concealed the Israelitish spies sent into her land by Joshua, and lied
about them to her countrymen, and who was commended by the Lord for
her faith in this transaction.[1] Rahab was a harlot by profession and
a liar by practice. When the Hebrew spies entered Jericho, they went
to her house as a place of common resort. Rahab, on learning who they
were, expressed her readiness, sinner as she was, to trust the God of
Israel rather than the gods of Canaan; and because of her trust she
put herself, with all her heathen habits of mind and conduct, at
the disposal of the God of Israel, and she lied, as she had been
accustomed to lie, to her own people, as a means of securing safety
to her Hebrew visitors. Because of her faith, which was shown in this
way, but not necessarily because of her way of showing her faith, the
Lord approved of her spirit in choosing his service rather than the
service of the gods of her people. The record of her approval is, "By
faith Rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient,
having received the spies with peace."[2]
[Footnote 1: Josh. 2: 1-21.]
[Footnote 2: Heb. II: 31.]
It would be quite as fair to claim that God approved of Rahab's
harlotry, in this case, as to claim that he approved of her lying.
Rahab was a harlot and a liar, and she was ready to practice in both
these lines in the service of the spies. She was not to be commended
for either of those vices; but she was to be commended in that, with
all her vices, she was yet ready to give herself just as she was, and
with her ways as they were, to Jehovah's side, in the crisis hour of
conflict between him and the gods of her people. It was the faith that
prompted her to this decision that God commended; and "by faith" she
was preserved from destruction when her people perished.
Another case that has been thought to imply a divine approval of an
untrue statement, is that of Samuel, when he went to Bethlehem to
anoint David as Saul's successor on the throne of Israel, and, at the
Lord's command, said he had come to offer a sacrifice to God.[1] But
here clearly the narrative shows no lie, nor false statement, made or
approved. Samuel, as judge and prophet, was God's representative in
Israel. He was accustomed to go from place to place in the line of his
official ministry, including the offering at times of sacrifices of
communion.[2] When, on this occasion, the Lord told Samuel of his
purpose of designating a son of Jesse to succeed Saul on the throne,
and desired him to go to Bethlehem for further instructions, Samuel
was unnecessarily alarmed, and said, in his fear, "How can I go? if
Saul hear it, he will kill me." The Lord's simple answer was, "Take
an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord. And
call Jesse to the sacrifice, and I will shew thee what thou shalt do:
and thou shalt anoint unto me him whom I name unto thee."
[Footnote 1: 1 Sam. 16: 1-3.]
[Footnote 2: 1 Sam. 7: 15-17; 9: 22-24; 11: 14,15; 20:29.]
In other words, the Lord said to Samuel, I want you to go to
Bethlehem as my representative, and offer a sacrifice there. Say this
fearlessly. In due time I will give you other directions; but do not
borrow trouble on account of them. Do your duty step by step. Speak
out the plain truth as to all that the authorities of Bethlehem have
any right to know; and do not fear any harm through my subsequent
private revelations to you. In these directions of the Lord there is
no countenance of the slightest swerving from the truth by Samuel;
nor is there an authorized concealment of any fact that those to whom
Samuel was sent had any claim to know.
Still another Bible incident that has been a cause of confusion to
those who did not see how God could approve lying, and a cause of
rejoicing to those who wanted to find evidence of his justification
of that practice, is the story of the prophet Micaiah, saying before
Jehoshaphat and Ahab that the Lord had put a lying spirit into the
mouths of all the false prophets who were at that time before
those kings.[1] Herbert Spencer actually cites this incident as an
illustration of the example set before the people of Israel, by their
God, of lying as a means of accomplishing a desired end.[2] But just
look at the story as it stands!
[Footnote 1: 1 Kings 22: 1-23; 2 Chron. 18: 1-34.]
[Footnote 2: _The Inductions of Ethics_, p. 158.]
