As a fact, the British contempt for the Americans might have urged them
as rashly against Bunker Hill as it did against the redoubt which they
gained, at last, only through failure of the ammunition of its
defenders; but, in view of the few hours at disposal of the Americans to
prepare against a landing so soon to be attempted, it is certain that
the defences were well placed, both to cover the town and force an
immediate issue before the British could increase their own force.
It is equally certain that the British utterly failed to appreciate the
fact that, with the control of the Mystic and Charles Rivers, they
could, within twenty-four hours, so isolate Charlestown as to secure the
same results as by storming the American position, and without
appreciable loss. This was the advice of General Clinton, but he was
overruled. They did, ultimately, thereby check reinforcements, but
suffered so severely in the battle itself that fully two thirds of the
Americans retired safely to the main land.
The delay of the British to advance as soon as the landing was effected
was bad tactics. One half of the force could have followed the Mystic
and turned the American left wing, long before Colonel Stark's command
came upon the field. The British dined as leisurely as if they had only
to move any time and seize the threatening position, and thereby lost
their chief opportunity.
One single sign of the recognition of any possible risk-to themselves
was the opening of fire from Boston Neck and such other positions as
faced the American lines, as if to warn them not to attempt the city, or
endanger their own lives by sending reinforcements to Charlestown.