CHAPTER VI

THE BRITISH CONTRACT

Size of the “Drawings and Descriptions.” Pseudonyms. Proposals.

Contract with the British government. Was Fulton false to his

principles in supporting Great Britain against France? His

financial position under the contract.

The “Descriptions” that Fulton left in England were in two parts, of

which the first is a recital of his negotiations and work, and the

second a minute description of the boat and bombs. Both parts are wholly

in Fulton’s handwriting and cover twelve double sheets of paper, five

for the first and seven for the second part. The sheets are 14¾ inches

high with a double or folded width of 19⅛ inches. The writing is on both

sides of the sheets, so that exclusive of the outside pages, which are

left blank, except for the descriptive recital on page 1 of the first

part, there are 43 pages of writing. There are from 26 to 28 lines to a

page with a margin of 2 inches on the left-hand side, and about 8 words

to a line. The paper is heavy hand-made linen, slightly off the white in

color with gilt on the edges. One-half of each sheet is water-marked

with a design composed of a crown and fleur-de-lys surmounting the

letters P & B, the other half of the sheet being water-marked Portal &

Co. 1796.

The drawings are water-colored and are on sheets of heavy Bristol paper

measuring 22¼ × 18¾ inches. As will be seen each one is dated and signed

by Fulton.

The “Bond and Contract” to which reference is made was found in 1812

among the papers of Lord Melville and was then deposited by his

executors in the Public Record office. With the exception of the

Admiralty CIRCULAR given on page 52, the contemporaneous archives of the

government contain little concerning Fulton’s work, and are in this

respect quite different from the French records. The explanation is that

the British ministers were fearful lest information regarding the

submarine should transpire to their detriment. They, therefore, treated

all correspondence as confidential and kept letters and other documents

in their personal rather than official files. In fact Fulton adopted the

pseudonym of “Robert Francis,” a designation that was frequently, though

not exclusively, used by both the Government officials and himself in

correspondence during the years 1804–1806.

The “Contract” was Fulton’s own conception in form and substance, the

government accepting the terms that he proposed. This is shown by his

notes and copies of letters that still exist.

Lord Hawkesbury who had induced Fulton to leave France for England was

Robert Banks Jenkinson (1770–1828). His father, created Lord Hawkesbury

in 1786 and Earl of Liverpool in 1796, had served as Secretary for War

from 1778 and therefore during the greater part of the American

Revolution. The son, using his father’s junior title of Lord Hawkesbury,

became Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1801 in the Addington ministry.

As such Secretary, he would be the one to open negotiations with Fulton

in Paris.

Fulton arrived in London on the 19th of May. Addington had been

displaced by Pitt in the control of the government a few days before.

Lord Hawkesbury, though no longer in charge of Foreign Affairs,

continued in office, holding the portfolio of the Home Office in the new

cabinet. In spite of his change of status, Fulton would naturally call

on him as the only official with whom he was acquainted. In his note

book, in which he copied in neat hand the letter of Lord Hawkesbury that

the agent “Mr. Smith” had handed him in Paris, he writes at the bottom

of the copy of the letter, “I had an interview with Mr. Hammond on the

21 when he desired me to give in proposals they were as follows.”

From this juxtaposition of names it is fair to assume that to Lord

Hawkesbury he gave the name of Hammond. Fulton was fond of doing such

things. His own attempt at personal disguise under the name of Francis

was very thin. The coincidence that his real and temporarily assumed

names began with the same letter will be noted. So do Hawkesbury and

Hammond. The letters to “Mr. Hammond” are letters that would be written

only to one who was high in authority. It was not in accordance with

Fulton’s character to send such communications as are the Hammond

letters to a subordinate. In “Mr. Hammond” can be seen Lord Hawkesbury

who had just been made a peer in his own right and was Pitt’s leader in

the House of Lords. This identification of “Mr. Hammond” will be borne

in mind in connection with several letters given on pages 96 et seq. as

well as those immediately below containing the proposals promised on May

21st.

London May the 22d 1804

Proposals for the examination of a System of Submarine navigation,

Having been invited to London by the late Administration to

demonstrate the practicability of navigating under water and attacking

and destroying ships of war by submarine operations I propose that

government name a commission as they think proper to examine the

following principles and give their decision for or against each

article, which commission Should be composed of at least two able

mechanecians and one Chymest,—

Then follows matter describing the plunging vessel almost verbatim with

that given in the “Descriptions,” beginning with First principle on page

56 down to and including the demand for £100,000 on page 59, after which

the proposals continue as follows:

What plans government may have in View to draw the power of Bounapart

into governable limits Secure perminant peace and forever remove all

Ideas from the Side of France I do not pretend to Conjecture.

