CHAPTER XIII.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.

The low rates in favor of foreign goods and of domestic goods intended

for export amount to a serious discrimination. Paul Morton told the

United States Industrial Commission that goods were carried from Hamburg

to Denver for less than the rates from Chicago to Denver.[113] Complaint

was made many years ago that the Pennsylvania Railroad and other roads

charged lower rates, even 50 percent lower, on goods shipped in from

foreign countries than on domestic traffic of the same sort.

Investigation revealed in some cases a far greater difference than 50

percent.

At one time the rate on tin plate from Liverpool via Philadelphia and

the Pennsylvania Railroad to Chicago was 24 cents a hundred, while the

rate from Philadelphia over the same road was 28 cents.

In the Texas and Pacific Case the record showed that books, buttons,

carpets, clothing, etc., were carried from England, via New Orleans to

San Francisco for $1.07 a hundred, while the same articles of domestic

manufacture paid $2.88 on the same trains from New Orleans to Frisco.

Boots and shoes, cashmere, confectionery, cutlery, gloves, hats and

caps, laces and linens, etc., took the same blanket rate of $1.07 from

Liverpool and London to San Francisco, while similar American goods paid

the railroads $3.70 a hundred from New Orleans to California. In some

cases the railroads received only ⅙ as much for the transportation of

foreign goods as for domestic goods. The Interstate Commission held that

“any difference in charge between foreign and domestic traffic is

unlawful,” and ordered the discrimination to cease, but after long

litigation the United States Supreme Court decided that among the

circumstances and conditions to be considered in judging rates are the

conditions of ocean traffic and water competition to interior ports in

the United States, etc., so that a carrier may be justified in making

low rates to secure foreign freights which would otherwise go by

competitive routes or not go at all.[114] The practical result appears

to be that railroads may nullify the protective tariff and discriminate

in favor of foreign shipments to any extent that is necessary to make

them move, regardless of the question whether or no they ought to move

under such conditions.

Foreign manufacturers cannot only ship their goods across the country

more cheaply than our manufacturers can, or at least such of them as pay

schedule rates, but can also get special rates on all raw materials they

buy here and ship over our lines for export. For example, a Chicago

miller pays 21 cents per one hundred lbs. to get either wheat or flour

to New York, while the English miller can buy wheat in Chicago and take

it to New York for 13 cents. In some cases the rate on flour has been as

much as 11 cents more than the rate on wheat. Since 2 or 3 cents a

hundred lbs. is a good profit, our millers cannot grind for export

against the English millers.[115] The railroads turn down our millers

and establish a protective tariff for free trade England, protecting her

millers against competition.

American shippers take such advantage of the low export rates as they

can, but sometimes these concessions are made to the shippers in one

city and not to those of other cities; for example, the railroads

carrying export flour from Minneapolis at a discount refused similar

concessions to shippers at intermediate points.[116]

The heart of the railroad problem The history of railway discrimination in the United States, the chief efforts at control and the remedies proposed, with hints from other countries · 第 13 / 31 章