_THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY, WITH ITS LIMITS; THE DUTY OF
COURTESY WITHOUT LIMITS._
"Put them in mind to be in subjection to rulers, to authorities, to
be obedient, to be ready unto every good work, to speak evil of no
man, not to be contentious, to be gentle, showing all meekness
toward all men. For we also were aforetime foolish, disobedient,
deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and
envy, hateful, hating one another"--TITUS iii. 1-3.
St. Paul, having in the previous chapter sketched the special duties
which Titus is to inculcate upon different classes of Christians,--aged
men and aged women, young women, young men, and slaves,--now passes on
to point out what must be impressed upon all Christians alike,
especially as regards their conduct towards those who are in authority
and who are not Christians.
Here he is on delicate ground. The Cretans are said to have been a
turbulent race, or rather a group of turbulent races; neither peaceable
among themselves, nor very patient of foreign dominion: and the Roman
rule had been established there for less than a century and a half.
Previous to their conquest by Metellus in B.C. 67, they had been
accustomed to democratic forms of government, and therefore would be
likely to feel the change to the Roman yoke all the more acutely. As
our own experiences in a neighbouring island have taught us, people who
have been allowed to misgovern themselves, and to fight among
themselves, for many generations, do not readily give a welcome to a
power which deprives them of these liberties, even when it offers in
exchange for them the solid but prosaic advantages of peace and
security. Besides this, there was in Crete a strong mixture of Jews,
whose rebellious propensities seemed to be unquenchable. Nor was this
all. Within the Church itself the spirit of anarchy had displayed
itself: partly because, as in the Churches of Corinth and Galatia, the
characteristic faults of the people still continued to show themselves
after the acceptance of Christianity; partly because, as everywhere in
the Churches of that age, the contests between Jewish and Gentile
converts were always producing disorder. This appears in the first
chapter of our Epistle, in which the Apostle states that "there are many
unruly men, ... specially they of the circumcision," and in which he
finds it necessary to make it a qualification for the office of bishop
or overseer, that the persons appointed should be such as "are not
accused of riot or are unruly." Besides which, as we learn from numerous
sources in the New Testament, there was in various quarters a tendency
to gross misconceptions respecting Christian liberty. Through Gnostic
and other antinomian influences there was a disposition in many minds to
translate liberty into license, and to suppose that the Christian was
above the distinctions of the moral law, which for him had no meaning.
Lastly, there were probably some earnest Christians, who, without going
to any of these disastrous extremes, or sympathizing with the factious
and seditious spirit of their fellow-countrymen, nevertheless had
serious doubts as to whether Christians were under any obligation to
obey a pagan magistrate, and perhaps were inclined to believe that it
was their duty to disobey him.
For all these reasons St. Paul must have known that he was charging
Titus to give instructions, which would be very unwelcome to a large
number of Cretan converts, when he told him to "put them in mind to be
in subjection to rulers and authorities, and to be obedient." But it was
the very fact that the instructions would be unwelcome to many, that
made it so necessary that they should be given. Both for the internal
well-being of the Church, and for the maintenance of right relations
with the State, it was imperative that the principle of obedience to
authority, whether ecclesiastical or civil, should be upheld. There must
be peace, and there must be liberty: but there could be neither the one
nor the other without a respect for law and for those who have to
administer it.
The Apostle does not here argue the case. He lays down certain positions
as indisputable. The loyal Christian must submit himself to those who
are placed over him; he must render obedience to existing authorities.
There is one obvious limit to this which he indicates by a single word
to be noticed hereafter, but with that one qualification the duty of
obedience is imperative and absolute. Jew and Gentile Christian alike
must obey the laws, not only of the Church, as administered by its
overseers, but also of the State, as administered by the magistrates,
even though the State be a heathen power and the magistrate an idolater.
The reason why St. Paul does not argue the matter is obvious. He is not
writing to those who are likely to dispute or disobey these
injunctions, but to one who has to see that they are obeyed. His object
is not to prove the excellence of the rules which he lays down, but to
advise Titus as to what rules are to be most insisted upon. Titus was
well aware of the principles upon which these rules were based and of
the arguments by which the Apostle was accustomed to defend them. He
does not need information on that point. What the Apostle thinks may be
necessary for his guidance is a clear intimation of those practical
lessons of which the Cretans needed most to be reminded. It was quite
possible that Titus might have taken the view that the question about
obedience to existing authorities was a burning one, and that it would
be better for the present to say as little about it as possible. To
object, therefore, that these directions in the second and third
chapters of this Epistle are unworthy of St. Paul, and consequently not
written by him, because they contain nothing which might serve as a
sufficient refutation of the adversaries, is to beat the air without
effect. They contain nothing calculated to serve as a refutation of the
adversaries, because the Apostle writes with no intention of refuting
opponents, but in order to give practical instructions to his delegate.