Four hundred of Ahab's prophets were ready to tell him that a campaign
which he wanted to enter upon would be successful. Micaiah, an honest
prophet of the Lord, was sent for at Jehoshaphat's request, and was
urged by the messenger to prophesy to the same effect as Ahab's
prophets. Micaiah replied that he should give the Lord's message,
whether it was agreeable or not to Ahab. He came, and at first he
spoke satirically as if he agreed with the other prophets in deeming
the campaign a hopeful one. It was as though he said to the king, You
want me to aid you in your plans, not to give you counsel from the
Lord; therefore I will say, as your prophets have said, Go ahead, and
have success. It was evident, however, to Ahab, that the prophet's
words were not to be taken literally, but were a rebuke to him in
Oriental style, and therefore he told the prophet to give him the
Lord's message plainly. Then the prophet gave a parable, or a message
in Oriental guise, showing that these four hundred prophets of Ahab
were speaking falsely, as if inspired by a lying spirit, and that, if
Ahab followed their counsel, he would go to his ruin.
To cite this parable as a proof of Jehovah's commendation of lying is
an absurdity. Jehovah's prophet Micaiah was there before the
king, telling the simple truth to the king. And, in order to meet
effectively the claim of the false prophets that they were inspired,
he related, as it were, a vision, or a parable, in which he declared
that he had seen preparations making in heaven for their inspiring by
a lying spirit. This was, as every Oriental would understand it, a
parliamentary way of calling the four hundred prophets a pack of
liars; and the event proved that all of them were liars, and that
Micaiah alone, as Jehovah's prophet, was a truth-teller. What folly
could be greater than the attempt to count this public charge against
the lying prophets as an item of evidence in proof of the Lord's
responsibility for their lying--which the Lord's prophet took this
method of exposing and rebuking!
There are, indeed, various instances in the Bible story of lies told
by men who were in favor with God, where there is no ground for
claiming that those lies had approval with God. The men of the Bible
story are shown as men, with the sins and follies and weaknesses of
men. Their conduct is to be judged by the principles enunciated in the
Bible, and their character is to be estimated by the relation which
they sustained toward God in spite of their human infirmities.
Abraham is called the father of the faithful,[1] and he was known as
the friend of God.[2] But he indulged in the vice of concubinage,[3]
in accordance with the loose morals of his day and of his
surroundings; and when he was down in Egypt he lied through his
distrust of God, apparently thinking that there was such a thing as
a "lie of necessity," and he brought upon himself the rebuke of an
Egyptian king because of his lying.[4] But it would be folly to claim
that God approved of concubinage or of lying, because a man whom he
was saving was guilty of either of these vices. Isaac also lied,[5]
and so did Jacob;[6] but it was not because of their lies that these
men had favor with God. David was a man after God's own heart[7] in
his fidelity of spirit to God as the only true God, in contrast with
the gods of the nations round about Israel; but David lied,[8] as
David committed adultery.[9] It would hardly be claimed, however, that
either his adultery or his lying in itself made David a man after
God's own heart. So all along the Bible narrative, down to the time
when Ananias and Sapphira, prominent among the early Christians, lied
unto God concerning their very gifts into his treasury, and were
struck dead as a rebuke of their lying.[10]
[Footnote 1: Josh. 24:3; Isa. 51: 2; Matt. 3: 9; Rom. 4:12; Gal. 3:9]
[Footnote 2: 2 Chron. 20: 7; Isa. 41: 8; Jas. 2: 23.]
[Footnote 3: Gen. 16: 1-6.]
[Footnote 4: Gen. 12: 10-19.]
[Footnote 5: Gen. 26: 6-10.]
[Footnote 6: Gen. 27: 6-29.]
[Footnote 7: 1 Sam. 11: 1-27]
[Footnote 8: 1 Sam. 21: 1,2.]
[Footnote 9: 2 Sam. 11: 1-27.]
[Footnote 10: Acts 5: 1-11.]
The whole sweep of Bible teaching is opposed to lying; and the
specific injunctions against that sin, as well as the calls to the
duty of truth-speaking, are illustrative of that sweep. "Ye shall not
steal; neither shall ye deal falsely, nor lie one to another,"[1] says
the Lord, in holding up the right standard before his children. "A
lying tongue" is said to be "an abomination" before the Lord.[2] "A
faithful witness will not lie: but a false witness breatheth out
lies,"[3] says Solomon, in marking the one all-dividing line of
character; and as to the results of lying he says, "He that breatheth
out lies shall not escape,"[4] and "he that breatheth out lies shall
perish."[5] And he adds the conclusion of wisdom, in view of the
supposed profit of lying, "A poor man is better than a liar;"[6] that
is, a truth-telling poor man is better than a rich liar.