I beg leave to propose one which will be prompt in execution and if

Successful will forever Remove from the mind of Man the possibility of

France making a descent on England. I propose a submarine expedition

to destroy the fleets of Boulogne and Brest as they now lie. I am

ready to exhibit the practicability of my plan or at least that the

chances are many to one in favour of Success, and merits immediate

attention as the Season is much advanced much is to be done and no

time should be lost.

If government adopt my plan it must be organized nearly as follows,

One good Mechanecian must receive my drawings, take my orders and see

to the execution of the Machinery. An Active Sea officer must have

power to choose 100 hardy seamen _out of the fleet_ who are good

swimmers about 40 tons of powder and 7 thousand pounds for various

expences will fit out the expedition.

If government give into this plan I demand the following terms.

A pay of 200 pounds a Month while I devote my time to the enterprise

or till government notify that they have no further need of my

exertions,

If Government appoint their own officers to make the Attack; from the

directions I may give, without my going to Sea to direct it I demand

only the monthly pay.

But if government think proper that I go on board a Ship of war off

Boulogne and Brest to direct the time and mode of Attack I demand one

fourth the Value of each Vessel burnt or destroyed, In either case if

I do not succeed I demand nothing for my trouble but the monthly pay

before mentioned, till government notify that my exertions are no

longer necessary,

ROBERT FRANCIS

These proposals were sent under a covering letter to “Mr. Hammond” dated

the following day.

London May the 23d 1804

Mr. Hammond

Sir I herewith send you my proposals for examining the principles of

submarine navigation, also my proposal for a submarine attack on

Boulogne and Brest, in this period of our communications it is

necessary we Should clearly understand each other, First Ministers

will have the goodness to examine the mode I propose for investigating

the properties and combinations of Submarine navigation, if they

approve of it they will Sign it as a contract between them an me, then

appoint a commission to decide which commission approving the reward

follows; this part finished the expedition if thought proper is to

commence on the terms specified

I have the honor to be with

much respect your most obedient

ROBERT FRANCIS

Without waiting for his proposals to be accepted, Fulton’s mind began

working on the commission to be named. On June 12th he suggested to “Mr.

Hammond” that the government and he should name an equal number, the

majority to decide. On his part, he proposed Bishop Watson, Sir John

Sinclair, Lord Stanhope and the Rev. Edmund Cartwright. Apparently

Fulton had great faith in the efficacy of the church in this matter.

The Bond and Contract is on five pages wholly in Fulton’s handwriting

with an outside sheet with two dockets, one reading

Articles of Agreement

with Mr. Fulton

20th July 1804

The other

This attested Counterpart of an

agreement between His Majesty’s

Government in 1804 & Mr. Robert Fulton

was found among the papers of the late

Lord Viscount Melville, 22nd Jan. 1812.

M——

Articles of Agreement between the Right Honorable William Pitt, first

Lord commissioner of his Majesty’s treasury and Chancelor of the

Exchequer; and the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Melville first Lord of

the Admiralty, in behalf of his Majesty’s government on the one part;

and Robert Fulton citizen of the United States of America and inventor

of a plan of attacking fleets by submarine Bombs, on the other part,

The said Robert Fulton agrees to disclose the principles of his scheme

to Sir Home Popham and to superintend the execution of it on the

following conditions

_First_, To be paid Two hundred pounds a month while he is employed on

this Service for his personal trouble and Expences;

_Second_, To have a credit lodged from time to time for the payment of

his Mechanical preperations, not to exceed Seven thousand pounds.

_Third_, That in His Majesty’s dockyards and Arsenals shall be made or

furnished all such articles as may be required, which are applicable to

this purpose.

_Fourth_, If any circumstance should arise to prevent government

carrying this plan into execution then the parties are each to name two

commissioners for the purpose of examining the principles; and trying

such experiments as they may think proper, And if it should appear to

the Majority of the Members that the plan is practicable and offers a

more effectual mode of destroying the enemies fleet at Boulogne, Brest,

or elsewhere, than any now in practice and with less risk, then

government is to pay the said Robert Fulton the sum of Forty Thousand

Pounds as a compensation for demonstrating the principles, and making

over the entire possession of his submarine Mode of Attack.

_Fifth_, When the Said Robert Fulton has destroyed by his submarine

carcasses or Bombs one of the enemies deck’d Vessels, then Government is

to pay him the sum of Forty Thousand pounds, provided commissioners

appointed As in the previous article shall be of opinion that the same

Scheme can be practically applied to the destruction of the enemies

fleets,

_Sixth_, If the Arbitrators differ in opinion then they are to draw lots

for the choice of an Umpire and the Majority of Voices to decide all

points of reference within the construction of this agreement and that

decision to be final

_Seventh_, One half the supposed Value of all Vessels destroyed by Mr.