But although the Apostle does not here argue the case, we are not left
in ignorance as to the principles upon which he based the rules here
laid down so emphatically. The thirteenth chapter of the Epistle to the
Romans is quite clear on that point. "There is no power but of God; and
the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the
power, withstandeth the ordinance of God." That is the kernel of the
whole matter. The fact that a few rule over the many is not to be
traced to a world-wide usurpation of the rights of the simple and the
weak by the selfishness of the crafty and the strong. That theory may
explain the terrorism of a bully, or of a band of brigands, or of a
secret society; it is no explanation of the universal relations between
governors and the governed. Nor is it the result of a primeval "social
compact," in which the weak voluntarily surrendered some of their rights
in order to have the advantage of the protection of the strong: that
theory is pure fiction, and finds no support either in the facts of
man's nature, or in the relics of primitive society, or in the records
of the past. The one explanation which is at once both adequate and
true, is, that all authority is of Divine origin. This was the
declaration of the Forerunner, when his disciples complained to him of
the influence which Jesus exercised over those who came in contact with
His teaching: "A man can receive nothing, except it have been given him
from heaven" (John iii. 27). This was the declaration of the Christ,
when the Roman Procurator pointed out to Him that he had power of life
and death over Him: "Thou wouldest have no power against Me, except it
were given thee from above" (John xix. 11). The power of the Redeemer
over the minds of men and the power of a heathen governor over the
bodies of men have one and the same source,--Almighty God. Christ
declared His innocence and asserted His claims; but He made no protest
against being tried by a pagan official, who represented the power that
had deprived the Jewish nation of its liberties, because he also
represented the principle of law and order, and as such was the
representative of God Himself.
St Paul, therefore, is doing no more than restating what the Lord had
already taught both by word and example. Christians must show submission
to rulers and constituted authorities, and must yield ready obedience to
magistrates, even when they are heathen. As heathen they were no doubt
rebels against God, however little they might be aware of the fact. But
as magistrates they were His delegates, however little they were aware
of the fact. The Christian is aware of both facts; and he must not
suppose that the one cancels the other. The magistrate still remains
God's delegate, however inconsistent his own life may be with such a
position. Therefore it is not only allowable for Christians to obey him;
they must make it a matter of conscience to do so: and the history of
the Church throughout the eras of persecution shows how greatly such
teaching was needed. Whatever may have been the case when St. Paul wrote
the Epistle to the Romans, we may safely maintain that persecution had
already taken place when he wrote these instructions to Titus. Not that
he seems to have a persecuting power in his mind, when he enjoins simple
obedience to existing authority; but he writes with full knowledge of
the extreme cases that might occur. A moralist who could insist upon the
duty of submission to rulers, when a Nero had been on the throne for
twelve or fourteen years, was certainly not one who could be ignorant of
what his principles involved. Nor could it be said that the evils of
Nero's insolent despotism were counteracted by the excellence of his
subordinates. The infamous Tigellinus was Praetorian Prefect and the
Emperor's chief adviser. Helius, who acted as governor of Italy during
the Emperor's absence in Greece, was in character a second Nero. And
Gessius Florus, one of Pilate's successors as Procurator of Judaea, was
so shameless in his enormities, that the Jews regretted the departure of
his predecessor Albinus, although he also had mercilessly oppressed
them. But all these facts, together with many more of the same kind, and
some also of an opposite character, were beside the question. Christians
were not to concern themselves with discussing whether rulers governed
well or ill, or whether their private lives were good or bad. The one
fact which concerned them was that the rulers were there to administer
the law, and as such must be respected and obeyed. The conscience of
Christians and the experiences of politicians, whether rulers or ruled,
throughout all the subsequent ages have ratified the wisdom of St.
Paul's injunctions; and not only their wisdom but their profound
morality. Renan says with truth, but with a great deal less than the
whole truth, that "Paul had too much tact to be a preacher of sedition:
he wished that the name of Christian should stand well, and that a
Christian should be a man of order, on good terms with the police, and
of good repute in the eyes of the pagans" (_St. Paul_, p. 477). The
criticism which resolves a profound moral principle into a mere question
of tact is worthy of the critic who makes it. Certainly St. Paul was
far-sighted enough to see that frequent collisions between Christians
and the recognized administrators of the law would be no good thing for
Christianity: but it was not because he believed obedience to be the
best policy that he charged Titus to insist upon it.
It is of the very essence of a ruler that he is "not a terror to the
good work, but to the evil: ... for he is a minister of God to thee for
good, ... an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil." It is quite
possible that the law which he administers is unjust, or that he
administers it in such a way as to make it work injustice, so that good
deeds are punished and evil deeds are rewarded. But nowhere is good
punished _as_ good, or evil rewarded _as_ evil. When Naboth was
judicially murdered to gratify Jezebel, it was on the assumption that he
was a blasphemer and a rebel; and when Jesus of Nazareth was condemned
to death by the Sanhedrin and by the Procurator, it was on the
assumption that he was guilty of similar crimes. So also with all the
monstrous and iniquitous laws which have been made against Christianity
and Christians. The persecuting edict "cast out their name as _evil_."