[Footnote 1: Lev. 19:11.]
[Footnote 2: Prov. 6:16, 17.]
[Footnote 3: Prov. 14:5.]
[Footnote 4: Prov. 19:5.]
[Footnote 5: Prov. 19:9.]
[Footnote 6: Prov. 19:22.]
The inspired Psalms are full of such teachings: "The wicked are
estranged from the womb: they go astray as soon as they be born,
speaking lies."[1] "They delight in lies."[2] "The mouth of them that
speak lies shall be stopped."[3] "He that speaketh falsehood shall not
be established before mine [the Psalmist's] eyes."[4] And the Psalmist
prays, "Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips."[5] In the New
Testament it is much the same as in the Old. "Lie not one to another;
seeing that ye have put off the old man with his doings,"[6] is the
apostolic injunction; and again, "Speak ye truth each one with his
neighbor: for we are members one of another."[7] There is no place for
a lie in Bible ethics, under the earlier dispensation or the later.
[Footnote 1: Psa. 58:3.]
[Footnote 2: Psa. 62:4.]
[Footnote 3: Psa. 63:11.]
[Footnote 4: Psa. 101: 7.]
[Footnote 5: Psa. 120: 2.]
[Footnote 6: Col. 3: 9.]
[Footnote 7: Eph. 4: 25.]
IV.
DEFINITIONS.
It would seem to be clear that the Bible, and also the other sacred
books of the world, and the best moral sense of mankind everywhere,
are united in deeming a lie incompatible with the idea of a holy
God, and consistent only with the spirit of man's arch-enemy--the
embodiment of all evil. Therefore he who, admitting this, would find a
place in God's providential plan for a "lie of necessity" must begin
with claiming that there are lies which are not lies. Hence it is of
prime importance to define a lie clearly, and to distinguish it from
allowable and proper concealments of truth.
A lie, in its stricter sense, is the affirming, by word or by action,
of that which is not true, with a purpose of deceiving; or the
denying, by word or by action, of that which is true, with a purpose
of deceiving. But the suppressing or concealing of essential facts,
from one who is entitled to know them, with a purpose of deceiving,
may practically amount to a lie.
Obviously a lie may be by act, as really as by word; as when a man
is asked to tell the right road, and he silently points in the wrong
direction. Obviously, also, the intention or purpose of deceiving is
in the essence of the lie; for if a man says that which is not true,
supposing it to be true, he makes a misstatement, but he does not lie;
or, again, if he speaks an untruth playfully where no deception is
wrought or intended, as by saying, when the mercury is below zero,
that it is "good summer weather," there is no lie in the patent
untruth.
So far all are likely to be agreed; but when it comes to the question
of that concealment which is in the realm of the lie, as distinct from
right and proper concealment, there is more difficulty in making
the lines of distinction clear to all minds. Yet those lines can be
defined, and it is important that they should be.
A witness on the stand in a court of law is bound by his oath, or his
affirmation, to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth," in the testimony that he gives in response to the questions
asked of him. If, therefore, in the course of his testimony, he
declares that he received five dollars for his share in a certain
transaction, when in reality he received five hundred dollars, his
concealment of the fact that he received a hundred times as much as he
admits having received, is practically a lie, and is culpable as such.
Any intentional concealment of essential facts in the matter at issue,
in his answers to questions asked of him as a witness, is a lie in
essence.
But a person who is not before a court of justice is not necessarily
bound to tell all the facts involved to every person whom he
addresses, or who desires to have him do so; and therefore, while a
concealment of facts which ought to be disclosed may be equivalent to
a lie, there is such a thing as the concealment of facts which is not
only allowable, but which is an unmistakable duty. And to know
when concealment is right, and when it is wrong, is to know when
concealment partakes of the nature of a lie, and when it is a totally
different matter.
Concealment, so far from being in itself a sin, is in itself right; it
is only in its misuse that it becomes reprehensible in a given case.