Fulton’s Submarine Mode of attack to be paid him by government as long

as he superintends the execution of his plan; but when government has no

further occasion for his service; or that he wishes to retire, then he

is only to be paid one quarter of the supposed value of such vessels as

may be destroyed by his scheme, and this remuneration to continue for

the space of fourteen years from the date thereof

_Eighth_, In case the Vessels destroyed by this scheme should exceed in

amount Forty thousand pounds, then the Forty Thousand pounds first

stipulated to be paid, shall be considered as part payment of the whole

sum which may become due to the said Robert Fulton,

_Ninth_, If in the course of practice any improvemt Should be Suggested

that can only be esteemed as a collateral Aid to the general principles

of Mr. Fulton’s mode of attack, then such improvements are not to

deminish or set aside his claims on government,

_Tenth_, All monies which may become due to Mr. Fulton to be paid within

six months from the time when they Shall be so adjudged according to the

tenor of this agreement,

_Eleventh_, This agreement to be considered by both parties as a liberal

covenant with a View to protect the Rights of the individual, and to

prevent any improper advantages being taken of his Majesty’s Government.

Mr. Fulton having deposited the drawings and plans of his submarine

scheme of attack; in the hands of a confidential friend with the View to

their being delivered to the American government in case of his death,

does hereby bind himself to withdraw all such plans and drawings and not

devulge them or any part of his principles to any person whatever for

the space of fourteen years; which is the term during which he is to

derive all the advantages of their operation from the British

Government,

The benefit of the foregoing agreement shall be extended to the heirs

and executors of the said Robert Fulton, Signed this Seventeenth day of

July one thousand eight hundred and four

ROBERT FULTON

exchanged with a counterpart

signed by the Right Honble

William Pitt & the Right

Honble Lord Melville

H.P.

Witness

Home Popham

The reading of these remarkable documents of such great historical

interest, especially at this time when submarine navigation has been

developed to the point of complete success, kindles many lively

reflections.

The question is whether Fulton acted as a man of honor in abandoning the

country for which he had volunteered to fight and where he had received

such signal and loyal service from its citizens. Was he justified in

transferring his support to another nation at war with France and thus

help destroy the growing power of France for which country he had

professed so much affection? This question has been debated by Fulton’s

biographers, although apparently none of them knew exactly what it was

that Fulton had done for the British Government. They were all under the

impression that his work consisted chiefly in the demonstration of the

efficacy of torpedoes, carcasses or bombs as Fulton vicariously called

them, or mines as we would speak of them today. Cadwallader D. Colden

gives several pages of his book to developing, with some labor, an

excuse for Fulton. Dickinson finds some justification in the fact that

Fulton had been only partially reimbursed by the French Government for

his work, but more particularly in that the development of Napoleon’s

ambitions was repugnant to Fulton’s ideas of republicanism. The last is

without question the correct and only view to take.

A radical republican, hating blindly all forms of autocracy, he had

remained in France believing that in France he would see the full

flowering of his principles. He offered his inventions to the French

Government, not for pecuniary gain, because his proposals show that he

was willing to abide by their decision as to the monetary value to be

determined only after he had achieved success, but because he thought

that the French revolution was a real movement toward perfect liberty.

To this end he offered not only his device, but also himself. He was

anxious to be enrolled in the fighting force of France and go forth in

his little boat to do battle against mighty England. When, therefore, he

was refused by Bonaparte and his sincere offers scorned with absolutely

unjustified insult, we can imagine his revulsion of sentiment and

forgive any bitterness of feeling. In a moment his idol was shattered.

He realized that those in control of the French Government were not

actuated by a broad conception of world freedom, but solely by personal

ambition and thirst for power. He makes this position quite clear in a

letter to Lord Melville quoted by Colden as follows, though, before

publishing, the latter must have edited the orthography: “In writing

this letter, I feel no enmity to the people of France, or any other

people; on the contrary, I wish their happiness; for my principle is,

that every nation profits by the prosperity of its neighbours, provided

the governments of its neighbours be humane and just. What is here said,

is directed against the tyrannic principles of Bonaparte, a man who has

set himself above all law; he is, therefore in that state which Lord

Somers compares to that of a wild beast unrestrained by any rule, and he

should be hunted down as the enemy of mankind. This, however, is the

business of Frenchmen. With regard to the nations of Europe, they can

only hold him in governable limits, by fencing him round with bayonets.”