It was because men believed, or professed to believe, that Christians
were grievous offenders or dangerous citizens, that they brought them
before the magistrates. And the same holds good of the religious
persecutions of which Christians have been guilty against other
Christians. Nowhere can we point to a case in which a person has been
condemned for having been virtuous, or for having failed to commit a
crime. Many have been condemned for what was really meritorious, or for
refusing to do what was really wicked; but in all such cases the
meritorious conduct and the wicked conduct were held to be of exactly
the opposite character by the representatives of the law. Legally
constituted authority, therefore, is always by profession, and generally
in fact also, a terror to the evil and a supporter of the good. It is
charged with the all-important duty of upholding right and punishing
wrong in human conduct, _a duty which it never disowns_. For even when
through blindness or perversity it upholds what is wrong or punishes
what is right, it professes to be doing the opposite. Therefore to rebel
against it is to rebel against the principle of moral government; it is
a revolt against that principle which reflects and represents, and that
by His ordinance, the moral government of Almighty God.
St. Paul assumes that rulers aim at what is just and right. The
Christian is "to be ready unto every good work": and, although the words
are no doubt intended to have a general meaning as well, yet the context
suggests that their primary meaning in this place is that Christians are
always, not only to be obedient to rulers and magistrates, but to be
ready to support and assist them in any good work: the presumption being
that what the authorities direct is good. But, without perhaps having
this object in view, the Apostle here indirectly intimates the limits to
a Christian's obedience and support. They are to be given to further
"every _good_ work": they cannot of course be given to further what is
evil. What then must a Christian do when lawful authority requires him
to do what he knows to be wrong? Is he to rebel? to stir up a revolt
against those who make this demand? No, he is still "to be in subjection
to rulers": that is, he must disobey and _quietly take the
consequences_. He owes it to his conscience to refuse to do what it
condemns: but he also owes it to the representative of Divine law and
order to abstain from shaking its authority. It has the power to give
commands and the right to punish disobedience, and he has no right to
refuse both obedience and punishment. To disobey and submissively take
the consequences of disobedience is his plain duty in so painful a case.
In this way, and in this way _only_, will loyalty to conscience and
loyalty to authority both alike be preserved. In this way, and in this
way _best_ (as history has again and again shown), is the reformation
of unjust laws effected. The moral sense of society is far more
impressed by the man who disobeys for conscience' sake and unresistingly
goes to prison or mounts the scaffold for his disobedience, than by him
who violently resists all attempts to punish him and stirs up rebellion
against the authority which he cannot conscientiously obey. Rebellion
may succeed in redressing injustice, but at a cost which is likely to be
more grievous than the injustice which it redresses. Conscientious
disobedience, accompanied by loyal submission to the penalty of
disobedience, is sure to succeed in reforming unjust laws, and that
without any cost to counterbalance the good thus gained.
Having thus trenchantly determined the duty of believers towards rulers
and magistrates, St. Paul passes on to sketch their proper attitude
towards other members of society. And just as in speaking of conduct
towards authorities he evidently has in his mind the fact that most
authorities are unbelievers, so in speaking of conduct in society he
evidently is thinking of a state of society in which many of its members
are unbelievers. What kind of conduct will Titus have to insist upon as
befitting a Christian? "To speak evil of no man, not to be contentious,
to be gentle, showing all meekness towards all men."
It would be difficult to point to a precept which is more habitually
violated by Christians at the present day, and therefore more worthy of
being constantly brought to the front and urged upon their
consideration. There are plenty of precepts both of the Old and of the
New Testament, which are habitually violated by the godless and
irreligious, by those who, while bearing the name of Christian, scarcely
make even a pretence of endeavouring to live Christian lives. But here
we have a group of precepts, which a large number, not only of those
who profess to live soberly and righteously, but of those who do indeed
in other respects live as Christians should, consent to forget or
ignore. "To speak evil of no man; not to be contentious; to be gentle,
showing all meekness towards all men." Let us consider calmly what such
words as these really mean; and then let us consider what we constantly
meet with in the controversial writing, and still more in the
controversial speaking, of the present day. Consider the tone of our
party newspapers, and especially of our religious newspapers, on the
burning questions of the hour and on the men who take a leading part in
them. Read what a High Church paper says of a Low Church Bishop, or what
a Low Church paper says of a High Church Bishop, and measure it by the
injunction "to speak evil of no man." Or again, read what some of the
organs of Dissent allow themselves to say respecting the clergy of the
Established Church, or what some Church Defence orators have allowed
themselves to say respecting Liberationists, and measure it by the
injunctions "not to be contentious, to be gentle, showing all meekness
towards all men." It is sometimes necessary to speak out and call
attention to real or suspected evils; although not nearly so frequently
as we like to think. But it is never necessary to throw mud and deal in
personal abuse.
Moreover, it is very unbecoming to do so. It is doubly unbecoming, as
St. Paul reminds us. First, such conduct is utterly un-Christian.
Secondly, it is very much out of place in those who before now have been
guilty of quite as grave faults as those for which we now abuse others.
We are just the persons who ought to remember, because we know from
personal experience, how much the grace of God can effect. If we have
by His mercy been brought out of the sins which we now condemn in other
people, what may we not hope for in their case, provided we do not
disgust them with virtue by our acrimonious and uncharitable
fault-finding? Abuse is the wrong weapon to use against unrighteous
conduct, just as rebellion is the wrong weapon to use against
unrighteous laws.