Concealment is a prime duty of man; as truly a duty as truth-speaking,
or chastity, or honesty. God, who cannot lie to his creatures,
conceals much from his creatures. "The secret things belong unto the
Lord our God: but the things that are revealed belong unto us and to
our children for ever,"[1] says the author of Deuteronomy; and the
whole course of God's revelation to man is in accordance with this
announced principle of God's concealment of that which ought to be
concealed. He who is himself the revelation of God says to his chosen
disciples, even when he is speaking his latest words to them before
his death: "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear
them now;"[2] and he conceals what, as yet, it is better for them
should remain concealed.
[Footnote 1: Deut. 29: 29.]
[Footnote 2: John 16:12.]
There is a profound meaning in the suggestion, in the Bible story of
man's "fall," that, when man had come to the knowledge of good and
evil, the first practical duty which he recognized as incumbent upon
himself, was the duty of concealment;[1] and from that day to this
that duty has been incumbent on him. Man has a duty to conceal his
besetting impurities of thought and inclinations to sin; to conceal
such of his doubts and fears as would dishearten others and weaken
himself by their expression; to conceal his unkindnesses of spirit and
his unjust prejudices of feeling; to conceal, in fact, whatever of his
innermost personality is liable to work harm by its disclosure, and to
a knowledge of which his fellows have no just claim. In the world as
it is, there is more to be concealed than to be disclosed in every
individual life; and concealment rather than disclosure is the rule of
personal action.
[Footnote 1: Gen. 3:6, 7.]
Absolute and unrestricted frankness in social intercourse would be
brutal. The speaking of the whole truth at all times and to everybody
could have neither justification nor excuse between man and man. We
have no right to tell our fellows all that we think of them, or
fear for them, or suspect them of. We have no right to betray the
confidences of those who trust us, or to disclose to all the fact that
we have such confidences to conceal. We have no right to let it be
generally known that there are such peculiar struggles within us as
make our lives a ceaseless battle with temptations and fears and
doubts. There is such a thing as an indecent exposure of personal
opinions, and as a criminal disclosure of the treasures of the inner
life.[1] How to conceal aright that which ought to be concealed, is
one of the vital questions of upright living.
[Footnote 1: See 2 Kings 20: 12-19.]
The duty of right concealment stands over against the sin of lying.
Whatever ought to be concealed, should be concealed, if concealment
is a possibility without sinning. But the strongest desire for
concealment can never justify a lie as a means of concealment; and
concealment at the cost of a lie becomes a sin through the means
employed for its securing. On the other hand, when disclosure is a
duty, concealment is sinful, because it is made to stand in the way of
the performance of a duty. Concealment is not in itself wrong, but it
may become wrong through its misuse. Lying is in itself wrong, and it
cannot be made right through any seeming advantage to be gained by it.
Concealment which is right in one instance may be wrong in another
instance, the difference being in the relations of the two parties in
the case. A man who has lost a leg or an eye may properly conceal
from others generally the fact of his loss by any legitimate means of
concealment. His defect is a purely personal matter. The public has
no claim upon him for all the facts in the premises. He may have an
artificial limb or an artificial eye, so constructed as to conceal his
loss from the ordinary observer. There is nothing wrong in this. It
is in the line of man's primal duty of concealment. But if a man
thus disabled were applying for a life-insurance policy, or were an
applicant for re-enlistment in the army, or were seeking employment
where bodily wholeness is a requisite, it would be his duty to
make known his defect; and the concealment of it from the parties
interested would be in the realm of the lie.
So, again, if a man were proposing marriage, or were entering into
confidential relations with a partner in business, or were seeking
financial aid from a bank, he would have no right to conceal from the
party interested many a fact which he could properly conceal from the
public.
A man who would be justified in concealing from the general public
his mental troubles, or his business embarrassments, or his spiritual
perplexities, could not properly conceal the essential facts in the
case from his chosen adviser in medicine, or in law, or in matters of
religion. It is a man's duty to disclose the whole truth to him who
has a right to know the whole truth. It is a man's right, and it may
become his duty, to conceal a measure of the truth from one who is not
entitled to know that portion of the truth, so far as he can properly
make concealment. But as a lie is never justifiable, it is never a
proper means of concealment; and if concealment be, in any case, a
mode of lying, it is as bad as any other form of lying.