France, his dearly beloved France, was no more liberal under the upstart

clique of the consulate than was England under the régime of her long

established autocracy. This is the only explanation of how and why

Fulton abandoned his allegiance to France, went to England and there

worked to strengthen the British navy that it might the more easily

smash the growing power of the French fleet with which he had once so

ardently desired to serve. He had been cruelly stabbed by the hands of

his friends in the most tender spot in his heart. This cruelty that

served to clear his vision he could not forgive, much less forget.

Fulton had undoubtedly been unfairly and even cruelly treated by the

French authorities. His cherished ideas into which he had thrown his

whole soul had been rejected without fair or reasonable examination. His

pride had been deeply wounded. But Fulton was magnanimous enough to have

overlooked this treatment had France herself remained true to his

conception of her own ideals. It was not that Fulton abandoned France,

but that France deserted Fulton. From his arrival in 1797, he thought

that he saw in France a great exponent of a new world liberty, with

freedom of trade, freedom of men, freedom of the seas, and above all an

enduring world-wide peace. In his enthusiasm he believed that such

ideals, in which he firmly believed, were not only practically

realizable, but that France was about to make them the guiding

principles of every nation. It was for that reason that he so warmly

espoused her cause.

In 1797, soon after his arrival in Paris, he wrote to his friend Lord

Stanhope his views based on what he fancied to be the actuating theory

of the French revolution:

My Lord

Hoping every month to Return to England, together with the difficulty

of transmitting Letters to London, has hitherto prevented my Writing

to you Since my arrival In Paris. But at present I have troubeled you

with a very Long Letter, the object of Which I will here

explain,—Since my arrival In Paris I have been Very active In my Canal

pursuits, And on this Subject I have Created a Revolution In the mind

of all the french engeneers I have met with, who are now descidedly In

favour of the Small System of Canals—Which are now Contemplated on an

emmense Scale of extension which you will See explained in my

Letter—It is Contemplated to Raise the Whole Revenue by a Single toll

on Canals which System will Infinately Simplify the operations of

Government, tend directly to Set trade free and annihilate a Mass of

Political absurdities which have hitherto disturbed the peace of

Nations—all of Which you will find explained in the annexed Letter,

Which Letter will Shew you how much Frenchmen are turning their mind

to the true fountain of Riches—viz home Improvement and Systems of

Industry. With the true philosophic Ideas which the entertain of

Foreign Possessions and Restricted trade—And I Can assure you that I

find In them the most Resolute determination to establish the

principles which you will find explained And Which to me appears of

the Very first Importance to Lasting peace—and the Wellfare of all

Nations—It is therefore of much Importance that English Men Should

know the truth of these principles and Learn their true Interest by

Giving up as the french mean to do, and will Compel _others to do_ the

System of foreign Possessions and Restricted trade they should also

understand that Frenchmen are Realy thinking Like philosophers Which I

hope my Letter will prove.

By 1801, when his offer of his talents and personal service were

spurned, Napoleon was already leading France far afield from the

altruistic but impossible programme of 1797. In 1802, Napoleon had made

himself consul for life. In the spring of 1804, he was proclaimed

Emperor of the French and the beautiful dream that had entranced Fulton

for more than ten years had faded into nothingness, as dreams usually

do. He saw that in the aristocracy of England he could find a truer

democracy than in the demagogic leaders of France. Fulton was but human.

His warm heart, artistic temperament and impetuous nature now asserted

themselves and drove him back to the country whence his forebears had

come, and away from the people whose governing powers had wounded his

pride and had failed him in his ideals.

The “Descriptions” given above were written just prior to August 10th,

1806, and recite the course of events from the autumn of 1803. At the

time they were signed, Fulton was arranging to return to America, and

actually sailed about ten weeks later. His negotiations with the

Government had not been satisfactory in that his devices had not been

accepted and he had not received in money what he felt was due. The

contract shows that Fulton, profiting perhaps by his French experiences

not to put trust in princes, foresaw this contingency and provided

against it in the Fourth article, that should any circumstance arise to

prevent carrying the plan into execution commissioners should be

appointed to determine whether the stipulated compensation had been

earned. The “Descriptions” were prepared for submission to the

arbitrators and were actually read to them, as is shown by a note

attached to a copy of the manuscript reading as follows:

These papers I read to Sir Charles Blagden, Capt. Hamilton, the Rev.

Dr. Cartwright and Alexander Davison, Esq., on the 18th of August 1806

these gentlemen being named Arbitrators to settle my Claims on

Government under a contract which I made with Mr. Pitt and Lord

Melville—the two last named acting for me.

