder till that day
When there is no more sea, and the strong cliffs
Pass like a smoke, and the last peal of it
Sounds thro' the trumpet."
ALFRED NOYES (_Drake_).