But concealment, even when it is of facts that others have no right to
know, may cause others to be deceived, and deliberate deceit is one
form of a lie. How, then, can concealment that is sure to result in
deception be free from the sin that invariably attaches to a lie in
any form, or of any nature whatsoever?
Concealment which is for the _purpose_ of deception, is one thing;
concealment which is only for the purpose of concealment, but which is
sure to _result_ in deception, is quite another thing. The one is not
justifiable, the other may be. In the one case it is a man's purpose
to deceive his fellow-man; in the other case it is simply his purpose
to conceal what his fellow-man has no right to know, and that
fellow-man receives a false impression, or deceives himself, in
consequence.
We may, or we may not, be responsible for the obvious results of our
action; and the moral measure of any action depends on the measure of
our responsibility in the premises. A surgeon, who is engaged in an
important and critical operation, is told that he is wanted elsewhere
in a case of life and death. If he sees it to be his duty to continue
where he is because he cannot safely leave this case at this time, he
obviously is not responsible for results which come because of his
absence from the side of the other sufferer. A man is by a river bank
when a boy is sinking before his eyes. If the man were to reach out
his arms to him, the boy might be saved. But the man makes no movement
in the boy's behalf, and the boy drowns. It might seem as though that
man were responsible for that boy's death; but when it is known that
the man is at that moment occupied in saving the life of his own son,
who is also struggling in the water, it will have to be admitted that
the father is not responsible for the results of his inaction in
another sphere than that which is for the moment the sphere of his
imperative duty.
If a wife and mother has to choose between her loving ministry to her
sick husband and to her sick child, and she chooses that which she
sees to be the more important duty of the hour, she is not responsible
for any results that follow from her inability to be in two places at
the same time. A man with a limited income may know that ten families
are in need of money, while he can give help to only two of them. Even
though others starve while he is supplying food to all whom he can
aid, he is not responsible for results that flow from his decision to
limit his ministry to his means.
In all our daily life, our decision to do the one duty of the hour
involves our refusal to do what is not our duty, and we have no
responsibility for the results which come from such a refusal. So in
the matter of the duty of concealment, if a man simply purposes the
concealment from another of that which the other has no right to know,
and does not specifically affirm by word or act that which is not
true, nor deny by act or word that which is true, he is in no degree
responsible for the self-deception by another concerning a point which
is no proper concern of that other person.
Others are self-deceived with reference to us in many things, beyond
our responsibility or knowledge. We may be considered weaker or
stronger, wiser or more simple, younger or older, gladder or sadder,
than we are; but for the self-deception on that point by the average
observer we are not responsible. We may not even be aware of it. It
is really no concern of ours--or of our neighbor's. It is merely an
incident of human life as it is. We may have an aching tooth or
an aching heart, and yet refrain from disclosing this fact in the
expression of our face. In such a case we merely conceal what is our
own possession from those who have no claim to know it. Even though
they deceive themselves as to our condition in consequence of our
looks, we are not responsible for their self-deception, because they
are not possessed of all the facts, nor have they any right to them,
nor yet to a fixed opinion in the case.
If a man were to have a patch put on his coat, he might properly have
it put on the under side of the coat instead of the outer side, thus
making what is called "a blind patch," for the purpose of concealing
the defect in his garment. Even though this course might result in a
false impression on the mind of the casual observer, the man would not
be blameworthy, as he would be if he had pursued the same course with
a purpose of deceiving a purchaser of the coat. So, again, in the
case of a mender of bric-a-brac: it would be right for him to
cement carefully the parts of a broken vase for the mere purpose of
concealing its damaged condition from the ordinary eye, but not for
the purpose of deceiving one who would be a purchaser.
A man whose city house is closed from the public in the summer season,
because of his absence in the country, has a perfect right to come
to that house for a single night, without opening the shutters and
lighting up the rooms in intimation of his presence. He may even keep
those shutters closed while his room is lighted, for the express
purpose of concealing the fact of his presence there, and yet not be
responsible for any false impression on the minds of passers-by, who
think that the proprietor is still in the country, and that the city
house is vacant. On the other hand, if the house be left lighted up
all through the night, with the shutters open, while the inmates are
asleep, for the very purpose of concealing from those outside the fact
that no one in the house is awake and on guard, the proprietor is not
responsible for any self-deception which results to those who have no
right to know the facts in the case.