The words “two last” refer, of course, to Dr. Cartwright and Mr.

Davison. The “Descriptions,” therefore, give Fulton’s case as he saw it,

and consequently are of intense interest and historical importance.

His vision for the United States that the population would increase from

5,500,000, as it then was, to 120,000,000 has already been almost

realized, sooner, of course, than he expected, but the absence of

colonies and lack of desire for them have hardly met an equally

successful prophetic fate. Certainly he never foresaw Porto Rico,

Panama, Samoa, Hawaii, Guam, the Philippines and other outlying

possessions.

What a delightful picture Fulton unconsciously presents of the skillful

and diplomatic way in which the British Ministry handled him from the

beginning to the end! When the emissary, known only as “Mr. Smith,”

stated to Fulton that the Government wished to use the submarine against

the French fleet, Fulton pointed out that it was not the part of wisdom

so to do, that the British with their superiority in sea power had more

to lose than to gain by developing such a weapon. In so doing, he but

anticipated Earl St. Vincent who, bluff old sea-dog like so many of his

profession to whom innovations in naval warfare were anathema, exclaimed

that “Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed to encourage a mode

of war which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which, if

successful, would deprive them of it.”

“Mr. Smith” was very clever and was not put off by any such argument. He

saw clearly that whether England needed the device or not, they must

have control of the man who possessed the secret. He evidently felt sure

of Fulton’s sentiments because he told him quite frankly that they

wished him “out of France and in England.”

On the financial side, Fulton appears to have had a proper estimate of

himself and the value of his devices. The sum of £10,000 as a retainer

would be no mean figure today, but owing to the difference in purchasing

power it was comparatively a vastly greater figure in 1803. This

retainer was in addition to his main fee or price for selling the

explanation of his devices which he put at £100,000. The “Descriptions”

read that he said “require” that sum. He first wrote “demand,” which

word he erased, but not sufficiently to obliterate it, and then wrote

“require.”

The rating of the value of his devices as being equivalent to a

ship-of-the-line, or battle ship as a capital ship is now called, is

certainly ingenious and not unreasonable. If his devices had any value

at all they would increase the effective power of the fleet by much more

than the addition of one first-class vessel.

But Fulton was dealing with men far abler than he in fixing values and

making contracts. The negotiations were not broken off by abruptly

refusing to pay the sums asked. That would have been a blunder that one

selected for such a delicate mission would not be guilty of committing.

The British representative apparently did not even suggest that the

retainer was exorbitant, but only that it was “contrary to established

rules” to pay in advance. Then, before giving an obligation to pay a sum

commensurate with the value of the devices, the reasonable and

unanswerable preliminary condition of an experimental demonstration was

made a prerequisite.

The British diplomats unlike the French had avoided giving any offense

to his amour propre. Though they refused to grant his financial

requests, they succeeded in getting him to go to England, which was

their main purpose. Not until they had him safe in London, did they take

up the question of a contract. The original demand of £100,000 was

reduced to £40,000. The retainer disappeared entirely except as it was

represented by such portion of the £800 with which “Mr. Smith” was

furnished in the first instance to pay his own and Fulton’s expenses. In

lieu of the reductions, there appears in the contract an agreement to

pay a salary of £200 a month. How deliciously clever! To one in the

straightened circumstances in which Fulton always had been and still

was, for even now any surplus of income of which he might have been

possessed, but of which there is no evidence, was swallowed up by his

steamboat experiments, this monthly payment must have been of

inestimable importance. It guaranteed him comfort and at last a

substantial excess for his other work, because his submarine

disbursements were to be met entirely by the government up to a maximum

limit of £7,000. On the other hand, the Government held secure the man,

who as an enemy they feared, and who as such was a constant source of

worry. This result was obtained at a cost that was to them a trifling

figure.

Fulton appears to have concluded that his claim for £100,000 was perhaps

too high because he voluntarily accepted the sum of £40,000 mentioned in

the contract. Of this latter amount, he made to the arbitrators the

ingenious suggestion that they pay him one-half in cash and the other

half in an annuity based on his life, the annuity to be forfeit should

the secret of his inventions in submarine warfare be divulged by him or

his friends. It is regretted that Fulton did not disclose the names of

his friends who were jointly interested with him, as they were probably

the same who had financed his French experiments.

Fulton’s receipts on his own account amounted on balance to £13,391 ..

16 .. 10, leaving due as he claimed £1608 .. 3 .. 2, exclusive of any

payment in part or whole of the £40,000. As it was, he did not do badly

for two years’ work. In addition the Government furnished £11,353 ..

3 .. 2 to repay his expenditures.

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